Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Secret~~

[redacted] 25X1

Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned and NATO Country Statements at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD)

9 June – 28 August 1987

Volume II [redacted] 25X1

Reference Aid

~~Secret~~

IR 87-10031L
December 1987

022

Copy

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Page Denied

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9 5X1

Directorate of Intelligence

Secret

Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned and NATO Country Statements at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD)

9 June – 28 August 1987

Volume II

25X1

Reference Aid

25X1

Secret

IR 87-10031L
December 1987

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CD/PV.411
9 June 1987

ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 9 June 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)

GE.87-61461/8964E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 411th plenary meeting and the second part of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welcome among us to His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, who is addressing the Conference today. Ambassador Petrovsky is a distinguished career diplomat who is well-known to all of us as an expert on disarmament questions. I am sure that the members of the Conference will follow his statement with particular interest, and I wish him a successful visit to Geneva.

Please allow me to express, on behalf of all of us, our gratitude to Ambassador Vejvoda, head of the delegation of Czechoslovakia, for the capable and outstanding manner in which he directed the meetings of the Conference during his chairmanship in the month of April 1987, and for his repeated endeavours and numerous initiatives to overcome the obstacles impeding the progress of its work.

I have pleasure in welcoming Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the new head of the delegation of the United States of America to the Conference. I wish him every success in his task. I would also like to welcome Mr. Jan Martenson, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, who is attending our meetings today in his new capacity, although Mr. Martenson is already well known to the Conference in his previous capacity in which he participated in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is an honour for me to preside over the meetings of the Conference during the month of June. I promise you that I will exert my utmost endeavour to discharge this task in the best possible manner and to further the work of the Conference. However, although I am aware of the responsibilities borne by the President of the Conference in this respect, I believe that these are joint responsibilities to be shared by all of us. Accordingly, I am confident that you will grant me your unstinting co-operation and assistance for the achievement of this objective.

I wish to express briefly the extent of the concern that I feel with regard to the progress achieved in the work of the Conference. Regardless of differences of opinion concerning the evaluation of the Conference's achievements, there are some facts that cannot be ignored or disputed by any fair-minded person. During the nine years since its establishment, the Conference has failed to reach any agreement on disarmament, which was the reason for its establishment as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. After an active beginning, we now find an evident diminution in the topics that the Conference is dealing with, and its work has become characterized by a state of relative inertia. The improvement in the international climate, and particularly in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which have resumed their arms control negotiations, has not helped to give the expected stimulus to the Conference on Disarmament, in which the prevailing attitude is one of "wait and see" pending the outcome of the bilateral negotiations, and the Conference is

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

apparently unable to generate the spontaneous impetus needed to accomplish the tasks assigned to it and to fulfil the hopes that have been pinned on its work. In fact, the Conference on Disarmament provides a unique framework for a comprehensive discussion of disarmament issues; its membership includes all the nuclear-weapon States, and it constitutes a forum through which all States can exercise their legitimate right to participate in disarmament endeavours. Consequently, it is a framework that we should diligently endeavour to preserve and strengthen in order to give it every chance of success.

Therefore, although we are today beginning the second part of the session of the Conference and have only a few weeks left before its conclusion, this should not deter us from making every possible effort to overcome the obstacles that are preventing us from dealing effectively with all the items on the agenda. The most important of these is undoubtedly the nuclear-test ban. You are all aware of the stage that has been reached in the consultations concerning the re-establishment of the ad hoc committee on that item. I am willing to continue those consultations although, in order for them to produce the desired results, delegations must be prepared to respond to those endeavours. Accordingly, I hope that the groups will soon finalize their positions so that we can seek a formula for conciliation that will break the deadlock that has marked the discussion of this item for the last four years.

Through informal meetings, we have succeeded in overcoming a major obstacle by agreeing to continue discussing the question of halting the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. There was every indication that we were about to reach agreement on a series of concepts to define this framework in the light of the experience of the last session. I therefore appeal to all delegations to show sufficient flexibility so that we can reach agreement on those aspects and hold the first of the informal meetings at an early date during this summer session.

Numerous delegations have expressed their concern that insufficient efforts are being made to reach agreement on the establishment of a subsidiary body to discuss the question of the prevention of nuclear war. I share their concern, and believe that there is a need to push ahead with the consultations on this question without making them dependent on any other agenda item. It is regrettable that agreement has still not been reached in this respect, notwithstanding the fact that we have been on the verge of such agreement at several stages of the work of the Conference in previous sessions.

I also hope that the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will continue its negotiations during the second part of the session in the same serious and positive spirit that characterized its work during the first part, so that the Committee can deservedly become an example to be followed for all the other agenda items. I have no doubt that Ambassador Ekéus, the representative of Sweden, will ensure this through his capable chairmanship of that Committee.

There is also an urgent need for an intensification of efforts to finalize the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, particularly since this is the last opportunity that we will have to submit it to the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

General Assembly of the United Nations, as required, before the end of its forty-first session. The Ad hoc Committee is certainly capable of doing so by virtue of the capable chairmanship and long experience of Ambassador García Robles, the representative of Mexico, and the painstaking work that has been accomplished over the last few years.

I also hope that the ad hoc committees on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, chaired by Ambassador Pugliese, the representative of Italy, on security assurances, chaired by Ambassador von Stülpnagel, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, and on radiological weapons, chaired by Ambassador Meiszter, the representative of Hungary, will succeed in achieving progress in their substantive discussions of the agenda items with which they are concerned, in order to compensate for the time lost in the discussion of procedural aspects during the first part of the session.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

I now give the floor to His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I should like first of all to express my gratitude to you for your kind words about us, and to congratulate you on taking up the office of President, while at the same time expressing the hope that, under your leadership, the Conference on Disarmament will move forward along the path charted in its agenda. I should also like to associate myself with your very favourable assessment of the work of your predecessor as President of the Conference, the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Comrade Milos Vejvoda, and the good wishes addressed to the new representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf.

This summer session of the Conference on Disarmament is meeting at an extremely important time. Nations have come close to a point when they will have to make a historic choice: either they will rise to an understanding of the prime importance of common human values, and the concomitant need to reach agreement with one another, or they will let their differences, which are admittedly serious, plunge humanity into the nuclear abyss.

Today, a real chance has emerged of transforming the moral and political potential of declarations and resolutions on disarmament into practical deeds. There are prospects for immediate agreement on the elimination of Soviet and United States medium-range missiles and shorter-range INFs in Europe; the holding of concrete negotiations on shorter-range INFs deployed in the eastern part of the Soviet Union and in the United States; a solution to the issue of tactical nuclear systems in Europe, including tactical missiles; and a radical reduction in strategic offensive arms with concurrent strengthening of the ABM Treaty régime.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

I am pleased to note that the negotiations on the conclusion of a convention to eliminate chemical weapons, conducted at the Conference, have entered the home stretch. How soon final success at the negotiations will be achieved depends on the collective wisdom and will of the representatives gathered today at the Palais des Nations.

The solution of another major problem, the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, will also to a large extent depend on the Conference on Disarmament. The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, which was held a few days ago, set the task of achieving the complete prohibition of nuclear tests as a priority step towards ending the development, production and improvement of nuclear arms, and bringing about their reduction and elimination. The meeting proposed that full-scale negotiations should begin at once to achieve accords in this area. The same goal was proclaimed in the statement on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member States adopted at that meeting.

The Soviet delegation has an important task before it today: to submit to the Conference for its consideration a document entitled "Main provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", a document sponsored jointly by the group of socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. All the delegations have copies of the text.

In putting forward this initiative, the sponsors are guided by a desire to stimulate an early start on substantive full-scale negotiations at the Conference. The document we submit can form the basis for such negotiations. At the same time we are prepared to discuss constructively any other proposal or suggestion that may lead to the early conclusion of an effective treaty on the complete and general cessation of nuclear tests. To carry out all this work, we firmly insist that an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test ban should be set up without delay.

Prior to a joint presentation of the "Main provisions", we agreed with the other sponsors that each of our delegations would express its views regarding this document during the discussion, in an appropriate form. Accordingly, I would like to dwell on the motives that have prompted the Soviet Union to take part in this joint initiative.

The basic factor that guides us, not only in the work of the Conference but also in the efforts made outside the Conference with a view to putting an end to nuclear tests, is our profound conviction that the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests constitutes an important independent measure in the area of curbing and halting the arms race.

First, it would be a major military and technological measure opening up a direct and effective path towards releasing the stranglehold on the entire area of nuclear and space weapons.

Second, it would be a serious political step leading to genuinely tangible material consequences and introducing an element of predictability in the development of international relations.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Third, it would be a substantial international legal undertaking whose implementation would involve strengthening the existing system of treaties and agreements in the field of disarmament as a legal basis for relations between States.

Fourth, it would be a measure of high moral import. Our planet is being crushed by the burden of nuclear arms. Soon there will be no space left on Earth to store mountains upon mountains of ever more sophisticated devices designed to wipe out the human race. And where there are mountains, there also occur landslides and avalanches. There is no need to describe the psychological atmosphere surrounding an international community which is constantly threatened by a nuclear avalanche. We must realize that each new nuclear-arms system denies bread to the hungry, shelter to the homeless and schooling to the illiterate, and deprives peoples of the possibility to channel all their resources to the needs of development.

By putting forward together with socialist countries the new initiative aimed at prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet Union reaffirms its commitment to the purposes and principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has effectively halted the spread of the nuclear threat across our planet, as well as its readiness to implement fully in practice all the obligations that follow from it, including those contained in article VI.

A business-like discussion of the issues involved in a nuclear-test ban, which we propose should be held at the Conference, should start not from scratch but on the basis of the wealth of experience the Conference has already gained.

Indeed, the problem of nuclear testing is inseparably linked with the entire history of our forum and its predecessors, starting with the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Over many years, various documents on the subject have been submitted to this forum, including several draft treaties. The trilateral talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have a place in the history of this problem; the participants regularly informed the Committee on Disarmament of the encouraging progress made, but, unfortunately, the talks never produced a final agreement.

Speaking of the past, I would like to recall not only the squandered opportunities, of which there were quite a few, but above all the fact that during the process, the outline of a possible agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests, verification methods and techniques began to take shape. In 1974 and 1976 the Soviet Union and the United States concluded agreements on yield thresholds for underground nuclear-weapon tests and peaceful nuclear explosions, which, however, never entered into force because of the United States position. The decade-long efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts on detection and identification of seismic events have produced some significant and useful lessons. The series of international experiments covering Level I seismic data exchanges is of great practical importance. At present, the Group is working on a new important aspect of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

seismic verification of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions, which is designed to upgrade the verification mechanism -- the exchange of Level II seismic data.

The 18-month-long unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions has generated immense moral and political potential in favour of ending nuclear tests and demonstrated in practice that it is indeed possible to adopt measures capable of ending nuclear-weapon tests once and for all. We are pleased to note the Conference's positive assessment of and response to the moratorium.

The document which has been submitted today -- further evidence of our resolve to make new efforts to achieve a general and complete ban on nuclear tests as soon as possible -- brings together the positive experience of many years of joint efforts to solve the problem of nuclear testing and new ideas and proposals recently advanced by many other nations, above all the six countries from four continents. At the same time the draft treaty is not just a collection of previous proposals but a qualitatively new document. It is imbued with the ideas and the spirit of new political thinking, which requires that diplomatic practice should be brought into line with the realities of the nuclear and space age.

This may be seen first and foremost in the issue of verification and control. We believe that verification is indispensable for affective implementation of real disarmament and confidence-building measures, especially when there is an acute lack of such confidence. The new document therefore includes large-scale verification measures ranging from declaring the location of test ranges to participation by international inspectors in verifying that no nuclear-weapons tests are conducted at these test ranges. For the purpose of effective verification we propose that an international inspectorate should be established, something which was not provided for either in the 1982 Soviet proposal on treaty provisions, or in the tripartite reports submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. The joint experiment by Soviet and United States scientists in Semipalatinsk has demonstrated vividly that such forms of verification are realistic and possible. With their equipment installed in the area of the Soviet nuclear-test site, United States experts performed effective verification of the non-conduct of explosions, thus performing, in fact, the functions of an international inspectorate.

In the document submitted today the question of creating an international seismic monitoring network is being developed in a new direction. Seismic stations with standard characteristics which would function with the participation of observers from an international inspectorate are to be a basic component of such a network. The implementation of this proposal would contribute significantly to creating a climate of mutual trust among States. The same purpose is served by a special section on international exchanges of data on the radioactivity of air masses.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Within the system of verification that we propose, major importance is attached to on-site inspections. Their purpose, as we see it, consists in settling problems which give rise to doubts as to compliance with the Treaty and which cannot be eliminated by means of the other verification measures envisaged in it. I would also like to stress that the State which has received a request for an on-site inspection will be obliged to allow unconditional access to the location designated in the request. In other words, the inspections will be mandatory, not voluntary. Obviously, the criteria and procedures governing requests for inspection and verification and their conduct, including the rights and functions of inspection teams, have yet to be developed. But this task is quite within the power of the Conference on Disarmament. Besides, experience in other nuclear weapon test ban negotiations is available in this area.

The content of the specific provisions of the document which has been put forward today proves once again that for us there is no problem of test ban verification. But I want everyone to have an absolutely clear understanding regarding the political meaning of this sentence. It does not at all mean that there is nothing more to discuss and elaborate. Quite the contrary: we stand for thorough elaboration of all the necessary specific arrangements, and we shall go as far in this direction as our partners will be prepared to go. We are also ready to consider other measures to verify the non-conduct of tests. In this context, I would like to confirm the positive attitude of the Soviet Union towards the proposals in this regard which have been put forward by the six countries from four continents. We have in mind sending Soviet experts to a meeting with experts from those countries to discuss the question of a general nuclear weapon test ban, as well as our readiness to take up the proposal made by those countries concerning assistance in nuclear weapon test ban verification, including on-site inspections. Certainly, we continue to consider verification not as an end in itself but as a means to ensure effective functioning of the treaty, which in turn must become a major self-contained measure facilitating progress in the limitation, reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in a nuclear-weapon-free world, the Treaty and the strict control envisaged therein, together with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should become a guarantee against the reappearance of this type of weapon, and a major part of the supporting structure of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

There is no doubt in anyone's mind that the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests depend first and foremost on the USSR and the United States, which, in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, bear particular responsibility in attaining the goals of nuclear disarmament. We therefore propose that the treaty should provide for the possibility that, initially, not all nuclear powers but only the USSR and the United States will participate it in.

Involvement of the Conference on Disarmament in the process of practical elaboration of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests does not in any way conflict with the current bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations. On the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

contrary, it is designed to support the bilateral efforts with multilateral ones. This is all the more essential since the bilateral talks are unfortunately stalled. For our part, we want these talks to be full-scale, purposeful and productive, so that with every passing day they bring us closer to the complete cessation of nuclear tests under strict international control. Being realists, we agreed at the bilaterial Soviet-United States talks in Geneva to proceed in stages, on a step-by-step basis. The Soviet approach to full-scale negotiations on the nuclear-weapon test ban embodies our readiness to agree on a gradual solution of the problem through the introduction of intermediate limitations on the number and yield of nuclear explosions. The immediate declaration of a bilateral moratorium could be a first step in this respect. Although we would prefer a complete moratorium, nevertheless, taking into consideration the United States position, we would be ready to agree with the United States to limit the yield of nuclear explosions to one kiloton and reduce their number to a minimum. In our opinion, this might be done through appropriate legislation to be adopted by the United States Congress and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The ball is in the United States court.

At the same time it is obvious that even in the most favourable circumstances, the Soviet-United States negotiations, by virtue of their bilateral character, cannot provide a final solution to the problem -- the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests everywhere and by everyone. Hence our conviction that the elaboration of agreements at the Soviet-United States negotiations and the elaboration of a comprehensive treaty in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should proceed in parallel.

In general, our approach to the organizational aspect is as follows: the Soviet Union is ready to participate in any bilateral, trilateral or multilateral forum in order to work for a radical solution to the problem of nuclear tests. We would like not only to set the existing machinery in motion, but also to ensure that it produces practical results at an early stage. We confirm our readiness to work within the Conference for the purpose of broadening the ban laid down in the 1963 Moscow Treaty -- which, incidentally, would be fully consistent with the intentions expressed and obligations undertaken by the parties at the time of its signature.

The experience of many years of negotiations and discussions having to do with the problem of nuclear weapon testing, the technology which is available today for verification purposes, and many other factors, give grounds for believing that the conclusion of a treaty is perfectly feasible.

Today nothing stands in the way of a halt to nuclear-weapon tests, except for the stubborn attempts of the Western nuclear powers to cling to the concept of nuclear deterrence. Some "students" have mastered the course of nuclear deterrence so well, and have become so rigid in the dogmas of that concept and their reluctance to part with the nuclear bomb, that they have surpassed their "teacher" in that respect.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The notion of ensuring security through military force, which no longer corresponds to present-day requirements, is standing in the way of a dynamic rapprochement of negotiating positions. Because of the dogmatic tenets of nuclear deterrence, which picture nuclear weapons as a blessing for mankind, a patent medicine for preserving peace, an elixir of security, the inherent positive potential of negotiations as an instrument for achieving mutual understanding and promoting co-operation among States has yet to be fully realized.

This alone allows us to see the need to transcend the ideology of nuclear deterrence that underlies NATO policy. Yet the problem, of course, is broader in scope and more profound in nature than the success or failure of the negotiations.

We in the Soviet Union have recently carried out a very thorough review of all aspects of this approach. Our conclusion was that its proponents, apparently, have learned nothing from Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The lessons of Chernobyl, apparently, are also fading from memory. While upholding nuclear weapons its apologists are doing all they can to improve them; they are drawing up programmes for their use specifying at what stage of war particular types of these weapons could be used against specific targets, on what scale, etc. They want to get people used to the idea that this is a natural thing to do and is indispensable for the sake of security. In reality the concept of "nuclear deterrence" is false, dangerous and profoundly immoral.

It is our profound conviction that nuclear deterrence is nothing other than a concentrated expression of militarist intentions, an unwillingness to remove the nuclear threat, a short-sighted and narrowly self-centred approach to the problem of national and international security. It is no accident that this concept, being a point of focus of dogmatic views, is in itself a breeding ground for all that is ossified and dogmatic. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence turns States into targets for a nuclear strike.

Nuclear deterrence means a runaway arms race in pursuit of military superiority, a constant threat to strategic stability.

Nuclear deterrence means perpetual international tension, hopeless confrontation, and the maintenance of distrust.

Nuclear deterrence means the cultivation of the image of a "potential adversary", promotion of the ideology and psychology of antagonism and enmity.

Nuclear deterrence means subordinating politics to the dictates of militarism and further militarization of man's thinking.

Nuclear deterrence means encouraging others to acquire the most destructive of all weapons, to seek nuclear Power status and the ability to threaten others.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Finally, nuclear deterrence means unpredictability, uncertainty -- in essence, brinkmanship, which objectively heightens global psychological stress. Nuclear deterrence means a precarious and illusory security structure, a fragile and unreliable pseudo-peace susceptible to the destructive effects of fear and mutual mistrust, i.e. of all those things that permeate this concept.

To rely on nuclear deterrence is to rely on blind fate, to accept the risk of a nuclear catastrophe which can be brought about not necessarily by evil designs but by a technical malfunction or human error, the likelihood of which will inevitably grow with the continued build-up and increasing sophistication of military technologies.

The concept of nuclear deterrence is yesterday's thinking. Nonetheless, it continues to exist in today's politics, preserving its deadly thrust while threatening the foundations of durable peace and stability. It is particularly dangerous in a situation when, as a result of decisions taken in Washington, such constraints on the arms race as SALT I and SALT II are being removed, the ABM Treaty régime is being eroded, and the real threat of arms appearing in space is growing.

New political thinking, which requires first and foremost that both the need for and the possibility of a nuclear-free world should be acknowledged in the interests of the survival of mankind, presupposes a firm renunciation of the concept of nuclear deterrence. This new thinking is based on the premise that relations between States should be regulated by political and legal mechanisms, international organizations and bilateral and multilateral negotiating bodies.

New political thinking addresses in a novel and urgent manner the issue of enhancing the role, dynamism and efficiency of all international forums, including the Conference on Disarmament. The introduction of the "Main provisions" of a treaty reflects our profound belief in the potential of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, as well as our willingness to work together with other members of the Conference with a view to enhancing its prestige and effectiveness. Many of those present in this hall believe that the prestige and effectiveness of the Conference depend to a significant degree on whether it will at long last be able to begin practical work on a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We, at all events, are profoundly convinced that this is so. We see that the majority of participants are ready to engage in serious negotiations. This is a hopeful sign. It is to these sound forces that we address ourselves.

On our part, we see our task at the Conference as that of strict adherence to the "commandments" of the Final Document, which in its time was aptly called "the Bible of disarmament"; of honest, unprejudiced, committed co-operation and team-work with all those who seek disarmament not in words but in deeds. We have a right to expect reciprocity on the part of our negotiating partners. "There is a time to live, and a time to die ... a time to cast away stones and a time to gather stones together." Every tiny brick, even a small stone, laid by the participants in the Conference in the foundation of a common edifice of security will serve to guarantee its durability.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

This is especially important now when the moment of truth has come, when clear-sightedness, an effort to break the fetters of the militaristic mentality, and joint efforts in building a nuclear-free, non-violent world are becoming a categorical imperative.

The President (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. Before giving the floor to the representative of Sweden, I should also like to welcome again among us, Mrs. Maj Britt Theorin.

Mrs. Theorin (Sweden): Mr. President, may I express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you, Ambassador Alfarargi, in the Chair as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of June. My delegation is looking forward to working with you. I assure you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation in your important task, and I wish also to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, my sincere thanks for the skilful way in which he guided the Conference during the closing of the previous session and up to the opening of this session. My delegation has listened with great attention to the important statement of the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Petrovsky, and the document he presented on behalf of the Soviet Union, and will study it with great attention. And on this occasion it is also my pleasure to welcome among us the new representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf.

A year from now the General Assembly of the United Nations will meet for its third special session devoted to disarmament. Its main task should be to look ahead, not to look back. But it cannot avoid taking stock of six years' development in the disarmament and armaments field.

In the recent period, the dialogue between the major world Powers has recovered. They are on speaking terms, though it is obvious that mutual suspicion and lack of trust have not been easy to remove.

In the recent period, the disarmament agenda has rapidly expanded. Proposals have proliferated. Perhaps never before has such a wide range of topics been dealt with, in one way or another, by multilateral or bilaterial forums. New proposals and a new debate have raised new expectations. They have yet to be met. Today is a time of both great opportunities and risks.

If the obvious opportunities at hand are lost, we run the risk that political conditions for substantial agreements will not improve but deteriorate. Time is by no means certain to bring the parties closer to each other. Negotiations may instead get bogged down in a sludge of brackets, technicalities and political complexities. As Martin Luther King put it:

"Beware of:

Justifiction of procrastination

Paralysis of anlaysis."

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

In bilateral and multilateral negotiations alike, the challenging task is the same -- to seize the opportunity and conclude those agreements that are already within obvious reach. Both bilaterally and multilaterally, the challenge is not to stop at that, but to move decisively closer to other agreements where further sustained efforts will be needed. There should be no reason not to move urgently towards an agreement on United States and Soviet nuclear weapons in Europe. The time is ripe.

A "zero option", a "double zero" or a "triple zero" will strengthen, not endanger, European and international security. It should be a point of departure for further nuclear disarmament in Europe, for substantial and balanced reductions of conventional forces, for far-reaching measures to build confidence and security.

The prospect of an agreement on missiles in Europe stands out in glaring contrast to the sombre picture in other areas of the bilateral negotiations. The two super-Powers have so far failed convincingly to show us, and each other, how they aim to approach the prevention of an arms race in space, the termination of the arms race on Earth and the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Here in the Conference on Disarmament, there should be no reason not to move urgently towards an agreement banning all chemical weapons. The time is ripe. A chemical weapons convention should secure the complete elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. To achieve this is a common priority of all delegations here present. It requires purposeful and speedy action.

But the concentration of efforts in the Conference on these negotiations cannot excuse its inability even to begin substantive work on priority items on its agenda.

The nuclear-test ban is a case in point. Nuclear testing continues. Only one out of the five nuclear-weapon States, China, has refrained from carrying out any tests over the last two years. As this year's session of the Conference opened in February, the Soviet Union abandoned its 18-month-long unilateral moratorium and embarked upon what appears to be an intensive testing programme. The United States maintains a programme of 20 tests on average per year. And French nuclear testing still goes on unabated in the South Pacific.

My Government regrets and deplores this state of affairs. It amply illustrates the relevance of continuing efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. The intensity of ongoing nuclear weapon testing confirms its essential role in the development of nuclear weapons.

This is precisely why we have to press on. The long-term impact of a comprehensive test ban would be to reduce the ability of nuclear-weapon States to develop new types of nuclear warheads or to substantially modify existing nuclear designs. A brake would be put on the qualitative nuclear arms race.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

A test ban would also have important immediate effects. It would mark a political turning-point of the highest order, and it would significantly boost the non-proliferation régime.

Our present efforts here in Geneva are hardly commensurate with the importance of the issue. The Conference on Disarmament remains the appropriate forum. It has a responsibility to deliberate on issues and arrangements that may prove crucial, once the political conditions for concluding a treaty are at hand.

In the forty-first General Assembly the political climate of the test ban issue was clearly improved. There have also been signs of greater openness on the matter at this Conference. Valuable work is being performed by the Group of Seismic Experts, as they now prepare for a second global data collection and analysis test in 1988.

Against this background, it is ever more urgent to reach agreement at the current session of the Conference to set up an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It should deal with important aspects of a test ban such as the scope and content of a treaty, as well as verification and compliance.

The wording of a mandate will be of little importance to the actual work of the Committee once that work is under way. To lose more time on further procedural futilities will be a major disservice both to the cause of a comprehensive test ban and to the multilateral disarmament process.

In their current bilateral talks on nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and the United States are apparently discussing the possibility of gradual reductions in the frequency and maximum yield of nuclear tests. A definite end to all nuclear weapons testing is long overdue, and from this perspective any agreement that leaves room for continued testing is clearly insufficient. Such agreements must include a clear commitment to reach a complete and comprehensive test ban at an early, specified date. They can serve as steps in the right direction only if reductions are substantial and impose real constraints on the ability of the parties to develop nuclear weapons at will.

Under the second item on the agenda of the Conference, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, my delegation welcomed the informal consultations of last year. They should in our opinion be made a regular and well-structured part of the work at the Conference.

Under the agenda item on negative security assurances, renewed efforts must be made to make progress. Sweden attaches particular importance to the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain legally binding, unambiguous and unconditional undertakings from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

Last year's deliberations in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space produced results, though modest ones. It was noted that a gradual militarization of space has been taking place for close on 25 years. It was found that the legal régime for arms limitation in outer space raises certain barriers to the arms race in that environment, but that in some crucial areas this régime is far from complete.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Sweden welcomes the re-establishment of the Committee this year and the commencement of its substantive work. It is indeed of the utmost importance to build upon the common ground that has been created in order to achieve progress in the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Undoubtedly the key to solving some of the fundamental issues involved is to be found in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic and space weapons. But the deployment of space-based strategic defence systems would also affect the security of other countries. Indirectly, as such deployments might alter the strategic relationship and thus have consequences for overall stability. Directly, because possible defence systems could, at least in theory, be provided with an additional capacity to be used against targets other than strategic weapons, in space or on Earth. For this reason, the deployment of space weapons is a source of concern for the whole international community. There is a strong case for multilateral involvement.

Another aspect of the further militarization of outer space that might constitute a direct threat to the vital national interests of many States is the development of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). Many States other than the two major nuclear Powers have developed considerable space programmes and have made large investments in peaceful space activities. It is legitimate for -- yes incumbent on -- members of the CD to address, in a substantive way, questions related to the protection of peaceful activities in outer space.

The Ad hoc Committee should explore the possibility of verifiable and legally binding instruments prohibiting ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. A ban on ASAT weapons should include a prohibition on development, testing and deployment as well as use. Existing ASAT systems should be destroyed. However, in order to consider concrete measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, further work is called for. The review of the legal framework has to be completed, and the Conference must seek to define and identify the technologies and weapons systems to be addressed.

In February this year, I mentioned the possibility of setting up a group of technical experts to deal with these issues. Such a group of experts could assist, inter alia, by working out technical definitions of space weapons, specifying the relevant technologies, and addressing the technical aspects of verification.

The Swedish proposal in 1984 for a draft treaty on radiological weapons expressed the priority we attach to banning the release of radioactive material through attacks on nuclear facilities. The unitary approach -- combining the prohibition of radiological weapons with the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities causing mass destruction -- was introduced in the Swedish proposal. Much to the disappointment of my delegation, differing views on issues often not directly linked to the question of protecting nuclear facilities have blocked the way for the Committee.

In order to prevent strongly felt procedural viewpoints from blocking substantive efforts in this item too, my delegation is ready to work separately on the issues of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

facilities. An effective prohibition of such attacks is an indispensable part of any radiological weapons treaty. We are at the same time ready to take part in discussions about radiological weapons in the traditional sense.

The foremost challenge today to the Conference on Disarmament is to accomplish the early and successful conclusion of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 has not sufficed to halt a chemical weapons arms race. We have had reports on the use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world, most recently in the Gulf, where its use by Iraq has been effectively substantiated by United Nations experts. Such reports add to a growing concern that chemical weapons are for the present and the future and not only the past. Chemical warfare is a growing danger.

There seems to be universal recognition that the only effective response possible is the creation of an international disarmament régime for chemical weapons. Negotiations in this Conference have made steady progress. The most recent updating of the "rolling text" of late April this year is thus in many respects hardly recognizable compared with the modest first draft of 1984.

The flexible and positive approach of delegations to the negotiations is particularly gratifying for my delegation, as it facilitates the difficult task of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. This approach has brought a number of key problems closer to their solution. Progress has been made in the direction that all chemical weapon stocks should immediately be declared and, within a 10 year period, eliminated by destruction only. The initial declaration of stocks shall be verified and the stockpiles thereafter systematically monitored. What remains to be done is to agree on an order of destruction up to the end of the tenth year after the Convention has entered into force. Consensus on a broad outline of the order of destruction is growing. It is vital for trust in the convention that all States parties to it be obliged from the outset to declare all weapon stocks.

A régime for the elimination of chemical weapon production facilities is also taking shape. Understanding has been reached on the verification of declarations of such facilities and their closure, as well as international systematic monitoring and verification of the elimination of facilities.

To prohibit future production of chemical weapons in a verifiable manner is a major concern. Over the years more negotiating efforts and intellectual energy have been devoted to this part of the convention than to any other problem. It is unavoidable that the chemical industry will be affected by a system of non-production. As the outline of a generally acceptable verification régime is now emerging from the negotiations, it can, however, be stated that the industry, already subject to intrusive environmental and health regulations would assume a modest additional burden when the convention enters into force.

Some differences on details in the régime remain. But they should not be impossible to overcome. Trust in the convention will depend on the means provided to investigate also non-declared activities which could constitute

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

violations of it. A challenge inspection system is indispensable. The core of the system should be international on-site challenge inspection. It would deter violations, if effectively designed.

Informal consultations on this matter during the spring session have been encouraging. Support is growing for the idea that a team of inspectors should be automatically dispatched following the request of a party. There are still differences of opinion as to whether the inspectors should have unimpeded access to the location or facility concerned, in accordance with the original request, also in the event that the requested State proposes an alternative arrangement.

An area where discussions have only recently begun are provisions on assistance and on economic and technological development. And the institutional arrangements of the convention must be elaborated. Outstanding issues must now be vigorously addressed. Progress already made shows that a convention is clearly within reach. Compromises will now have to be made, and even compromises hard to enter into. Crucial decisions will eventually have to be taken, and also decisions difficult to take. As negotiations hopefully draw closer to a decisive stage, I am confident that no member of the Conference will spare any effort to make possible the accomplishment of our common task: an urgently needed chemical weapons convention. With such a convention we should secure that all chemical weapons are destroyed -- once and for all.

Despite efforts over several years to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, a number of issues are still outstanding. With the co-operation of all delegations, the Conference should conclude its work on this item before the third special session. We should be firm in urging the nuclear Powers to act now. We should be equally firm in ensuring that this Conference is able to act -- now.

It is commonplace nowadays to speak of many worlds: the Old World and the New World, the industrialized world and the third world. In matters of international security, however, there is only one world. In the age of nuclear weapons, security cannot be accomplished in narrow regional terms, much less in strictly national ones. The economic well-being and the security of all nations is linked, and destined to become progressively more so.

There is an absolute need for conversion: from a system of international risk to a system of international security; from production for death and destruction to production for life and development; from the rule of the barrel and the muscle to the rule of international law, of sense, reason and compassion. All States have a stake in disarmament. And we all have a role to play in making disarmament a reality.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words she expressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, allow me to convey to you the best wishes of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on your assumption of the important office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. Our two countries have for many years been linked together by bonds of close co-operation. Through your personal share in the activities of the conference, you have distinguished yourself as an excellent and successful diplomat. Let me assure you of my delegation's all-out support in the discharge of your responsible duties. Our heartfelt thanks go to your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda. He did an admirable job chairing the Conference with a deep sense of commitment and purpose. His extraordinary endeavours to overcome obstacles preventing progress in the nuclear field, notably his efforts to set up a workable ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda, deserve our particular recognition. I should like to take this opportunity to welcome the new representative of the United States, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, in our midst, and I wish him good luck and all the best.

On 28 and 29 May, a session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was held in Berlin, at which the leaders of these countries adopted significant documents. The Communiqué and the Statement on the Military Doctrine of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, published after that meeting, deal with many issues of extreme relevance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Both are available to you as document CD/755. I wish to express my special thanks to the secretariat for having produced and distributed the material so quickly.

The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Petrovsky, whom we welcome very warmly in our midst, and to whose statement we have listened with great interest, has already made reference to that session. The proposal of socialist States he had just put forward represents a specific contribution, inspired by the Berlin meeting, towards coming to grips with one of the tasks that are uppermost on the Conference's list of priorities, a task which should long since have been tackled.

The leaders of the Warsaw Treaty Organization have reaffirmed their nations' fundamental foreign policy goals, which consist in warding off the nuclear threat, stopping the arms race and safeguarding peace for all times. Faced with the first real opportunity in many years for acheving progress in the disarmament area, they have demonstrated their earnest desire to do everything in their power to ensure that this historic chance is seized. For that reason, they call for concerted efforts and a new way of thinking, a fresh approach to the issues of war and peace, disarmament and other complex global and regional problems.

It is certainly no accident that the Communiqué stresses in particular the need to conclude an agreement on eliminating Soviet and United States medium-range and shorter-range missiles. The improved conditions for such an agreement, which are mainly the result of the Soviet Union's flexible stance, have given rise throughout the world to great hopes of achieving early success in negotiations. Those hopes must not be dashed. The liquidation of entire

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

weapon categories would signal a breakthrough and set the stage for further steps aimed at removing nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction from the face of the Earth and preventing an arms race in outer space.

To ban all nuclear weapon testing remains a task of the highest priority for reasons which have been amply explained by Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky. The proposal setting forth the basic provisions of a nuclear-test-ban treaty gives a convincing answer to the question of what role our conference can play in tackling that task. The initiative takes into account the current status of the debate and ought to get practical work started. My delegation expects that a lively exchange of opinions and negotiations will develop on that proposal. What the Conference badly needs is a committee on agenda item 1, so that all relevant issues can be addressed in a concrete fashion. It is high time to apply to nuclear topics the often quoted principle that multilateral and bilateral disarmament negotiations should complement each other. All countries, not least all the members of our Conference, have a responsibility to fulfil in pushing open wide the door to nuclear disarmament.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have underlined the need for the earliest possible elimination of chemical weapons. Our conference should complete the pertinent convention by the end of this year. For that reason, the socialist countries will continue to participate actively in the efforts to draw up its text and its annexes. The Soviet Union's announcement that it has stopped producing chemical weapons and that it is building a facility for the destruction of existing stocks has had a particularly favourable impact on the atmosphere at the negotiating table. We trust the other side will respond in kind and refrain from any action likely to hamper the negotiating process.

Those who demand that more attention should be paid to conventional disarmament are kicking at an open door. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty reiterated in Berlin the proposals contained in the Budapest Appeal adopted a year ago. Also, in view of the attempts to answer nuclear disarmament with increases in conventional weaponry, they have emphasized that cuts in nuclear arms must give the impetus to radical reductions in other categories of weapons. In order to dispel the misgivings expressed on the other side, they are prepared "to have the imbalance that has arisen in certain elements redressed in the course of the reductions". That means that the side which has an advantage will make appropriate cut-backs. Apart from conventional armaments in Europe, this approach should also find ready acceptance in other cases where the conclusion of disarmament agreements is being jeopardized by measures designed to increase arsenals under the pretext of disparities in armaments and forces.

The allied countries attach great importance to regional steps to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons, and continue to lend strong support to the relevant proposals tabled by the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Verification occupies a central place in the decisions adopted by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. What must be created is an effective system to verify the implementation of disarmament steps in the strictest way possible so that the security of all parties may be ensured. The principle that genuine disarmament presupposes genuine verification applies in a very special way to the measures discussed at our forum. Do we not know all too well how much progress in the field of disarmament can be slowed down if divergencies persist on this particular subject?

The participants in the Berlin meeting have vigorously declared themselves in favour of overcoming any confrontational approach and asserting civilized standards and an atmosphere of openness, transparency and trust in international relations. There are many ways to achieve this. An important step, in this context, would be for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO to enter into consultations in order to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty States is in every respect subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. Hence the conclusion that many weapons are not synonomous with more security. Dependable security can only be attained by disarmament and arms limitation measures. That is why the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are convinced that their military security will best be ensured by concrete disarmament steps on the basis of equality and equal security. This is the lesson to be learned from history if we are to preserve our fragile world in this nuclear and space age, and if any military doctrine is to be labelled a "peace doctrine". We must arrive at a situation where international disputes are settled exclusively by political means and peace is made enduring by a comprehensive system of international security.

The Berlin documents before you bear the mark of all those who strive to remove war from human life.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, may I first congratulate you on the assumption of your important office of President of the Conference, and promise you the complete co-operation of my delegation. At the same time I would like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda, for his achievements and his dedication in the post of President and for the results he obtained. May I also welcome the new Ambassador of the United States, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, and extend my best wishes for his future work in this Conference.

Mr. President, in response to remarks made this morning, and especially the very forceful remarks of Deputy Minister Petrovsky which clearly pointed, among others, to the Federal Republic of Germany, I would like to correct the perspective which, in my view, was partially out of focus. I would like to remind the Conference that the paramount political precept of the Government

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

of the Federal Republic of Germany, to which the entire North Atlantic Alliance fully subscribes, is that of reliably preventing any war in Europe, be it conventional or nuclear. Every Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is therefore under the obligation not to examine decisions concerning security and disarmament exclusively from the point of view of reducing nuclear weapons. There is no alternative within the foreseeable future to the defence strategy of flexible response developed by the North Atlantic Alliance; this strategy serves to prevent war. For the implementation of this strategy the Alliance remains dependent on a balanced arsenal of conventional and nuclear forces. The role played by nuclear weapons in this context must be reduced to the absolute minimum in quantitative and qualitative terms. And in this context of disarmament we see prospects for a nuclear test ban (as item 1 of our agenda is called) as different from a nuclear-weapon test ban.

Our security policy has always consisted of two complementary elements: an assured capacity for defence and deterrence, not only nuclear deterrence, and efforts towards arms control and disarmament in all areas, with a view to achieving a stable military balance at the lowest possible level. The common objective of our defence and disarmament policy must be to increase the security of our country and the whole Alliance. Disarmament cannot be an end in itself. On no account must it lead to less security. Eliminating individual weapon systems does not necessarily mean a gain in security. It was this link that particularly concerned my Government in respect of disarmament decisions in the field of intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Our decisions on security matters would be incomplete without a renewed affirmation of the second pillar of the Alliance concept: the extension to our Eastern neighbours of the offer of intensive political dialogue and comprehensive co-operation in all fields. East-West antagonism cannot be defused and overcome with lasting effect solely by means of agreements on security matters or disarmament accords.

Arms reductions are facilitated if political confidence-building visibly precedes or accompanies the process of disarmament. It is not weapons by themselves that pose a threat.

The Soviet proposal tabled at the INF negotiations in Geneva does not constitute a truly satisfactory solution of the INF problem from our point of view. In the case of longer-range INFs, the Soviet proposal envisages the retention of 100 warheads each in the United States and the Soviet Union. The 100 warheads of SS-20 missiles thus remaining in the Asian parts of the Soviet Union would, owing to the possibility demanded in the Soviet draft treaty of transferring these systems to the European part for training purposes, continue to constitute a factor of insecurity for all Europeans. Moreover, such an arrangement would pose serious verification problems. For these reasons, the Federal Government prefers -- as do its partners -- the global elimination of this category of weapons. We hope that the Soviet Union will show flexibility on this point.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

After resolving other questions concerning verification, an agreement on long-range INFs could, in the Federal Government's opinion, be reached within the next few months. It would prove that tangible disarmament steps are attainable on the basis of the equitable reconciliation of both sides' interests.

As for shorter-range intermediate missiles, i.e. missiles with ranges of between 500 and 1,000 km, the Soviet proposal, which has still not been submitted in writing, likewise envisages a "zero option" confined to Europe. This solution has a serious drawback: the overwhelming preponderance of the Soviet Union in the range below 500 km, particularly in the form of the 583 Scud missiles, for which the West has no equivalent, is to remain intact.

The preponderance must also be seen against the background of clear Warsaw Pact superiority in the conventional field. In Central Europe and on the European flanks the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, especially its land forces, are clearly superior to those of NATO. The main battle tank ratio between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, including the augmentation forces on both sides, is roughly one to three.

Massed armoured forces are a traditional means of attack, being particularly well suited to the rapid seizure of foreign territories. This explains their political weight.

There can be no question of the Federal Government's unconditionally accepting the Soviet proposal of a "zero option" in the 500-1,000-km range. Removal of the ground-launched missiles in the 500-to-1,000-km range will increase German concern about the imbalance in the systems with a range below 500 km. It is difficult to accept such a situation in the long term, and we are therefore pressing for the continuation of the disarmament process.

The 72 German Pershing Ia missiles with their American warheads cannot be included in a US-Soviet "zero option". These missiles have never been the subject of negotiations. The considerable superiority of the Soviet Union in terms of missiles with a range below 500 km, as well as the unilateral withdrawal by NATO between 1980 and 1988 of 2,400 nuclear warheads, which are not being replaced, should make it possible to accomplish successfully the negotiations on this point. By withdrawing 2,400 nuclear warheads, NATO has removed more nuclear weaponry from Europe than is now under negotiation in Geneva.

The Federal Government stands by its view that the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces must remain part of a comprehensive disarmament process covering all weapon systems and must lead to further steps towards disarmament. We regard the following steps towards disarmament as necessary and possible.

Firstly, in the super-Powers' disarmament process, the Federal Government expects an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive potentials of both sides. Such an agreement would provide for the elimination of a total of some 10,000 nuclear warheads. Both sides must strive to find a

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

co-operative solution to the problem of the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons which makes allowance for the security interests of both parties. This applies especially to the application of the ABM Treaty. Drastic reductions in offensive weapons must inevitably influence the need for and the extent of defensive systems.

Secondly, my Government seeks the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons. The negotiations at our Conference on Disarmament are so far advanced that the outstanding matters of verification should no longer be an obstacle to the final world-wide abolition of this category of weapons. It is encouraging that the final communiqué of the Warsaw Pact summit last week reiterated the view that the negotiations could be completed before the end of this year. We all now hope for further flexibility and purposeful negotiating. In view of the state of these negotiations, this is not the time to introduce new or geographically restricted approaches. It is essential to bear in mind Germany's particularly vulnerable position and the special threat which chemical weapons present to us. We therefore expect our primary interest in such a convention to be respected.

Thirdly, the next step in the disarmament strategy of the Federal Government and its allies is to establish a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels in the whole of Europe. In Vienna preliminary talks are going on between the members of the two alliance systems on a mandate for a conference on conventional arms control. The central purpose of such a conference is to eliminate the imbalances which are detrimental to us. We therefore welcome as a step in the right direction the willingness expressed in the Warsaw Pact communiqué of 29 May 1987 to remove "the imbalance that has arisen in certain elements".

The main concerns of the Federal Government are: to initiate a step-by-step process of negotiation which guarantees the undiminished security of all concerned at every stage; to eliminate the ability to conduct surprise attacks or launch large-scale offensives; to establish further confidence-building measures aimed at improving the openness and predictability of military behaviour; to take account of regional imbalances; to provide reliable guarantees against circumvention; and to develop effective verification rules, including on-site inspections.

In addition, a second phase of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe remains necessary.

In view of the particular threat posed to the Federal Republic of Germany by the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, which will be further increased by moves in the field of nuclear disarmament, the Federal Government is pressing for an early agreement to clear the way for the necessary disarmament negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Morel.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President. First of all, may I extend my congratulations to you on your taking the chair for the month of June, and pledge to you the full co-operation of the French delegation. Personally, in the course of the last few months, in the framework of co-ordination of space activities, I have had occasion to work closely with you at important moments during the work of our Conference, and I am pleased to see you assuming these responsibilities.

I should also like to thank Ambassador Vejvoda for so effectively chairing the Conference, as we have all appreciated, during April and May. I should also like to welcome Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the new representative of the United States, and to pledge to him the full co-operation of our delegation. Finally, I followed with keen interest the statement by the Deputy Minister of the USSR, Mr. Petrovsky, and particularly the crux of his statement -- the proposals relating to a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Mr. President, our analysis is different. It is well known: I will recall it in a few words. We believe that the complete prohibition of nuclear tests is not a prior condition for disarmament, but rather one of its components. Now, I would not have taken the floor today to recall these well-known facts if the representative of the USSR had not taken this opportunity to make what I would call ironic remarks about other nuclear Powers, drawing a distinction between certain teachers and certain students, in a way which my country cannot leave unanswered. I will simply recall that in the past, in these matters, my country has not shown any particular readiness to be anybody's student, and it does not intend to do so in the future. What we have seen and what we can still see is the propensity of certain countries to set themselves up in a way as teachers of the truth of the moment -- their truth of the moment -- teachers of deterrence through the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. In yet another manner today we hear the teachers of denuclearization; the subject changes but the teacher remains.

For our part we were not students yesterday, any more than we will be students today. Denuclearization in our view is not an end in itself; the goal to be attained is security. And what are we offered today? To a slight extent it is "Don't do what I do, do what I say". In explanation, I will simply recall that Soviet and United States nuclear armaments continue to be modernized with new prototypes, new models, new tests, new offensive systems. Reykjavik appeared to mark a significant step by identifying the true problem, namely, the absurd and dangerous redundancy of a strategic system which is largely superfluous, largely redundant. Six months later, what do we find? Priorities have changed. Today, we are told, the objective is denuclearization, to begin with in Europe, by means of the INF agreement, which certainly has its own potentialities to offer. Yet this Europe which is to be denuclearized would continue to be threatened by thousands of other strategic offensive nuclear weapons. We thought that it would be more credible to begin with these strategic offensive nuclear weapons. And if the objective is denuclearization, what substitute are we offered? Inevitably, through a simple shift in the centre of gravity, conventional weapons would be

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Morel, France)

assigned a major and decisive role. Of course, collective security is the ideal. But those who seek a priori to criticize a so-called dogma of deterrence, do they not run the risk of forgetting the lesson of two world wars which were conducted with conventional weapons, as well as the lessons of the inter-war period with its well-known failures in the area of collective security? In seeking negotiations, we seek better security. But my country's position in these matters will always be not to tie itself to any dogma, because we have no feeling of obeying any dogma of nuclear deterrence. We are not interested in dogma, we are interested in facts.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of France for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? It seems that this is not the case.

As members are aware, the President of Argentina, Mr. Raúl Alfonsín, will be the first speaker at our next plenary meeting, on Thursday 11 June. As you know, this is the first time that a head of State will be addressing the Conference, and I wish to stress the significance of this fact. I am counting on all of you to see that the plenary starts precisely on time. On this special occasion, I will invite President Alfonsín to speak from my right on the podium.

You will recall that, in accordance with the timetable for meetings to be held this week, the Conference is to hold an informal meeting immediately after this plenary meeting. During that time, I intend to submit for your consideration a draft programme of work in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure.

I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting and immediately convene the informal meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 11 June at 10 a.m. sharp.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.412
11 June 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 June 1987, at 10.a.m.

President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 412th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Distinguished representatives, I am deeply honoured to extend a warm welcome among us today to His Excellency Raúl Alfonsín, President of the Argentine Republic, who is the first head of State to address the Conference on Disarmament and its organs. My presentation of President Alfonsín will be an expression of esteem, since he needs no introduction. The fame of his actions and his ideas have preceded him. He is the leader who placed democracy on a firm footing in Argentina. He is a staunch believer in freedom and human rights and, having re-established rule based on law and order, is now engaged in the struggle for development. In spite of the magnitude of the internal responsibilities that he is shouldering, his ideas and his actions have transcended the confines of his own country. He has worked actively for peaceful solutions in Latin America and, within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, has endeavoured to turn that Movement into a constructive instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of development. At the United Nations and international organizations, he has endeavoured to make the fabric of the international community stronger and more cohesive. His statement yesterday before the International Labour Conference -- which he, as a democratic leader, called the World Labour Parliament -- bore further testimony to those endeavours. Today, as he addresses the Conference on Disarmament, let us remember President Alfonsín's prominent international role as a member of the New Delhi Six which is dealing with vital issues relating to disarmament. His ideas and proposals in this field have earned him the respect and appreciation of all.

Today, Mr. President, while speaking in Arabic, I cannot but recall the time when, centuries ago, the Arab and Spanish cultures met, intermingled and interacted in spite of the difference between the two languages. In fact, there are many common elements between them. As a representative of Egypt, I believe that, notwithstanding the geographical distance between my country and Argentina, they have much in common by virtue of their cultural background, their membership of the Non-Aligned Movement, their struggle for development and their representation at the Conference on Disarmament. Accordingly, I look forward to listening to you today since, in a way, I will be hearing a perspicacious view of questions that are also of concern to my country, Egypt, whose approach to international issues is similar to that which is being pursued by Argentina. I am confident, Mr. President, that all the members of the Conference on Disarmament appreciate the endeavours that you are making and will follow your statement with particular interest. I now have great pleasure in giving the floor to His Excellency President Alfonsín of the Argentine Republic.

President ALFONSIN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Thank you for your kind words, Mr. President. I accept them as a tribute to the nascent democracy in Argentina, and I attach special value to them because I know they come from a true fighter for the cause of peace. You referred to the presence of the Arab World in Argentina through the presence of Spain. What you say is true, but in addition this presence has spread the length and breadth of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(President Alfonsín, Argentina)

Argentina through two million descendants of Arabs who have enriched Argentine society with their labour and their intelligence. I am also grateful for the honour accorded to me by being invited to address this Conference.

We all know that mankind could be annihilated if a nuclear war were to start. We also know how little has been achieved towards eliminating that threat. There is an enormous disproportion between the magnitude of the danger we face and the meagre capacity to neutralize it that we have shown so far. This is one of the most dramatic features of our times, one that the Conference on Disarmament, indeed, faces every day.

I believe it is essential that we should all help to overcome this problem: peoples and Governments should actively work to ensure the survival of mankind. Our lives and those of our children are at stake.

That is why the democratic Government of Argentina, from the moment it took office, has sought to state year after year the importance it attaches to the work of this Conference, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Today, I am pleased and honoured to attend the Conference in person in order to reiterate the commitment Argentina has undertaken regarding the cause of peace in the world, and the success of the work being carried out here.

For the same reasons, we have been engaged since 22 May 1984 in a common effort, together with Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, in favour of disarmament and peace. By joining our voices we wanted to show that, in spite of geographical distance, linguistic diversity, cultural differences and varied social and political régimes, we share among ourselves and with other nations the need and the determination to fully recover the right to live, that sacred right of every human being and every nation which has been cast into the category of a merely conditional and inevitably short-lived right by the terrible weapons manufactured today by man.

I cannot mention the Six-Nation Initiative for Peace and Disarmament without evoking the memory of Indira Gandhi and Olof Palme, pioneers in this effort for the defence of life that unites several continents, indefatigable fighters for harmony and tolerance among men and the victims of blind and senseless violence.

There are those who think that violence and the will to destroy are part of human nature and that, therefore, all efforts to consolidate peace and achieve disarmament are simply futile and pointless.

History, as we know it, tends to bear them out, since until this day men have methodically and bloodily devoted a significant part of their energies to killing one another, while attempts to stop this deplorable situation have been of little avail.

It would be naïve to claim that of late human nature has undergone changes that would modify these ancestral tendencies. But it would also be suicidal not to take account of the fact that scientific and technological

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(President Alfonsín, Argentina)

advances have given us an immense power which would destroy life on Earth in a matter of seconds if it were used in a manner similar to that witnessed in past wars.

It is precisely because of this that we are living through a crucial period. If we continue to act as in the past with the power at our disposal today, we will have no future. If mankind wishes to have a future, it will have to change.

I think that, generally speaking, there is agreement on this. Disagreements begin when we examine what ought to be changed or what is said to have changed already.

Let us, for instance, take the doctrine of deterrence, accepted by many as an indisputable truth. According to this doctrine, the arms race, and particularly the nuclear arms race, is by no means dangerous but, in fact, a healthy phenomenon. The rationale behind it lies in the formidable destructive capacity of nuclear weapons: none of the prospective contenders would dare to unleash a war for fear of the enormous damage the enemy's nuclear reprisals might cause. Those who subscribe to this doctrine claim that nuclear deterrence has so far prevented any war between the super-Powers from breaking out. Therefore, in order to preserve peace, the arms race has to continue, since the balance of terror is upset and re-established dynamically and continuously.

This theory has never convinced me. Indeed, I have always found it to be incomprehensible and dangerous.

In the first place, it is not original. A little more than a century ago the European big Powers, the world's strongest States of the time, laid down the doctrine of "armed peace" on these same foundations of fear and deterrence. The result was the bloodiest war ever fought, the First World War, and its near-inevitable sequel, the Second World War.

Moreover, the theory of deterrence is suspiciously convenient. It does not compel anyone to exert himself in the difficult task of changing traditional behaviour, but on the contrary encourages him to continue and even promote it, since the only essential change -- fear, the deterrent against launching a war -- would already have been accomplished.

However, this change engendered by fear is doubtful and unprovable. The fact that no war has broken out between the super-Powers does not necessarily confirm the theory of deterrence: other reasons based on expediency or advantage may have weighed just as much, or more. Memories of awful past experiences may in fact have been more significant than potential future damage. Let us also remember that at the beginning of the second decade of this century boastful statements could be heard about armed peace having ensured four decades of peace and prosperity in Europe. Proof that fear of destruction was not enough to prevent war came very soon, since the dynamics of a defence system based on purely military considerations automatically led to a conflict, outside the control of the leaders of the time.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(President Alfonsín, Argentina)

But if we are not certain that fear of nuclear war has so far been a decisive factor in preventing it, we do know that on several occasions the use of nuclear weapons was advocated in conflicts where only conventional weapons were being used. It was held in these cases that the limited use of nuclear weapons would not be challenged for fear of an escalation of retaliations and counter-retaliations. Although those arguments were finally discarded, the fact remains that the question of the threshold of deterrence was considered, and that it could be discussed again. Will we one day witness an insane escalation of estimates about the number of deaths necessary to make someone fear retaliating with more nuclear weapons?

There is yet another reason for contesting the doctrine of deterrence. The nuclear arms race, apart from causing arsenals to expand, has reduced and continues to reduce the time span in which a decision to unleash war will be taken. Today it is only a matter of a few minutes; tomorrow, maybe a matter of seconds. As a result, the decision depends more and more on data processing by computer. I see no reason why fear that we, mere human beings, would be destroyed should lead these machines to stop processing information and taking actual decisions.

We do not know, actually, whether fear of destruction has been the decisive factor in avoiding the outbreak of nuclear war. But we do know other provable effects of the theory of deterrence.

In the first place, as I have already mentioned, it has been the main cause of the world's arms race. It is enough for one of the parties to give credence to the doctrine of deterrence, and the others will be trapped in the logic of the balance of terror. And since the balance of terror is inherently unstable, each party is constantly encouraged to ensure that it is not upset to its own disadvantage, or tempted to secure advantages. In this way, the arms race inevitably tends to reinforce itself and to grow indefinitely. That is also why it has ceased to be a mere consequence of political tension between the super-Powers, and has become one of its main causes.

Today we can see that, although the critical areas of confrontation are much more peaceful and stable than was the case in the early post-war years, and even the marginal areas are calmer than they were 20 years ago, nuclear weaponry is continuing to increase in magnitude and complexity to levels far greater than during those periods.

The nuclear arms race is also one of the main sources of mistrust between the super-Powers, and therefore one of the main obstacles to the implementation of more constructive ways of ensuring peace.

In the meantime, vast economic, human, scientific and technical resources are being assigned to the arms race. With only part of these resources, the most pressing problems facing mankind could be solved. Meanwhile, the size of defence expenditure has already started to produce dangerous effects on the world economy.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(President Alfonsín, Argentina)

These are merely some of the consequences of accepting a doctrine which, essentially, we do not believe will ensure peace.

If life on Earth can be destroyed today in a few moments, this is because man has acquired immense power over nature. The same power that could liberate mankind from all of its pressing problems has been harnessed to threaten its survival. This is irrational. This is unacceptable.

Bertrand Russell once said that in this modern world, human beings have increased their knowledge enormously, while their wisdom has made very little progress, if any at all. We have now reached an extreme situation in which the survival of mankind depends on our ability to change traditional, or even ancestral, behaviour. To face and overcome that challenge -- as Russell would have said -- is not a matter of technical knowledge but rather of greater political wisdom.

In my view, this is the crucial question of our times. I do not believe the arms race or the doctrine supporting it provide us with an adequate answer. Rather, I think that they engender greater risks in so far as they have placed us in a vicious circle of negative consequences that feed upon each other and increase every day the danger of eventually unleashing a nuclear war.

That is why we must, first of all, break that vicious circle. This is the essential purpose of adopting practical measures such as the moratorium on nuclear tests and the non-militarization of outer space, which we have demanded and continue to demand through the Six-Nation Initiative for Peace and Disarmament. We are convinced that if these measures were adopted, they would halt the current arms race, creating the best possible conditions for the initiation of an effective disarmament process.

For the same reasons, we have welcomed hopefully and supported certain encouraging events of recent years: the resumption of the dialogue on disarmament between the United States and the Soviet Union, the meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, their solemn joint statement to the effect that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. From this perspective, we have considered that the conclusion of a treaty to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces in Europe would constitute an important step forward. For the first time, nuclear weapons already deployed would be eliminated by mutual agreement, thus showing that it is possible to initiate an effective disarmament process.

Contrary to what has happened in the past, breaking the vicious circle in which we have been placed should be the first step in fostering a system of mutually supportive constructive relationships that progressively create greater security and not greater risks.

If, in order to survive, we have to change, why should we trust an ostensible change based on fear, instead of working for real change based on reason? We cannot accept, we cannot understand that the survival of human

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(President Alfonsín, Argentina)

beings on Earth should be subject to a system which is grossly vulnerable to the probability of error, or to the insufficiency of terror. In order to survive we must tread another path, one which is admittedly difficult and unexplored. But only in this way will we be able to respond to the magnitude of the danger threatening us, with solid and meaningful progress. Only in this way will we succeed in overcoming that tragic helplessness which I evoked at the beginning.

In speaking of Mahatma Gandhi, André Malraux says in his Anti-Memoirs that one of the characteristics of a prophet is that he reveals what is obvious. I think that we need a few prophets to make us abandon once and for all the theories that require us to comprehend the incomprehensible, to accept the unacceptable, so that we may embark, simply, on building a world of peace.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank President Raúl Alfonsín, President of the Argentine Republic, for his important and comprehensive statement. In view of the close attention with which it was received, I believe that, when it is published as a document of this Conference, his statement will constitute an important source of reference for our future work. I also wish to thank him for the kind words that he addressed to myself.

Distinguished representatives, I now intend to suspend the meeting for 10 minutes so that I can accompany the President of the Argentine Republic on his departure from the building. The meeting is suspended for 10 minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 10.45 a.m. and resumed at 10.55 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare the 412th meeting of the Conference on Disarmament reconvened.

Distinguished representatives, we shall now resume our work for today. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has requested the floor. I therefore give the floor to Ambassador Nazarkin, the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all I should like to emphasize on behalf of the Soviet delegation that we have listened with tremendous attention and interest to the important statement which has just been made by His Excellency President R. Alfonsín of Argentina. The address by President Alfonsín here in this room, the ideas he put forward, are unquestionably of enormous importance for all of us -- all the more so since President R. Alfonsín is very well known as the Head of State of Argentina, but also as an outstanding fighter for peace and disarmament. Together with the other leaders of the Six Nations, he is responsible for major initiatives which have without fail received the support of the Soviet Union.

At the previous meeting of the Conference the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, congratulated you on your assumption of the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

presidency of the Conference and expressed gratitude to your predecessor Ambassador M. Vejvoda, for having guided the work of the Conference in April. I fully associate myself with Mr. Petrovsky's statement.

In connection with the statement made on 9 June by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel, I should like to make a number of observations. Ambassador von Stülpnagel expressed the concern of his Government about the elimination of Soviet and United States medium-range missiles in Europe, stating that the elimination of individual types of weapons does not necessarily enhance security. I should like to point out the following: firstly, although today the question of medium-range missiles has taken pride of place from the standpoint of the possibility of achieving agreement very soon, the Soviet Union considers that questions of strategic offensive weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the cessation of nuclear testing are also of high priority. This is demonstrated by our new proposals on all the above-mentioned aspects of nuclear and space weapons. Secondly, the elimination of Soviet and United States medium-range missiles and shorter-range INFs in Europe would undoubtedly be of historic significance. In fact, for the first time an agreement would have been achieved on real reductions in nuclear arms. This would give a powerful impetus to negotiations in other areas of arms limitation and disarmament. In connection with Ambassador von Stülpnagel's statement I should like once again to clarify the position of the Soviet Union on medium-range missiles. We have repeatedly stated our readiness to settle the problem of medium-range missiles on a global basis. There would be no obstacles to such a solution if the United States were to agree to the elimination of its nuclear systems in Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, as well as the withdrawal of its aircraft carrier fleet within agreed boundaries. And of course the United States would have no medium-range missiles on its own territory. We are proposing that a start should be made now towards the elimination of nuclear weapons in Asia.

The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany based his disagreement with our proposed "zero option" for shorter-range INFs on the claim that the Soviet Union enjoys superiority in missiles with a range of below 500 kilometres, and that the Warsaw Treaty Organization enjoys superiority in conventional armaments. I should like to clarify this issue as well. We are also proposing the complete elimination of this class of Soviet and United States missiles in Europe, and thus the elimination of any side's superiority in them. As for the linkage between the question of eliminating medium-range missiles and shorter-range INFs and the problem of conventional weapons, this ignores a well-known fact -- our readiness to accept the most radical reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in the process of eliminating existing imbalances and asymmetries in individual types, by means of reductions by the side which is ahead. These are issues we propose to make the subject of consultations between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

We have heard today with great interest the assessment of the concept of nuclear deterrence which was put forward by President R. Alfonsín. With great eloquence, accuracy and cogency he showed the destructiveness of this concept for mankind and the extremely dangerous consequences of its application in

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

practice, as well as its role in stimulating the arms race. At a Conference meeting as recently as 9 June, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, V.F. Petrovsky, set out our assessment of the concept of deterrence in detail. From what President R. Alfonsín said today, it is clear that our assessments coincide. This is a source of great satisfaction to us.

As regards the statements by the representatives of France and the Federal Republic of Germany at the previous meeting regarding the concept of nuclear deterrence, I should like to say the following: the Soviet Union is not proposing that the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe should simply be followed by a return to the situation which prevailed on this continent 50 years ago. We are proposing that, after eliminating nuclear weapons, we should create a comprehensive security system which would rule out the very possibility of conducting war in Europe -- and not just in Europe -- using any type of weapon.

The Soviet Union and its allies are proposing a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe to a level where neither of the parties, while ensuring its defence, would have the means for a surprise attack on the other side, or for offensive operations in general. I should like to remind you that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty and each of the parties to it is subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. It is set forth in a document which has been circulated at the Conference on Disarmament (document CD/755 of 2 June 1987). Our doctrine is strictly defensive, and it is based on the concept that under present-day conditions recourse to military means to resolve any dispute is inadmissible. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty will never under any circumstances initiate military action against any State or alliance of States unless they are themselves the target of an attack. They will never be the first to employ nuclear weapons. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have no territorial claims on any other State, either in Europe or outside Europe. They do not view any State or any people as their enemy. Rather, they are prepared to conduct their relations with all the world's countries, without any exception, on the basis of mutual regard for security interests and of peaceful coexistence. It is not the purpose of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to maintain armed forces and armaments beyond the scale required to repel attack from outside. So they will strictly keep to the limits sufficient for defence and for repelling any possible aggression.

I agree that it is essential to combine the processes of arms reduction and the creation of a political climate of trust. It is precisely such an approach which underlies the concept of comprehensive security put forward by the socialist States. It is precisely the organic links between measures in the military, political, economic and humanitarian areas that serve as a basis for our policy in the field of security. In particular, we regard the continued division of Europe into opposing military blocs as unnatural; we appeal for their simultaneous dissolution and, as a first step, the elimination of the military organizations of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. Such a move would make an important contribution to eliminating the antagonism between East and West referred to on 9 June by Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Finally, in connection with the French representative's reaction to the statement by Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovsky, I should like to point out that Deputy Minister Petrovsky did not name any State in that part of his statement which prompted the reaction. We were surprised to hear such an interpretation of this statement, in which France was apparently included among the "students".

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Nazarkin for his statement, and now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, may I first of all express my delegation's congratulations to you, Sir, on assuming the important office of President for this month. I would also like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia for the excellent guidance he gave in the month of April. I would also like to extend our heartfelt welcome to the new representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, to our Conference.

In the statement just delivered by the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, there was a reference to the existence of United States nuclear weapons in Japan. May I take this opportunity to say that Japan adheres to a non-nuclear policy, and I can categorically state that there are no nuclear weapons of any State in Japanese territory.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for his kind words. Are there any requests for the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. BOLEWSKI (Federal Republic of Germany): Thank you, Mr. President. My delegation reserves the right to reply to the observations made by the Soviet delegate at an appropriate time and in an appropriate way. For the time being, it suffices to point out that the position of my delegation as well as of many others on the doctrine of deterrence is widely known and need not be repeated at the present time. We shall resort to those points in detail at the given moment.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. Are there any further requests for the floor? Apparently not.

Distinguished representatives, I have requested the secretariat to circulate today the usual timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable is, of course, purely indicative and subject to changes or additions, if necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adop s the draft decision.

It was so decided.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): As you are aware, consultations are taking place concerning the programme of work for the second part of the annual session. I understand that the groups will meet for consultations immediately after this plenary meeting, so that we can expedite agreement on that programme. I have been informed that the Group of 21 will meet in this room with the usual facilities. If there are no further comments, I shall declare that the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 16 June, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.413
16 June 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 16 June 1987, at 10. a.m.

President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 413th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates, consultations as you know are still going on on the programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session. I intend in the light of those consultations to convene as soon as we finish our list of speakers an informal meeting of the Conference in order to consider that question. We shall then resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize any agreement which may have been achieved at the informal meeting. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Hungary, Bulgaria, France and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, His Excellency Ambassador David Meiszter, head of the delegation of Hungary to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Let me, at the outset of my statement, congratulate you on the assumption of the responsible post of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of June. In wishing you success in guiding the proceedings for this auspicious body, I would like to assure you that my delegation will fully co-operate with you in any of your efforts to move the work towards tangible results. May I be permitted to express the thanks and appreciation of my delegation to your distingusihed predecessor in the chair, Ambassador Milos Vejvoda, for his genuine efforts in reaching real advance in high-priority tasks. I would like also to welcome in our midst our new colleague, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, head of the delegation of the United States of America. I am looking forward to co-operating with him as I did with his distinguished predecessors.

The session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held at the end of May in Berlin, the documents of which were presented to the Conference the other day by Ambassador Harald Rose, rightly drew the attention of world public opinion time and again to the overriding need for urgent, tangible results in the field of nuclear disarmament. The communiqué issued by the session placed particular emphasis on a new way of thinking, a new approach to the issues of war and peace, disarmament and other complex global and regional problems, and the abandonment of the concept of "nuclear deterrence", which supposes that nuclear weapons are the guarantee for the security of States. Specific details of the new thinking were highlighted by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir F. Petrovsky of the USSR in his statement to the Conference to which my delegation fully subscribes.

To translate those goals into reality, practical steps need be taken in the field of nuclear disarmament. One such step could be to proceed as soon as possible to the conclusion of an agreement on eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe, coupled with the elimination of shorter-range missiles. Another step in that direction could be a radical reduction in offensive strategic weapons along with strengthening of the ABM Treaty régime. One cannot but welcome and render unconditional support to the efforts under way, and hope that the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States will produce tangible results in the very near future.

I have listened with interest to positions explained by some delegations concerning the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament in the context of the elimination of all European medium-range nuclear

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

missiles. Although the issue of conventional disarmament is not one of the subjects actively dealt with here in this body, I find it appropriate to recall that several proposals have been made to this effect by the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Just to mention some of them:

Last June my delegation submitted to the Conference the Budapest Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. That proposal still stands;

The Berlin session of the Warsaw Treaty Organization discussed ways of implementing the programme submitted by its States parties with a view to achieving a 25 per cent reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe during the early 1990s. The reductions are scheduled to take place simultaneously with and in conjunction with reductions in tactical nuclear systems;

Furthermore, the Berlin session, responding to the concerns raised, expressed its awareness of the asymmetric structures of the armed forces maintained by the two sides in Europe, and stated its preparedness to have the imbalance that has arisen in certain elements redressed in the course of the reductions, proposing that the side which has an advantage over the other should make the appropriate cut-backs.

May I draw attention to the fact that thereby not only has this concern been addressed, but this has been done using the very term "redressed" that may be familiar to those raising the concern.

Nuclear disarmament as a complex of specific disarmament issues has been from the beginning a top-priority task of the Conference on Disarmament too. The fact that promising efforts are being undertaken in the USSR-United States bilateral talks does not relieve this body of its responsibility to make its own contribution as envisaged in its mandate. On the contrary, the progress in talks between the USSR and the United States should be a factor prompting this body to prove that the Conference itself is not outside the mainstream of international trends towards a safer world.

During the first part of this year's session, efforts were made by the presidents of the Conference as well as by individual delegations or groups of delegations, in plenaries and in informal consultations alike, to find a way to proceed, but in vain. In assessing what the Conference on Disarmament has accomplished so far, it should be noted that the steps taken fall far short of the task inscribed in our mandate, without mentioning the even more ambitious proposals found in abundance in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly or the proposals made by the USSR on 15 January 1986, or in several other documents.

The least we should be able to do here is to specify the areas where we could contribute to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament. There is a wide range of possibilities for that, starting with working out a phased programme for eliminating nuclear weapons and ranging up to the initiation of practical work on such particular issues as the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

The central issue in proceeding towards nuclear disarmament is the comprehensive cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. It is the well-known position of my delegation that the eventual aim of a CTB should be to prohibit all test explosions by all States in all environments for all time, and to work out effective measures to prevent circumvention of the ban under the pretext of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. A CTB could be one step capable of greatly contributing to advancing the limitation, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Partial steps towards a full scale CTB -- such as reducing the number and yield of nuclear explosions -- might facilitate reaching the above goal, provided such measures are not offered as a substitute. At the same time one may agree that working out such practical steps is better suited to the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States.

During its spring session the Conference invested an enormous amount of work to create the necessary procedural framework for commencing negotiations on the issue, but it failed. My delegation is aware of the conflicting views as far as the substance and the appropriate procedure are concerned. Nevertheless, I cannot agree that this is enough reason to put off the commencement of work. Even though a State or States may for the time being consider the CTB as a long-term objective, that should not exclude the commencement of practical work. The time needed to work out a treaty is not a matter of months. Take the example of the prohibition of chemical weapons with its decades-old negotiating history.

My delegation strongly urges all those concerned to put aside stereotyped positions, show flexibility and start practical work. To set up an Ad hoc Committee on a CTB without further delay is indispensable. The scope of a future CTB should not cause too many difficulties, since it is almost self-evident. On that understanding our practical efforts might be concentrated on other crucial aspects, among others verification.

In the view of my delegation, the proposal presented by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky of the USSR on behalf of the group of socialist delegations contains all the necessary major elements that provide a solid basis for sensible work. Whether a CTB is a short-term or long-term objective may well prove to be of less importance once the work has been started.

As one of the sponsors of the "Basic provisions" of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, I would like at this stage to highlight some of its features we find especially important. An outstanding feature of the proposal is that it provides for a ban on nuclear-weapon testing as far as the scope of a future treaty is concerned. As a first step the ban would apply to the two major nuclear Powers for a period of five years. The proposal leaves no doubt, however, that the final aim is a universal ban on nuclear-weapon testing by virtue of subsequent accession to it by the other nuclear Powers. This approach to the scope of participation is meant to accommodate well-known positions held by some of the nuclear Powers.

The most remarkable feature of these provisions is undoubtedly the part dealing with verification of the test ban. It provides for the application of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

national means of verification, and access to the results of such verification for other States. Another provision for verification is the establishment of a network of international seismic stations, including the exchange of Level II seismic data and the measuring of atmospheric radioactivity and the exchange of the data obtained from such measurements.

Radical provisions are proposed for on-site inspection in cases when suspicions or doubts emerge concerning strict compliance with the treaty. Under its terms all parties would have the right to demand, and the challenged party would be obliged to provide access for, an on-site inspection to clarify events giving rise to suspicion on the basis of an appropriately substantiated request, through procedures to be elaborated.

We continue to hold that strict compliance with a future treaty is a must to ensure the effective functioning and authority of a CTBT. A verification régime on the lines proposed could meet that requirement. It could greatly contribute to dispelling long-held reservations to the effect that finding the appropriate verification mechanism may cause insurmountable difficulties.

There is a further specific item in the vast domain of nuclear disarmament I would like to dwell on: the question of negative security assurances. Strengthening of the security of States, and particularly those which have renounced the nuclear option, has been an issue ever since the world was divided into nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Amplified by the emergence of the NPT and its review conferences, this task is coming more and more to the forefront. It is not an exaggeration to say that assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons has become a permanent subject of any multilateral conference held on nuclear issues.

This question was actively dealt with at earlier stages of the work of this Conference, in plenary and in working bodies. However, it was progressively moved to the periphery of attention, not without an unfounded sense of scepticism. This in our view is a deplorable development, especially if we add that the Conferences's performance in other nuclear fields has been meagre to say the least. It is a matter of consolation that this year the ad hoc committee set up to deal with the subject will start substantive work under the chairmanship of Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

The question of assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons has mainly been considered so far in the context of unilateral undertakings assumed by the nuclear-weapon States. Efforts to merge these undertakings -- different in substance and wording to a large extent -- into a single international instrument of legally binding character turned out to be a futile exercise. Not that the final aim was wrong, but perhaps the approach pursued or the political conditions were unfavourable. We continue to hold that States which have renounced the nuclear option are entitled to enjoy firm, unconditional assurances that they will never be subjected to the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. We are still of the view that the appropriate form for such assurances would be a single international instrument of legally binding character.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

An approach to the subject from the narrow angle of unilateral undertakings by the five nuclear-weapon States may rightly be considered obsolete now. Recent developments in international politics provide a reliable substantive basis to seek and find a broader, fresh approach better suited to the prevailing political circumstances.

During their summit meeting in Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan reached a historic political understanding to the effect that "a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought". The USSR has repeatedly declared that it strictly adheres to the policy of non-first-use. Documents of the Berlin session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization contain numerous elements relating to this issue. As far as the East-West aspect of the question is concerned, the Stockholm Conference also contributed a significant element to the issue of negative security assurances: the participants made a firm political commitment to refrain from the use of military force, be it nuclear or conventional. One could go on with the enumeration of the favourable elements providing the substantive basis for a fresh approach based on new thinking.

My delegation feels it appropriate that the ad hoc committee, when resuming its work this year, should survey the latest developments relevant to its work -- including those mentioned a minute ago -- and take advantage of the new situation created by the latest favourable developments in international politics. Given goodwill on the part of all, the Committee should find a way out of the impasse regarding the problem of negative security assurances.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency Ambassador David Meiszter for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself and to my predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda. The next speaker on my list today is His Excellency Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov, head of the delegation of Bulgaria to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, may I express my pleasure at seeing you, the representative of Egypt, with which my country enjoys friendly relations, in the chair as President of the Conference for the month of June. Your personal abilities which you displayed as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and of other United Nations bodies, make me confident that you will discharge your important duties in a most efficient manner. I assure you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation in your task to give a good start to the work of our summer session. I also wish to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, my delegation's sincere thanks for the efforts he made and for the skilful way in which he guided the Conference during the month of April and in May. I would like to seize the opportunity to welcome in our midst Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the new head of the delegation of the United States of America. We are looking forward to co-operating with him as we did with his predecessor.

The Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty reaffirmed in its Berlin Declaration that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, being a defensive one, is subordinated to the task of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. It is not my intention to dwell in detail on the constituent elements of the Declaration, since its text has been circulated as an official document (CD/755) and was very well introduced by Ambassador Harald Rose on 9 June.

My delegation would like to emphasize, however, that the States parties singled out in their communiqué the need for renewed efforts to agree upon practical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. They are calling for:

Immediate conclusion of an agreement to eliminate all United States and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe;

Simultaneous elimination of the Soviet and United States shorter-range missiles in Europe and opening of negotiations on such missiles stationed in the eastern parts of the Soviet Union and on the territory of the United States;

Settlement of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, including tactical missiles, in Europe through multilateral negotiations;

Conclusion of an agreement on radical reductions in offensive strategic weapons coupled with a strengthening of the ABM Treaty régime;

Conclusion of a total ban on nuclear testing.

The negotiations between the USSR and the United States on intermediate nuclear forces are now at a crucial point. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have made their contribution in order to facilitate the reaching of agreement at the negotiations. In the course of his recent visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the State Council of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, stated, inter alia:

> "The USSR and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty went far beyond the well-known 'zero option'. This unique chance for European nations should not be missed. Reaching an agreement would not just have major political importance. It would change to a significant degree the psychological atmosphere on our continent. And this would open the way to other important agreements in the field of disarmament."

Mr. President, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has been the most powerful booster of the arms race and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race in the aftermath of the Second World War. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty reject the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as amoral and dangerous. Nuclear weapons are not and cannot be a guarantee of security. Quite the contrary. The more nuclear weapons are piling up in the arsenals, the more the risk of nuclear catastrophe grows. My delegation shares the view expressed in this hall by the President of the Argentine Republic that it is high time "to abandon once and for all the theories that require us to comprehend the incomprehensible, to accept the unacceptable ...".

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

An agreement on intermediate nuclear weapons can and must be a first step towards a higher goal: the gradual reduction and total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. To make more tangible the prospects for achieving this goal, two important measures are needed: a halt to all nuclear testing, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee stressed once again the importance of a general and complete prohibition of nuclear testing as a measure to halt the development, production and refinement of nuclear arms and achieve the gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of these weapons, as well as to prevent an arms race in outer space. Being deeply convinced of the urgent necessity for the Conference to begin substantive work on item 1 of its agenda, my delegation is co-sponsoring document CD/756, "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". This document was presented by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, in a most detailed and eloquent manner.

The nuclear-test ban is not an end in itself. This is a problem which has been examined for more than 30 years now, and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions. It is generally recognized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons than a nuclear-test ban. It is obvious that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing intensifies the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was undoubtedly right in pointing out, at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly, that the readiness to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty was "the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament".

In 1963 the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom undertook, in article I of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of nuclear testing. This undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Furthermore, article VI of this Treaty embodied a legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

In a report submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on 30 July 1980, the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR stated, inter alia, that they were "mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments will have", as well as "conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems". Against this background it is unacceptable today to hear that some countries regard the nuclear-test ban as a long-term objective.

In co-sponsoring document CD/756, my delegation hopes that it will impart new vigour to the efforts aimed at commencing practical work on item 1. The document puts in a single perspective the positive stock of many years of efforts; it contains ideas and proposals advanced by many countries, including the Six States from Five Continents. The content of the draft

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

treaty is imbued with the spirit of new political thinking which, as Deputy Minister Petrovsky stressed, "requires that diplomatic practice should be brought into line with the realities of the nuclear and space age".

The issue of verification and control is a case in point. For years it was argued by a number of delegations that this problem is the main stumbling-block on the road towards an agreement. The joint proposal of the group of socialist countries is clear proof of their readiness to explore all avenues with a view to establishing a solid system of verification and control to be embodied in an agreement on a nuclear-test ban. Use of national technical means of verification, establishment of an international system of seismic verification, international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity, ensuring the non-functioning of nuclear-weapon test sites, on-site inspection: no idea has, in our view, been forgotten in the document tabled by the socialist countries. And it is worth mentioning again that the Group of socialist countries puts forward the idea that an international inspectorate should be established, something which was not envisaged either in the 1982 USSR proposal or in the tripartite report submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

At the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly the political climate of the test ban issue was a bit improved, and a trend towards convergence of views emerged. There were also clear signs of greater openness on the matter during our spring session. Valuable work is being performed by the Group of Seismic Experts, which is preparing a second global collection and analysis test in 1988. There is no doubt in our mind that it is long overdue for the Conference to begin substantive work immediately on its agenda item 1.

My delegation would like to make very briefly some points about the work of the ad hoc committees.

In the communiqué issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Berlin recently, the States parties reiterated "their preparedness to complete the preparation of an international convention banning chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons and the industrial basis for their production by the end of this year". In this regard they recalled their Moscow Declaration of 25 March 1987.

The "rolling text" entitled "Current stage of the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention" registers the progress achieved so far. The Ad hoc Committee took the only logical decision: to use the "rolling text" as a basis for negotiations during the summer session of the Committee. My delegation would like neither to underestimate nor to overestimate the problems that remain to be resolved by the Ad hoc Committee. It seems to us, however, that there is a trend towards convergence of views with regard to the outstanding political problems: issues pertaining to non-production of chemical weapons, fact-finding, including challenge inspection, the organization and functions of the Consultative Committee and its organs, just to mention, perhaps, the most important ones. The task of negotiating

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

solutions to those problems could be carried out provided that there is a clear political will not to artificially complicate the negotiations, not to become bogged down in never-ending discussions on technical details.

For three years now discussions have been going on in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. There are different views as to what has been done and what needs to be done. It is clear that the present legal régime raises some barriers to an arms race in outer space, but that in many crucial areas this régime is far from complete. Hence, on the one hand, existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, must be strictly adhered to. On the other hand, the work of the Ad hoc Committee must be broadened and deepened with a view to considering specific measures and undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

At its forty-first session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a decision providing for the Conference to conclude the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first part of its 1987 session. Although some progress was registered, one has to recognize that the finalization of the draft Programme continues to elude the Conference. It is clear that time is running out, because the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is coming closer and closer. Therefore, we believe that the summer session of the Conference is duty-bound to do what the spring session failed to achieve on item 8.

At the end of the spring session an exchange of views took place on how best to proceed further with item 7. Having worked over the last few years on the basis of a unitary approach, the Ad hoc Committee decided to discuss the two tracks -- "Radiological weapons in the traditional sense" and "Prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities" -- separately in two contact groups. One must not, however, overlook the fact that procedural devices per se do not produce concrete results unless they are coupled with more flexible positions on substance. In other words, the challenge to make headway on item 7 remains as great as ever.

Before concluding, I would like to point out that my delegation welcomes the setting up of a working group to examine ways and means of improving the work of the Conference. We believe that the group should, among other things, recognize the need for the Conference to work on all issues included in its agenda and consider them in a substantive manner, regardless of whether an ad hoc committee has been established or not.

If now my delegation does not dwell on items 2 and 3 of the agenda, it is due to the fact that our position was laid out on 28 April.

On the eve of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament we should try to move forward on as many issues on the agenda as possible. The work of the Conference is going to be reviewed. Therefore, the best possible thing for the Conference to do is to make progress and begin producing concrete results. After all, we must give the international community what it has asked us to do. We have a chance, so let us take it.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov of the delegation of Bulgaria to the Conference on Disarmament for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and to my predecessor Ambassador Vejvoda, as well as for having reminded us of the close relationship binding Egypt and Bulgaria. The next speaker on my list is His Excellency Ambassador Pierre Morel, representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, in introducing the French document on the maintenance of a security balance among all the parties to the convention during the 10-year period of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, which will be distributed to members of the Conference under the number CD/757, I wish to emphasize the paramount concern underlying this paper, that is the search for security within the framework of the convention. I will elaborate on the various practical applications before I come to the indispensable complement, that is verification. I now turn to the first part, the security imperative and its consequences.

Having already set out our general concerns at the end of the spring half of the session, on 28 April, suffice it this time for me to recall that in our view the convention, in order to be credible, must guarantee all parties to the convention security from the very moment of its entry into force, and not only a future security once all chemical weapons have been eliminated. The 10-year period must not be a period of diminished security. It is the first phase of the application of the convention, the development of which, in conditions of security acceptable to all, is indispensable in order to reach the second and final phase of the convention.

The order of destruction of stockpiles, as has already been pointed out by many States, is in this regard of decisive importance. But this is not simply a technical problem. The matter is eminently political since it is a question of establishing, for the whole of the 10-year period of stock destruction, a security balance based on security stocks which are limited, homogeneous and verifiable. Let us look more closely at these two concepts.

First of all, security balance. The future convention must be based on strict equality between all parties. No signatory country can claim special treatment at one moment or another. This is indeed the final goal, since the aim is a final ban on possession and production by all the States parties to the convention. But this equality must also be the rule during the 10-year period. Otherwise, in the initial stages, the convention will follow in the steps of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a treaty for the disarmament of disarmed countries, organizing maintained armaments for some and disarmament for others.

The provisions of the convention will play a decisive role in this respect. One must start from two observations which very seriously complicate the smooth course of the 10-year period.

First observation: stockpiles will be declared only 30 days after the entry into force of the convention. The precise state of affairs as regards chemical warfare will not therefore be technically known or politically recognized until after the accession of most States.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Morel, France)

Second observation: we already know, but in a very unclear way, in the absence of declarations on the part of the major chemical-weapon States, that the capacities are very unequally distributed and that a single European State alone possesses considerable resources. Whatever the order and volume of destruction of stockpiles, the linear or stage-by-stage schedules which have been contemplated so far would in fact lead, in the early years of the convention, to an oligopolistic situation in stock-holding until the end of the 10-year period, with small stockpiles cut down to insignificant volumes in the very first years.

In our view, this pattern cannot be considered a temporary drawback. Ten years is a very long period for the security of a State. For the sake of the credibility of the convention, and thus in order to ensure full accession by all States, we cannot go from everything to nothing because of an uncertain and profoundly inequitable mechanism.

Nor can one rule out the risk of delay due to technical reasons, or a crisis in the implementation of the agreed timetable for destruction of stocks during this 10-year period. Everything must be done to avoid this, but we cannot altogether set aside the possibilities that could arise. Here again one or two States might be in a position to deal with such a situation, whereas all the others would be taken unawares. In order to remedy this major drawback of lack of balance in the implementation of the destruction programme, and to ensure the fairness and therefore the full credibility of the convention, there is a need to establish a security balance which will enable all States that feel it is necessary to have a minimum chemical weapon capacity. Obviously this would not involve a sort of quantitative levelling out, but, for the period required, 10 years, guarding against any attempt to use or threaten the use of chemical weapons, thus affording a serious guarantee of a smooth transition from the present situation to the final régime of elimination and total prohibition.

Other approaches to the transition could in theory be contemplated to ensure security balance. They are set out in the French document. One would consist of a prior Soviet-United States agreement which would enter into force immediately to bring the stocks held by the most heavily armed Powers into line with those of the others, the entry into force of the convention being delayed correspondingly. The other possibility would be to arrange the 10-year period in such a way that the first half would apply only to the United States and the USSR.

For practical as well as political reasons, the drawbacks of these options are clearly greater than the advantages, if only because they delay the entry into force of the convention at a time when the possibility of chemical weapons becoming commonplace must be seriously considered. We therefore set them aside, and cast our vote for the full application of the convention and recognition of the right to maintain limited security stocks during the 10-year period.

Now to the security stocks themselves. In the document before the Conference today, France suggests that a distinction should be drawn, in the declaration made on the thirtieth day after the entry into force of the convention, between stockpiles other than security stocks, which fall under

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Morel, France)

the general régime already being developed, and security stocks as such, subject to a specific régime, which would remain unchanged until the end of the eighth year, and would then be destroyed in simultaneous and very carefully defined phases during the two last years of the 10-year period.

These stocks should meet specific criteria, and the following are the main characteristics.

They should be optional: the establishment of a security stock may appear necessary to one party or another to the convention, which might consider at the time the convention enters into force that it needs to ensure security balance vis-à-vis other Powers holding chemical weapons. But it goes without saying that the convention cannot impose this on any party. It is thus an option open to all member States for a period of 10 years, subject to very strict constraints which will be set out in detail later on.

The stocks should be limited; we suggest a level which is very low but still of military significance, that is, in our view, between 1,000 and 2,000 tons. In order for the stocks to remain credible until the last year of the 10-year period, we propose an amount equal to at least twice the minimum volume regarded as militarily significant. The exact level would have to be determined by agreement among the parties before the entry into force of the convention. But at all events the proposed range makes it possible to appreciate the difference between this stockpile and the present capacities of the major Powers, which are measured in tens of thousands of tons on the one side, and hundreds of thousands of tons on the other. This gap on its own is sufficient to show that security stocks can only have a purely defensive role against the possiblility of a chemical weapon attack. There is therefore no conflict with the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The stocks should be identical for all parties, that is to say at the same level for all countries, in accordance with the reasons just given above.

The stocks should be homogeneous, in other words made up exclusively of munitions containing V-nerve agents. Monitoring would thus be simplified, but also the inevitable maintenance of protection programmes against an attack by chemical weapons during the 10-year period.

The stocks should be verifiable from the entry into force of the convention right up until complete destruction. This particularly sensitive point will be elaborated on in the second part of this statement.

The stocks should be backed up by a single production facility for the countries that so desire. This provision may be surprising in a prohibition convention, but it meets two considerations which stem from technical constraints on the one hand and respect for the convention on the other.

From the technical point of view, provision should be made for maintaining the security stock in condition or renewing a portion of it over an eight-year period: it is not possible to rule out the possibility of storage accidents, defective munitions or, more generally, the need for maintaining the level of part of the security stock. In a broader context, associating a production facility with the security stock should go a long way

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Morel, France)

towards deterring any party to the convention which might be tempted to cheat, and also persuading non-signatory States that they cannot gain a clear advantage by staying outside the convention.

The corollary of this particular provision is of course that this single production facility must be declared from the date of entry into force of the convention and placed under international control until its destruction at the end of the 10-year period.

The main characteristics of the security stock having thus been set out, I will merely add that our document describes the setting-up arrangements when the two distinct régimes come into force: the régime for security stocks, as just outlined, and the régime for stockpiles other than security stocks, in accordance with the provisions at present being negotiated in the draft convention. It also sets out how, after eight years, when all other stocks and related facilities have been destroyed, a start would be made on the simultaneous destruction of security stocks and each single production facility.

Let me now turn to verification, which is obviously one of the essential elements of the system proposed. Since this is a transitory régime and one which is at odds with the ultimate aim of the convention, it is indispensable to ensure that it cannot be diverted from its final purpose. Verification is of decisive importance for the whole of the convention, but it is of course particularly significant for security stocks.

I will not return here to the production facility which is under permanent international control and which will be closed down during the ninth year and destroyed before the end of the tenth year. This is a relatively simple case of complete verification — "unlimited", one might say -- whereas the definition of the verification régime for the security stock is inevitably a matter of greater complexity. As a matter of principle the security stock must be subject to challenge inspection. But, as can be seen from the current work of the Conference on this subject, access to storage facilities has led to the search for balance between security considerations (and confidentiality) on the one hand, and the need to ensure full respect for the convention on the other. Our latest exchanges of views have shown that there is no ready-made a priori formula, but that it should be possible to establish a régime which is both strict and balanced and which will ensure effective and realistic verification.

We believe therefore that the verification régime for security stocks is simply one special case within the more general framework of verification of the convention, and that it does not merit special treatment. That is why we have refrained in this document from defining a single and therefore final formula, and have set out, together with the formula we prefer, other options which are less satisfactory in our view. The choice to be made between these various options will of course depend on the answers to three major questions.

The first, a particularly sensitive one, is that of location. In our wish to take part in an open exercise which would make it possible to appreciate, before choosing, the advantages and drawbacks of the various possible formulae, we are ready to envisage the declaration of the location of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Morel, France)

a security stock as from the very entry into force of the convention. This undoubtedly offers an advantage with regard to verification. But at the same time, we must appreciate the real and serious drawback as regards security, since declaring the location might also encourage a pre-emptive attack in the the event of a crisis. That is why our preference falls on the option under which the location would not be declared publicly, but recorded in a sealed envelope which would be opened in the event of a challenge inspection. The possibility of transfer to another location would naturally have to be kept open, but this would then be subjected to the same conditions; that is to say, with the new location indicated in a sealed envelope.

The second question concerns the number of locations for security stocks, whether the location is declared or not. Here again, security considerations would lead us to believe that several locations would be preferable; but if the monitoring is to be effective, agreed limits are required, which we would suggest be set at five locations.

The third difficulty which should be pointed out here is the question of direct access in the case of challenge inspection. I raise this matter here for the record; the solution to be chosen with regard to security stocks will in the final analysis be the same as that decided on for the general régime.

Whatever the final balance determined for the monitoring of security stocks, we must recall that this will be carried out within a strictly defined framework, which will place heavy burdens on all the parties to the convention:

Initial declaration within 30 days of the entry into force of the convention, specifying the volume, composition and location of the place of storage, either publicly or in a sealed envelope;

During the first eight years, régime of challenge inspection which varies according to whether the location is known or not;

At the end of the eighth year, opening of the sealed envelopes where appropriate, and in any case placing of stocks under international control preparatory to phased destruction. The challenge inspection régime thus remains the indispensable instrument for verification.

This very brief recapitulation of the verification mechanisms enables us to emphasize that we do not intend to leave any escape clause in drawing up the régime which will be finally adopted.

There is still one point which can be linked to verification. This is what has been presented -- wrongly -- as the risk of CW proliferation which it is claimed would stem from the approach adopted by France. Some have stated that, by providing for the possibility of constituting a limited security stock for a period of 10 years, this would at least indirectly sanction CW proliferation. This is a complete misunderstanding. The risk of CW proliferation can be defined only in relation to a ban; it necessarily exists in any convention arrangement simply because sovereign States cannot be forced to accede to a convention. Everything which, like the security stocks, will help to enhance the effectiveness, the non-discriminatory character and the equality of all parties in the course of the 10-year period, will

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Morel, France)

strengthen the credibility of the convention and encourage States to accede. But let me add above all that the provisions related to verification, and the destruction of security stocks and the sole production facility referred to above, clearly show that these provisions do not in any way encourage acquisition of a CW capability. The limited option proposed contains binding and very stringent provisions. Far from encouraging proliferation, the instrument we have suggested introduces clarity and equity in the relations between all the States parties in the decisive period of the first 10 years of implementation of the convention.

Having thus set out the principal reasons which led us to put this document before the Conference, we are aware of the fact that the provisions suggested for security stocks may have certain relatively new elements. But we would also like to recall that France put this question before the Conference for its attention as much as two years ago. To date it has not been possible to embark on a detailed discussion of this issue, and so it is essential to do so today, because the problem cannot be avoided.

We also know that security stocks are not the only important issue that has not been dealt with so far: much remains to be done, for example, in defining super-toxic lethal substances, on guarantees, which have been wisely raised by the delegation of Pakistan, or on the strictly industrial aspects of the convention.

None of these issues in our view is of such central importance in the structure of the convention as that of security stocks. Without constantly assured security there will be no stable, credible and lasting convention. It would be better to deal with this issue before concluding negotiations and do this in an open-minded way, with great clarity of approach, so as to arrive at a workable mechanism which will be the best guarantee of the success of the convention, rather than leaving it until afterwards, in an atmosphere of uncertainty and distrust.

And in order to dispel misunderstanding, in order to avoid the repetition of unfounded allegations such as those that have appeared in the press recently, I would like to conclude by reiterating vigorously that our goal is the complete elimination of chemical weapons, as our Prime Minister recalled recently in Moscow: "The day when there is a verified diappearance of chemical weapons, we will be the first to destroy our own: I can make this formal commitment: we will be at zero level at the same time as the others."

This is the best way to sum up the proposal we have just made, which we hope will be considered by the Conference with all the attention it deserves.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Pierre Morel, the representative of France to the Conference, for his statement. Now I give the floor to Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, the representative of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, permit me first of all to express my pleasure at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of June. Pakistan and Egypt are bound to each other by many ties and work closely together in international forums. May I therefore assure you

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

that in the fulfilment of your responsibilities as President of the Conference, you will have the full co-operation of my delegation. Your diplomatic skill and experience are known to all, and I am confident that under your guidance the work of the Conference will be conducted in a most able manner. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to compliment your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, who presided over the Conference in April with great distinction and skill.

I should also like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who have joined us since I took the floor last time, the distinguished Ambassadors of Indonesia and the United States, and to wish them a successful tour of duty in Geneva.

In my statement on 16 April, I gave the views of my delegation on the nuclear and nuclear-related items of our agenda. It is gratifying that, since then, the Conference has appointed Ambassador Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on item 6. It is our hope that substantive work on this important question will commence at an early date and will lead to positive results.

While I do not intend today to dwell at any length on issues which I touched upon in my last statement, I cannot help expressing a strong sense of disappointment that the Conference has yet to come to an agreement on an appropriate organizational framework for dealing with the first three items on its agenda, relating to several priority questions in the area of nuclear disarmament. The address by the President of the Argentine Republic, His Excellency Mr. Raúl Alfonsín, to the Conference last week was an eloquent call for nuclear sanity, and we hope it will be heeded by those who seem to believe that the only way of assuring their own security and that of their allies is to hold mankind hostage to the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

I would now like to turn to items 4, 5 and 8 of our agenda. Pakistan has always supported a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on chemical weapons. My delegation is therefore gratified at the progress which is being made under item 4 of our agenda in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Last year and in the inter-sessional period, the Ad hoc Committee was able to elaborate the text of several important parts of the convention under the chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom. Further significant progress was recorded during the spring part of the current session under the able guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, notably in the agreement that elimination of stocks should take place only through destruction, and towards drafting texts concerning verification of declarations on production facilities, their interim monitoring and the verification of their elimination, modalities for the revision of lists under article VI and some details of the institutional structure to be established under the convention.

We are confident that the momentum of the negotiations will be maintained during the summer part of the session. A complete ban on chemical weapons now seems to be within our reach, and we would urge all parties to join in an effort to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion before the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament next year.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

We are not unmindful of the outstanding issues, some of them of considerable complexity, which have yet to be resolved. Foremost among them are the questions of challenge inspection and of non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry. At the heart of both these issues lies the same consideration, that of effective verification. There has been no dearth of proposals on the question of challenge inspection. My delegation too submitted one such proposal last year in an attempt to bridge the differences which have prevented an agreement so far. We have been heartened by indications of a gradual convergence of views during the spring part of the session. It is evident, however, that considerable work remains to be done before this convergence is translated into treaty language. The issue of challenge inspection raises two considerations: one the one hand, the need for a stringent verification régime which would make it extremely difficult for any violation of the convention to go undetected, and on the other hand, the right of a State to protect installations of a highly sensitive nature having relevance to its supreme security interests from unreasonable and unjustified scrutiny. In our view, these two considerations are not irreconcilable, and we are confident that it would be possible to work out a mechanism which takes due account of both. One way of doing so would be to entrust the Executive Council with decision-making authority in disputed cases under an appropriate voting mechanism which guarantees that such differences are settled with all possible dispatch.

In the context of challenge inspection, some concern has been expresssed about the possibility of what are described as "frivolous" challenges. My delegation feels that these fears are largely exaggerated. We do not subscribe to the view that some States or their leaders act responsibly while others do not. In any event, more harm would be done by placing undue impediments on the right of a State to request inspection than would result from a resort to "frivolous" challenge.

My delegation has consistently taken the view that declarations regarding chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities should be made at the earliest possible stage, and should be comprehensive and detailed in order to be fully verifiable. We therefore welcome the flexibility shown by the Soviet delegation earlier during this session on the question of the declaration of locations of chemical weapon stocks and their verification. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee will soon be able to finalize the relevant provisions of article IV of the convention.

Despite encouraging progress in several areas, a number of important questions remain open besides those I have already mentioned, including questions relating to scope, the definition of chemical weapons, the definition of production facilities and measures to be taken for their elimination, and organizational questions. Nor should we forget articles X and XI dealing retrospectively with assistance and with economic and technological development. The importance of the final clauses (articles XII to XVI) should also not be underestimated. Articles X and XI are of great interest to the developing countries, and we are happy to note that the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee envisages their being taken up during the current session. My delegation has submitted a proposal on the question of assistance which we hope will receive consideration when work on article X commences.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

An important subject to which the Conference should address itself is that of adequate follow-up action to established violations of the convention. In this context, the question of sanctions to be taken against a State which has been found to have acted in violation of its obligations under the convention deserves serious examination. To withdraw from such a State its rights and privileges under the convention can hardly be regarded as a response commensurate with the gravity of an act posing a threat to the objectives of the convention. The States parties to the convention ought to go further and undertake collective action to remedy the situation.

My delegation has noticed a tendency to enter into too many technical and procedural details in drafting the convention. We feel that many of these details could be left to the international authority and its organs which will be established under the convention. In trying to settle all these matters at this stage by including them in the text of the convention or its annexes, we run the risk of unduly delaying its conclusion. There is also a more pragmatic reason why we feel this should not be attempted. It is quite likely that, after the entry into force of the convention and with the benefit of actual experience, a need might be felt to improve some of the technical and procedural details relating to implementation. If all these details are contained in the text of the convention, the necessary modification may be extremely difficult to bring about in view of the obvious difficulties in amending a multilateral international agreement. My delegation therefore does not favour introducing into the convention such an element of rigidity which may not be in the interest of its effective implementation.

Before I pass on to other items on our agenda, may I say that my delegation has been dismayed at the statement just made by the distinguished Ambassador of France. The proposal that parties to the Convention should be permitted to maintain secret security stockpiles of chemical weapons would negate the main objectives of the ban. It would also seriously undermine confidence in the observance of the convention, and only deepen mutual suspicion among States parties with all its perilous consequences. It comes at a particularly inopportune time in view of the progress that is being made in the negotiations taking place in this Conference.

The question of prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on the agenda of the CD since 1982. It has been identified by the General Assembly as a priority item. However, the discussions which have been held in the plenary, and since 1985 in the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, have been largely confined to an academic discussion of some of the issues which this problem raises. This is so largely because of the inadequacy of the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee, which does not permit it to embark upon the practical work of negotiating an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in this zone. As long as a suitable mandate which would enable the Committee to exercise its negotiating responsibility is denied to it, the prospects of making meaningful progress will remain limited. The Pakistan delegation therefore regrets that the efforts made by the Group of 21 at the beginning of the session to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee were not fruitful because of the inflexible position taken by one group. My delegation is, however, prepared to work constructively and make its modest contribution to the consideration of this issue in this Committee under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Mankind today stands at the threshold of an important turning-point. Outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind, is today being used extensively for military purposes. The majority of the space objects now in orbit serve military functions. There is a growing threat of the emergence of active space weapons and of ASAT and ABM weapons. Unless effective measures are taken to avert this danger, outer space will become yet another area of military competition and confrontation, severely restricting its use for peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all countries.

Competition in the military uses of outer space would have grave consequences. It would exacerbate the current state of instability inherent in the deployment of global nuclear arsenals, give the arms race a qualitatively new dimension, undermine existing disarmament agreements and jeopardize the disarmament process as a whole.

The imminent threat of "weaponization" of outer space which faces us today underscores the urgency of initiating negotiations in the Conference. While it is relatively easy to stop the development of a weapon in its initial stage or before it is actually tested and deployed, it becomes much more difficult to prohibit after its production and deployment. The Conference must not therefore delay shouldering its important responsibility in this area; otherwise it may soon be too late to reverse this dangerous trend.

It is sometimes pointed out that the question of an arms race in outer space is best left to the two super-Powers, which are already engaged in talks on the subject in Geneva. My delegation finds this argument unconvincing. While we are prepared to admit that, by reason of their actual or potential military capabilities, the two super-Powers, which are also the two principal space Powers, have a special responsibility in this connection, questions relating to outer space are no longer today of concern only to them but equally to other members of the international community. Bilateral talks therefore do not diminish the need for multilateral negotations. Only multilateral negotiations in the Conference can fully protect the rights of the international community. The super-Powers also have a responsibility to keep this Conference, and through it the General Assembly, informed of the progress of their talks.

The current legal régime regarding outer space is clearly inadequate for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The rapid technological developments which have been taking place in the area of outer space have revealed serious deficiencies and loopholes in existing agreements. There is no agreement on such basic terms as "peaceful purposes" or "militarization". Agreements currently in force leave considerable room for various military activities, including deployment of a wide range of weapons, in particular ASAT weapons. Further developments in space technology could erode the existing space law and make it completely irrelevant.

The goal that we must set for ourselves is the complete prohibition of all space weapons, including weapons directed against targets in space such as ASAT systems, weapons which interfere in the functioning of space objects, and space-based ABM systems. Such a ban must also provide for effective verification provisions, including on-site inspection. Pending the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

achievement of a comprehensive ban on space weapons, certain interim or partial measures could also be profitably negotiated. Priority in this regard could be given to the questions of a moratorium on the development, testing and deployment of ASAT weapons, and the immunity of space objects.

The United States-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1972 imposes important though limited restrictions on the development of space-based ABM systems. There have recently been disquieting reports that the restraints imposed by this agreement may be weakened. Such a development would be fraught with extremely serious consequences. Without these restraints, there would be an unrestrained arms race in both offensive and defensive systems. We therefore call upon the two parties to adhere strictly to its terms. Pakistan's proposal last year for an international instrument to supplement the ABM Treaty was made with the objective of strengthening the restraints contained in this treaty and making them applicable to all technologically advanced States.

There are some who maintain that the functions performed by many satellites have a stabilizing effect as they contribute to crisis management, early warning, communication and the verification of arms control agreements. My delegation does not wish to quarrel with this argument, except to point out that information gathered by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites has also been used in support of military operations. However, if the functions performed by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites are as benign as they are sometimes made out to be, one may well ask why this capability should remain the monopoly of the space Powers. Should we not entrust surveillance and reconnaissance activities by satellites to an international agency in order to monitor compliance with disarmament agreements? In this context, the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency deserves serious consideration. Such a multilateral verification capability could supplement and support bilateral arrangements and national technical means of verification.

The Registration Convention of 1974 provides a useful instrument as a confidence-building measure. The present system of declarations could be strengthened and, if properly implemented, could give greater transparency to outer space activities. So far the space Powers have not described the military functions of their satellites, although it is a well-known fact that most of these are performing such functions. The Review Conference of the Registration Convention which is to be held in 1989 could provide a useful opportunity for strengthening this Convention.

Mr. President, I will now turn to the last item on which I would like to express the views of my delegation, namely the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament did some useful work during the spring part of the session under the dedicated leadership of Ambassador García Robles, but was unable to complete its work in accordance with General Assembly decision 41/421. While we recognize the complexity of some of the remaining issues, we do not think it is impossible to resolve them if the necessary good will and flexibility is demonstrated by all sides, especially some nuclear-weapon States. Regrettably, this spirit does not seem to be much in evidence on the part of some of the delegations which have begun to question parts of the Programme earlier agreed upon by consensus and to reopen issues which appeared to have

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

been settled. My delegation will not, however, fail to make its due contribution with a view to the elaboration of a meaningful Programme before the third special session on disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, head of the delegation of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament, for his statement. I also thank him for having paid tribute to the close relationship between Egypt and Pakistan. I thank him for the kind words addressed to me and to my predecessor Ambassador Vejvoda. As I announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold a five-minute informal meeting to consider the draft programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session. After we conclude our consideration of that subject, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize any consensus that emerges at the informal meeting. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.45 a.m. and resumed at 12 noon.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): The 413th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. As a result of our exchange of views at the informal meeting, I intend to put before the Conference for decision a draft programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session. The draft programme of work is contained in document CD/WP.282, as amended at the informal meeting. I intend now to repeat those amendments for the record. First, agenda item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", will be considered in plenary meetings during the period 27 to 31 July. Secondly, agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", will be considered during the period 3 to 7 August. Thirdly, reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly will be taken up from 10 to 28 August, which would then become the closing date for the 1987 session. If there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session, as contained in document CD/WP.282, with the amendments that I have read out. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference is agreeable to that.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): This concludes our business for today. I intend now to adjourn the plenary. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 18 June at 10 a.m. sharp. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.06 p.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.414
18 June 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 June 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)

GE.87-61686/9022E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 414th meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates, in accordance with its programme of work the Conference will consider today agenda item 1, "Nuclear-test ban", and item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, and I now give him the floor.

Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia): Mr. President, it is indeed a great pleasure for my delegation to see you, Sir, representative of a brotherly non-aligned country with which Indonesia has always enjoyed a warm and cordial relationship, presiding over the Conference's deliberations for the first month of its summer session. In congratulating you, I am confident that under your wise leadership and long experience, our deliberations will reach a fruitful result. For my part, I would like to pledge my delegation's assurances in rendering its support and co-operation in the discharge of your duties.

Since this is the first time that I am taking the floor, may I take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia for his skilful leadership in guiding the Conference's deliberations last April, and to convey my gratitude to the distinguished representatives who have extended kind words of welcome to me in their previous interventions. I pledge to them my delegation's continued readiness and co-operation in striving for the goal of the Conference on Disarmament. Let me also have the pleasure of joining the previous speakers in welcoming the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, representative of a country with which Indonesia also enjoys close and friendly co-operation.

Next year, the General Assembly will hold its third special session devoted to disarmament, where, among other things, it will review the progress that has been achieved during the past nine years in the field of disarmament, since the adoption of the Final Document of its first special session. Thus one hardly needs to over-emphasize that this summer session, as well as next year's session, will be crucial and of utmost importance for the Conference on Disarmament, since the work of the Conference will also be reviewed in that special session.

Nine years ago, members of the United Nations solemnly declared and committed themselves in the Final Document of SSOD-I to a set of objectives and principles leading to the realization of the ultimate objective -- general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, we also made recommendations concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations. We agreed that the then existing disarmament machinery should be revitalized, and then we welcomed and recognized what is now the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Furthermore, paragraph 121 of the Final Document states

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

that bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

After taking stock of what we agreed in 1978 on some objectives and principles regarding disarmament, it is only natural, Mr. President, that my delegation should arrive at a conclusion similar to that in your previous statement as the head of the Egyptian delegation -- that bilateral and multilateral, or for that matter regional negotiations are not alternatives to one another, but complement and sustain each other. The results of the negotiations in each of these forums will serve as a mosaic forming the general and complete disarmament that we are striving for. Accordingly, it is our obligation not to construe negotiations in one forum as preventing the work in other forums. Indeed, all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States not only have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations but also have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament.

It is within this context that my delegation is happy to note that important multilateral and regional efforts have achieved fruitful and concrete results. The Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention and the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe are some of the examples. My delegation is especially happy and encouraged by the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga, turning the South Pacific into a nuclear-free zone. In our own region, Indonesia, together with other ASEAN countries, has for some time been engaged in important steps in drafting a treaty to establish the region of South-East Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, an essential component of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). My delegation hopes that all nations, and especially nuclear-weapon States, will accept such a contribution. I believe that this is not too much to ask for, since through paragraph 33 of the Final Document, we have agreed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States, constitute an important disarmament measure.

The negotiations in Reykjavik, despite their failure to result in a final consensus, also made an important contribution to the process of disarmament. From the meeting permeated the truth that a deep reduction in nuclear weapons and the eventual elimination of those weapons is possible. We, like others, take encouragement from the current initiatives taken by both sides to follow through and build upon what has been achieved at Reykjavik.

However, in spite of these results, it is by no means certain that those achievements have brought us closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. Most unfortunate is that, after all these nine years, the Conference on Disarmament has yet to realize a single draft treaty on a topic

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

on its agenda. Therefore, during the run-up to the United Nations General Assembly third special session devoted to disarmament, my delegation, compelled by its conscience, appeals to all member States to make all the necessary efforts to prove that our Conference is able to live up to its tasks and deliver what is expected by the international community. With this spirit, and if reason dictates that producing agreements on all items in this relatively short period of time is too ambitious a target to aspire to, let us then, at least, exert all those efforts needed to finalize the draft treaty on chemical weapons which we have been negotiating for many years. Hopefully, further steps could be taken that would bring us closer to negotiating draft treaties on other items which we have also been discussing for many years.

As we are aware, at the beginning of the spring session, negotiation on the chemical weapons convention reached a promising stage and gave rise to justifiable optimism. We hope during this summer session the Committee will take up other remaining important issues. At this juncture, I would like to congratulate Ambassador Ekéus and the co-ordinators of the three working groups for their skilful and commendable efforts which have enabled the Committee to achieve remarkable results. My delegation is also very appreciative of the constructive and flexible approach shown by delegations during the negotiations.

Item 7 is another issue in which my delegation believes that, given the necessary political will and sufficient flexibility, the Conference on Disarmament will be able to achieve concrete results. We have been engaging ourselves for many years in open debates covering the issues in track A and track B. It is about time now that the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should be spared from the ordeal of a procedural debate and allowed to start its substantive considerations in order to produce a "rolling text", as proof that the Conference is capable of registering further progress.

It was four years ago that our Conference for the last time established a subsidiary body on its very first item -- the nuclear-test ban. The mandate given to this body, as seen by my delegation, was to undertake work aimed at making negotiation on a CTBT a possibility. Like many others, my delegation has long considered that the mandate has been fulfilled and that we have already reached the stage where negotiation toward formulating the draft treaty should commence immediately. Thus, it is distressing to witness that lack of consensus on the question of a new mandate during these past three years has prevented the Conference from establishing a committee in order to set serious substantive work in motion.

Clearly, these past three years have provided ample evidence that nothing could be expected in the absence of an ad hoc committee. Such a situation has benefited neither the Conference nor the international community, and thus we must not let this situation continue endlessly. This bitter reality has confronted us with the choice of either maintaining the present situation, which does not produce a single result, or accepting a mandate that would enable the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee with the objective of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a CTBT. I am aware that some of us have deemed that such a mandate is inadequate, but this would nevertheless permit the Committee to start its substantial work and therefore open up the possibility of achieving results. It is under such circumstances that my delegation is ready to choose the latter course, since it offers the possibility of putting an end to this dire situation and, hopefully, will bring us closer to carrying out the negotiation that we all have been waiting for.

Before concluding, I do not have the slightest doubt that all of us gathered here have, in our common quest for peace, been imbued by a noble and ultimate mission. Einstein once said that "Peace cannot be kept by force, it can only be achieved by understanding".

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Tarmidzi, head of the delegation of Indonesia to the Conference on Disarmament, for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the President and to my predecessor Ambassador Vejvoda. I reciprocate his feelings concerning the close relations between our two countries, and I wish him every success in his task at this Conference.

Distinguished delegates, I have no other speakers for today and accordingly I wish to ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage. If there are no requests for the floor, I would like as usual to ask you to adopt the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. Of course the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. The chairmen of the subsidiary bodies have been consulted. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): The co-ordinator of the group of non-aligned neutral countries has asked me to announce that the group is going to hold a meeting immediately after this plenary meeting in this conference room. This brings us to the end of our work at today's session. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 23 June, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.415
23 June 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 June 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. S. Alfararqi (Egypt)

GE.87-61808/6945e

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 415th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates, in accordance with the programme of work, the Conference will consider today agenda item 1; "Nuclear test ban", and item 2; "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of this Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, and it is my pleasure to give him the floor now.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you Mr. President. It is a source of special pleasure for me to take the floor in a meeting during the month in which you are presiding over the proceedings of the Conference. We are all aware that you have thorough knowledge of the subjects which we are here to analyse. We are also fully aware of your impartiality, and, what is more infrequent, that you have faith in the task which we have to discharge. You may be assured, Sir, in carrying out your important functions, of the unreserved co-operation of the delegation of Mexico.

On 22 May 1984 the leaders of six States from different parts of the globe issued a joint statement in which, after noting that their countries differed in religion, culture and political systems, they underlined that they were united in "the conviction that there must not be another world war", adding that

> "on this, the most crucial of all issues, we have resolved to make a common effort in the interests of peace. Agreements which merely regulate an arms build-up are clearly insufficient. The probability of nuclear holocaust increases as warning time decreases and the weapons become swifter, more accurate and more deadly. The rush towards global suicide must be stopped and then reversed."

Two of these leaders, the heads of Government of India, Indira Gandhi, and Sweden, Olof Palme, were to fall victim to assassins' bullets, the first in 1984 and the second in 1986, and be replaced by those who are currently discharging the functions of prime ministers in their respective countries. The six heads of State or Government -- Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina, who just a few days ago made an outstanding statement to this very Conference; Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece; Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India; Miguel de la Madrid, President of Mexico; Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden; and Julius Nyerere, First President of Tanzania -- who have frequently reiterated the appeal made in 1984 not to jeopardize the chance of initiating a process of nuclear disarmament, and who held a second summit meeting in my country last August (you will recall that the first took place in New Delhi in 1985), wished to commemorate the third anniversary of the appeal to which I have just referred.

Accordingly, on 22 May this year they issued a joint statement in which, after noting that they welcomed the resumption of the dialogue on nuclear and space issues between the two super-Powers, as well as the fact that, at the summit meeting held in this city of Geneva in November 1985, between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev declared that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", they highlighted the importance of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

the immediate adoption of a number of specific nuclear disarmament measures for which, as was seen in Reykjavik, only political will is required. In this connection I can do no better than quote three of the paragraphs of the joint statement, the full text of which has been distributed today with the symbol CD/758. These paragraphs read as follows:

"Disarmament negotiations are now at a crucial point. There is a real possibility for an agreement in at least one important area. A breakthrough on the issue of nuclear arms in Europe appears to be within reach.

"An agreement to eliminate all intermediate nuclear forces from Europe would be of considerable significance and would constitute the crossing of an important psychological threshold, since, for the first time, it would lead to mutual withdrawal and destruction of fully operational nuclear weapon systems. We, therefore, urge the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct their current negotiations with a view to bringing them to a successful conclusion during 1987.

"However, an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces would be only the first step towards our common goal: the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. In the Delhi and Mexico Declarations, we had called for two important measures -- a halting of all nuclear testing and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We reiterate the crucial importance of these measures."

The authors of the statement are very well placed to prevent the absence of adequate procedures to verify compliance with the obligations entered into from being cited to justify a negative attitude, since on 7 August last year, at the second summit meeting held in Mexico, they adopted a document on verification measures which is reproduced in its entirety in Conference document CD/723 of the 15th of the same month and year, whose seventh paragraph reads as follows:

"In connection with a mutual halt in nuclear testing, our six nations are prepared to establish promptly and in co-operation with the United States and the USSR, temporary monitoring stations at existing test sites and to operate them for an initial period of one year. All data should be available to the six nations, the United States and the USSR. Data analysis could be a joint undertaking and preliminary analysis would be done at the sites. Monitoring of test sites by instruments installed on site would provide an extremely high sensitivity down to small fractions of a kiloton and even tons of explosives."

Obviously this is what the authors of the joint statement have in mind when they conclude their statement by alluding to it in the three last paragraphs, which I will now read out by way of rounding off my own statement:

"In Mexico, we made a concrete offer on verification of a halt to nuclear testing. That offer remains.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"For too long, fear and mistrust have prevented progress in disarmament. Arms and fears feed on each other. Now is the time to break this vicious circle and lay the foundation for a more secure world. The present momentum should not be lost.

"We urge President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to live up to this challenge so that future generations are spared the nightmare of a nuclear holocaust."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador García Robles, the distinguished representative of Mexico, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me, which I consider a courtesy to me personally. I have no other speakers on my list for today, and accordingly I should like to ask whether any other member wishes to take the floor. I see none.

Distinguished delegates, as you know, for some time now there have been active consultations on an appropriate framework to deal with agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". I now suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference so that I can report to you on the stage reached in those consultations. If I see no objection, we shall proceed accordingly. It is so decided. The plenary meeting is therefore suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 10.40 a.m. and resumed at 10.50 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (spoke in English): The 415th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. As a result of consultations which have been held on an organizational arrangement to deal with agenda item 2, I wish to put before the Conference for decision the following text:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides that informal meetings be held on the substance of item 2 of its agenda, entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', during its 1987 session, and that the discussions at those informal meetings be duly reflected in the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the proposed text.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (spoke in English): I should like now to turn to another subject relating to the forthcoming informal meetings. Under the rules of procedure, the President of the Conference has the responsibility, in accordance with the normal duties of any presiding officer, to ensure that discussions at plenary or informal meetings are conducted in an orderly way. Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I have taken upon myself the initiative of preparing a list of topics for the purpose of facilitating a structured discussion at informal meetings on the substance of agenda item 2. That list

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

is my own, and therefore does not bind any delegation. Furthermore, it is understood that members wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the agenda item, as is the normal practice of the Conference. I shall now read out that list of topics:

"Interrelation between bilateral and multilateral consideration of the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; participation in negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; role of the Conference on Disarmament.

"Security concepts relating to nuclear weapons.

"Implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I).

"Interrelation between measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament measures in other areas.

"Verification in relation to the purposes, scope and nature of agreements.

"Existing proposals."

Is there any comment at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of France.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Thank you, Sir. The delegations which are members of the group of Western countries are ready, as they were last year, to play a full part in the informal meetings on item 2 of our agenda. We would like to maintain the informal nature of this debate, which we feel is the appropriate way to have a useful debate in this area. We take note, Sir, of what you have said, after the decision just adopted by the Conference, on the list of topics which in your opinion should be discussed during informal meetings on item 2. As you pointed out, this list has been submitted under your sole responsibility and is binding upon no delegation. We would also like to stress that we do not see in your statement any precedent whatsoever for decisions relating to the activities of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT (spoke in English): I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement. Is there any comment at this stage? There seems to be none. Distinguished colleagues, allow me on this occasion to express, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, our gratitude to the presidents of the Conference who preceded me, in particular Ambassador Vejvoda, the representative of Czechoslovakia, for the efforts they exerted with regard to the organizational framework of item 2 which we have just formalized.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

If there are no other comments, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. Before doing so, I wish to inform you that the date of the first informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2 will appear in the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week which we will consider at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 25 June at 10 a.m.

Another announcement I would like to make is the following. The slot reserved for the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons on Friday, 26 June at 3 p.m. will be used by the Contact Group on track A of that Committee. And now I declare the plenary meeting adjourned until Thursday at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.416
25 June 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 June 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)

GE.87-61933/9212E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 416th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished representatives, the Conference continues today, in accordance with the programme of work, its consideration of agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban", as well as agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may also raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I should like to inform you that at my meeting with the co-ordinators yesterday, new seating arrangements for non-members invited to participate in the work of the Conference were discussed. As seating arrangements for the Conference were agreed upon at an informal meeting held on 23 January 1979, any change would have to be agreed upon at another informal meeting. Accordingly, may I suggest that we hold a brief informal meeting immediately after this plenary in order to consider this matter? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Morocco, Mongolia, the German Democratic Republic and China. I give the floor to the first speaker, His Excellency Ambassador El Ghali Benhima, head of the Moroccan delegation to the Conference.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President. May my first words be addressed to you, Mr. President, to congratulate you on the occasion of your accession to the Presidency of the Conference. My delegation is doubly pleased with this state of affairs.

You represent a country, Egypt, whose name calls to mind a civilization which since remote antiquity has constituted an important part of the cultural heritage of mankind. You also represent a country to which Morocco is linked by the same language and the same culture, and with which it shares the same aspirations.

The fact that you are a skilled diplomat, the depth of your thinking and your fine judgement, along with a wealth of experience, constitute appreciable assets to continue the impetus given by your predecessors, in the chair, Ambassadors Fan, Lechuga and Vejvoda, and to stamp the work of the Conference with new vigour.

At this crucial time, when the fear of a nuclear apocalypse has not yet abated and the hopes for a collective leap forward are reawakening, I should like to recall Morocco's interest in the work of the Conference, which is prompted by a two-fold conviction: that the cause of disarmament is universal and represents a legitimate aspiration of the entire international community whatever the size of its members' territories, whatever their economic power and whatever their ideology. This faith in the universality of the cause and in collective responsibility for ensuring that this cause triumphs, was expressed by His Majesty King Hassan II over a quarter-century ago at the first Non-aligned Summit in 1961 in Belgrade. My sovereign stated then in

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

essence that, given the growing danger of the arms race threatening the world, the cause of disarmament was becoming a concern of all mankind, and all countries were duty-bound to step up their efforts to find a global solution.

The second conviction lies in the historic mission of the Conference on Disarmament and its competence to consider all disarmament-related questions and contribute solutions to them in conformity with its mandate and with the broadest possible consensus.

This is an arduous mission, it is true, bearing in mind the complexity of the issues and the difficulty of reconciling divergent approaches to security, which bear a strong imprint of accumulated distrust arising from a still recent past where security was almost exclusively based on strike-back capability. None the less, the mission of the Conference is not an impossible one, because all the members of the international community, despite our ideological, political and socio-economic differences, aspire to live in peace. But to succeed in this, a contribution is required from everyone and our political will must be real. To be lasting, peace and security in the world -- our ultimate goal -- should not be based on the power of arsenals.

Yet, we cannot but recognize that despite our common conviction, despite our commitment, the threat to the survival of mankind posed by the arms race, and particularly the nuclear arms race, remains firmly rooted in our collective consciousness.

To justify our fears one need only mention the astronomical sums, amounting to several thousand billion dollars each year, being spent on the manufacture, development, stockpiling or acquisition of weapons, particularly in the nuclear field. And as if existing arsenals were not sufficient to destroy our planet several times over, their proliferation, vertical and horizontal, is continuing imperturbably, together with their upgrading and refinement. Indeed, the constant progress in strategy as well as in technology has led to a new generation of nuclear weapons which are indecently called "clean", since they cause the deaths of human beings without damaging the environment. But of equal seriousness is the fact that at the beginning of this decade, the unrestrained arms race shifted into outer space, which for us is a matter of grave concern. The militarization of space increases the dangers weighing on our planet and undermines the efforts of the international community, which aspires to make outer space a res communis.

A year and half ago, the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev prompted great hopes in the world, presaging the freeing of mankind from the spectre of nuclear war. The proposition that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" constitutes the central foundation of these hopes.

The blossoming of what is now called "the spirit of Geneva" appears to lie at the origin of the repudiation of confrontation and the inception of a dialogue of trust, of which the Reykjavik summit offers a happy illustration. The bilateral negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons, as well as the numerous proposals related thereto, are the expression of a new perception

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

of disarmament and security problems. We welcome it, and express the hope that the reluctance persisting as to the content of these negotiations will disappear to enable the speedy conclusion of agreements leading to the dismantling of nuclear arsenals and guaranteeing the security of all parties, particularly on the European continent.

Because of its geographical position so close to Europe, within the Mediterranean basin, and on the shores of such an important maritime route as the Strait of Gibraltar, Morocco is following with great interest the current negotiations for the elimination of short-range and medium-range missiles. In this connection, we are convinced, bearing in the mind the interaction of geography and politics, that détente, peace and security in Europe will inevitably have beneficial repercussions in the Mediterranean, because Mediterranean security cannot be dissociated from security in Europe. My country spares no effort to transform the entire Mediterranean region into a crossroads of co-operation and dialogue, free from tensions and confrontations. Each year since 1981, the United Nations General Assembly, has unanimously adopted a resolution stressing the importance of this interdependence.

In a year's time the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is to be held. Its first task will be to take stock of efforts undertaken since the first special session in 1978 to implement the principles and objectives which were unanimously accepted in the Final Document.

Without wishing to anticipate its work, I should like to join many other delegations in reviewing the results of eight years of work within this body. The results cannot be said to be null or negative. However, like all of you, I must acknowledge that so far no agreement, no international instrument, indeed no partial disarmament measures, have been forthcoming to crown many years of negotiations.

Immediately following the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the international community vested great hopes in the Committee on Disarmament -- now the Conference -- for the building of the new world order in the field of disarmament, and hence of security and peace. Unfortunately, we must recognize that much remains to be done for the achievement of the objectives which have been assigned to it. This delay, which must be ascribed to a lack of political will, has prevented this Conference from performing the task entrusted to it.

How else can we explain the three-year-long deadlock on the nuclear test ban, the first item on the Conference's agenda?

The drawing up of an international treaty banning all nuclear tests has always been considered by my country as being very important, as there can be no nuclear disarmament without a halt to nuclear tests. At a time when the number of nuclear tests is rising every year and when the nuclear capabilities of an increasing number of countries have been of concern to the international

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

community, such a treaty would be the key element of any programme designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce the threat of a nuclear war.

An internationally monitored nuclear test ban would considerably restrict the operational capacity of countries to manufacture or use nuclear weapons. It would also hold back the race to develop new weapons, and would stem the rivalry between the Powers in the atomic club.

Finally, such a treaty would offer these Powers an opportunity to honour the commitments entered into under the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty, thus taking a decisive step towards a world where nuclear weapons will no longer be the dangerous guarantees of international security and peace.

Only two atom bombs have been used in wartime. None the less, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1,570 nuclear tests were conducted between 1945 and the end of 1986, despite the partial nuclear test ban treaty which dates back to 1963. The General Assembly, gravely concerned about the ever more rapid continuation of this testing, has never ceased to appeal to all States to refrain from nuclear testing and to urge the drafting of a treaty prohibiting all tests. Unfortunately, the proliferation of resolutions is paralleled by a constant increase in the number of tests.

More than ever the negotiation of such a treaty is a matter of high priority, and there is no need to underline its urgency. The ways and means of achieving this objective have already been set by the United Nations General Assembly. In its recent resolution 41/46 A, the Assembly requested the members of the Conference on Disarmament to create at the beginning of 1987 "an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions". It also recommended that "such an ad hoc committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification".

In this connection, we may note that the terms of the mandate as defined by the General Assembly already contain elements of compromise likely to meet the wishes of certain delegations to study further the question of verification. In our view, the difficulties of greater or lesser seriousness linked to verification have done all too much to prevent the Conference from negotiating seriously.

I should like to recall in this connection a statement by the United Nations Secretary-General 15 years ago, recognizing that all technical aspects relating to the verification of a nuclear test ban have been amply examined. We may add to this observation the results of the painstaking and laudable work carried out by the Group of Scientific Experts. The technical test comprising data exchange and analysis which the Group undertook a year ago demonstrated the reliability of national means of seismic event detection.

May the sense of the responsibility of each and every one vis-à-vis the international community and our loyalty to the ideals that bring us together

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

here enable positions to be brought closer together so that this treaty, which has been awaited for over three decades, finally becomes a reality.

Such a treaty is not an end in itself, but the beginning of a process of drawing up other instruments or other measures for disarmament. There is no doubt that the first consequence of a nuclear test ban would be the cessation of the arms race followed by nuclear disarmament, which constitutes the second subject of concern to this Conference.

It was not without good reasons that the entire international community, at the first special session of the General Assembly, recognized that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind, and that it is essential to halt the nuclear arms race.

In order to put an end to this perilous escalation of the arms race, paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session stresses that "the achievement of nuclear disasrmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification".

However, to date the Conference has still not begun negotiations on this item, nor even responded to the many appeals of the General Assembly for the setting up of an ad hoc committee to implement the above-mentioned recommendation.

To justify the lack of a negotiating body on this item, the argument has been advanced that nuclear disarmament is currently the subject of bilateral negotiations. While recognizing the validity of this argument, we cannot fail to note that the Geneva negotiations relate only to the arsenals of the two major Powers. But achieving a general halt to the nuclear arms race will require multilateral negotiations to include the stockpiles of all the nuclear powers.

Moreover, we continue to believe that bilateral and multilateral negotiations are in no way mutually exclusive. Rather they complement each other, and each has an impact on the dynamics of the other.

The recent decision of the Conference to discuss this agenda item 2 in informal meetings is not likely to meet the above considerations. None the less, my delegation welcomes the decision, whilst remaining convinced that the appropriate context for this debate can only be an ad hoc committee.

Since the beginning of the atomic era, and more particularly since the Hiroshima episode, one of the goals of the international community has been the complete elimination of nuclear weapons -- the main condition to prevent a nuclear war.

Awareness of the dangers constituted by nuclear arsenals should, in our view, facilitate the drawing up of measures likely to prevent a nuclear war which could be unleashed as a result of a technical incident, human error or the escalation of a local conflict. This is why the international community should protect itself against these frightening eventualities through

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

agreements or measures which the Conference on Disarmament is entrusted with negotiating under paragraph 20 of the Final Document and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, in particular by setting up an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate.

With the conquest of outer space, which has opened up new horizons for mankind, the arms race has taken on an even more dangerous dimension. While this advance has greatly increased man's potential in the area of cartography, weather forecasts, remote sensing of natural resources and also verification of the implementation of disasrmament agreements, it also offers considerable military possibilities.

Thus the great Powers have been quick to take advantage of these possibilities by using space for military purposes -- surveillance, early warning or rapid communication. However, the progress of science and technology, as well as the striving for military supremacy, quickly gave rise to more dangerous military activities in space. Thus, since the end of the 1970s we have been following with profound concern the military activities of the great Powers which are aimed at setting up an operational system capable of destroying satellites in certain orbits.

Worse -- according to scientific and political circles, these Powers are planning for the near future other military uses of space which would be even more threatening for our planet. It is no secret that new systems of anti-missile missiles are already at a very advanced state of design. These space weapons, which no longer deserve to be called weapons of the future are the product of a new space technology. Thus, space offers a further confirmation of the theory of the arms race spiral, whereby the development of space weapons prompts new refinements of anti-satellite weapons.

In the face of these activities in space, we cannot but acknowledge that the existing array of international instruments, particularly the 1967 outer space treaty, the 1979 agreement governing the activities of States on the Moon and other celestial bodies, as well as the ABM Treaty of 1972, have not been able to prevent the militarization of space. This is why we share the conviction of the General Assembly in its resolution 41/53 that "further measures are urgently needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

We are pleased that the United States and the Soviet Union are working to this end in their negotiations in Geneva. We express the fervent hope that their efforts, as well as the efforts of the Conference, which is also actively involved in this area through its ad hoc committee under the competent chairmanship of Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy, will be crowned with success.

As early as 1959 the General Assembly planned to make "general and complete disarmament under effective international control" the ultimate goal of its efforts. Thus, one of its main decisions at its first special session on disarmament in 1978 was to undertake the drawing up of a comprehensive programme of disarmament as an agreed framework for sustained international action on specific disarmament measures.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Almost a decade later, the implementation of this programme is considerably delayed, without any foreseeable prospect that it will be finally completed and approved by all. The perseverance of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, who for many years has been chairing the ad hoc committee, entrusted with this task, is equalled only by his confidence in the capacity of the members of this Conference to overcome their differences to arrive at a consensus text. In this connection, we should like to appeal for maximum efforts so that the definitive text of this comprehensive programme of disarmament can be adopted before the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Its submission to that session would constitute not only the culmination of many years of negotiations, but would also provide proof of the efficiency of this Conference.

Our optimism regarding the ability of this Conference to meet the expectations of the international community by negotiating international disarmament agreements is also prompted by the recent stepping up of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the presidency of Ambassdor Ekéus of Sweden.

Chemical weapons have always prompted universal horror, yet their manufacture and stockpiling, and new research for the production of still more dangerous nerve gases, continue. We are aware that current negotiations on an international convention banning chemical weapons involve complex problems, delicate political questions, as well as economic and trade interests. This new interest in this type of weapon is of profound concern to us. We, nevertheless venture to hope that the impetus given to negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on prohibition of the development, manufacture, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons will continue until the final adoption of the treaty in question. Such a treaty would undoubtedly constitute a landmark in the continual efforts of this Conference to discharge its duties.

The tragic accident at Chernobyl showed, if there was any need to do so, that nuclear plants are potential radiological bombs. The dissemination of radioactive fallout which followed the accident spread death and desolation all around the immediate area, and also carried waves of radioactivity across frontiers. The Chernobyl accident reminded us of the imperative need to speed up negotiations on an international treaty on radiological weapons. Although these negotiations began several years ago, they are now deadlocked as a result of differences regarding the scope of the convention. As far as we are concerned, we continue to believe that traditional radiological weapons are the weapons of tomorrow, while recognizing the vital need to negotiate a ban. However, the question of attacks on nuclear facilities constitutes a daily concern for the international community because of the threat arising from the mass destruction they can cause, particularly through radioactive fallout.

We hope that the approach chosen this year to discuss these two aspects of radiological weapons will be promising. The merit for this choice devolves upon the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador David Meiszter of Hungary, to whom we wish all success, together with the co-ordinators.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

I cannot conclude this examination of the various items on the agenda without saying something about the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My country believes that the undertakings given in declarations by the nuclear Powers in respect of non-nuclear-weapon States are important but not sufficient, as they do not provide a complete guarantee. The most effective guarantee against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons remains the conclusion of effective international arrangements, including nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

This goal can be achieved only if the nuclear-weapon Powers show greater boldness in negotiations conducted within the Ad hoc Committee in order to agree on a common approach to these negative security assurances. In this connection, we hope that the work of this Committee, re-established at the beginning of the session, will very soon begin, and will be expedited by its new chairman, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

In a remarkable work entitled L'heure de s'enivrer (Time to get drunk), the Canadian writer and philosopher Hubert Reeves makes a disenchanted comment on the arms race. Observing that mankind is feverishly preparing for its own suicide, he writes:

> "Everything is happening as if our species were prompted by a death-wish, driving it to take as rapidly and intelligently as possible, the steps leading it to its own destruction."

It is up to all of us to ensure that this apocalyptic image is for ever banished from our minds.

I should like to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Indonesia and the United States of America.

It is also a pleasure for me to express my Government's gratitude to the Canadian Government for the workshop on outer space organized in Montreal last May. This workshop was devoted to one of the items on the Conference's agenda to which we attach paramount importance. It is our hope that the workshop will contribute to the implementation of the mandate entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador El Ghali Benhima, head of the Moroccan delegation, for his statement and the kind words that he directed to me, as well as his affirmation of the fraternal and close relations which link Egypt and Morocco, and his kinds words to my predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda. I now give the floor to Ambassador Bayart, the chief of the Mongolian delegation to the Disarmament Conference.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I have taken the floor since you took over the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament in June, allow me to congratulate you most heartily as you carry out this important and responsible function, and assure you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation.

Being aware of your competence and great diplomatic experience, we are convinced that under your wise leadership the Conference on Disarmament will effectively continue its work in order to achieve practical results.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express our thanks to your predecessor in the chair, the distinguished representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Ambassador Vejvoda, for his effective and able leadership of our work during April and in the inter-sessional period.

We note with appreciation that Ambassador Vejvoda spared no effort to allow the Conference to get down to practical work in resolving the tasks before it, especially on item 1 of its agenda.

I endorse the words of welcome to the new representatives of Indonesia and the United States of America, Ambassadors Agus Tarmidzi and Friedersdorf, and I would like to assure them of our readiness to maintain the same links of co-operation which we had with their predecessors.

On 9 June this year, speaking on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, submitted for the consideration of the Conference on Disarmament a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests".

In submitting this document, its authors are pursuing a single goal -- a rapid start of practical work in the Conference on this subject, and the stepping up of multilateral efforts to create an international legal régime which completely prohibits nuclear weapon tests.

The document is a qualitatively new proposal reflecting new political thinking and fundamentally new approaches to the key issues of a nuclear weapon test ban, and in particular the questions of verification. It has been compiled on the basis of throughgoing analysis of the wide-ranging discussion of the subject of a nuclear-test ban which has taken place within our multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and at sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. It takes into account the opinions and wishes of many other States, and in particular, the specific ideas and opinions of the "Delhi Six". Hence it should be stressed that the document submitted by the socialist countries is not simply a collation of their own proposals, but also the proposals of other countries.

Thus, by bringing together the positive results of many years of joint work on the problem of nuclear tests, as well as the new ideas and proposals made recently by many States, the document which has been submitted might become the basis for work on detailed elaboration of a future treaty

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

prohibiting nuclear weapon tests. At the same time, we would welcome any other proposals which would help in the search for mutally acceptable decisions and rapid agreement on the text of a treaty.

Although the question of a nuclear test ban has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for a long time, in recent years there has been much stronger awareness that, as regards concrete actions to halt such tests, there are no difficulties of a technical nature; there is no verification problem. This question, together with other matters related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, were placed on a practical plane in particular as a result of the action of the Soviet Union in imposing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions which lasted for a year and a half. This fine example for the other nuclear Powers had an exceptionally important impact in international life. The moratorium showed that it was really possible to adopt measures which could effectively block the nuclear arms race.

A joint Soviet-United States moratorium would now be invaluable in underpinning the work of the Conference as regards the nuclear test ban. We know that the Soviet Union is ready to take such a step at any time. Agreement on the part of the United States of America here would undoubtedly enjoy the approval and support of the whole international community.

The significance of the Soviet moratorium also lies in the fact that at the same time, a number of methods of verifying the non-conduct of nuclear tests were themselves subjected to tests in which specialists and equipment from the United States were involved at the non-governmental level. It seems to us that these methods could be incorporated in a future nuclear test-ban treaty.

In the document submitted by the socialist countries, questions of verification are among the central issues. The document proposes a clearly defined system providing for a combination of three types of verification -- national technical means, an international system of seismic monitoring and on-site inspections.

The Mongolian delegation is convinced that the use of these three types of verification together could provide the parties with a full assurance that not a single suspicious wave-form event would pass unnoticed.

Indeed to a significant extent this is already a reality as a result of an extensive network of seismological stations in many States. Moreover, practical experience has confirmed this. According to information published by Soviet specialists, in April 1986 the seismological station in Obninsk in the USSR easily detected a nuclear explosion with a yield of 1.3 kilotons which was conducted in Nevada. In their opinion, 20 Soviet stations provide sufficient information on nuclear tests world-wide. It may be assumed that the 200-odd similar stations near the socialist countries, either installed by the United States of America or operating under their control, work just as well as the 20 Soviet ones.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

In Mongolia we learned with satisfaction that the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, in their joint declaration of 22 May this year, reaffirmed their proposals for nuclear test ban verification addressed to the USSR and the United States. We must make use of these proposals.

As we know, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to send representatives to meet experts from the six States to participate in a joint search for mutually acceptable solutions which might then form the basis of reliable verification machinery for a complete and general nuclear-weapon test ban treaty. We would like to express the hope that the United States has not yet said its last word on the proposals made by the six States.

In reply to the joint declaration of the six States, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, again called upon the United States to begin full-scale talks on the complete cessation of nuclear tests under strict international control, including on-site inspections, and referred favourably to the possibility of using the proposals put forward by the Delhi Six in the context of measures which might be agreed at such talks.

It is important now not to let a single opportunity slip, and to bring the whole negotiating machinery into motion without delay, in order to prepare a draft treaty on a complete nuclear test ban. Efforts here should cover all the various aspects; one set of negotiations should not rule out or replace other negotiations, but rather complement them.

Whilst giving due weight to the efforts being undertaken in particular at the Soviet-United States expert talks on the cessation of nuclear tests, and attaching great importance to the Soviet proposal for the implementation of practical interim measures which will bring us closer to the main aim of a complete nuclear test ban, as contained in the reply from M.S. Gorbachev to which I just referred, at the same time the delegation of Mongolia considers that the Conference on Disarmament should play a central role in this issue, since what is involved is a multilateral comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban. For that reason we are in favour of the rapid commencement of practical work on all the issues related to the problem of a nuclear test ban, and the creation for that purpose of an ad hoc committee on item 1 on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of General Assembly resolution 41/46 A.

I do not think it would be superfluous to emphasize that many of the States members of the Conference are parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which unequivocally refers to a desire "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", and a determination "to continue negotiations to this end".

Now I would like to say a few words on the question of a chemical weapon ban. During the first part of the Conference's session, substantial progress was made in agreeing convention provisions on the declaration of stocks of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

chemical weapons, plans for their destruction, international verification of declarations, and verification of chemical weapon storage facilities. This created the necessary conditions for the completion of work on this important problem -- the problem of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks. The final solution depended on the elaboration of an order of elimination.

At the end of the first part of the session, the delegation of Mongolia, guided by a desire to promote the rapid solution of this problem submitted for consideration in the Ad hoc Committee working paper CD/CW/WP.162 on an order of elimination of chemical weapon stocks. The order we are proposing provides for comparison between various categories of stocks on the basis of mass. For this purpose we think that stocks should be grouped in such a way that each group includes categories of like effectiveness. With such an approach it is necessary to give major emphasis to the grouping of chemicals within the categories.

When proposing the inclusion in each separate group of various chemicals which have similar properties as chemical warfare agents, we would at the same time accept that States possessing chemical weapons would have a certain freedom of action when destroying stocks within the groups, as far as the sequence of destruction would be concerned. This takes into consideration the positions of certain delegations on this subject.

Turning to the subject of working out comparative equivalents, in principle and on the whole, we do not reject the idea contained in such an approach. However, careful analysis shows that working out an objective and effectively applicable equivalent, would in practice be extremely complicated and would require a great of deal of time. We should obviously bear this fact in mind and try to avoid making the negotiations unnecessarily complicated and perhaps delaying them at a time when efforts to agree on the text of a convention have entered the final stage.

We in no way claim that our proposal for the order of elimination of chemical weapon stocks indicates the only correct solution to the problem. However, it is quite obvious that the order we propose, in essence, is extremely simple, and at the same time, it could be applied very effectively. In proposing this for consideration by other delegations, we are guided by the aim of achieving the rapid development and conclusion of an international convention which would immediately bring to an end the development and production of any chemical weapons, and would provide a timely and comprehensive declaration of all existing stocks and production facilities, as well as placing them under stringent international control and then providing for their steady and proportional elimination down to zero -- the same zero for each State party to the convention, regardless of whether it now possesses chemical weapons or not, because only thus is it possible to ensure real equal security for all States in this area. On the basis of these principles we are ready to co-operate with all interested delegations.

The Mongolian People's Republic warmly welcomed the results of the regular session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which was held at the end of May in Berlin. We note

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

that the documents of the meeting, not only contain a thorough analysis of the basic yet interrelated trends in the world today, and an outline of philosopical approaches to the challenges facing us today, but also put forward a programme of practical steps towards disarmament, the strengthening of confidence and security, and the development of constructive relationships among States in the widest variety of areas.

In our view, one of the distinctive features of the new initiatives put forward in Berlin lies in the fact that they respond to the concerns voiced in the past by representatives of the West, not least here in this room. I am thinking in particular of the readiness expressed by meeting participants to have the imbalance in certain elements redressed in the course of the reduction of military confrontation in Europe. What is important is that this should be done by means of appropriate reductions by the side which is ahead, and not by a further build-up of arms.

We also note with satisfaction that many of the provisions put forward at the Berlin meeting are directly related to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, including such important issues on its agenda as the nuclear test ban and the chemical weapon ban. In our view, the document on the military doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty merits special attention, since it shows clearly that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty and that of each State party, is subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional.

Mongolia considers this provision to be of exceptionally great and fundamental importance. The same could be said of another provision in the same document, to the effect that the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty will never under any circumstances initiate military action against any State or alliance of States unless they are themselves the target of an armed attack, and that they will never be the first to employ nuclear weapons.

The Mongolian People's Republic again expresses its full support for the constructive policy of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty in promoting a rapid political settlement of crisis situations in various parts of the world, including Asia, on the basis of respect for the principles of independence and national sovereignty of peoples.

In conclusion, I would like to inform the Conference that, in accordance with the decision of the Soviet leadership and in agreement with the Government of my country, the previously announced withdrawal from Mongolia to the Soviet Union of one motorized rifle division and certain individual components of the Soviet forces temporarily stationed in Mongolia was recently completed.

We are convinced that this act of good will by the Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR in substantially reducing the numbers of Soviet forces temporarily deployed in our country will help to strengthen mutual understanding and trust and promote relations of good-neighbourliness and co-operation amongst the States and peoples of Asia and the Pacific.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Bayart, head of the Mongolian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, for his statement, and for his very kind words addressed to myself and to my precedessor Ambassador Vejvoda. The next speaker on my list is His Excellency Ambassador Harald Rose, head of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, in the message which United Nations Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar sent to the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of the year, he said that "a most important and urgent matter of disarmament is the complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests and no efforts can be spared in the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. To that end, fresh and perhaps innovative proposals are needed which would lend a decisive impetus to your efforts and complement other endeavours in this field."

The socialist countries share this view. What is more, the documents issued following the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was held in Berlin on 28 and 29 May, show that the members of this alliance regard readiness for an early conclusion of a general and complete test-ban treaty as a gauge of the defensive character of military doctrines, and that they call for negotiations to this effect right now. There are many reasons for that. Suffice it to mention the following:

First, a comprehensive test ban would make impossible the development, production and deployment of new generations of nuclear weapons, especially those possessing a first-strike capability.

Second, such a ban would be an effective step towards putting up a barrier to the arms race in outer space, one of the most serious threats to international security.

Third, in conjunction with further agreements on the elimination of certain nuclear weapon categories, the ban would impede or at least render considerably more difficult any nuclear arms race in other fields. Incidentally, this is a most important reason why a comprehensive ban must remain a priority task in its own right, and why my country cannot accept the concept that nuclear arms need to be reduced and eliminated before a test-ban treaty can be concluded.

The debate at the Conference on Disarmament reflects unanimous agreement on the significance of a test ban. CTB advocates and opponents alike are perfectly aware of its far-reaching consequences for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, for confidence-building and for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The inferences they draw are different, however.

The discussions in the CD have also revealed in this case that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence in its most extreme interpretation is being invoked to foil any effort to achieve progress in working out an agreement. On the other hand, even many champions of that doctrine regard a global test-ban treaty as a task of topical importance. This seems to be true, for example, of the majority of members of the United States Congress.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Here is how my delegation sees the present situation at the Conference: views differ widely as to when negotiations should begin. The majority's demand for an early start contrasts sharply with the "long-term objective" approach and the strings attached to it. No delegation, however, is opposed to an exchange of opinions and a search for agreement on major elements of an accord banning nuclear weapon tests.

There may be different perceptions of the role this forum is supposed to play in the process of drafting a test-ban treaty, but no side is actually disputing the need for the Conference to get involved. The CD can and must set the ball rolling for a global solution, parllel to bilateral efforts and negotiations.

It would be dishonest to hide the fact that essential differences of opinion persist about the approach to be chosen and about matters of substance. Yet, at the same time, real prospects for joint action are emerging. For them to come to fruition, the parties concerned will have to be prepared to seek a compromise.

In my delegation's view, there are opportunities for the Conference to do practical work, provided all the sides involved are committed to meeting the others half-way in procedural and substantive matters.

Opinions on the mandate of a committee are not all that far apart. Given good will, an understanding ought to be possible. As far as the Group of Socialist Countries is concerned, it has demonstrated a great deal of flexibility. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the renewed efforts of the Group of 21 to forge a compromise, and is ready to take part in that endeavour. What matters most to my country is that practical work should get under way in a committee as quickly as possible.

Proposals and ideas on how to start business-like work in a committee do exist. In this context, my delegation would like to say a word or two about the joint proposal of the Group of Socialist Countries, entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests" (CD/756).

As Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky stressed on 9 June, what we have before us now is an entirely new approach to the issue. The proposal does not confine itself to a mere elaboration and supplementing of old positions. Rather, it fuses together and develops further ideas and suggestions put forward by representatives of different groups in previous years.

In all its parts, the document advances new, concrete ideas. To give you an example, it spells out the obligation of the USSR and the United States, as the Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals, to be the first to discontinue their testing programmes. The sponsors are very interested in learning what the other participants in the Conference think about the various elements of the proposal. In fact, a concrete exchange of views in a committee would be even better.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Today I intend to draw your attention specifically to some aspects of the verification procedures contained in CD/756. Firstly, for the first time ever, verification provisions are presented in their complexity, reflecting circumstances and possibilities as they really exist. Properly combined, national technical means of verification, international verification measures and on-site inspections can ensure sufficiently reliable verification. Clandestine tests involving militarily significant yields would thus be practically ruled out.

Secondly, the parties to the treaty which have the necessary national technical means would make available to the relevant organ to be set up under the treaty any pertinent data obtained by those means. Both the establishment of an organ pursuant to the treaty and the obligation to provide information are new elements.

Thirdly, the parties to a future accord are called upon to create an international system of seismic verification, for which they would have to allow the establishment of stations on their territory in order to ensure the continuous exchange of level II seismic data. Monitoring stations would operate with the participation of observers from an international inspectorate.

Fourthly, every State party would undertake to participate in the international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity and to allow aerosol monitoring stations on its territory.

Fifthly, international inspectors would be present at test ranges to verify that no nuclear explosions are conducted there, so that those sites can no longer be used to explode nuclear devices.

Lastly, on-site inspections would be mandatory. Here again, States would have equal rights and duties.

Consequently, the measures elaborated upon in the "Basic provisions" document would ensure (a) strict observance of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing; (b) utilization of effective and modern technical means for the verification system; (c) virtually global coverage; and (d) verification on a democratic basis, with equal rights for all parties to the treaty.

The sponsors of CD/756 are prepared to look into any other verification proposal made during CTBT negotiations. Clearly, the socialist countries know no taboos when it comes to verifying compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. They will go as far as the other negotiating parties are prepared to go.

My delegation is convinced that the new proposal of the socialist countries offers a chance to work out all the details of the required verification provisions and the other parts of a treaty.

The other day, the President of the Argentine Republic, His Excellency Mr. Raúl Alfonsín, observed in his important statement:

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

"We have now reached an extreme situation in which the survival of mankind depends on our ability to change traditional, or even ancestral, behaviour. To face and overcome that challenge ... is not a matter of technical knowledge but rather of greater political wisdom."

My delegation fully subscribes to this view. What is more, it regards President Alfonsín's words as an appeal to apply new thinking to all areas of disarmament and, in doing so, to start the long-overdue negotiations on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Harald Rose, the head of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Conference on Disarmament, for his statement. The next speaker on my list is Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the Conference on Disarmament. I give him the floor.

Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, it gives me much pleasure to see you, a well-respected diplomat with rich experience in multilateral diplomacy and disarmament negotiations, in the chair of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of June. Both Egypt and China were once cradles of world civilization, and under the new historical conditions, the friendly relations and co-operation between our two countries are developing steadily. Please accept my sincere congratulations.

Your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, who also has long and many-sided experience, has won admiration from all of us for the outstanding skills and initiatives he displayed in promoting the work of the CD.

I wish also to take this opportunity to warmly welcome Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia and Ambassador Friedersdorf of the United States of America, who have newly participated in the work of the CD. I am confident that we'll maintain and develop good relations of co-operation.

The Chinese delegation wishes to make a statement on nuclear disarmament. With incessant regional conflicts, continuous escalation of the arms race and sharp confrontation between the two major military blocs of the East and the West, the present world situation is volatile, the danger of war still exists and the shadow of a nuclear war looms over our world. Achievement of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war have thus become a strong demand of people throughout the world who desire peace and development.

China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. We maintain that the Soviet Union and the United States, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, have a special responsibility for curbing the nuclear arms race and carrying out nuclear disarmament. They should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and drastically reducing and destroying on the spot all types of nuclear weapons possessed by them at any localities both inside and outside their respective territories. Thus,

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

conditions will be created for the convening of a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States to discuss steps for further nuclear disarmament as well as the thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons.

On 3 December 1986, the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted as resolution 41/59 F a proposal on nuclear disarmament submitted by the Chinese delegation. In the resolution the Assembly "urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear weapons"; and it "expresses its deep concern that negotiations on nuclear disarmament should yield concrete results at the earliest possible time". The fact that this resolution was adopted by consensus, with the support of all the United Nations Member States, including the Soviet Union and the United States, shows that China's reasonable and rational proposal aimed at promoting the process of nuclear disarmament enjoys popular support, and it also proves that the correct and effective way to realize nuclear disarmament is for the two major nuclear States to take action first in this regard.

For some time now, the trend of the Soviet-United States disarmament negotiations has drawn extensive attention from the international community. Their recent negotiations and various proposals on medium-range nuclear missiles have been a subject of ever greater attention. It is only natural that the people of the world are concerned about what actions the States possessing tens of thousands of nuclear warheads will eventually take.

The position of the Chinese delegation is: dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union is better than confrontation; and relaxation is better than tension in the relations between the East and the West, and between the two military blocs locked in confrontation. The principle contained in the United Nations Charter on seeking settlement of disputes through peaceful means should be supported by all United Nations Member States. We sincerely hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will, at an early date, through negotiations, reach disarmament agreements conducive to the relaxation of international tension and without detriment to the interests of other countries. The nuclear weapons covered by the United States-Soviet negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles are but a very small portion of the huge nuclear arsenals possessed by the two major nuclear Powers. Nevertheless, if the Soviet Union and the United States take the step of eliminating all medium-range missiles in real earnest, it will be a welcome event.

In the issue of nuclear disarmament, world peace and the security of all countries are at stake. All countries have an equal right to participate in its discussion and settlement. Whether and how the Soviet Union and the United States will eliminate all their medium-range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia is an issue that not only concerns the two countries themselves, but also has a direct bearing on the security of European and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

Asian countries. Therefore, the positions of these countries deserve full respect and serious consideration. After repeated consultations, the West European countries not only support the United States in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on the "zero-zero" formula for the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe, but also urge the global elimination of all medium-range nuclear missiles possessed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is known to all that the security of Europe is important, and that the security of Asia is equally important. Why should 100 INF warheads be kept in Asia while such weapons are reduced to zero in Europe? Militarily, they pose a threat to the security of Asian countries; politically, it is not fair, and the European countries will not be at ease about them either. In the final analysis, such a solution will not necessarily be advantageous to the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, we hold that the medium-range nuclear missiles deployed by the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe and Asia should be reduced according to the same principle, simultaneously and in a synchronized and balanced manner, until their total destruction -- hence a simple and straightforward "zero option" in both Europe and Asia.

As I have shown, it is possible for the two major nuclear Powers to reach temporary and partial agreements in their disarmament negotiations, because the world's people have a strong demand and the two major nuclear Powers both have such a need. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament and the international community should urge them to actually take the first step of nuclear disarmament at an early date by eliminating all medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia, including missiles, launchers and nuclear warheads. Meanwhile, we must not fail to see that there has been no change in their respective basic strategies, and that no substantive progress has been achieved so far in their negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons and space arms. The people of the world must remain vigilant against the continued arms race in various forms. For the sake of a genuine relaxation of the international situation, we have every reason to insist that the two major nuclear Powers should not only eliminate all their medium-range nuclear missiles, but also drastically reduce all types of their nuclear weapons at any localities both inside and outside their territories, and halt the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons.

To accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament is the common desire of the people of the world. At the same time, we wish also to note that the task of general and complete nuclear disarmament can by no means be accomplished overnight. It is the consistent proposition of China that, as a practical measure for prevention of nuclear war, all nuclear States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstance and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free zones. On the very first day that China possessed nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government solemnly declared that at no time and under no circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. And on many occasions, China has declared that it unconditionally undertakes the commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

nuclear-free zones. China also favours the conclusion, through negotiations, of an international convention prohibiting the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States.

China respects and supports the efforts made by the States concerned for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the actual conditions in their own regions and on the basis of consultations. In our view, nuclear-weapon States should respect their proposals and the status of nuclear-free zones, and should accordingly assume relevant obligations. Proceeding from this position, China supports the proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean peninsula. China has signed protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

The Chinese delegation intends to submit a working paper containing a comprehensive presentation of China's position on nuclear disarmament. I have just dealt with some points contained therein.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy are playing an increasingly important role in the economic and social progress of various countries. However, nuclear energy has been used to manufacture weapons which have become a tool in the hands of the super-Powers in seeking military superiority, thus posing a grave threat to the entire human race. This reminds me of an ancient legend in China: "Hou Yi shoots down the suns". As the legend has it, once upon a time, there were ten suns in the sky. All the crops, forests and grassland were scorched. An archer by the name of Hou Yi valiantly shot down nine of them, leaving only one in the sky. From then on, normal growth of farm crops, grasses, trees, etc. became possible and tranquility and stability reigned under heaven. We, as members of the CD, should follow the example of Hou Yi and make positive contributions to the realization of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the maintenance of international peace and security.

As early as 16 October 1964, when China possessed its first atomic bomb, the Chinese Government issued a statement calling for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. We solemnly expressed in the statement our sincere hope that nuclear war will never break out. And we are deeply convinced that nuclear war can be prevented so long as all the peace-loving countries and peoples of the world make common endeavours and persevere in the struggle. We firmly believe that as nuclear weapons are made by men, they can certainly be eliminated by men.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, head of the Chinese delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. I thank him for his statement, and I also thank him for the kind words to my person, in which he affirmed the friendly relations between Egypt and China, and I also wish to thank him for his kind words addressed to my predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

We have concluded the list of speakers for today, but does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to His Excellency the Ambassador of France.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President. I should like to inform the Conference that my delegation intends to take the floor at the next meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, on Tuesday 30 June, on item 2 of its agenda, namely legal issues. With the assistance of experts in space questions who have come from Paris on this occasion, we should like to deal more specifically with questions of definition and terminology which, as the Conference knows, have occupied the attention of our Committee for several years.

In specifically tackling terminological and lexicological problems in the area of space matters and considering the technical constraints related thereto, we wish to derive some pointers regarding useful methods for all matters related to the definition of activities in space. In our view, one may conclude that, rather than proceeding from categories defined a priori, in a theoretical, abstract manner, we should follow a pragmatic approach on the basis of actual data which we know are continuously changing. I might add that on this occasion we shall be pleased to provide each delegation with a copy of a dictionary of space studies which has recently been published by the French National Centre for Space Studies.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Morel, the Ambassador of France, for his statement.

Distinguished delegates, I have requested the secretariat to circulate an informal paper containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the next week. As I announced during last Tuesday's meeting, arrangements have been made to hold the first informal meeting to discuss the substance of agenda item 2 on Tuesday 30 June, immediately following the plenary meeting. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and can be changed if necessary. If there is no objection to this, then I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): As I informed you at the opening of this plenary meeting, I intend to convene an informal meeting of the Conference to deal with the question of seating arrangements for non-members participating in our work immediately after this plenary meeting. Before announcing the date of the next meeting, let me inform you that as far as the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons is concerned, informal meetings will be held on track B today, following the informal consultations on track A which will be held at 4.15 p.m. in room 1. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 30 June, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.417
30 June 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 30 June 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)

GE.87-62133/9327E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 417th meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates, at the outset I should like to extend a cordial welcome to the Director-General for Security and Disarmament Affairs in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Ambassador Kristvik, who will be our first speaker at this plenary meeting. I would also like to extend a cordial welcome to Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, who will preside over the Conference during the coming month of July. His experience in what used to be known as the Committee of Disarmament, over which he presided, and his well-known diplomatic ability, will undoubtedly be of great benefit to the Conference on Disarmament during the month of July.

In conformity with its programme of work, our Conference will today begin its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers this morning the representatives of Norway, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The first speaker is Ambassador Kristvik of Norway. I give him the floor.

Mr. KRISTVIK (Norway): Mr. President, may I take this opportunity to congratulate you, the distinguished representative of Egypt, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We have appreciated the efficient manner in which you have guided the work of the Conference during the month of June. I would, in particular, like to congratulate you on the decision taken at the plenary meeting on 23 June that informal meetings should be held on the substance of item 2 of the Conference's agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

For several years, Norway has participated in the work of this important negotiating forum and all its subsidiary bodies. Norway has also been since 1984 the candidate of the Western Group for full membership, and hopes that this question will be solved in connection with the third special session devoted to disarmament. In two areas -- chemical weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban -- we have initiated research programmes which are relevant to the deliberations of the Conference. Today I have the honour to introduce three documents which concern the results of recent research in Norway.

My country is committed to doing its utmost to contribute to the multilateral negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, which would ban chemical weapons world-wide. In 1987, the negotiations are being ably guided by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. We highly appreciate his dynamic leadership and his continuous search for solutions to the sensitive political and complicated technical issues still outstanding.

One of the main problems concerns the question of on-site challenge inspection. It is the view of the Norwegian Government that it is absolutely necessary to dispatch the inspection team to the site concerned within 48 hours after the issue of a request for an on-site inspection. The investigation at the site should be detailed and comprehensive. We have taken note of the idea which was presented by the United States at the recent

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)

Holmenkollen Symposium in Oslo, that when an inspection takes place, provisions should be made to protect sensitive types of installations and facilities. Norway believes that this notion of "managed conduct" is a way in which to address security concerns related to the challenge inspection issue.

In this context, I should like to point out that on-site challenge inspection would occur only in exceptional circumstances. Thus, it would represent the "safety net" to the convention, which would already contain an elaborate system of routine on-site inspections. In fact, an effective chemical weapons convention will necessitate more comprehensive monitoring systems than any existing disarmament treaty.

The solution to these questions will require the flexibility of all parties concerned. Against this background, Norway welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are continuing their bilateral talks on all aspects of a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. These consultations, which were initiated after the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985, have had a positive effect on the negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament.

My country is of the opinion that both the multilateral negotiations and the bilateral talks should be intensified with a view to solving the main outstanding questions. The international community expects these abhorrent weapons to be eliminated as soon as possible.

Chemical weapons have recently been used in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The incorporation in the global convention of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is therefore necessary. The Norwegian reseach programme on verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons should be seen against this background. As a result of six years' research at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, procedures have been developed for verification of alleged use. Today, I take pleasure in introducing documents CD/761 and CD/762.

The first document summarizes the results of research undertaken in 1986 and 1987, when the procedures were tested in two field exercises. These tests confirmed that the methods we have developed can be used on an all-year basis.

The procedures, which are outlined and described in document CD/762, cover the following phases of an investigation; establishment of the inspection team, survey of the alleged contaminated area, collection of samples, field analysis, preparation of samples for transport to laboratories, analysis in laboratories and preparation of the report of the inspection team. In elaborating this system we have consulted a number of countries, in particular Canada.

Document CD/762 provides that the international inspectors should conduct their mission in the least intrusive manner necessary to accomplish their task. On the basis of the field exercises, my country proposes that on-site inspection should take place within 48 hours after a request has been received by the Technical Secretariat. A proper investigation requires efficient methods for carrying out the inspection, with special emphasis on sampling and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)

sample analysis. Within 10 days after the completion of their on-site inspection, the international inspectors should present their findings in a report to the Technical Secretariat.

In presenting these proposed procedures, I should like to stress that the work undertaken at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment during 1986 and 1987 shows that some aspects of verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons need to be further examined. We shall continue our research programme with that in mind, and shall also take into account that some of these procedures could be applied to other situations concerning fact-finding.

Norway's development of procedures for on-site inspection on the basis of field experiments, which provide realistic and reliable data and avoid the artificial conditions of a laboratory, will contribute to the effective implementation of the convention. The wealth of research results will, no doubt, facilitate the work of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. In addition, the general aspects of the procedures should be incorporated in an annex to article IX of the Convention. Canada and Norway will therefore table a joint proposal for such an annex on 7 July.

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would contribute to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We are therefore of the opinion that a test ban, which should include a prohibition of both nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, should be concluded as soon as possible. This necessitates, however, that the Conference on Disarmament should resume its work on practical and interrelated issues, which in any case need to be addressed in detail prior to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty. Such issues include compliance, verification and the scope of a test ban. Two years ago, Norway and nine other Western countries outlined a suitable programme of work for these issues (document CD/621 of 24 July 1985). Against this background, my country regrets that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet agreed on a mandate for an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban.

However, the United States and the Soviet Union are conducting bilateral talks on testing issues. Norway hopes that these two countries, prior to the seventh session of these talks next month, will agree on an agenda for initiation of bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing, based on a step-by-step approach. In this context, joint United States-Soviet experiments designed to improve verification measures would be of particular interest. Norway has also taken note of the inclusion of a system of mandatory on-site inspections in the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests" which the Soviet Union introduced on 9 June (document CD/756).

In the field of seismological verification, the Group of Scientific Experts is preparing for the international experiment for the exchange and processing of seismic wave-form data (level II data). NORSAR, being one of the world's largest seismological observatories, will take an active part in this experiment. Its implementation will, no doubt, represent a further step towards the establishment of a future global system for the international exchange of seismic data.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)

Norway has consistently maintained that such a global system must take advantage of the rapid and ongoing technological developments in seismic instrumentation, data communication and computer systems. This is the general thesis of document CD/763, which also describes the recent operation and associated research activities at the large-aperture Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) and the small-aperture Norwegian Regional Seismic Array System (NORESS).

Drawing on the experience gained in the operation of these two arrays, document CD/763 contains three concrete proposals concerning principles for a modern seismic data exchange system. Firstly, the global seismic network should, to the extent it is practically possible and otherwise appropriate, incorporate the establishment of small-aperture seismic arrays along NORESS principles. Secondly, seismic data exchange by dedicated, high-capacity links, such as satellite channels using small dedicated ground stations, would form a convenient, efficient and reliable method for the needs of the envisaged global data exchange system. Thirdly, it must be possible, through an international data centre in the global seismic network, to request and obtain any level II data from any participating station.

The preparation of these three documents is a reflection of the considerable resources which Norway devotes to its participation in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It is also an indication of the significance which the Norwegian Government attaches to the Conference on Disarmament, as the single negotiating forum for global disarmament questions.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Kristvik of Norway for his statement, and for the very kind words that he directed to me. I now give the floor to Ambassador Friedersdorf, the representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, as the new United States representative to the Conference on Disarmament, I wish to thank you for the very warm, courteous and hospitable manner in which you and your colleagues have welcomed me. The representatives, delegates and members of the secretariat whom I have met have all made me feel very much at home. I am grateful for the assistance and friendship all of you have extended to me, and I look forward to working with all of you.

I am most impressed, Mr. President, with your dedication and attention to the work of the Conference, with the diligence and energy you bring to your important responsibilities, and with your impartial and fair approach. It is a pleasure to take up my duties during the presidency of the representative of a country and an ancient and wise people with whom the United States enjoys close and friendly relations.

My delegation also extends a warm welcome to the new representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, and wishes him well as he takes up his new responsibilities in Geneva. My delegation also welcomes the representative of Norway, the Conference's old friend Ambassador Kristvik, who has returned to Geneva to address us again today. By the introduction today of additional working papers, Norway continues its important contributions to our work.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

It is very reassuring for a newcomer to this forum to witness, at first hand, the seriousness with which delegations apply themselves to the critical tasks of disarmament negotiations. The results may not be as far-reaching or timely as we would wish, but I believe the peoples of the world can rely on the dedication and skill of those individuals representing the countries at this Conference to do their utmost to achieve real and lasting results in the field of disarmament.

The approach of my Government to our work here has often been articulated. But it may be useful to set it out again at this time. United States arms control objectives are integrated with its defence and foreign policies to strengthen deterrence and stability; to reduce the risk of all war, especially nuclear war; and to support the security of the United States' allies. Since the beginning of his Administration, President Reagan has followed these fundamental principles: We seek only those agreements which contribute to our security and that of our allies; We seek agreements which reduce forces, not simply limit them; To this end, we seek agreements on broad, deep and equitable reductions in offensive arms; Within the category of offensive nuclear arms, we give priority to reducing the most destabilizing weapons, that is, fast-flying, non-recallable ballistic missiles; We also seek equitable arms control agreements in the areas of nuclear testing, chemical weapons and conventional forces; We insist on agreements that can be effectively verified. Arms control agreements without effective verification provisions are worse than no agreements at all. These principles form the basis for our efforts to bring renewed integrity to arms control.

Let me turn now to the first items on our agenda: a nuclear test ban, and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. These two agenda items, and their interrelationship, are matters that the United States delegation has addressed in this Conference on many occasions, most recently in plenary statements by the acting United States representative on 24 February and 23 April of this year. However, more recent interventions, in particular the plenary statement by the distinguished Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, make it important to ensure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of others as to United States views.

I want to begin with the subject of deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence. In his statement of 9 June, Minister Petrovsky delivered a litany of alleged ills and evils of nuclear deterrence, laying this heavy burden at the feet of the West. He ascribed to the West dogmatic tenets, wrongly picturing our view of nuclear weapons as "a blessing for mankind", and claimed that nuclear deterrence is "nothing other than a concentrated expression of militarist intentions".

I hardly need to say that the United States strongly rejects this mischaracterization of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is not a matter of a blind, inflexible doctrine. Nuclear deterrence is a policy designed to support Western security. The Western States, including those which make up the NATO alliance, rely on nuclear deterrence in 1987, as they have relied on nuclear deterrence for decades, not because of some obstinate devotion to an abstract concept. No, the United States and its allies live in a real and a

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

dangerous world -- one torn by violations of the United Nations Charter's fundamental prohibition against the use or threat of use of force. In this world it is clear to anyone who chooses to examine the facts that nuclear deterrence is a matter not of theory, but of security. Nuclear deterrence is designed to prevent the outbreak of war -- be it conventional or nuclear -- by ensuring that a State possessing massive forces armed with conventional and chemical weapons -- in addition to nuclear weapons -- has nothing to gain, and much to lose, by initiating an attack.

If nuclear deterrence is tantamount to being unwilling to remove the nuclear threat, then the Soviet Union may look to its own position more critically, in the light of its unwillingness to adopt a truly "zero-zero" approach in the bilateral negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces, and to agree to ban all such forces, including those outside Europe.

To pursue real progress on the issues of arms control -- bilaterally; between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization; and among members of the Conference on Disarmament -- the Soviet Union should take into account what the views of my Government and of United States allies really are, and not create false issues on the relevance of deterrence.

In its statement of 24 February in this Chamber dealing with nuclear deterrence, the United States delegation stressed the absence of general conflict in Europe since 1945; recalled the agreement of General Secretary Gorbachev with President Reagan that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; addressed the role of nuclear deterrence in Soviet military thinking; and spoke of the final essentiality that the international community, over time, find other means to ensure international security. The United States, for its part, understands full well what a tragedy any use of nuclear weapons would be, as it understands what a tragedy the widespread use of conventional weapons, and now even chemical weapons, has been over the past 40 years, and continues to be even today.

At their 12 June meeting in Reykjavik, just 18 days ago, the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a statement that included an important reaffirmation of the policy of deterrence. I quote that document:

> "Serious imbalances in the conventional, chemical and nuclear field, and the persisting build-up of Soviet military power, continue to preoccupy us. We reaffirm that there is no alternative, as far as we can foresee, to the Alliance concept for the prevention of war -- the strategy of deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, each element being indispensable."

I would invite my colleagues around this table to consider what the situation would be in Europe today without the consistent implementation of this deterrent policy. And I would pose this further question: If the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union is not for the purpose of deterring attack, what is its purpose?

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

I have referred to the security situation in Europe. One important United States effort, designed, in part, to improve security thereby reducing the number of nuclear weapons, is the intermediate nuclear force negotiations that are continuing here in Geneva. On 16 June, the United States formally presented its position in those negotiations, calling for the global elimination of all shorter-range INF missile systems of the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States INF delegation also took that occasion to call attention to the benefits to the United States, the Soviet Union and the world at large were the Soviet Union to join the United States in agreeing now to the global elimination of all United States and Soviet longer-range INF systems. The global elimination of these systems would increase confidence in an agreement by greatly simplifying verification and making questions of compliance less ambiguous. The appearance of a single SS-20 missile would be an unambiguous violation of the agreement. Given the range, mobility and transportability of these systems, they are a threat wherever they are deployed.

Let me turn now specifically to the first item on our agenda, a nuclear-test ban. This Conference is well aware that representatives of the United Sates and the Soviet Union have been meeting in Geneva since July 1986 in a series of discussions known as the nuclear testing experts meetings. The most recent session ended on 29 May, and the next is scheduled for mid-July. Within the context of those meetings, the United States has proposed to the Soviet Union a process whereby the two countries initiate negotiations on the subject of nuclear testing. The Soviet Union has, thus far, rejected the United States proposals.

At the October 1986 Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, and in the recent discussions in Moscow between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, both sides agreed that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is a long-term objective which must be approached via a step-by-step process. The first order of business in this step-by-step process will be the negotiation of verification improvements to the threshold testing treaties of 1974 and 1976, i.e., the threshold test-ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty.

Agreement on such improvements would lead to the ratification of those treaties by the United States. The United States has agreed that, in parallel with reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both countries, a subsequent step could be to proceed to negotiations on intermediate limitations on nuclear testing. For its part, the United States has consistently affirmed its position that the ultimate goal of ceasing nuclear testing can only be reached through a series of steps in conjunction with a parallel programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.

In apparent harmony with its understanding that this is a step-by-step process, the Soviet Union has proposed joint experiments on improved verification that would allow a demonstration of both direct hydrodynamic yield measurement techniques, advocated by the United States, and indirect seismic methods, favoured by the USSR.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

This, in the United States' understanding, would be related to the first step, i.e., the negotiation of verification improvements for the threshold test-ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty. The United States has regarded this proposal as a potentially useful initiative; it is being addressed by representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union.

At no time during the bilateral discussions has there been serious discussion of any kind of testing moratorium. Proposals to make a moratorium the first step in the process must be regarded as an appeal to emotions rather than good sense. Such an approach undermines the work already accomplished, and if pursued, would ensure that a first step is never taken. It is ironic that a first-step testing moratorium is inconsistent with the joint verification activities proposed at the highest levels of the Soviet Government.

The United States stands prepared to pursue the understandings which form the basis of the discussions now being conducted in the nuclear testing experts meetings. My Government reiterates its proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately initiate bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing in accordance with the understandings which have been reached between the two sides at the highest levels.

The United States agrees with the importance of the Conference on Disarmament as the single forum of world-wide scope for multilateral disarmament negotiations, and acknowledges the interest of the States represented here in this important subject. Therefore, my Government has called upon this body to undertake actions which would complement, not compete with, the bilateral efforts I have described. And my Government insists that a multilateral negotiating body only conclude agreements which entail multilateral obligations. My delegation once again expresses willingness to support an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban based on a non-negotiating mandate.

Let me turn briefly to one matter related to items 1 and 2, and, moreover, 3 of our agenda. That matter is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. My delegation takes this opportunity to congratulate the Parliament of the Spanish State on its ratification of this important measure of nuclear arms control. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an agreement that has been a truly stabilizing force in the prevention of war, including nuclear war, and in bringing about a cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

I would like to conclude today by noting with satisfaction that our chemical weapons negotiations have resumed in earnest. My delegation looks forward to registering real advances, both on the basic issues that remain to be resolved, and on the many key details that need to be worked out. To facilitate understanding of chemical weapons verification issues and to assist our efforts here, the United States has invited the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, and appropriate Soviet experts to visit the United States chemical weapons destruction facility in Tooele, Utah. This would include a visit to a chemical weapons bunker. I want to say to Ambassador Nazarkin today that this invitation remains open, and that I hope he can accept it.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

General Secretary Gorbachev, in a statement made in Moscow on 23 June, noted that the Soviet Union is building a chemical weapons destruction facility. Secretary of State Shultz had suggested, earlier this year, that the two sides exchange visits to the sites of their destruction facilities. These visits would be practical examples of confidence-building in the field of chemical weapons arms control. They would add to other encouraging achievements in confidence-building. One of these is the recent United States-Soviet agreement on a draft joint text to establish nuclear risk reduction centres in their capitals. This agreement, which is a direct result of a United States initiative, is a practical measure that will strengthen international security by reducing the risk of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that might result from accident, misunderstanding or miscalculation.

Another positive development in confidence-building, of course, was the adoption by the Stockholm Conference, in September 1986, of a set of confidence-building measures, based largely on proposals made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, designed to increase the openness and predictability of military activities in Europe.

With these successes in mind, let us approach our own work in the Conference on Disarmament with optimism and confidence that we shall ourselves be successful.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Friedersdorf, the representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, including his reference to the close relations between Egypt and the United States of America. I would now like to welcome His Excellency, Dr. Larijani the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Islamic Republic of Iran. I give him the floor.

Mr. LARIJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I would like at the outset to express my pleasure and gratitude for the opportunity which has been given to me to address this august forum. May I also express my sincere wishes for the success of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The items on the agenda of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament are all of importance to the future of mankind and international peace and security. The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great significance to, and follows with keen interest, the deliberations in this Conference. However, due to time limitations, I cannot take up all the issues, but will confine myself to the important issue of chemical weapons, hoping that we can contribute in some way to this important issue. The issue of chemical weapons, the discussion about this topic, is a matter of urgency at this time.

Nuclear weapons were twice used in the course of the Second World War. Fortunately, they have not been used since. Chemical weapons, on the contrary, have been deployed continuously and used on an increasing basis over the past three and a half years. The main characteristics of chemical deployment over this period includes the ever-increasing sophistication of the chemical weapons and the chemical agents which have been used, making the cure of the injured people more difficult and the provision of help much more

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Larijani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

complicated. At the beginning of this tragic period chemical warfare was directed against military objectives and targets mainly, but recently the use of chemical weapons on civilian targets has been increased and intensified.

The pattern of progress among these characteristics should indeed be considered alarming to the human community. Should this horrible trend continue, the day will soon arrive when criminal elements may try to use chemical bombs and explosives against airports and cities of other countries. It seems very unreasonable to watch these developments passively and merely feel content with recommending to the civilian populace to carry gas masks in their handbags during their normal shopping and daily work. We think this is a historic moment in the Conference on Disarmament to be more realistic. There is a point of urgency to the matter.

Thanks to the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General, in March 1984, the United Nations produced its first report on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. In April 1985, a second report confirmed the use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers. A third report prepared in March 1986 concluded that chemical weapons had been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian positions. But the last report of 8 May 1987, prepared by the team of specialists dispatched by the Secretary-General to both Iran and Iraq, shows a new dimension as regards the violation of international law. In this report the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population is explicitly cited. The specialists report that they visited a whole family, incuding young children as well as old members of the family, injured by such weapons. The same team also reports on their visit to a two-year-old baby, a victim of mustard gas, who died in front of their very eyes. Needless to say, these are only the incidents known to the team. Numerous others have just slept in history; no cameras present, no team to depict the tragedy of their suffering for future generations, not to mention for the future deliberations of the politicians of the world. The state of ignorance on such an important manner seems to be beyond expectation.

Along the same current of events, just two days ago, on 28 June 1987, Iraqi forces attacked the city of Sardasht. Four residential areas in the city were the target of chemical bombardment. Th first report shows more than 10 deaths and more than 650 injuries, mostly children who happen to be more vulnerable and defenceless once exposed to the green and yellowish clouds generated by mustard gas.

It is very essential that we should all for a moment imagine how a child would behave when he cries hard for survival, and with each cry, lumps of this lethal gas are pumped into his lungs. We should also imagine what the desperate mother could do -- prevent the child from breathing, I mean suffocate him, or let her dear one die of mustard gas.

Mr. President, please don't recommend that all children should carry a gas mask in their back-pack; don't recommend that children should stop breathing for a few hours. No, Mr. President, we should do something serious, and right now.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Larijani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Nobody should expect a criminal government, a defeated aggressor which recognizes no boundaries to its action, to abide by any law or regulation. But are we justified in leaving the future of our lives to the whims and wishes of such criminals?

I hope I have been able to demonstrate the urgency of the matter, and why we should act right now, for tomorrow is too late. We should embark on some serious concrete and practical ways to deal with such insanity and criminal conduct. Firstly, we should try to strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925, for example through reaffirmation of commitment to the Protocol by the signatory States. Secondly, any and all international responses to any violation of the Protocol should be concrete, strong and prompt. Thirdly, all possible ways and means should be utilized to exert pressure on the violator in order to prevent the repetition of such crimes. This should include, among other things, the imposition of a total arms embargo and a variety of sanctions, as well as suspension of its membership in the United Nations and other international organizations. We are sure that in the present case, if these ideas are materialized and implemented, the aggressor régime of Iraq will definitely be prevented from continuing further use of chemical weapons.

It simply does not make sense that countries crying for humanity, peace and stability are generously arming, assisting and politically supporting such a criminal régime, regardless of its violation of internatiional law and continuation of such shameless crimes. No political ambition can justify this ignorance! Any assistance to the violator with the knowledge of its continuous violations is in itself a crime and constitutes participation in the crime.

Finally, it is our earnest hope that this session of the Conference on Disarmament will produce the necessary machinery and needed modalities for strengthening the ban on the use of chemical weapons, effective implementation of international law and regulations in this field, and safeguarding peace, stability and the future of mankind. Considering the tangible and substantial progress made in the course of the past year in the preparation of the convention on chemical weapons, while hoping that it will be finalized at the earliest possible time, I would like to extend our gratitude and appreciation to Ambassador Ekéus, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and his colleagues in the working groups.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Dr. Larijani, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, for his statement. Distinguished representatives, we thus conclude the list of speakers for today's meeting -- I give the floor to the representative of the USSR.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. President. First of all, I should like to welcome the presence in our midst today of the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Ambassador Kristvik, whose statement we have just heard with great attention and interest. It was also interesting to hear the first statement by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf. In connection with his statement, I should like to make a number of comments. First of all, on the issue of deterrence which he

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

referred to. The advocates of the concept of nuclear deterrence refer to the alleged deterrent nature of nuclear weapons and assert that this is what has ensured and continues to ensure peace.

A deep analysis of the concept of nuclear deterrence was provided on 11 June at the meeting of the Conference by President Alfonsín of Argentina. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, dwelt on this in detail in his statement to the Conference on 9 June, to which Ambassador Friedersdorf referred today. In the course of the spring session I had occasion to take the floor on this subject as well. This is why today I do not intend to provide an exhaustive analysis, and I shall simply confine myself to a few brief comments.

The vast destructive power of nuclear weapons is indeed a fundamentally new characteristic of modern weapons. On the one hand this quality can be described as that of a deterrent -- that cannot be denied. On the other hand it means that nuclear weapons leave no hope for any State to defend itself by means of military technology. This was clearly recognized in the Soviet-United States statement concerning the results of the Geneva summit meeting in November 1985. "A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought". But if you recognize that there can be no victors in a nuclear war, then how can you plan a first nuclear strike? Over four decades since the war the world has more than once teetered on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. True, no catastrophe has occurred so far. Maybe this was due in part to the deterrent nature of nuclear weapons. But is there any assurance that this deterrent factor will continue to operate in the future? To base plans for the future on the sole fact that the catastrophe has not yet occurred is in our view absurd.

Let us imagine an old person who is ill but doesn't want to go to the doctor, offering the following explanation: "I have lived for 70 years. I've never tried to be cured and I haven't died a single time, so I will live for 70 more years." The more sophisticated nuclear weapons are, the greater the role played by computer technology and automation then the less time remains to take decisions on which the existence of human civilization depends. If we recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be guarantors of peace, if we agree that, on the contrary, they represent a tremendous danger to the world, then we will inevitably be led to a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, the reduction and then the elimination of nuclear arms.

As for the approach taken by the Soviet Union to security issues, I should like to draw your attention to the following. But before I do that I should like to respond to Ambassador Friedersdorf's statement regarding our position at the negotiations on intermediate-range missiles. He appealed to us to look more critically at our position concerning Soviet missiles in this class in Asia. In this connection, I must point out that the United States has been steadily increasing its military strength, primarily in the nuclear category, in the Asia-Pacific region, especially close to the frontiers of socialist States in Asia. The number of delivery systems, mainly airborne, is being increased, and nuclear stockpiles are being enlarged on the ships of the United States Seventh Fleet and at United States bases in this area. It is striking, for instance, that deployment has begun in South Korea of United States "Lance" tactical nuclear missiles. And there is no guarantee

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

that the infrastructure created for these missiles cannot be used in future for other nuclear missile systems which are capable of striking the territories of the USSR, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China.

Bearing in mind the nuclear threat from the United States, and also the fact that the disarmament process has yet to go beyond discussions into practical actions, we are bound to keep a group of intermediate missiles in the Asian part of the USSR, which we are prepared to reduce to the level of 100 warheads. In a certain sense these intermediate missiles are intended to guarantee the security of more than the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet Union is not doing anything, nor will it do anything, over and above what is dictated by the minimum requirements of its own security and the defence interests of its allies and friends.

In its desire to give impetus to nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union is prepared, should an agreement be achieved with the United States on intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, to come to an agreement on the elimination of intermediate nuclear missiles outside the European continent too. We have repeatedly stated that we are prepared to settle the question of the elimination of intermediate nuclear missiles on a global basis. We would have no difficulty in giving up the right to have 100 warheads on intermediate nuclear missiles in Asia if the United States were to accept the elimination of its nuclear arsenals in this area, as well as the withdrawal of its aircraft carriers beyond recognized limits. Of course, the United States would have no intermediate nuclear missiles on its own territory. As far as shorter-range missiles are concerned once agreement is reached on intermediate nuclear missiles, the Soviet Union is prepared to settle this on a global basis. United States Secretary of State, G. Shultz was told about this in April this year in Moscow. As matters turned out, it was the United States side itself which was not ready to consider a practical solution to this issue. We had to take this circumstance into account in drawing up our draft treaty on intermediate nuclear missiles. In the final analysis, the Soviet Union, as is well known, is in favour of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, which presupposes a "global zero" solution to the problem of intermediate nuclear missiles and shorter-range INFs. This is what I wanted to say regarding the specific issue of intermediate nuclear missiles and shorter-range missiles.

Now I should like to revert to our approach to the problem of nuclear deterrence and nuclear security in the broader context. As is well known, the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty had recently in Berlin adopted a document on the military doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. It was issued as a document of this Conference (CD/755). From this document, it is clear that the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty adhere to a strictly defensive doctrine. This doctrine is subordinated to a single task, that of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. The strictly defensive nature of the doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty is manifested in their resolve never under any circumstances to initiate military action against any State or alliance of States unless they are themselves the target of an armed attack. It may be seen in their firm intention not to be the first to use

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

nuclear weapons; in the absence of territorial claims on any other State, either in Europe or outside Europe; and in the fact that they do not view any State or any people as their enemy.

The document adopted in Berlin is no mere proclamation of principles, but a sort of programme of action for the development of military forces. The basis for this programme is the principle of sufficiency, whereby the allied States maintain their armed forces in a state of operational readiness that is sufficient to ensure that they are not caught unawares. Should they, however, be subjected to attack they will repel the aggressor. The allied socialist States do not intend to maintain armed forces and armaments beyond the scale required to meet these objectives.

In the document they adopted, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty proposed to the member States of NATO that they should enter into consultations in order to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances, analyse their nature and jointly discuss the patterns of their future development so as to reduce the mutual suspicion and distrust that has accumulated over the years, to ensure a better perception of each other's intentions and to guarantee that the military concepts and doctrines of the two military blocs and their members are based on defensive principles. Unfortunately, the North Atlantic Alliance has so far not reacted to this proposal.

I will not now compare the military doctrines of the two blocs. This is the task of the proposed consultations. But I should like to draw your attention to one fundamental difference: our military doctrine contains the principle -- and the Soviet Union has assumed the corresponding obligation -- not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The other side rejects this principle, substituting for it the concept of deterrence, which allows for the first use of nuclear weapons at an early stage of the conflict.

Now I should like to say a few words about the issue of the cessation of nuclear testing, which was also referred to by Ambassador Friedersdorf today. The Soviet Union proposes a start to negotiations in any forum on a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. This proposal is rejected by our opponents. We are also prepared to agree to intermediate measures. Quite recently the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, put forward a proposal for a ban on explosions of over one kilotonne and the establishment of an annual quota of two or three explosions. We have not received a positive response to this proposal either.

Essentially, what the United States is proposing, and this was mentioned by Ambassador Friedersdorf today, simply boils down to a review of the system for monitoring compliance with the 1974 and 1976 agreements, one of which provides for a yield threshold of 150 kilotonnes. We do not oppose the ratification -- the earliest possible ratification -- of these treaties, but we must not lose sight of the ultimate goal which these negotiations should pursue: a complete and general ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

The United States claims that it is impossible to embark on such negotitions on the grounds that it needs testing in order to perfect nuclear weapons, to verify their reliability, and it links the continuation of testing

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

once again with the concept of nuclear deterrence. In this connection I have a question which I should like to put to the delegation of the United States. We all know that the concept of deterrence has been the basic concept in United States policy for over 40 years. None the less, until the beginning of the 1980s, the United States agreed to consider banning the testing of nuclear weapons not as a long-term but as an immediate goal, and without linking a test ban with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. And this was something that they did not only in theory but also in practice. Up to the 1980s they participated in the trilateral negotiations on the nuclear-test ban, which made considerable headway, and all in all were close to a successful conclusion, until they were unilaterally broken off by the United States.

My question is the following. What happened at the beginning of the 1980s that forced the United States to change its position sharply? Up to the 1980s agreement was not achieved because verification difficulties were cited. Now there are no such difficulties. Now reference is made to something else: apparently nuclear testing can be halted only after the elimination of nuclear weapons. But then what is the point of this measure? Of course, when you have no nuclear weapons there will be nothing to test. We consider the cessation of nuclear testing as an important measure leading to the curtailment of the arms race, and this is precisely why we are already proposing to initiate negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear testing. Unfortunately -- and this was confirmed once again today by Ambassador Friedersdorf -- the United States is prepared to have only a non-negotiating mandate for the ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament.

One further brief comment in connection with today's statement by Ambassador Friedersdorf, regarding his invitation to me to accompany some experts to a chemical weapon destruction facility in Utah. As I understood him, he stressed that this invitation, this visit is considered as a confidence-building measure. In fact it can certainly only be considered as a confidence-building measure, because if I do go to that facility I'm hardly going to derive anything useful there for the negotations on banning chemical weapons. In any case our experts say that they have no difficulties with the destruction of chemical weapons. They know how to do it. Consequently, this can hardly be anything other than a confidence-building measure. But I think that there are, in fact, considerably more effective confidence-building measures. As I see it, the main point which undermines confidence at the negotiations on chemical weapons are plans to develop binary weapons. Tell me, why participate in the preparation of a convention to ban and eliminate chemical weapons and at the same time take practical steps to develop a new generation of chemical weapons? Do such steps demonstrate the sincerity of the participants in the negotiations? I think that shelving these plans, these steps, would be a true confidence-building measure.

My brief comments have turned into a statement which was not all that brief, but on this note I will conclude.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of the USSR, Ambassador Nazarkin, for his statement. Are there any members of the Conference who would like to make a statement? I see none. In this case I move to the second part of our meeting today, and as the distinguished representatives know, we have received requests from two non-member States to participate in the informal meetings on the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", which we will start discussing today immediately after this plenary meeting. In order to consider those requests before we start our informal discussions, I intend to suspend this plenary meeting briefly to consider informally according to our custom the two requests that I have just mentioned. If there are no objections, I shall now suspend this plenary meeting.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 11.50 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): The meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. I should like to put before the Conference for decision working papers CD/WP.283 and 284 containing requests received from Finland and Norway to participate in the informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". If there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): Distinguished delegates, allow me now to make a brief statement to mark the conclusion of my period as President of the Conference during the month of June. The statement is a sort of progress report regarding the consultations that we have held on the procedural aspects of a number of pending topics on the agenda of the Conference. In doing so, I continue the tradition that has been established by a number of previous Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament. Although it is a relatively new tradition, nevertheless I believe in its usefulness as an affirmation of a joint responsibility between the President of the Conference and its members regarding the procedure and the process of work, with its negative and positive aspects, and also an affirmation of the ongoing nature of whatever consultations the President of the Conference undertakes in continuation of the process begun by his predecessor and up to the stage at which his successor will start, since this is made necessary by the very nature of the monthly presidential term.

The special consultations regarding the nuclear-test ban have been resumed on the basis of the draft mandate which was proposed by the neutral and non-aligned countries, and while some have welcomed this draft there are others who continue to study it. Some delegations still consider that the draft mandate which was proposed by the President of the Conference for the month of April constitutes an excellent basis for the consultations on this topic. I hope that we can reach agreement to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban as soon as possible. Without trying to reach any prejudged conclusions, I believe that the solution must be a compromise one, which would reconcile the positions of the various groups without detriment to any of them. In spite of my awareness of the difficulty of reaching such a composite solution, nevertheless I believe that we can reach it by exerting further efforts and manifesting the political will to do so.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

At all events the Conference must avoid continuation of the current deadlock which surrounds the consideration of this topic, and any withdrawal from the framework of the Ad hoc Committee in which it has been examined.

It proved possible to reach an agreement regarding the holding of informal meetings of the Conference to examine the item on preventing the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Undoubtedly the arrangements and the understanding that we have reached in this context are a step forward in comparison with the previous session of the Conference. I hope that the discussions that we will start today on this subject will help to establish a framework through which this topic will be examined to a larger extent during the next session in keeping with the mandate of the Conference as a multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

In spite of the obvious desire to reactivate the consultations concerning the topic of the prevention of nuclear war and what I have learnt of the manner in which some groups have assessed their positions, unfortunately we have not been able to translate this into a concrete reality. I feel sure that my successor, Ambassador Terrefe, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, will continue these consultations during his presidency of the Conference, taking into consideration all the previous proposals regarding the most appropriate framework for the examination of this subject.

The positions of the groups regarding new types of weapons of mass destruction as well as new systems of these weapons remain unchanged. Nor have I noticed any change in the positions of the groups regarding the question of expansion of the membership of the Conference, and therefore I saw no real point in beginning intensive consultations on the subject. However, this subject should be a matter of concern for you during the next few weeks in order to avoid a situation in which the Conference would find itself once again obliged, when drafting its annual report, to record its inability to reach a decision on the subject and to respond to the membership applications presented to it.

This concludes my progress report for the period of my presidency. I would now like to wish my successor Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia every success for the period of July during his presidency of the Conference.

Before I conclude, please allow me to wish farewell to a highly esteemed colleague, a dear friend and brother, on the occasion of his departure after many years of distinguished activity at the Conference. Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka has carried out his duties as representative of his country with great ability and efficiency, and he has helped the Conference on Disarmament to reach compromise solutions on thorny questions during difficult periods through which it has passed. He will be sorely missed by his colleagues and friends, but I am sure that he will continue his close relationship with us in his new post as Director of UNIDIR, and I wish Ambassador Dhanapala every success in his new assignment and in the mission in which he believes, namely disarmament.

In conclusion I would like to express to you all my sincere gratitude for your co-operation with me during this month, and particularly the co-ordinators of the groups, with whom I had the honour of dealing closely. I

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

would also like to thank my dear friend Ambassador Komatina, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference, and Ambassador Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, and all their colleagues for all the sincere efforts they have exerted to help me, and I would also like to thank all the staff working behind the scenes, whose voices we hear although we do not see them, the interpretation services who through their efforts have enabled us to carry on a fruitful dialogue and who have conveyed to us all the opinions regardless of linguistic differences. This concludes my statement. Before adjourning this meeting, does anyone wish to take the floor? Ambassador Fan, the distinguished representative of China.

Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (translated from Chinese): Thank you, Mr. President. In your statement you mentioned that the outstanding Ambassador Dhanapala is going to leave us, and today is the last day he is with us in the meeting. Tomorrow he will take up the post of head of UNIDIR. Mr. President, I fully agree with your appraisal of Ambassador Dhanapala. Ambassador Dhanapala is an outstanding representative of the non-aligned movement. At this forum and other forums on disarmament he submitted many positive proposals, thus playing a positive role. Ambassador Dhanapala is an outstanding representative of Sri Lanka, which maintains close relations with China. He has made important contributions to the friendly relations between the Chinese delegation and the Sri Lankan delegation.

The Chinese delegation wishes to take this opportunity to express its gratitude for his co-operation and his contribution to the work of the CD. I personally also wish to thank him for his co-operation and help in my work. Although he is leaving the CD, and his departure means that we will lose a friend and outstanding colleague, to our regret, Ambassador Dhanapala will continue to display his talent and wisdom in another post. I am glad about this and wish him every success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Fan, representative of China to the Conference for his statement. I now give the floor to Ambassador Richard Butler, the representative of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you, Mr. President. I did not intend to take the floor on this occasion, and will do so only very briefly because of the exceptional character of this occasion. Let me start first of all by saying that I did not find it necessary to make a statement in the formal plenary during the month of your presidency, and that deprived me of the opportunity of expressing what pleasure it causes my delegation to see you in the Chair, but as this is the end of your term as President, I think the most appropriate thing for me to say is our very deep debt of gratitude for the way in which you have conducted our affairs this month.

The exceptional occasion to which I referred is the departure from the Conference of Jayantha Dhanapala, a person I have known for in excess of 20 years, representative of a country with which mine has immensely close links. I won't belabour the point, but I want to make it clear that I consider the departure of Jayantha Dhanapala from this Conference a very

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

severe loss to the Conference, and I feel it personally. The only consolation, and I think it is a more than adequate one, is that Jayantha Dhanapala will not be lost to the cause of disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Richard Butler for his kind words addressed to me and to our friend Ambassador Dhanapala. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of France.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Thank you Mr. President. I merely wish to associate myself with the regrets and good wishes that mark the last day on which our colleague and friend Ambassador Dhanapala is performing his tasks as representative of his country to the Conference on Disarmament, and to add, because of the special interest that France has had from the outset in the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR, that we are convinced that under his guidance, with his remarkable competence, with the authority he has acquired in disarmament circles and which is clearly perceived by us all here -- we are certain that the Institute itself will recover the authority and influence I feel it needs in the interests of the international community as a whole. Thus I should like to wish him every success. These are my personal wishes, and the wishes of the French Government.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Morel, representative of France, for the words he addressed to our dear friend Ambassador Dhanapala, and now I give the floor to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, permit me, on the occasion of the conclusion of your term of office, to thank you for the very useful contribution you have made to the work of our Conference. As we know, the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Ambassador J. Dhanapala, is leaving his post, and I should like to state the following. We regret to have to part from Ambassador J. Dhanapala, with whom we have built up relations of close and business-like co-operation. He is an outstanding diplomat with a deep knowledge of disarmament issues. At the same time, as Ambassador J. Dhanapala is moving to a new and important post, I should like to wish him great success in his new field and to express the hope that the relations of close, business-like and friendly co-operation that we have built up here at the Conference will continue in the future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank distinguished Ambassador Nazarkin of the USSR for his kind words addressed to Ambassador Dhanapala and to me personally. Are there any other speakers who wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia.

Mr. CULAFIC (Yugoslavia): Thank you Mr. President. Allow me in the name of Ambassador Kosin and the whole Yugoslav delegation, as co-ordinator for the Group of 21 for the month of June, to express our great satisfaction at having had this opportunity to work closely with you under your very versatile guidance. I take this opportunity also to repeat the high appreciation of the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Culafic, Yugoslavia)

work of Ambassador Dhanapala already expressed by Ambassador Kosin in the name of the Group of 21, and I wish to associate the Yugoslav delegation also, as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for the month of June, with all the appreciation expressed here in this room today. I also wish to express our great satisfaction that we will have Ambassador Dhanapala in a very responsible job devoted to the cause of disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia for his statement on behalf of the Group of 21 and for his kind words addressed to Ambassador Dhanapala and to me, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Mrs. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. I am certain that the head of my delegation, Ambassador Garcia Robles would have wished to be present today in order to leave on record his thanks to Ambassador Dhanapala for the work he has accomplished in this Conference. However, in his absence, it falls to me to speak, and it is for me an honour to address these words to Ambassador Dhanapala, since it has been my privilege to work closely with him and I have always learnt something from him, I have always gained something new from him, something that has remained with me and something that will be greatly helpful to me in my future career. I am convinced that Ambassador Dhanapala will discharge the duties entrusted to him with great success, and I should like to tell him that we shall miss him in this Conference. We shall miss his advice and his wisdom. We are nevertheless happy to know that he will continue to devote himself to the subject to which we ourselves are devoting this period.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for her statement in tribute to Ambassador Dhanapala. I now give the floor to Ambassador Dhanapala.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Thank you, Mr. President. I had not intended to take the floor on my last appearance in the CD, but I have been deeply touched by the very warm and generous references made to me by you personally and by so many of my friends and colleagues in the Conference. I am conscious that my intervention is delaying a very informal meeting on an important subject, item 2 of our agenda, and I would not want to be the cause of delaying work on this very important issue.

Let me very briefly begin by congratulating you on your successful tenure of office as President, in particular the achievement that you have registered in having successfully arranged an agreement to have an informal meeting on item 2. I would also like to acknowledge the presence here today of two distinguished visitors, Ambassador Kristvik of Norway and the Deputy Minister of Iran, whose contributions my delegation has listened to with great interest.

As has been noted today marks my final appearance in the Conference on Disarmament as head of the Sri Lanka delegation to this single multilateral negotiating body, to which Sri Lanka was admitted as a result of a decision of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In the three and a half years that I have been here, I have

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

benefited greatly from the contributions made by so many delegations, from the co-operation and especially from the lesson in dedication and commitment to the ideal of disarmament that I have seen amongst the participants whose friendship and co-operation I have been privileged to have in the period I have been here. Physically my position has moved from, I think, the seat where the Federal Republic of Germany sits to where I am now, almost directly opposite you. And in that odyssey, if I may call it such, I had the privilege of occupying the seat which you occupy, Mr. President, in the month of April 1984, and again, as I said, of enjoying the co-operation and friendship of my colleagues.

In my diplomatic career, I think it is true to say that there are few other bodies as august as this where I have been privileged to work with so many distinguished and talented people dedicated to such a lofty goal as disarmament. That we have made little progress in achieving our goal I think is no reflection on the dedication of our efforts and the sincerity of our motives. It is, as in the case of all United Nations endeavours, the reflection of our times.

I would merely like to conclude by wishing you all success in your task, and expressing my thanks to all of you for having given me your friendship and co-operation. It has been noted that I do not leave the field of disarmament, and I will continue to be associated with you in that field, although not directly in the Conference on Disarmament. I have no doubt that my successor will be able to count on the same friendship and co-operation that you have extended to me.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Dhanapala for his statement, in which I believe he has expressed many of the ideas that lead us to believe that Mr. Dhanapala has fulfilled his duty in the best possible manner. Accordingly, I believe that he will carry out his new functions with the same ability and with the same enthusiasm.

On behalf of all of you, I express to him our best wishes for success, and we shall always share with him our common aim of full and complete disarmament.

Before I adjourn this meeting I would like to inform you that His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Mr. Hans van den Broek, will be addressing the Conference at its next plenary meeting on Thursday, 2 July. May I suggest that, on that occasion, we start our plenary meeting at 10.30 a.m., and not 10 a.m., in order to facilitate arrangements relating to the visit of the Minister? I see no objection, so we shall proceed accordingly.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 2 July, at 10.30 a.m. As agreed in the timetable of meetings for this week, the Conference will hold the first informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2 after I adjourn this meeting. I intend to open the informal meeting in five minutes' time. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.418
2 July 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 July 1987, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 418th meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning, I should like to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to His Excellency Mr. Hans van den Broek, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, who will be addressing the Conference today as our first speaker. Mr. van den Broek was a distinguished Member of Parliament until 1981 and is a well-known public figure. He has been deeply involved in the field of foreign affairs and for more than five years has been entrusted by his Government with high responsibilities in that field covering, of course, disarmament matters. In that connection, he already delivered an important statement in the then Committee on Disarmament on 29 March 1983. I should like to express pleasure that he is visiting us again and I am sure that all members of the Conference will follow his statement of today with particular interest. I am also happy to note the presence of Mr. Jan Martenson, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, who is with us here today.

Allow me now to make a brief opening statement.

On behalf of the members of the Conference on Disarmament and on my own behalf, I should like to express our warm appreciation to Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt for the efficient and able leadership he provided as President of the Conference for the month of June. His contribution contained in his closing statement will guide us in our work during the brief remaining period of this session.

It is an honour for me to preside once again over the work of the CD. Seven years ago, in August 1980, I had the pleasant experience of working with the outstanding members of this Conference. A few of them I am very pleased to see in this conference hall today, still devoting dedicated service to the cause of disarmament, international peace and security. I look forward to working again closely with them and other members of the Conference on Disarmament.

The agenda of the Conference on Disarmament has remained essentially unchanged since its inception in 1979. The nuclear-test ban, the first item on the agenda, is an area where CD has made the least progress and yet it is an issue to which the highest priority was attached by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Even before that the international community had been vigorously urging the nuclear-weapon States to end nuclear testing.

Since 1983, it has proved impossible to re-establish an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban. In fact, numerous proposals and initiatives which, if pursued, could have achieved that goal have been rejected, including the 18-month moratorium on nuclear testing. Since 1945, over 1,600 nuclear explosions have been registered and the figure is ever increasing. The need for searching in the CD for a workable mechanism whereby proposals and initiatives directed towards a nuclear-test ban could be examined and positive responses could be elicited, is urgent. This, I believe, the Conference may wish to pursue.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

I shall make every effort to continue the informal consultations which have already started on this item, with a view to reconciling the positions of the various groups. With regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, informal meetings of the Conference have already commenced.

With regard to the other items of the agenda where the Conference has established subsidiary bodies, I am sure that progress is being made by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. Concerning the finalization of the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD) for submission to the resumed forty-first session of the General Assembly, I hope that what has been achieved so far will be preserved and enhanced under the capable and dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles. The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, chaired by Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances, chaired by Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, chaired by Ambassador Meiszter, the representative of Hungary, will, I hope, succeed in their specially difficult task of harmonizing the various positions.

That concludes my statement.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today with its discussion of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with Rule 30 of the its Rules of Procedure, any member wishing to so do may raise any subject pertinent to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Hans van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

Mr. van den BROEK (Netherlands): Mr. President, I am happy to be the first today to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency for this month. I thank you for your very kind words addressed to me and I am sure that in this crucial month of the summer session the Conference will benefit from your guidance -- guidance from an experienced man who also in the early 1980s left his mark here in this very room. May I also thank Ambassador Alfaragi of Egypt for the able and balanced way in which he presided over the Conference last month. My delegation also wishes to welcome the newcomers to the Conference, Ambassador Tarmidzi, from Indonesia, and Ambassador Friedersdorf, from the United States, to whom we wish a speedy recovery.

It is a privilege and a pleasure for me to be in your midst for the second time. Since 1983, when I last addressed the Conference, the international situation has undergone significant changes. We have put up with disappointments and have gone through times of tension.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)

I greatly value this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament, particularly at a time when the arms control horizon is brightening. There are now real prospects for the long-sought breakthrough in the bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which are held, as we all know, in this very same city of Geneva. A first sign that things might be taking a turn for the better was the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference last year, followed by the broadening of perspectives at the Reykjavik Summit. And I have the impression that in this body too there is a quickening of pace, at least in some areas. The negotiations on chemical weapons are a case in point.

In my view, this certainly does not mean that we can afford any complacency because it should be admitted that progress in this Conference on a number of issues has been disappointingly slow. Too much time is often devoted to procedural matters at the expense of substance. I hope that, through a joint effort, we will be able in the period ahead to make fuller use of the unique negotiating mechanism with which this forum provides us. The tasks ahead of us are indeed formidable.

Before going into the substance of these tasks, allow me to make a few general remarks. There seems to be a tendency to focus solely on weapons, nuclear weapons in particular. This is understandable in view of the dilemmas posed by their destructive nature. My own country is acutely aware of this. But it will be clear that armaments must be seen in the broader context of relations between countries and between groups of countries. The so-called arms race, with which we are trying to come to grips, is not primarily an autonomous self-propelling process. As we see it, armaments are the result of political tensions and not the other way round. Of course, if a country's armaments are well in excess of any reasonable defence needs, this will in turn cause further mistrust.

Just as arms control cannot be divorced from political tensions, neither can arms control be divorced from security policy. Arms control is not an end in itself. It should contribute to the preservation of stability and peace. In the East-West context this is best served by establishing a stable balance at the lowest possible levels of armaments. Such a balance is in the interest of peace in the world as a whole. Under present conditions, which include a serious conventional imbalance in Europe, nuclear deterrence is an indispensable element of a strategy that has kept the peace on this continent for over four decades. I should like to stress that the only purpose of deterrence -- dissuasion might be a more proper expression -- is to prevent war, as is also clearly spelled out in a recent United Nations study on the subject. At the same time we should make every effort to bring down the high levels of armaments on both sides. But it would be irresponsible to discard the present structure of peace, before a better alternative is firmly within our grasp.

If you allow me, I will now deal with a number of specific issues concerning the arms control process. The first point is the important role that confidence can play in the whole process. Greater mutual confidence will make it easier to reach arms control agreements. Incidentally, the relation also works the other way round: once a solid and verifiable agreement is reached, this will contribute to further confidence. Especially in those

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)

situations where real arms control is difficult to achieve, confidence-building measures can be most useful in preparing the way. They can, moreover, also serve as a complement to actual arms control.

The basic idea of the concept of confidence-building measures, as developed in the European context, is to create more openness -- or "transparency" if you like. One can thereby reduce the fears and mistrust which too much secretiveness with regard to military matters can engender on either side. In Stockhom, 35 countries reached agreement on a set of measures including notification and observation of various military activities, as well as provisions for on-site inspection. It will be a challenge for all of us to work out confidence-building measures applicable in other parts of the world as well, particularly in regions where tensions occur, and it would seem that such measures, tailored to the specific situation, could play a useful role as a first step forward towards political accommodation. The Netherlands has advocated before such confidence-building measures in the areas of Central America and the Middle East.

The second point concerns verification. It is increasingly recognized that asking for on-site inspection is reasonable and legitimate. As we all know, verification has been a stumbling-block in many arms control negotiations in the past. The growing consensus on the need for strict verification holds the promise of progress with regard to arms control in general. But let us bear in mind that verification is a matter where the details -- the fine print -- are all-important.

The third point I would like to touch upon is that of deep cuts. Reductions in nuclear weapons on a scale we dared not hope for at the beginning of the decade now appear feasible. It is towards the goal of banning long-range INF missiles that most progress has been made, a subject to which my country attaches particular importance. We equally welcome the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are in agreement on the principle of a 50 per cent cut in their strategic arsenals. It is clear that we have come a long way, if we compare this to the much more modest limitations contained in the SALT treaties of the 1970s. However, somewhere down the road towards nuclear disarmament, one reaches a point beyond which the negative impact of the conventional imbalance in Europe becomes untenable.

This brings me to the fourth point, the increasing need for arms control in the conventional field. As you know, we have been struggling with this issue in the MBFR talks in Vienna for many years. This is an example of a negotiating process that has been blocked by the twin problems of insufficient transparency and disagreement over verification provisions. I do mean that efforts to achieve meaningful results in that forum should be continued.

We are now also embarking on a new endeavour. The 16 NATO countries and the 7 Warsaw Pact countries are preparing new negotiations with regard to forces and armaments in the area from the Atlantic Ocean up to the Urals. Our aim in those negotiations will be to remove the destablizing asymmetries existing at present and to bring about a stable conventional balance at lower levels. I am pleased to note that Eastern countries have now acknowledged that asymmetries do exist and that they should be redressed. In our view, the negotiations on conventional stability will have to devote special attention

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)

to those elements of current forces that represent a capability for surprise attacks or massive offensive operations. Progress towards these goals would be a major contribution to peace and security on this continent and could at the same time increase the scope for further reductions in the nuclear field.

Of course, the emphasis on conventional arms limitations should in no way be limited to Europe alone. Since the Second World War the world has come to bear the scars of many grave conflicts, all of them involving conventional arms, with devastating consequences for man and his environment. Eighty per cent of world military expenditure is spent on conventional weapons. The quickest rise in such expenditure is occurring in the developing world, where poverty is greatest. Awareness of this sad truth seems to have led to a growing recognition, in United Nations bodies as elsewhere, of the need for greater attention to conventional disarmament. These are matters that deserve serious consideration at the forthcoming Conference on Disarmament and Development.

My fifth point concerns the trend in arms control towards the complete elimination of whole categories of weapons. The biological weapons convention provides a first example and it will, we all hope, be followed by a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. In the case of chemical weapons we are moving from a prohibition of use to a complete ban on development, production and possession. The example of the Biological Weapons Convention shows that a third phase might be contemplated as well, in which further confidence-building measures, notably the exchange of information on research, might help further to ensure that no development of a certain type of weapons is taking place.

As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, we surely are still far from negotiating these weapons away. However, as I pointed out, we are moving to a possible ban on virtually a whole category of these weapons, and we hope that progress will soon be made on other categories as well.

An important condition for success in arms talks is that the forum one chooses should be well suited for negotiations on the weapon system concerned. This particular forum, the Conference on Disarmament, has a long agenda. A realistic assessment of the agenda, its achievements and prospects shows that chemical weapons offer the best chance of success. The CW negotiations therefore deserve, in our view, the priority they receive in the practical day-to-day work in Geneva.

Agreement on a ban on chemical weapons, would serve as a unique illustration of the role the Conference on Disaramament can play as the single world-wide multilateral negotiating body. Given the long-standing abhorrence of these weapons shared by the world community, the CD now faces the historic task of bringing about a treaty banning the production, possession, development and use of these weapons. This task is a great challenge, but certainly not an insurmountable one. Negotiating history shows great creativity and perseverance toward this end. As in the past, the Netherlands is anxious to make its contribution on that score.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)

Determination should guide us in a joint effort to bring the chemical weapons treaty within sight. In defining the essential characteristics of the treaty, some basic facts are to be borne in mind.

Firstly, the convention must, by its very nature, be detailed so as to cover all essential requirements; on the other hand, we must realize that not every single detail can be foreseen or taken care of. Technological developments will not come to a halt. The treaty should therefore provide for a continuous review, among other things, of the lists of chemicals to be covered under the different régimes of control and prohibition.

Secondly, verification remains a key component of every credible and solid arms control treaty. That applies in particular to the chemical weapons convention. There, verification requires essentially a three fold structure: declaring and dismantling of stocks and production facilities; strict verification provisions including routine inspection of the relevant part of the chemical industry in an equitable but adequate way; and finally an appropriate régime for consultation, fact-finding procedures and challenge inspections.

The effectiveness of challenge inspections is closely related to the efficiency of the routine part of the verification régime -- verification of destruction and verification of non-production. A very stringent system of challenge inspection, and that is what we need, will prove acceptable only if it is reserved for exceptional cases of serious concern about compliance. The first condition for an effective challenge-inspection régime is therefore an effective system for routine inspection. The second condition in my view, is that when a party considers a challenge inspection to be necessary, no obstacle whatever should be able to prevent the inspection from taking place. The third condition is that an inspection should always and under all circumstances lead to a quick and clear answer. The challenged State party should therefore be under a stringent obligation to disprove the allegations contained in the challenge request.

I am perfectly aware that meeting these conditions is not possible without paying the price of a certain openness. I am, however, convinced that, upon close consideration, this price is relatively small and is convincingly outweighed by the common goal of an effective world-wide ban on chemical weapons. Important work on this subject has been done in the recent past, especially by the United Kingdom (see document CD/715) and by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Netherlands will consider making a further contribution to the discussion on this most important subject when appropriate.

Recent reports on renewed use of t ese horrendous weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq have once again ur erlined the urgency of our work to bring about agreement on a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention.

The chemical-weapons negotiations surely gained momentum this year. Let us use the remaining two months of the summer session to the maximum, as well as the later part of the year when the CD is not in formal session. Even if the CD is not in session between September and January, this should not prevent us from pursuing the work with vigour.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)

A topic on which the Conference on Disarmament can, I feel, do further useful work is that of nuclear testing. You, Mr. President, mentioned it in your introductory remarks. For too long we have been waiting for the establishment of an ad hoc committee in which a great deal of concrete work can be done. I think on this subject we would be best advised to keep in step with the enhanced pace of nuclear arms negotiations. Now that strict verification seems politically acceptable and in essence technically feasible, it is only logical that, in parallel with a programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate certain categories of nuclear weapons, a step-by-step programme of limiting -- and ultimately ending -- nuclear testing should be carried out. Fewer nuclear weapons, fewer nuclear tests. I feel encouraged by the fact that recent developments appear to confirm the validity of this approach, which I have advocated on several occasions before.

For my Government, reaching a comprehensive test ban remains an important goal. In combination with other measures, it would serve the useful purpose of managing and containing nuclear arms development. Maybe in the past we equated in too simple a manner the halting of nuclear tests with ending the so-called nuclear arms race. What in the 1970s was labelled a "suffocation strategy" did not, in my view, do justice to the role of nuclear weapons in preventing war through deterrence. Having witnessed the intellectual and political stalemate on this question, I venture to say that in these last few months prospects for making steps in the direction of a test ban are not as unfavourable as they seemed to be. We hope the States concerned will further explore the possibilities of confidence-building measures in this area. Observing each other's tests on a basis of reciprocity and exchanging information on verification techniques are examples of measures that would strengthen that desired confidence.

Turning to the realm of outer space, it is undeniably true that space holds out great promises of scientific co-operation and achievements for the benefit of all mankind. The world community should take care that military competititon and destabilizing military activities will not take their place as prime characteristics of this vast expanse surrounding our globe. Various military functions in outer space are of a stabilizing nature, like satellites for observation, early warning and also, in many respects, those for communication. A call for the demilitarization of outer space, as sometimes heard, is therefore, in my view, not only politically unrealistic but, in fact, also damaging to stability.

The question of military developments in outer space is often associated with research by the United States, and the Soviet Union too, with regard to ballistic missile defence. Allow me two remarks on this. The first is that the whole matter relates as much to Earth as to space. In fact the only operational missile defence at this moment is ground-based. My second remark is that the issue of defensive systems cannot be seen in isolation from the so-called offensive systems. We have been witnessing some destabilizing first-strike tendencies in this field over the past decade. We attach great importance to an approach which seeks to counter such developments as part of the 50 per cent cuts, in conjunction with an extension of the period required for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)

I have referred to the stabilizing nature of many satellites. Of course, this is not the case for all satellites: in particular, some of those in low orbit can be used for targeting. Banning all anti-satellite weapons would therefore pose serious problems. Moreover, it would hardly seem feasible because there are so many ways to destroy a satellite. But maybe it is not too late to seek some way of protecting satellites in high orbit, which are generally of a stabilizing nature. At a time when more countries are gradually acquiring satellites, at least for civilian purposes, this is becoming an issue for which a multilateral forum such as the Conference on Disarmament clearly has a role to play in addition to ongoing bilateral efforts.

It is time to look ahead to next year's third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. That session will offer us an opportunity to take stock of how the world community has fared in matters of arms control and disarmament since the session in 1982. The Netherlands intends to play a constructive part at this Conference. I think that the special session should learn from past disappointments. In particular, a realistic approach aiming at practical progress can be more productive than the grand designs often favoured in the past.

There is no need to convince delegations in this room of the very important role the CD has to play. As I said before, the work of the Conference has too often been diverted to fruitless quarrels on procedures. I hope a common awareness will lead us on the road to improved working methods. I believe that the annual resolution to be adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on CD activities could well benefit from a willingness to apply the mechanism of consensus, which is so valuable in these cases.

Being here in Geneva, in this Palais des Nations, makes one even more conscious that arms control is an extremely complex and long-term undertaking. But despondency is out of place. This Conference on Disarmament needs all the patience, determination and perseverance one can muster, because the work to be done has everything to do with building a safer, a more stable and a more peaceful world.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, for his important statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me welcome you, the representative of friendly Ethiopia, to the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. We are confident that you will guide our work in July skilfully, so that at least some results will start to emerge from this session. It is a pleasure for me to see you again in Geneva even if for a short period after your years of absence. It was a pleasure for me to hand over the presidency of this Conference for the month of June to Ambassador Alfarargi, the experienced representative of Egypt, a country with which Czechoslovakia has

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

extensive and friendly co-operation. Ambassador Alfarargi proved again by the results of his presidency that he knows well how to use his experience and diplomatic skill in order to bring about positive results to our so often blocked and difficult negotiations.

Allow me to express our welcome to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. Hans van den Broek, whose statement my Government will study with the greatest care and interest. We would like also to welcome new members of our small disarmament Geneva community, namely, the Ambassadors of Indonesia and the United States.

Allow me at the very beginning of my statement to express my thanks to the Government of Canada for organizing an outer space workshop in Montreal in May. As a participant in that workshop, I would like to stress that it was a lively and very useful gathering which again drew attention to the necessity to prevent an arms race in outer space, to achieve relevant agreements and to ensure their effective verification. Especially as far as verification is concerned, the workshop proved that there are ways to explore how it could be done. New ideas were brought out and the exchange of views was sincere and valuable. Our thanks and appreciation go also to Ambassador Beesley of Canada, who was the master-mind of the workshop and served as leader of our deliberations there with the famous Beesley approach, his skill at getting everyone to speak his mind openly.

In fact, it is my intention to start my statement today with the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Czechoslovakia's approach to the military aspects of activities in outer space proceeds from the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was published after the Berlin meeting of its Political Consultative Committee on 28 and 29 May 1987. This military doctrine is strictly defensive in nature. In full conformity with this defensive nature, the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty calls simultaneously for the gradual reduction and final elimination of nuclear weapons and for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

That goal, on which there seems to be general consensus, is becoming more urgent with each passing day, more acute with each specific step towards the direct militarization of outer space. But the consensus is still not quite general, since some States continue to act in accordance with the words of former United States President L.B. Johnson "A State with clear superiority in space science and technology will have enormous superiority at the politico-military negotiations over the States without results in that field."

Realizing that outer space is now widely used for communication, navigation, observation and early warning activities, we nevertheless consider that there is one important circumstance which makes it possible to prevent outer space from being completely militarized in the true sense of the word. I mean the fact that to date, 30 years after the first man-made satellite was launched into outer space, no weapons have been placed in orbit. No matter whether it is a result of the existing treaties concerning outer space, or an effect of the insufficient stage of development of the relevant military technology, this state of affairs is highly favourable and worth preserving.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

We maintain that all basic categories of weapons should be prevented from being developed and deployed: weapons hitting targets in space from the Earth, space-to-space weapons and those we are most interested in, space-to-Earth weapons. As a relatively small country, we cannot afford an effective defence against attack from above. But not only small or medium-sized countries have this problem. Even large countries with huge military potentials cannot create a reliable defence against attack coming from outer space above their territory. Thus, the permanent deployment of weapons in outer space would represent, for all countries without distinction, a permanent and highly destabilizing threat.

We recognize today the two tendencies which represent a clear and mutually connected threat in this regard: on the one hand, an effort to introduce weapons into outer space under the guise of a defensive shield and, on the other, continued efforts to develop and deploy anti-satellite weapons. Both of these activities should be prohibited, since even if only one of them is continuing, there will be enough room for developments in both. Anti-ballistic and anti-satellite systems would have many common features. The aim of both these types of system is to act against objects moving through space. From the technical point of view, both types of system have a number of elements which fulfil identical or similar functions. Anti-satellite weapons will thus have certain anti-missile capacities, and vice versa. This applies, for instance, to objects armed with sufficiently strong lasers. Such objects could be used for attacks against satellites as well as against missiles. The fast development of sensors is another field which is common to anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons. The dual-use possibilities are also apparent in the case of radar systems used for detecting and tracking missiles and artificial Earth satellites. It may safely be presumed that with the intensified development of SDI, efforts aimed at integrating military functions in one space object will necessarily lead to an increase in such dual-use elements. One might conclude that today anti-satellite and anti-missile activities and their prohibition can hardly be considered in complete separation.

In this connection, we highly appreciate the Soviet moratorium on the testing of ASAT weapons which has been in force since August 1983. A certain moderation in this regard has also been imposed on the United States Government by the United States Congress. But the United States Administration seems to be unhappy with this moderation, and recently we have been witnessing efforts to resume ASAT testing. It would be deplorable if the testing resumed and a promising period of calm at ASAT proving-grounds was brought to an end.

As the United States SDI programme advances, there is clearly an uncomfortable obstacle in its way, which is the Soviet-United States ABM Treaty of 1972. We are being offered a so-called "broad interpretation" of the Treaty, which in fact means its liquidation. Just a couple of days ago we marked the fifteenth anniversary of the conclusion of that Treaty, and it was a good opportunity to ponder its significance. Had it not been concluded 15 years ago, the development of anti-ballistic systems would have continued unabated. And it seems quite probable that by now, anti-missile weapons, able

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

to strike not only missiles but a whole panoply of targets, would have been deployed in outer space. The ABM Treaty, which prevented all this, certainly deserves better treatment than its dissolution through a "broad interpretation".

Much has been said and written about the destabilizing consequences of the deployment of weapons -- irrespective of whether we label them defensive or offensive -- in outer space. Any measure will lead to a countermeasure, all advantages gained through the introduction of certain weapons will be nullified by the other side, and not necessarily by the deployment of the same weapons. We presume that all countries actively involved in outer space are clearly aware of the inevitability of this process of action and reaction. It is confirmed for instance by the fact that the United States is intensively increasing the resistance of its space systems against the effects of laser weapons, electronic jamming, electromagnetic impulses created by nuclear explosions, etc. The spiral of the arms race in outer space would continue steadily, as it did on Earth, and no country would ever be in a position to achieve decisive and permanent superiority. Besides, even the most rosy and rather illusory theories about the effectiveness of a multilayer anti-missile defence admit that the penetration rate will amount to at least 0.4 per cent, which, with today's arsenals, represents a huge destructive potential. It would inflict immense damage, especially on civilian populations, and no responsible Government should gamble with such numbers or engage in a course of action that would increase the probability of "testing" defensive shields in practice -- especially not in the hope that after the first nuclear strike the retaliation will be bearable.

It will be very important to evolve appropriate methods of verification which will ensure that outer space is not being used for aggressive military ends. The Montreal workshop I mentioned a while ago dealt with one of the possible approaches, that is verification through satellites. Another possible approach -- inspection of objects launched into outer space -- is reflected in the proposal advanced by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, at the beginning of our spring session. It is our feeling that a combination of the two approaches, that is verification "from below and from above" might lead to the establishment of an effective and viable verification system for outer space. Much still has to be discussed, especially how practically to combine the use of national satellites with their possible international use for verification purposes. My delegation would be only too happy if the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space could also discuss these important problems.

We are following with keen interest the Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. We find it encouraging that progress has been achieved at these negotiations and there are now real prospects for most dangerous nuclear weapons to be eliminated from Europe. The conclusion of agreements on these matters and their subsequent implementation would undoubtedly be facilitated if the nuclear Powers confirmed their readiness to eliminate the nuclear threat, starting with a halt to the further qualitative and quantitative build-up of nuclear arsenals. An important step in this direction would be the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Our Conference can be considered a multilateral body with considerable experience in the area of a CTB. it was actively involved in the negotiation of the 1963 partial test-ban treaty; later it received reports from the participants in the trilateral negotiations on a CTB, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom; it supports the activities of the group of scientific experts on seismology; it discussed verification and compliance aspects of a CTB in an ad hoc committee in 1982 and 1983. Moreover, we keep on discussing the problem widely at plenary meetings, where a number of important proposals have already been made. One of them, of which my country is a sponsor, came right at the beginning of the present summer session.

The document in question, entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", was submitted by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Vladimir Petrovsky, on 9 June. It reflects the firm readiness of the socialist countries to negotiate in order to achieve the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. The proposal is envisaged as a platform for negotiations within our Conference, but not as the only one, since we have repeatedly reaffirmed our readiness to discuss any constructive proposals. In our opinion, the substance of all existing proposals could be discussed in an ad hoc committee on the CTB with an appropriately formulated mandate.

Today I would like to draw the attention of the distinguished representatives to section D of the proposal, entitled "Ensuring compliance with the Treaty". It is clearly stipulated here that verification of the CTBT would be assured through both national and international means of verification, including on-site inspection. Important information gained through national technical means will be placed at the disposal of the appropriate organ established under the Treaty and, where necessary, may also be placed at the disposal of other parties. We believe that such a provision rightly combines the national nature of the technical means at the disposal of some countries with the contribution they may make to all the participants to the treaty.

International verification will be based on the continuous international exchange of level II data in accordance with agreed guidelines which will form an integral part of the treaty. For this purpose, a network of seismic stations with standard specifications will be established. We consider that members of the international inspectorate should be allowed to participate in the operation of these stations. In addition, the exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity would also be carried out.

After the treaty enters into force, it would be necessary to ensure that no nuclear explosions were being carried out at the former test ranges. For this to be reliably ensured we again propose the participation of both national personnel and international inspectors. Procedures for such verification will have to be agreed in advance.

Should national or international measures be insufficient to provide an assurance that the treaty is being fully complied with, an event whose status is unclear might be clarified through an on-site inspection. Each State party would have the right to request such an inspection in the territory of another State party. We maintain that the request for an on-site inspection should

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

cite grounds for the request, and that the requested State would be obligated to grant access to the locations specified in the request. My delegation is not going to suggest complete and detailed guidelines on how to handle the requests, how to conduct on-site inspections or how to define the rights and functions of the inspecting personnel. We have a number of ideas in this regard, but the best way to proceed in formulating criteria and procedures for on-site inspections will be through common efforts in the relevant ad hoc committee, so that the interests and preoccupations of all future participants in the CTBT are duly taken into account. The same applies to the treaty organs, especially the international inspectorate, for which the functions and rules of procedure could be mutually agreed and specified in an annex to the treaty.

Our delegation welcomes the fact that the CD has decided to hold a number of informal meetings to discuss item 2 of our agenda. We consider this a step in the right direction, since the elimination of the nuclear threat and the initiation of a process of gradual nuclear disarmament is the highest priority on the agenda of this Conference. Let me in conclusion express the hope of my delegation that we will adopt a similar constructive attitude with respect to agenda item 1 and establish, before the end of this summer session, an appropriate framework for further urgent work in this regard.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Vejvoda for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, first of all I would like on behalf of the Soviet delegation to welcome you as the President of the Conference for the month of July. July is the central period in the work of the Conference, whose outcome to a great extent influences the results of the year as a whole. We are confident that you will successfully guide our work during this intense period because we know you as an old colleague who successfully represented his country at the Conference (at that time the Committee) on Disarmament in 1980-1983. Moreover, those who participated in the work of the Committee on Disarmament seven years ago remember very well your able stewardship of the Committee in August 1980. It is also a pleasure for me to welcome you to this post because you represent a country with which we have long had traditionally good and friendly relations.

I would like to take this opportunity to express our delegation's gratitude to the distinguished representative of Egypt, Admbassador Alfarargi, for his skilful guidance of the Conference during the previous month.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to share some views regarding the progress of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is our understanding that at present all participants in this forum unanimously consider these negotiations the most promising direction in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The position of the Soviet Union and the other

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Warsaw Treaty States regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons is well known. Let me just recall the communiqué on the Session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty States held in Berlin on 28 and 29 May this year:

> "The States participating in the session favour the earliest possible elimination of chemical weapons. They reiterate their preparedness to complete the preparation of an international convention banning chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons and the industrial basis for their production by the end of this year."

During the summer session of the Conference the Soviet delegation intends to work resolutely for accelerated progress towards this goal.

At the plenary meetings of the Conference many representatives have also emphasized the need to speed up the preparation of a chemical weapons convention. We note with satisfaction the desire of Norway to do its utmost to contribute to the multilateral negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, which was expressed by Director-General for Security and Disarmament Affairs in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bjørn Kristvik, in his statement on 30 June this year.

The Soviet delegation shares the view expressed early last month by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. M.B. Theorin, that the progress already made in the negotiations shows that a convention is within reach and that compromises will now have to be made and difficult decisions taken. We have studied with interest the analysis of the situation at the negotiations contained in the statement by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad, on 16 June, as well as his ideas and assessments on specific aspects of the convention which is being drafted. Neither did we ignore the statement by the NATO member States at the June 1987 session of the NATO Council to the effect that those countries are determined to reach in the very near future an agreement on a comprehensive, global, and effectively verifiable treaty providing for a complete destruction of the existing arsenals within agreed time limits and the prevention of continued production of these weapons. We hope that this stated determination will be translated here, at the Conference, into concrete deeds, into real policies, into a search for compromises, into agreements.

It was with particular interest, therefore, that we learned several days ago that the newly appointed head of the United States delegation would address the Conference on 30 June. We expected Ambassador Freidersdorf to outline the United States' attitude towards what is taking place at the chemical weapons negotiations, and to make his own contribution to their successful advancement. I will not conceal the fact that we were a little bit puzzled by his words that the United States was seeking "equitable arms control agreements in the areas of nuclear testing, chemical weapons and conventional forces". Puzzled, because the issue of banning chemical weapons has been put on the same footing as the problem of nuclear testing, towards

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

which the United States Administration's negative attitude is well known. We would like to hope that this formula does not mean that the United States approaches the chemical weapons negotiations in the same way it is approaching the issue of multilateral negotiations on banning nuclear weapon tests.

We were also surprised by the fact that, without reacting to all the numerous questions under consideration at the negotiations, the distinguished United States representative concentrated solely on inviting Soviet representatives to visit a chemical weapons destruction facility in Tooele. Is this really the key to success at the multilateral negotiations on banning chemical weapons? Would it not have been more useful to concentrate on those crucial questions which are currently holding back progress at the negotiations?

On many such questions the United States position still remains unclear. This also refers, in particular, to such a field as challenge inspections. The present United States views, in our understanding, presuppose that a challenge without the right of refusal should cover all sites and facilities on the territory of a State party without distinction as to the form of ownership or the degree of Government control thereof. Such was the United States interpretation of article X of its draft convention in CD/500. And what, in this connection, would its interpretation be of article XI of the same document? Is this article deleted or not? And if it remains, then in what cases does the United States side propose to apply it? Resolving the issue of challenge inspections depends to a considerable degree on the answer to this question.

There is another problem -- that of responsibility for the actions of the subsidiary of a company registered in one of the States parties to the future convention. In this case, two situations may arise: when the subsidiary operates on the territory of another State party, and when it operates in a State not party to the convention. A third situation is also possible: that in which an international company registered in the territory of a State party operates in the territory of such a State. Such transnational corporations sometimes operate on the territory of other countries as a "State within a State", refusing to allow the activities of their subsidiaries to be monitored. The question of which State should be responsible for ensuring that these corporations observe the provisions of the convention is therefore of practical importance. Answers to this question would seem to be called for not only from the United States but also from other States in whose economic systems companies with considerable networks of affiliates on the territory of other States play an extensive role.

I have already touched upon the problem of confidence as applied to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are in favour of confidence. But we do not understand how the goal of confidence-building on the eve of concluding a convention can be combined with attempts to start at all costs the production of new types of chemical weapons, in particular binary weapons. If the conclusion of the convention is considered to be such a long-term objective as a nuclear test-ban, the production of chemical

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

weapons has its own -- although peculiar -- logic. But if the plan is still to conclude it as early as possible, which means that all chemical weapons will be destroyed, then why expand their production? Why waste money and material resources?

Assessing the situation at the chemical weapons negotiations we note not only the encouraging progress recently achieved, in particular at this year's spring session, but also the disturbing fact that at present the negotiations are clearly marking time. The discussion of a number of questions resembles walking in circles rather than moving ahead. Take, for example, article VI (Activities not prohibited by the Convention). When we were leaving in April, a number of participants promised to analyse their positions and come back with concrete answers. But we continue to hear from them nothing but questions. Moreover, attempts are beginning to be made to disavow compromises achieved through arduous efforts, to delay agreement on the convention. Can we not see behind all this a fear of the possible early conclusion of the convention, that has become so obvious of late?

We may be told that, now that a number of major questions of principle have been settled, the time has come for meticulous technical work on certain details. This, I agree, is also necessary. But here too, not all the opportunities are used. For example, a start could already have been made on drafting a concrete text for annex IV, section V, on verification of the elimination of chemical weapons stocks, as was agreed upon in the Group on Cluster I at the very beginning of the session. Unfortunately, there has been no progress here either.

At the same time the main task at the current session of the Conference as far as chemical weapons are concerned would seem to consist in finding solutions of principle to those few issues where there is as yet no general political agreement, and above all the problem of challenge inspections and non-production of chemical weapons by commercial industries. In this context we note with satisfaction the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, who during the spring session organized working meetings and consultations on some of these questions.

The present advanced stage of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons imposes on the participants yet another responsibility. The consensus parts of the "rolling text" -- which, by the way, make up the bulk of it -- are the result of complex, prolonged negotiations and represent a package of delicate interrelated compromises. They lay down the conceptual basis of the future ban on chemical weapons which must be comprehensive and include not only all stocks but also the development and production of such weapons; this ban must be observed in the process of "non-prohibited" activities and must be guaranteed by the most effective controls, ranging from systematic verification to the challenge inspection mechanism.

For these reasons the results of many years of efforts should be approached with care, if, of course, one's basic starting-point is the need for the rapid conclusion of the convention. A very alarming situation has arisen, in our opinion, as regards reaching agreement on the order of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

destruction of chemical weapon stocks. Article IV of the "rolling text" and its annex contain a set of important provisions which seemed to have received general support. However, the introduction of document CD/757 by the French delegation may, however, cause considerable difficulties in the negotiations.

We naturally proceed from the premise that the order of destruction must be based on the principle of undiminished security of States during the entire destruction process, as has already been agreed in annex IV, section II. However, the specific conclusions drawn from this general premise in document CD/757 lead us neither to the conclusion of a convention, nor to the ensuring of security.

What does the French document actually suggest? It provides that the States parties to the convention will have the right to retain production capacities and manufacture chemical weapons, and also acquire such weapons, for at least eight years and possibly longer after the convention enters into force. Moreover, this right would be granted not only to States possessing chemical weapons but also to those without them. As a result, the States possessing chemical weapons could renew their stocks (within the limits of the "security stock"), while those without could establish such "security stocks". This constitutes, in essence, a call for the legalized build-up and proliferation of chemical weapons. This suggestion leads not to equal security, but to increasing equal insecurity.

The security of the parties to the convention could, in our view, be ensured immediately after its entry into force through the implementation of a number of measures which would safely freeze stocks at current levels until they are destroyed, and would rule out preparations for their use as well as, naturally, their actual use. This would involve, first and foremost, the declaration of all the existing stocks, their placing under systematic international control with the help of on-site inspections and continuous monitoring with instruments, and the adoption of measures to ensure that the chemical weapons are not removed from the store except to a destruction facility. The relevant provision contained in paragraph 2 of article IV of the "rolling text" has been agreed upon by all delegations, and only one delegation has reserved its position. Moreover, the removal of chemical weapons from the store to a destruction facility should be conducted under international control. This provision, contained in the annex to article IV, section V, paragraph 6 (b), has been agreed upon by all participants in the negotiations.

The implementation of the above measures, which would in essence place chemical weapon stocks under "international arrest", would put all parties in an equal position in terms of their security.

The authors of document CD/757 consider that the security of all States parties may be called into question either gradually (e.g. as a result of delays in the timetable for the destruction of the stockpiles as a result of material difficulties) or suddenly (e.g. the exit from the convention of one of the States parties or its refusal to continue with the elimination of the remaining stocks). We agree that theoretically such situations may arise.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

However, the response to them should be different from that recommended by the authors of this document. If a State begins to experience material or technical difficulties in the process of destroying its stocks, it should be granted assistance in order to ensure compliance with the schedule of destruction.

It is another matter when a State refuses to continue destroying the stocks. This is a flagrant violation of the convention, with all the consequences that follow. This problem should be solved by creating an effective mechanism which would ensure compliance with the convention.

Let us suppose, finally, that a State possessing chemical weapons withdraws from the convention and unfreezes its chemical weapon stocks. This will result in an exceptional situation. The paradox of the French proposal, however, lies in the fact that while calling for equal security for States parties to the convention, it may objectively increase the likelihood that such an exceptional situation will arise because the number of States possessing chemical weapons will grow after the convention enters into force. It is one thing when all chemical weapon production facilities are closed and secured, and quite another when even one such facility remains. On the basis of this facility and its infrastructure it will be an easy and rapid task to exceed the limits of "security stocks". Hence, the dangerous consequences of a State's withdrawal from the convention will also increase, since it will possess not only reactivated stocks but also the potential for their rapid build-up, renewal and upgrading.

Approaching the problem of chemical weapons soberly and realistically, one should proceed from the fact that there are States which possess such weapons and States which do not. As was shown above, the conclusion of a convention should eliminate this difference, and this would happen immediately after the convention enters into force. However, document CD/757 is based on the premise that the status quo existing before the convention enters into force can be changed to the advantage of those States that do not possess chemical weapons or would like to increase their stocks, with all the dangerous consequences I have already mentioned.

The French document, in our opinion, runs counter to the essence and spirit of the convention being prepared and the entire consensus approach in chemical disarmament. I will not even mention the fact that the approach contained in this document would seriously hamper the monitoring of chemical weapon stocks. In the final analysis, a contradictory scheme for the legitimizing of chemical weapon industries -- and the most dangerous aspects of them -- is placed in opposition to the concept of consistent chemical weapons elimination.

As a result, not only will there not be an increase in confidence among the parties to the convention, but new sources of concern will appear which may divide the States that have signed the convention. In our view this cannot either ensure security for the parties to the convention, nor encourage them to join it on a large scale.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation considered it essential to set out frankly here the results of its analysis of document CD/757, in order to encourage business-like negotiations and enhance mutual understanding between the participants.

Although the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament has just begun, there is not a great deal of time ahead. We consider that biding time is quite inappropriate at the present stage in the negotiations, and call upon all participants at the Conference to make efforts to expedite the process of drawing up a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none.

As usual, we need now to adopt the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. Of course, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. The Conference will hold its second informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2 on Thursday, 9 July, immediately after the plenary meeting. This is noted in the timetable. I should like to add that the Ad hoc Committee re-established under item 6 on the agenda entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" will hold its opening meeting next Tuesday in this conference room, immediately after our plenary meeting scheduled for that day. This is also shown in the timetable which has been distributed to you today. If there is no objection to the timetable, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to it.

It was so decided

That concludes our business for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.419
7 July 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 7 July 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)

GE.87-62560/9426E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 419th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today begins its discussion of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject pertinent to the work of the Conference.

At the outset, I wish to extend my warm welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Kahiluoto, Director for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, who is addressing us today as first speaker. I am sure that all members appreciate the contributions made by Finland to our work and will follow his statement with particular interest.

I should also like to cordially welcome to the Conference today the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who is present at this plenary meeting.

I would also like to welcome the participants present today in this conference hall in the 1987 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme. We wish them well and success in their work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, Norway, Japan and Poland. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the first speaker, the Director for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Kahiluoto.

Mr. KAHILUOTO (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. I am sure that the work of the Conference this month will greatly benefit from your experienced guidance. I am also very grateful for the warm words of welcome which you just addressed to me when giving me the floor.

I shall devote my statement to the issue of chemical weapons. A complete ban on chemical weapons is one of the foremost goals of international disarmament efforts. It is, to us, a priority item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and the subject of intensive negotiations.

This is rightly so. Chemical weapons are repugnant weapons of mass destruction. Innocent and unprotected civilians are at particular risk in the event of their use. Yet, chemical weapons are perceived to be militarily useful. A number of States are believed to possess chemical weapons, although only two States have so far openly acknowledged that they do. Moreover, many States, in the developed and developing world alike, possess the required industrial capabilities to manufacture lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. Clearly, the danger of proliferation exists. Indeed, it will grow unless effective steps are taken.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the use of chemical weapons in war. Yet this funadamental norm of international law is being violated. In the Iran-Iraq conflict, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq has been demonstrated by the team of experts repeatedly dispatched to the area by the United Nations Secretary-General. Persistent reports that chemical weapons may also have been used elsewhere add to our deep concern.

Finland condemns the use of chemical weapons. Their use in the Gulf war threatens to undermine seriously the authority of the Geneva Protocol to the detriment of the security of each and every one of us.

Such a serious breach of international law underlines the urgent need to terminate the Iran-Iraq conflict by peaceful means as soon as possible. Finland supports the efforts by the United Nations Security Council to bring this about and urges the two belligerents to co-operate with the Council to this effect.

Finland has consistently supported a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons on a global basis. At this Conference, we have sought to contribute to the achievement of this goal primarily through our technical expertise on verification of various aspects of the future convention. I shall return to this contribution in somewhat greater detail later on in my statement.

We have noted with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention lately, particularly towards the end of last year and this year. We are grateful to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, for the firm guidance he has given and continues to give to this important and highly complex negotiation.

Despite progress, a number of difficult problems remain to be solved. Some are simply difficult in tecnhical terms. Others require difficult political decisions. We are encouraged by the fact that both major military alliances have, in their recent statements, reiterated their determination to achieve early agreement on a chemical weapons convention.

Let me briefly mention three outstanding issues relating to the convention which we consider to be of major significance.

First, there is the issue of existing stocks and their destruction. There is by now widespread agreement that all chemical weapon stocks and their locations should be declared very soon -- 30 days -- after the convention enters into force for the State party concerned. We welcome this progress. In our view, it is of cardinal importance to the credibility of the convention that all existing stocks be declared from the very beginning, and that their destruction be promptly initiated according to an order of destruction yet to be agreed upon. In our view, such an order of destruction needs to foreclose any possibility for proliferation of chemical weapons once the convention enters into force.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

Second, verification of the fact that no new chemical weapons will be produced once the convention enters into force is of essential importance. Arrangements concerning non-production, unlike those concerning destruction of existing stockpiles, do not have a fixed time-limit.

Arrangements concerning non-production must avoid unduly hampering the legitimate operations of civilian chemical industry. There seems to be general agreement on this point. At the same time, we feel, like many others, that the additional supervision of the industry stemming from the verification régime of non-production will not prove to be too burdensome. The civilian chemical industry is already heavily regulated because of the potential hazards it poses to health and the environment.

Third, challenge inspection undoubtedly remains the major unresolved issue at this point. Sensitive security concerns of States are intimately involved here. It is encouraging, however, that a reasoned dialogue on this issue seems to have begun. Differences are being narrowed. In view of the grave conequences which suspicions of undeclared stocks or production facilities, if not promptly and satisfactorily allayed, would have for the convention and international security in general, an effective system of challenge inspections is clearly a necessity.

It has been quite clear from the very beginning that effective verification of compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons convention is essential for the parties to have any confidence in it. Verification involves not only working out the necessary procedures in the convention itself, but also development of reliable technical methods and instruments to carry out specific verification tasks that those procedures entail.

It is precisely this latter aspect of chemical weapons verification to which Finland has devoted considerable efforts and resources since 1973. Our research project, conducted by a team of scientists from a number of Finnish universities and funded by the Finnish Government, develops instrumental methods for the detection, analysis and identification of chemical warfare agents. Since 1977, the results of the work have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament (and its predecessor) in the form of handbook-type annual reports, the so-called Finnish Blue Books.

Altogether, 11 Blue Books have been published so far, including this year's report. The latest report (CD/764) was introduced in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this past Friday. It is our hope that once a chemical weapons convention is concluded and enters into force, the Finnish Blue Books will constitute a kind of technical verification data base from which all States parties, and the Technical Secretariat in particular, may benefit.

Let me now briefly summarize the work done so far. The first 10 years of the project were devoted to developing analytical methods for three types of laboratories -- portable detection kits, trailer-installed field laboratories and stationary central laboratories -- as well as for collection of identification data on chemical warfare agents, their precursors, and degradation products. The findings were drawn together in the 1984 report.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

In the 1985 report, attention was turned to air monitoring of chemical warfare agents. The report describes in detail various techniques for collecting and analysing low-volume, medium-volume and high-volume air samples. The two latest reports describe how these techniques were tested in practice by means of large-scale field experiments. Kilogram amounts of harmless simulants of warfare agents were released into the atmosphere as finely dispersed aerosols. Air samples were then collected as far away as 200 kilometres downwind. At all distances, all the simulants released could be detected and identified.

This is significant in two ways. First, the experiments prove that the techniques developed really work in actual field conditions and are highly selective and sensitive. Second, the experiments prove that even very small releases of chemical warfare agents can be discovered at great distances if a network of detection stations is available.

While verification of compliance with the convention will be primarily based on data reporting and inspections, it is, in our view, important to have available, as a complement, methods which can reliably detect and identify atmospheric releases of chemical agents regardless of source.

Since air monitoring facilities are also needed for surveillance of ambient air for reasons of environmental protection, it would not, in our view, be necessary to establish a monitoring network solely for the purpose of chemical weapons verification provided that the facilities are designed with both purposes in mind. We will shortly present a working paper to this Conference on this aspect of air monitoring.

Another important subject recently addressed by the Finnish Project on Verification of Chemical Disarmament is automatic monitoring. In February this year, the project organized a workshop in Helsinki for the purpose of studying the potential applications of automatic monitoring systems in the context of verifying a chemical weapons convention. Twenty-odd qualified experts from a number of countries involved with the chemical weapons negotiations participated. The proceedings of the workshop have just been circulated to the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/765. They were introduced in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last Friday.

We in Finland appreciate the work done on various aspects of arms control verification in many countries, members and non-members of the CD alike. We have followed with interest the Norwegian research programme of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons since it was initiated in 1981. We are also aware of the important work on this and other subjects of verification carried out by Canada.

May I take this opportunity to thank the Governments of Canada and Norway for the valuable meetings they organized for our benefit among others, in the month of May. We found the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal as well as the Oslo Symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention most informative on the issues concerned.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

At this advanced stage of chemical weapons negotiations, a certain amount of co-ordination among the various national-level chemical weapons verification projects might be in order. After all, they do have a common goal: the rapid conclusion and effective functioning of a chemical weapons convention. Specifically, we have in mind a division of labour where outstanding technical verification issues would be apportioned among the various interested projects for in-depth study.

The Ah hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons would, in our view, be the most competent body to help to identify such outstanding technical issues for this purpose, perhaps even indicating an order of priority for their examination. Based on such guidance, representatives for the various interested projects could then agree among themselves on which of them would do what.

Today I have addressed only one item on the agenda of this Conference. As you are surely aware, my country attaches great importance to the other items as well.

We note with particular interest the fact that this Conference has, after a certain pause, re-established an ad hoc committee for the consideration of the question of negative security assurances. This is an issue to which Finland has devoted several statements in the past. We continue to regard it as very important and wish the Chairman, Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, every success in his difficult task.

We remain ready to participate in the discussion of this and the other items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Hopefully, we can do so as a full member of this important body in the not too distant future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to the President. In conformity with the decision of the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Huslid.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway): Mr. President, permit me at the outset to congratulate you, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July.

I have asked for the floor today to introduce -- and I consider this as a special honour -- to introduce on behalf of Canada and my own country, Norway, a concrete proposal in connection with the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. These negotiations have also just been extensively dealt with by my Finnish colleague, and I am grateful for the positive comments he made on the research made by the two countries. The proposal I have the honour to introduce is contained in document CD/766, of 2 July 1987, which concerns procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

We know that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. That Protocol is adhered to by more than 100 countries. It has, however, no verification provisions. For this reason, an understanding was reached in this Conference in 1983 to incorporate in the convention on which we are now negotiating a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. It is, of course, necessary to see to it that this is done in a way which does not erode the status of the Geneva Protocol, which is one of the oldest arms control treaties. The incorporation of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the chemical weapons convention could, in fact, reinforce the Geneva Protocol.

It is therefore necessary to devise a proper verification mechanism which could be included in the new convention and applied in cases of allegations of use of chemical weapons. In order to contribute to this, both Canada and Norway initiated research programmes on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons in this field in 1981. The results of this research have been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. It follows from the documents which have already been submitted that Canada and Norway have studied all phases of the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, i.e. from establishment of an inspection team and the team's investigation to submission of its report.

Against this background and taking into account the advanced phase of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, Canada and Norway have jointly elaborated a draft treaty text concerning general procedures for the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

Any allegation of the use of chemical weapons would, of course, be a matter of the most serious concern to the States parties to a convention banning chemical weapons altogether. Immediate on-site inspection, whether at the invitation of the State party on whose territory the alleged use of chemical weapons occurred or at the request of another State party, would be necessary for the purpose of maintaining the effectiveness and authority of the convention. Thus provisions in article IX concerning consultations, co-operation and fact-finding have relevance to verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, and the procedures applicable for verifying such an event should be included in an annex to article IX. We have thus elaborated a proposal for such an annex. In drawing up this proposal we have consulted a number of countries.

I cannot here go into any detail as to the concrete content of this proposal, and I refer to the paper, but I would like to mention a few salient points. The proposal requires that, upon receipt of a request from a State party for an inspection, the International Authority shall immediately notify the State party (or States parties) concerned of the requirement to conduct on-site inspection within 48 hours. The State party (or States parties) so notified shall make the necessary preparations for the arrival of the inspection team. The team should comprise a number of International Inspectors with the necessary qualifications, experience and training, as well as supporting staff with special skills or training, who may be required to assist the International Inspectors.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

The International Inspectors shall be permitted to take with them the necessary equipment and supplies and have unimpeded access to the site or sites. They shall collect enough samples so that a reliable conclusion may be reached as to the allegation of the use of chemical weapons and also interview people who may have been affected by the alleged use.

The samples shall be analysed by at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall draw up a list of certified laboratories, which must be in possession of standardized equipment for the type or types of analysis to be conducted. The Executive Council shall approve this list. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analyses of samples so that these results may be taken into account with the report of the inspection team.

The report of the International Inspectors shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat within 10 days of the completion of the inspection. The report shall be factual in nature and contain the findings of the International Inspectors. The Technical Secretariat shall provide a copy of the report to the State party that requested the inspection, to each State party that received the inspection, to the State party alleged to have used chemical weapons, and to the members of the Executive Council.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to add that the proposal contains a clause which states that the Technical Secretariat, under the supervision of the Executive Council, shall elaborate, and revise as necessary, technical procedures and interview questionnaires for the guidance of International Inspectors in the conduct of an on-site inspection.

The proposal tabled by Canada and Norway is based on six years of research by our two countries in the field of verification of alleged use. Canada and Norway submit this proposal as a basis for negotiations on the text for an annex to article IX concerning general procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We hope that the content of this proposal can be included prior to the beginning of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament in the rolling text, which will reflect the status of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention at that time.

The proposal which I have presented today, should be be seen in light of the commitment of both Canada and Norway to contribute to an early conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. It concerns a question which so far has not been dealt with in detail in the negotiations. In fact, the proposal is the first full-fledged text covering all phases of the procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We commend the proposal for your constructive consideration.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I would like first of all to express our warm welcome to you upon your assumption of the presidency for the month of July. I am certain that under your eminent leadership we will make still

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

further progress in our deliberations. Japan and Ethiopia, though located far apart, enjoy close and friendly relations. When we learnt in 1984 of the hardships that had befallen your people, the Japanese people responded in the spirit of solidarity by assisting your people in their brave efforts to overcome the tragic situation. May I also express our sincere gratitude to Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt for guiding us in the month of June.

I am happy to see Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Disarmament, at the rostrum today. Of my compatriots, he occupies the highest post in the United Nations and I wish him every success in his new assignment.

I would also like to welcome the United Nations Disarmament Fellows who are here with us today. I hope that they all gain valuable experience through the programme, including the visit to Japan sponsored by my Government.

Today, I would like to address the question of outer space. While Japan has been improving space technology for peaceful purposes, it has always maintained the view that we should examine thoroughly the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We share the common wish that outer space, the last frontier for mankind, should not become the means or arena of armed conflicts. This wish is expressed in the United Nations General Assembly's resolution 1884 (XVIII), in which the Assembly "solemnly calls upon all States to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner".

To date, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have possessed by far the largest share of the technical ability to make practical use of outer space, for example, in communicating via electro-magnetic waves transmitted outside the atmosphere and in transporting various hardware or at times men into outer space. In this context, my delegation welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have been engaged since 1985 here in Geneva in comprehensive bilateral arms control negotiations, including negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Furthermore, my delegation especially appreciates the resolution, with the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee at the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament in 1985, of the problem, which had been pending since 1982, of a subsidiary body on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the Ad hoc Committee last year we examined a wide range of substantial issues and, above all, exchanged concrete views on the legal issues, including the question of definitions.

I would like to make a few remarks on the relationship between the United States-Soviet nuclear and space talks and the discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation holds the general view that there is an organic interrelationship between the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations and the multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations. Given also the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union play a predominant part in current space activities, the progress of their bilateral negotiations has a

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

critical impact on our discussions in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan therefore urges both the United States and the Soviet Union to make yet further efforts for early progress in their negotiations. At the same time, outer space is open to all and is not a possession of any country. An arms race in outer space would directly affect the security not just of the two Powers but of all other countries in the world as well. We cannot afford to be indifferent to this important issue. In view also of the rapid progress in space development recently made by countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union, we should proceed with our work in the Conference on Disarmament to examine fully what kind of multilateral agreements would be useful.

What concrete approach should we take in the Conference on Disarmament to the question of that prevention of an arms race in outer space? Arms control and disarmament have a direct and important bearing on the security of each country. My delegation's approach to the work of the Conference on Disarmament is therefore based on the recognition that our disarmament objectives should be realized in a manner which will ensure and enhance the security of each country. We feel that we should work towards effective and realizable goals, instead of preoccupying ourselves with political declarations. This is how we should approach the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space as well.

First, we need to know fully and objectively how outer space is actually being used. For example, early-warning satellites no doubt have military functions, but they may also play a useful role in preserving strategic stability. On the other hand, meteorological satellites collect meteorological data over vast areas of the earth and serve important non-military purposes -- in agriculture, fisheries and transport -- but they may also be used for a military purpose. These factors need to be seen in perspective.

We should endeavour to find what measures would eventually best ensure our security in consideration of these many aspects. It would not be in consonance with reality to take, without delving into such issues, a sweeping, generalized approach in the name of the non-militarization or the prevention of the militarization of outer space. To do so would not ensure our security. Instead, the approach we should take is to intensify our efforts to gain an accurate grasp of exactly how outer space is being used in many areas. It is only on the basis of a solid grasp of the facts that we can formulate an objective judgement as to what kinds of activities in outer space may endanger international peace and security. We may then proceed to consider what measures may be mutually acceptable, effective and realizable on a multilateral basis.

Based on the concept of our approach that I have just described, I would like to make some observations on the main issues being discussed in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Mutual trust among States is a key element in arms control and disarmament efforts. This applies in outer space as well. To strengthen mutual trust, it is indispensable that all States should adhere strictly to the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the principles of international law concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. It is also necessary to free disarmament discussions from political propaganda.

The necessity for objective information for confidence-building among States is set out in the first operative paragraph of last year's General Assembly resolution 41/59 B, in which the Assembly "reaffirms its conviction that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities could help relieve international tension and contribute to building of confidence among States on a global, regional, or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements". It goes without saying that our deliberation on the basis of objective information is a prerequisite for fruitful results. Above all, the United States and the Soviet Union, the leading States in space developments, have a very important role to play in providing information. We note in this context that the substantive information provided thus far by the Soviet Union is, in our view, far from sufficient. It is hoped that this situation will be remedied.

The proposal to formulate a code of conduct as one of the confidence-building measures touches on the fundamental issue of how we go about regulating or controlling the activities of States in outer space, which is singularly different from the Earth. It would entail highly complex problems to try to apply an order or rules based on the relationships among States on the Earth to activities outside the atmosphere or even beyond the solar system, where physical conditions are quite different from those on the Earth. We need to proceed carefully and thoughtfully in examining the adequacy or limits of such application in the context of reviewing the international laws on arms control and disarmament in outer space.

In connection with the necessity for objective information, the deliberations on the expansion or strengthening of the reporting requirement under the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched in Outer Space are of considerable significance. My delegation supports the basic idea behind such a proposal. As is clear from General Assembly resolution 1721 B (XVI), entitled "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space", article IV of the Convention was drawn up on the basis of the understanding that the independent judgement of each country should be respected and taking into account how information was actually provided by the countries concerned in accordance with the General Assembly resolution.

The items listed for obligatory reporting under article IV are therefore limited to the minimum necessary for the identification of space objects. It is true that such a registration régime based on the Convention is not necessarily complete, but on the whole it has probably been effective with respect to the peaceful use of outer space. My delegation believes it necessary for us to examine fully from various aspects whether this proposal

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

would lead to concrete and pragmatic measures of arms control and disarmament. There seem to be many difficult problems involved, especially as regards the acceptability of the obligation to report military information, which relates to the problem of verification.

I would like to touch upon the protection of space objects and their activities. As the number of States that participate in space development increases and their activities become more sophisticated and diversified in the future, the need to protect space objects and their activities will become more urgent. Up to now, Japan has launched 36 satellites for such purposes as experimental launching, weather forecasting, communications and broadcasting. We are planning to launch about 10 more satellites by 1990. Japan thus has a keen interest in this issue of satellite protection. My delegation believes that space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not be attacked and should be duly protected.

In this context, it is highly significant that a proposal has been made to grant immunity to satellites in order to exempt them from attack. If the purport of this proposal lies in non-interference with those satellites which play an important role as NTM (national technical means) of verification, it will contribute to greater stability between the East and the West, and my delegation can support it. However, we should be very careful to make sure that satellite immunity would not in fact protect some activities which might endanger the outer space activities of other States. Much will need to be done to determine what satellites should be granted immunity. At this point, we should pay special attention to the fact that the purpose of protecting satellites cannot be achieved solely by concluding a declaratory international convention on the non-use of force.

Finally, I would like to touch upon a few basic legal issues which are under discussion in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

In reviewing the international law related to arms control and disarmament in outer space, we cannot bypass the basic issue of definition of a "space weapon". There are a number of complex problems which would make an abstract definition quite inadequate. For example, how do we deal with dual-purpose technologies? How do we set the criteria for defining a weapon? Which should be regarded as more important, the purpose of use or the objective function? It would seem much more practical to seek, through our work to grasp how outer space is being actually used, to identify the instances of military use, to categorize them, and to consider such measures as may be called for.

As measures to secure compliance with article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in space and other celestial bodies, we may recall article XI of the same Treaty, which stipulates for the provision of information on space activities and was later developed into the Convention on Registration, and article XII, which stipulates for the opening of all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

celestial bodies to representatives of other States parties on a basis of reciprocity. However, as I said earlier, the information to be provided under the Convention on Registration is limited. Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty, which was one of the key provisions seriously discussed in negotiating the Treaty, stipulates for nothing with respect to outer space other than celestial bodies. Therefore, those provisions are of only limited relevance in relation to verification. We need to see if these limited provisions are adequate to cope with the verification needs that arise from current space activities.

There have been truly remarkable developments in space technology compared to 1967 when the Outer Space Treaty was concluded. A large-scale space tracking radar can provide crucial information and a satellite in itself can apparently play an important role as a means of verification. Based on these changes in circumstances, it would be useful to examine what kind of technical verification means would be applicable to a multilateral verification system. Conversely, if we can identify available verification means, we may also be able to go on to see what kind of prohibiting provisions can be agreed on multilaterally.

One important proposal in this regard relates to the establishment of an ISMA (international satellite monitoring agency). There will be a number of legal, financial, and technical problems to be resolved on this proposal. However, my delegation shares the hope that such a proposal can contribute towards the solution of the verification issues, and it is keenly interested in seeing how the proposal is dealt with and developed in the future.

I have tried to set forth briefly the views of my delegation on the issues before us. As a country devoted to technological development for the peaceful use of outer space, we wish to continue to contribute to the deliberations in the CD on developing a sharper focus on verification and other problems, bearing in mind the technologies available to us.

I am hopeful that we will make substantial progress in our considerations this year under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Government of Canada for organizing a very useful workshop on outer space in Montreal in May. As a participant, I would like to say how grateful I was to Ambassador Beesley for his personal attention to us.

Ever since the seventh century, the star festival has been observed all over Japan in July, that is today. The festival owes its origin to the old Chinese legend that the star Vega (the Weaver), who is separated by the Galaxy from the star Altair, her lover, is allowed to meet him only once a year, on this evening. The children make their wishes, while looking up at shooting stars. Let us keep our sky ever beautiful and romantic.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and for the reference he made regarding the friendly relatinship and very fruitful co-operation that exists between our two countries.

I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): It gives me pleasure to welcome you, Ambassador Terrefe, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, a country with which Poland enjoys friendly relations of close co-operation. Let me congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in July, which is usually a month of intensive work. I am sure you will preside over the Conference's work in a most efficient and effective manner and I pledge my delegation's support and co-operation in your endeavours to achieve progress in our work. I also wish to use this opportunity to express my delegation's sincere gratitude to your precedessor, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, for his skilful presidency in June. It is also my pleasure to welcome the new head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Friedersdorf. I wish him a successful stay in Geneva and we look forward to the continuation of the co-operative relations we usually had with his delegation and, of course, I wish him a speedy recovery. May I as well warmly welcome in our midst today Mr. Akashi, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

For some time now, developments in international relations have been marked by a particularly intensive search for disarmament. The multi- and bilateral dialogues on security and disarmament have been intensified and a number of important initiatives and proposals have been put forward. Of particular significance in this respect are the Soviet Union's proposals of 15 January 1986 and their follow-up. Attempts are being made to establish a new forum for disarmament talks in Europe, the region where the military potentials of the two alliances are of particular density and magnitude.

All these efforts have a common source -- the feeling that the world is really at a crossroads, that present actions will determine the future for many decades to come, that every State, large or small, non-aligned or member of an alliance should make its contribution toward barring the way to a continuation of the arms race.

From this feeling of common responsibility for common security there also follow Poland's recent proposals concerning nuclear and conventional disengagement in Central Europe. The plan was first outlined by Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic in his statement on 8 May 1987; permit me, in this connection, to call to your attention document CD/754, which contains that outline. Later, Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Orzechowski, elaborated upon the plan at the Vienna CSCE meeting. Let me briefly discuss the main ideas of the plan.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The plan aims at curbing the threat of armed conflict in Europe. It provides for reducing armaments, both nuclear and conventional, qualitative and quantitative restraints on the arms race, and the building of confidence in the heart of the continent. The implementation of the plan should, on the basis of equal security for all parties, result in assured military stability at a relatively low level.

The territorial scope of the proposed measures would cover an extended region of Central Europe (the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland), with a possibility of its extension to cover the entire continent from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The measures proposed involve both nuclear and conventional armaments, military doctrines and security-building and confidence-building. The plan contains four main elements.

Firstly, the gradual disengagement and reduction of jointly agreed operational and battlefield types of nuclear arms. he aim is to commence the withdrawal and reduction of mutually agreed types of nuclear arms -- not only rockets, but also nuclear payloads, including those delivered at distances under 500 km. All types of nuclear weapons should be covered by international negotiations so that no "grey area" can emerge in this sphere.

Secondly, the gradual disengagement and reduction of jointly agreed kinds of conventional weapons, in the first place those with the greatest power and precision of destruction, suitable for use in a surprise attack. In other words, conventional weapons with remarkable striking power and precision which are capable of use in offensive operations should also be subject to an agreement. We are prepared to jointly specify the types of such weapons and negotiate their withdrawal and reduction.

Thirdly, evolution of the character of military doctrines so that they are mutually recognized as strictly defensive. A reorientation of military doctrines so as to render them strictly defensive, in the mutual perception of the parties, would facilitate the application of the proposed measures. It is our view that both the content of military doctrines and the role they play take on increased significance within the context of disarmament undertakings. The consideration of a concept of non-offensive defence could be of substantial importance.

Fourthly, a continuous search for, and agreement on, new confidence-building and security-building measures and on a mechanism for strict verification on the commitments undertaken. These confidence-building and security-building measures should be both political and military in character, and should be associated with measures for verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific provisions for observation and inspection, mutually considered as effective, will have to be worked out.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The plan forms a comprehensive entity. However, every one of its four elements may be seen as an autonomous offer as well. It is also a flexible proposal, as we are ready to modify, complement and broaden its particular elements. The details of the plan are being elaborated, and will be presented in the near future.

The Polish plan has a common denominator with the 1986 Budapest communiqué of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, as well as with the other concepts of European disarmament on a subregional scale, for instance the initiative of three political parties -- the German Socialist Unity Party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia -- concerning a nuclear-weapon-free corridor. In drafting the plan we have been inspired by experience going back to the Rapacki and Gomulka Plans, by the ideas of the Palme Commission and by other concepts. Their shared philosophy has been that of a search for reduced armaments and gradual disengagement of the military potentials of military alliances in the centre of Europe, the region of crucial importance for the security of the entire continent and for the relationship between the two alliances.

Yhis new Polish proposal is based on our unchanging conviction that regional solutions can not only bring security to specific regions but, by increasing confidence and enhancing political stability, also facilitate the global construction of an infrastructure of peaceful co-existence.

The measures proposed in the plan are of direct and significant relevance to at least three agenda items of the Conference on Disarmament. They could be taken into consideration during the Conference's work on item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", and item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament".

All the items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament contain problems of great importance and complexity. The highest priority, however, is generally accorded to a broad range of problems of nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament. Is it not a paradox that this is exactly the area where the Conference has done so little?

Poland, like the majority of States represented here, is not a nuclear-weapon Power. We do not feel, however, released from the sacred duty of persistent activity in all international forums in support of halting the growth of nuclear arsenals and starting the process of their elimination.

We believe that the Conference on Disarmament has not only the right but a moral duty to tackle the problems of nuclear disarmament more deeply and in a more concrete, business-like way.

While acknowledging the particular responsibility of the big Powers and the need for the process of nuclear-arms reduction to be initiated by them, we can hardly agreed with the unfortunate reality that a Conference attended by all the nuclear Powers still devotes much more attention to procedural disputes than to working out concrete measures. The bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States will continue to play a significant role in

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

stopping the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear arsenals, but full-scale nuclear disarmament can only be achieved as a multilateral undertaking with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of the Soviet Union and the socialist States, as well as many other States, the existing political realities, and especially the position of some nuclear Powers, are not conducive to such business-like negotiations. In our mind this should not, however, be regarded as a justification for the situation, but, on the contrary, as an incentive to search for tentative or partial solutions which are possible in the existing circumstances. It is rather rare in any disarmament negotiations that it is possible to achieve an ultimate solution in one step.

The May 1987 session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Berlin, stressed the overriding need for urgent, practical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. One of the measures singled out in the communiqué of the session is a "comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons testing as a high-priority measure designed to put an end to the development, manufacture and refinement of nuclear arms to bring about their reduction and elimination".

For years the nuclear-test ban has been the first item on the agenda of this Conference, which after all has all the predispositions to begin concrete, business-like work leading to a treaty banning nuclear-weapon testing. As has been stressed in this hall time and again, all arguments invoking the need for continued testing for reasons of strengthening of security are now unwarranted. The Soviet Union, by its moratorium on nuclear testing, which lasted more than a year and a half, demonstrated both goodwill and much political courage. They have not, however, been reciprocated.

The socialist countries have come forward with yet another significant initiative and submitted for the Conference's consideration a document containing "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". This approach of ours is a flexible one. The "Basic provisions" outline a possible framework for goal-oriented work for a long overdue ad hoc committee. We are ready, however, to consider any other proposal that will offer a basis for work leading to a conclusion of a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

The "Basic provisions" do not contain, in our opinion, ideas unacceptable to other groups of countries at the Conference. On the contrary, in drafting this document its authors broadly took into consideration the views of other States and their security concerns. The document also contains new ideas and develops some concepts already raised at this or other forums.

In short, it is a product of new political thinking. But thinking, no matter how progressive, will remain only a philosophical concept unless supported by common action. We need such common action at this Conference if we are to deal seriously with the nuclear-test ban. The "Basic provisions" are an open invitation to common thinking and common action. We would very much welcome the opinions of other delegations, as well as their own proposals. Stimulating an exchange of views can only lead to more goal-oriented work.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

I listened with great interest to this morning's statements by the distinguished representatives of Finland and Norway devoted to chemical weapons. Those statements are still further proof of their countries' deep and active interest in, and important contributions to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. Before I finish my statement, I would also like to touch briefly on the work of the Committee on Chemical Weapons.

My task is easier today as Ambassador Y.K. Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, in his statement on 2 July 1987, gave an evaluation of the present stage of the negotiations with regard to a chemical weapons convention and expressed his delegation's uneasiness at the slowing down of the pace of work of the Committee. My delegation fully shares his analysis and conclusions. In our opinion, if we are to achieve decisive progress this year, as is professed to be the desire of all, we have to concentrate our efforts more on the still outstanding priority aspects of the convention rather than on issues of lesser importance or urgency.

In particular, more goal-oriented and intensive work should and can be done with regard to the finalization of articles IV, V and VI, including the definition of a production facility, the order of destruction of chemical weapons and régimes for super-toxic lethal chemicals remaining outside schedule [1]. Moreover, challenge inspection, usefully dealt with by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee during the spring session, should be taken up by the Committee more vigorously.

We are grateful to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, and to the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Krutzsch, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Nieuwenhuys, for their strenuous efforts, but real progress can only come as a result of the common endeavours of all delegations and their genuine will to make such progress.

Poland, being a country which does not produce, possess or intend to acquire chemical weapons, is doing its best within its power to contribute to the prompt finalization of the convention. The destruction of existing chemical weapons and their elimination from military arsenals for ever will be a long and difficult process, demanding strict and so far unheard-of international control. It is therefore in our common interest to begin the process as soon as possible. We support all initiatives which may be helpful to eliminating chemical weapons, including regional solutions.

On the other hand, we are deeply concerned with some States' activities leading toward the initiation of production of a new generation of chemical weapons. Likewise disquieting are proposals put forward at our Conference which would allow for the production of chemical weapons after the process of destruction has started. Such an attitude, in our opinion, runs against the spirit and the letter of the future convention. Indeed, we hope that the authors of CD/757 will reconsider their position in favour of our common goal -- an effective convention on a chemical-weapons ban.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We strongly believe that the remaining part of the summer session of the Conference, as well as the time available before the beginning of the 1988 session, will, as in previous years, be used to the benefit of the convention. We are glad to note that a similar view was expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, His Excellency Hans van de Broek. We hope other delegations will be able to demonstrate a similar approach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there any other member wishing to take the floor at this point? I see none.

Members will recall that immediately after this plenary meeting the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet in this conference room.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 9 July, at 10 a.m. After that plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.420
9 July 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 9 July 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)

GE.87-62645/9503E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 420th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of Canada and France. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, as this is the first opportunity that I have had to take the floor under your presidency, I should like to express, on behalf of Canada, my pleasure and my government's pleasure at seeing you, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, assuming the important role of President of our Conference for the month of July. I would also like to take the opportunity to express my appreciation for the fruitful and constructive work done by your predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi, to move the work of this Conference forward and, although it may seem a little late to be reiterating something I have said before, I hope that you, like Ambassador Alfarargi, will be able to continue to build upon the extremely useful foundations laid by Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia.

The purpose of my statement today is to express the views of the Canadian Government on the current state of our efforts to negotiate a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons and to announce our intention to place before this body further results of Canadian research relating to the investigation of allegations of use of chemical weapons. I will also make some brief comments on document CD/766, which proposed an annex to article IX of the draft convention, dealing specifically with procedures for the verification of allegations of use. We have been pleased to join with Norway in tabling this document in the Conference on Disarmament.

The earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive, adequately verifiable ban on chemical weapons remains one of the priority arms control objectives of the Canadian Government. Such a convention should, in our view, provide for the immediate cessation of all chemical weapons production and for the systematic destruction within a specified period of all existing stocks of chemical weapons. The legitimate concern for security should be addressed in a way which ensures that implementation of the convention will not create any new kinds of imbalance which might undermine the security of any State party. However, the convention must not just constitute an arms limitation measure, but be seen from the outset to be a real disarmament measure, involving the complete elimination of an entire class of weapon of mass destruction.

The successful conclusion of such a convention would make a direct and lasting contribution to international security. It would, moreover, go a long way toward reviving public confidence in the relevance and efficacy of the multilateral arms control process in general and the authority of this negotiating forum in particular. This we see as indispensable to the long-term effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

For these reasons, the Government of Canada takes some considerable satisfaction from the serious, constructive and business-like approach to the negotiation which characterized our work during the 1986 session and which has persisted in the present one. Progress, indeed, continues to be made. The presence here this week of a number of industrial experts from several countries, including Canada, indicates the practical emphasis of our current endeavours. I would like to express special appreciation to Ambassador Ekéus for the energetic but sensitive way in which he is presiding over our work. All delegations of the Conference are now working with a seriousness of purpose which augurs well for prospects for continuing and significant negotiating progress.

Such progress is all the more urgent when seen against the distressing fact that chemical weapons continue to be used. Moreover, there is strong evidence that an increasing number of countries have acquired or may be seeking to acquire a chemical warfare capability. The Canadian Government was dismayed at the most recent report of the United Nations Secretary-General which again confirmed the repeated use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran War. Canada abhors and condemns this use of chemical weapons in clear breach of the legal obligations embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which both Iraq and Iran are parties. We again laud the Secretary-General for his initiative in launching an investigation and bringing its results to the attention of the Security Council. It is a matter of regret that, thus far, no effective means has yet been found, not only to prevent the repeated use of chemical weapons, but to bring an end to that tragic conflict. We again call on all parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to adhere to their obligations, and we urge the combatants in the Gulf war to seek, through negotiations, a termination of hostilities in accordance with Security Council resolutions 582 and 588.

The implications of this repeated use of chemical weapons, and of the reported interest of a number of countries in acquiring a chemical warfare capability, are alarming in several respects. They reinforce mutual suspicion and insecurity. They undermine the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. They also constitute an all too tangible reminder that the chemical weapon threat is not confined to one particular region or to one arena of potential conflict. They underscore that chemical weapons are a global problem which must be addressed on a global basis. This should reinforce our sense of urgency and our determination to persevere in the negotiation of an agreement to ban these weapons from the military arsenals of all countries.

It was against this background that the Canadian Government decided that, pending the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, certain practical steps should be taken with a view to limiting the danger of the misuse of chemicals for weapons purposes. Beginning in 1984, and in co-ordination with a number of other countries, Canada has placed export controls on several chemical compounds considered particularly useful for the manufacture of highly toxic chemical weapons. Canada has recently increased the number of chemical compounds whose export is controlled. The Canadian Government has been pleased to note that a number of other countries have acted similarly and have placed controls on the export of certain chemicals. We consider it would be useful if still more countries were also to do so.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

As part of our effort to facilitate these most important negotiations, Canada has regularly assembled and made available to all of the delegations to this Conference compendiums of all relevant plenary statements and working papers. These, I hope, have proven to be of value as working tools in this highly complex negotiation. I am pleased to report today that compendiums comprising the documentation from the especially busy 1986 session are now available and will be distributed to all delegations in the very near future.

If I may interject a personal comment, a number of us have found it difficult to develop an overview of the negotiations in spite of the expertise of members of our respective delegations and in spite of the excellent work of the Chairman of the subsidiary body, and we hope that these compendiums will assist in the process of enabling delegations to develop an overview.

Canada's long-standing interest in the broad issues of verification is by now well known. In the context of chemical weapons, we have devoted special attention, and considerable research effort, to questions relating to the verification of allegations of chemical weapon use. Last year, I tabled in this forum a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, which had earlier been presented to the United Nations Secretary-General. I am pleased to inform the Conference that we will be shortly submitting to the Conference on Disarmament a report entitled Verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples. It was conveyed to the United Nations Secretary-General on 20 May 1987. In his letter to His Excellency the Secretary-General, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, said the following:

> "The recent confirmed use of chemical weapons, in violation of international law, underlines the need to add to the body of knowledge which will contribute to the efficacy of a future treaty banning chemical weapons altogether. Such a treaty will, of necessity, make provision for the verification of allegations of the use of these weapons, with a view to deterring their use".

In referring specifically to the portable sensor kit, Mr. Clark pointed out:

> "This research project was undertaken as a case-study, to develop a better understanding of the technical problems associated with the provision of appropriate sensors to an investigating team. The speedy collection and subsequent analysis of samples pose many problems to an investigating team. These problems are compounded if the allegation relates to a 'novel' agent, that is, a chemical substance not previously used for or associated with hostile purposes".

The report which I will soon be submitting, while documenting two years of work, still leaves many questions unanswered. Nevertheless, we wish to share this work with other members of the international community who are also concerned with these matters.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

There is general agreement that, in addition to providing for cessation of the production of chemical weapons and for their destruction, the convention we are negotiating should also expressly ban the use of such weapons. The inclusion of such a provision will not only reaffirm the ban on use as set out in the 1925 Geneva Protocol but, by doing so in a context which includes specific provision for the verification of any allegations of use, will significantly strengthen the authority of the Protocol. We must ensure, of course, that nothing in the convention undermines the continuing authority of the 1925 Protocol - the point raised by my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Huslid of Norway, earlier this week and a point which has regularly been raised by the French delegation, to whom we are indebted as the guardians of that Protocol.

Canada was therefore particularly pleased to join with Norway in preparing a proposed annex to article IX entitled "General procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons". It attempts to set out a practical, workable framework for verifying allegations of use. We are indebted to Ambassador Huslid for the clarity with which he introduced this joint proposal for our collective consideration. Norway, although not yet officially a member of the CD, has consistently contributed most usefully to our work over many years. Like Canada, Norway has devoted special attention to questions relating to chemical weapons use. This has proved invaluable in the formulation of the proposed annex to article IX. Yet I suggest that the full value of the Norwegian and Canadian research efforts in these areas, much of which is of a highly technical nature, may come to be appreciated only after a convention is concluded and a technical secretariat has been set up to implement the convention and all its verification requirements. The same point could be made about the valuable work which Finland has shared, over the years, with the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors.

The proposed annex reflects our view that any type of use of chemical weapons would constitute the most serious kind of breach of the convention and that the verification requirement must be of a rigour that reflects the gravity of any such allegation. It takes cognizance of what seems to be an emerging consensus within this forum that the investigation of an alleged use must involve short-notice, on-site inspections. As formulated, the proposed annex aims to include provisions relating to procedures, techniques and allocation of responsibility at appropriate levels of both generality and precision, while allowing for the reality that many procedural and technical details will need to be worked out, by the Technical Secretariat under the supervision of the Executive Council. The annex aims to provide the necessary framework and guidance within which the more detailed procedures and techniques can be devised and effectively implemented. We join with the Norwegian delegation in commending it to the attention of the Conference for inclusion in the rolling text of the convention.

Earlier in my comments, I made a generally positive appreciation of the manner in which our negotiations are now proceeding. I also cited concrete events which underline the importance and urgency of our making progress. In concluding, I would like to register a cautionary note. We are embarked upon some of the most politically sensitive, legally intricate and technically demanding multilateral arms negotiations ever undertaken. If we are

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

successful, this will be the first time in the history of multilateral arms control that a major disarmament agreement has been concluded that also involves the creation from scratch of an elaborate, permanent new institution to oversee the implementation of such an agreement (we might usefully recall that the International Atomic Energy Agency preceded the conclusion of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and that its responsibilities continue to embrace other than arms control questions). Moreover, the implementation of this agreement will necessarily involve an unprecedented degree of intrusiveness into both military and civilian sectors of our societies. We therefore need to proceed with care and deliberation. Several important issues remain unresolved. On the question of challenge inspections, for example, while some considerable progress has been made, we have not yet been able to reach agreement with the required degree of precision. There also remains much detailed work to be done not only on technical questions but also on matters relating to the establishment, operation and governance of the international authority which will be responsible for overseeing the implementing of the convention.

I emphasize these points not for the purpose of inducing pessimism or despair. We have already achieved very much and we should not be daunted by the heavy work-load that remains. It is essential, however that we get it right. No useful purpose can be served, therefore, by the invocation of unrealistic and artificial deadlines. Let us proceed expeditiously, by all means, but let it be with care and deliberation toward the creation of a convention whose authority will be self-reinforcing due to its demonstrable workability and efficacy.

In closing, may I just express appreciation to those delegations which have thanked Canada for hosting two workshops recently directed towards trying to make a practical input into the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Mr. de la Baume.

Mr. de la BAUME (France) (translated from French): As this is the first time for it to take the floor in this month of July, the French delegation would like to begin by offering you, Mr. President, its warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for this month. We are convinced that you will be able fruitfully to guide our efforts. Your experience as your country's representative to the Conference from 1980 to 1983 and, in particular, as President of the Conference in August 1980 seems to us a very favourable omen for the continuation of our work. May I also express to Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt my delegation's heartiest congratulations for the skill and the competence with which he chaired the Conference during the month of June.

When he spoke on 2 July last concerning the negotiations under way on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the representative of the Soviet Union devoted a very substantial part of his statement to a critical scrutiny of the working paper submitted by the French delegation on 16 June last in document CD/757 and entitled "Working paper on the maintenance of a security balance among all the parties to the Convention during the 10-year period of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. de la Baume, France)

the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons". The reservations and questions put forward by the representative of the USSR seem to us above all evidence of a certain misunderstanding about the interpretation to be placed on our proposals. It would seem, therefore, that a few clarifications are required.

First of all, in his statement the representative of the Soviet Union said, and I quote, "We naturally proceed from the premise that the order of destruction must be based on the principle of undiminished security of States during the entire destruction process, as has already been agreed in annex IV, section II". And he added, "the specific conclusions drawn from this general premise in document CD/757 lead neither to the conclusion of a convention, nor to the securing of security".

For our part, we proceed from the idea that, to be credible, the convention must guarantee security to all States parties from its entry into force, and not just future security once all chemical weapons have been done away with. The order of destruction of stocks is, everyone agrees, of crucial importance in this regard. But the timetable must not lead to a situation where the countries possessing the greatest quantities of chemical weapons were entitled to keep a stock of such weapons for at least 10 years whereas others would be prohibited from possessing such weapons from the moment the convention came into force.

Moreover, it is clear that nothing guarantees that the States which are the main possessors of chemical weapons will not cease destroying their stocks. Regrettable as it may be, such an eventuality cannot be ruled out. We must therefore bear in mind the consequences that would stem for the security of States parties both from a withdrawal of the aforementioned States from the Convention and from a breach on their part that, if unredressed, would lead other parties to exercise their right of withdrawal.

To avoid such a situation, which would evidently be extremely detrimental to security interests, we, as you know, propose keeping virtually until the end of the 10-year period -- the extension of which cannot, moreover, be absolutely ruled out -- a militarily significant but minimal stock. That stock would not in any event represent more than a very small fraction of the stocks currently held by the countries possessing the greatest quantities of chemical weapons and the convention provides that these will be kept until the tenth year.

Later in his statement, the representative of the Soviet Union said that he saw in our proposals, and I quote, "a call for the legalized build-up and proliferation of chemical weapons". This criticism seems to us to be groundless.

Why? Because, if we analyse the situation, we find that, as the draft convention now stands, there is, in fact, no incentive for countries wishing to keep open the option of a chemical capability to accede to the convention. The fact that stocks would be destroyed only after the 10-year period could even encourage them to defer their own accession for that long.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. de la Baume, France)

The French document, on the other hand, proposes that a State that continues to possess or wishes to possess chemical weapons for the 10-year period alone should be compelled to say so and to open its entire territory to inspection, with the security stock — and the production unit -- being subject to more detailed verification.

These provisions, far, as we see it, from encouraging proliferation, should lead all States to forsake ambiguity; that is a restraint on proliferation. In this connection we must reject the idea that our proposals would be tantamount to changing the existing status quo in a manner conducive to proliferation. The current reality is indeed that there exist States which possess chemical weapons on the one hand and States which do not on the other; but nothing proves that, as the representative of the Soviet Union contends, the entry into force of the convention would ipso facto result in the elimination of this difference. We believe that that will be true only when all arsenals and all means of production have been destroyed -- and that, if everything happens as envisaged in the convention, will only be the case 10 years after the convention comes into force.

Those are a few comments that the French delegation wished to make at this juncture.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there any other member wishing to take the floor? I see none.

The secretariat has circulated today a working paper containing a draft decision on a request received from a non-member to participate in the informal meeting on the substance of item 2 of the agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The draft decision appears in document CD/WP/285. In accordance with the practice usually followed by the Conference, we might need to convene a brief informal meeting to consider that working paper. However, since the request was circulated on Wednesday last week and no objections have been raised, and keeping in mind that the non-member concerned has already been invited to participate in other activites of the CD, I suggest that we take its request up immediately at this plenary meeting. As I see no objection, I put before the Conference for decision working paper CD/WP/285, containing a draft decision on the request received from New Zealand to participate in the informal meetings on the substance of item 2. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

May I now turn to the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. As usual, the timetable is merely an indication and subject to change, if necessary. In addition to the regular plenary meetings, an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2 is scheduled for Thursday, 16 July, immediately after the plenary meeting. Meetings of the subsidiary bodies have been included after consultations with their chairmen. If I see no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

Before we adjourn, I should like to recall that the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", immediately after this plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 14 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.45 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.421
14 July 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 July 1987 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)

GE.87-62756/9620E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 421st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

To begin with, I should like to welcome our distinguished visitors at this plenary meeting. I am very happy to greet the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Mr. David Mellor, Q.C., M.P., who is addressing the Conference for the first time since he took over his important functions. His predecessor, Mr. Timothy Renton, contributed effectively to our substantive work each time that he visited us. I am sure that the Conference will listen to the Minister of State with special interest and I wish him a successful visit to Geneva.

His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, is addressing the Conference in connection with agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". The Deputy Minister is also in the Conference for the first time, and I wish to thank him for the interest he shows in our work. I am very happy to see him here today amongst us and the Conference will listen to him with interest.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference today continues its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure, however, any member wishing to do so, may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of the United Kindom, Viet Nam and Mexico. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Mr. David Mellor.

Mr. MELLOR (United Kingdom): Mr. President, may I begin by saying that it is a very real honour for me to address this distinguished body, and under your presidency, knowing of your own experience of disarmament, which dates back to the predecessor of this Conference and, indeed, to the first United Nations special session on disarmament. I approach my task with some humility, knowing that I am in the presence of so many experts upon this subject and that I myself have only come to these responsibilities after nearly five years as a Minister carrying responsibility in Home Affairs in my country, so I feel a little like the minor Italian composer who was much distressed by the death of Rossini, a very much greater composer, and was so moved by the death of this great man that he composed a funeral ode which was performed at a memorial service to Rossini. After the performance, he wanted to know how it had gone, so he went to see one of his colleagues who had been in the audience, another composer, and he said, "Well, what did you think of it?" and the fellow Italian composer looked a little embarrassed, shuffled his feet, but, being at heart a diplomat, finally said, "Well, perhaps it might have been better if you had died and he had written the music". So if any of you feel that way about my speech, I shall quite understand. So let me congratulate you, Mr. President, and also your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, on his successful presidency of the Conference.

Perhaps I could also say what a pleasure it was for me to meet so many of the Ambassadors and other senior figures here at our reception yesterday evening. If I may say so, it creates a very good impression upon a visitor of the shared endeavour that is the keystone of the work of this Conference that

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

people meet together in a friendly spirit at receptions like these. I am sure that the personal relationships that are forged in such receptions do aid and assist the detailed work that has to go in within this hall and elsewhere, and I take away, if I may say so, an extremely favourable impression of the spirit of co-operation that plainly exists around this table.

The British Government began its third term of office following our General Election last month and, of course, I welcome this opportunity to tell the Conference once again, as I know my predecessor will have done last year, that the British Government will continue to attach the highest priority to arms control. All of us face a demanding challenge: not just to reduce the world's massive stockpiles of weaponry, but also to increase and enhance mutual security. No challenge is greater. No challenge is more important, and I am pleased and honoured to have the chance to make my own contribution.

I hope that I can begin, and carry with me everyone around this table, when I pay a particular tribute to Dr. Ian Cromartie, who is, of course, as you will all know and sadly, retiring as Head of the British delegation. It is no idle compliment to praise his efforts at this Conference over the past five years, not least his sterling work in the chemical negotiations as Chairman in 1986. He will be much missed by this Conference, and by none more than my own colleagues. The experience and expertise that Dr. Cromartie built up over the years set high standards for the rest of us. I will try to live up to those standards today, when I shall be introducing a new British initiative in the field of chemical weapons.

May I first of all try to set out Britain's overall approach to arms control. We seek enhanced security, at lower levels of armaments and forces, through mutual, balanced and effectively verifiable agreements. Those may be familiar objectives. But I want to restate them at the outset. Sometimes we read statements, implying that the Governments of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have a special devotion to peace, a special understanding of what peace means. That remains to be proven. A peace race may be preferable to an arms race. But in the search for security and lasting peace, the British Government takes second place to no one.

At our recent General Election, the British people voted, as they will continue to vote, overwhelmingly for peace. Of course they want peace. But they also want security, from threats or bullying or blackmail. Of course the British people want nuclear stockpiles reduced, to make Europe safer. But they do not want just to make Europe safer for conventional war. Of course the British people want relations between East and West to improve. But not at any price -- and certainly not if it implies compromising their basic beliefs in freedom and justice. In short, the British people take a very straightforward view of the basic issues of East/West relations and arms control and they have again endorsed the British Government's approach. It is practical, steady and realistic and, I hope, it is also energetic, positive and ambitious.

But arms control is not an isolated endeavour. It cannot proceed on some elevated plane, divorced from all that happens in the rest of the world. Success in arms control is, and must be, linked to the much wider climate of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

international relations. And, above all, to relations between East and West. Divorce can be fatal. And even separation can be damaging. Our basic aims in arms control must depend on the general climate of East/West relations.

The British Government has played its part in improving that climate. For instance, our Foreign Secretary has made a point of visiting every country in Eastern Europe (except Albania) to stimulate dialogue and to exchange ideas and his efforts paved the way for the Prime Minister's highly successful visit to Moscow at the end of March. Such political contacts are invaluable. They can provide clearer views of the hopes and intentions of each side. They can help to replace confrontation with co-operation. They can increase confidence and trust. But the building of trust and confidence takes more than contacts alone. Today's huge stockpiles of weapons do not exist because of mistrust alone. They exist because of profound differences between two very different systems.

The Warsaw Pact Communiqué issued in Berlin last month stated that "the initiative of the socialist countries is designed to overcome any confrontational approach and to assert civilized standards and an atmosphere of openness, transparency and trust in international relations". Very fine words. But what is the reality? Abroad we see some 5 million people driven out of their own country of Afghanistan. Within the countries of the Warsaw Pact we cannot ignore those actions which directly threaten trust and confidence and which seem designed to emphasize the differences between us. To give you an example, this year people living in Britain will make over 25 million visits abroad. Those who prevent their citizens leaving their own country must understand the effect of such controls on mutual confidence.

So I believe that we in the West want to get across to such countries a fundamental message: Yes, we want peace; Yes, we do not reject co-operation, but trust is an indivisible element in our relations. Confidence cannot be created in isolated stages. Like security, it is a seamless robe. And every time we find cause for mistrust, that re-emphasizes the need for adequate defences; that weakens the basis for co-operation; and that delays progress in arms control. But yet progress does come. And at present, and I welcome this, we do seem to be on the verge of some important developments.

Last month, the North Atlantic Council confirmed the priorities that were set last December; and they are these: to achieve an Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement in the near future; to reduce United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons by fifty per cent; to eliminate all chemical weapons completely; and to establish conventional security in Europe by redressing imbalances in this area which are a particular concern to NATO. We also agreed to consider the further development of a comprehensive concept of arms control. This will, I hope, help to identify how best to make progress in these and other areas -- again, towards that basic goal of strengthening security at lower levels of arms and armed forces. This programme is ambitious and far-reaching. If it could be achieved, East/West relations would be transformed for the better and I hope it represents common ground between all of us here.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

May I deal in greater detail with the key issues as I see them, and I want to take in turn nuclear, conventional and then chemical weapons. Each can be treated on its own merits. But we cannot ignore the relationship between them. Progress in one can help to promote success elsewhere. But it cannot be allowed to damage our overall security.

On the subject of nuclear weapons, I will start with a fundamental truth, about security. This Conference hardly needs reminding of the peace that we have enjoyed in Europe for the past 40 years, compared with the 150 or so wars that have occurred outside our continent over the same period. We continue to believe that nuclear deterrence -- or nuclear security, as it is better described -- has a role to play in preserving this peace. And for that we need and will continue to need nuclear weapons. But we do not need them at the current inflated level; we can do with many less. And, as we make progress, we can discard the sterile and outdated arguments which have plagued the international debate in the past. The unilateralist approach to nuclear weapons has been consistently rejected by the British public and by Western opinion. I doubt whether it ever had much attraction elsewhere. We are all mutilateralist disarmers now. And we can all engage in the deeper debate -- not in slogans and flag-waving -- about what is crucial to ensure our mutual security.

Let me turn to the nuclear negotiations now in train, which inevitably lie beyond the direct control of this Conference, and whose pace and scope are largely determined by events outside this hall. First and foremost, we have been encouraged by recent progress in the United States-Soviet Union talks here in Geneva. The two super-Powers have between them some 95 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons, as well as the greatest potential for expanding military activity from outer space. We all have an interest in these negotiations. We all look to their success.

The bilaterial talks are directed at major reductions in nuclear weapons, on a scale never seen before. Make no mistake: an agreement to abolish Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces and shorter-range systems down to 500 kms would represent a great step forward in nuclear arms control. That is why we accord it the highest priority. We welcomed the signs of Soviet realism last year. Then they began to move towards a serious agreement on longer-range INF. But let us keep the record straight. It was not the Soviet Union which proposed a global zero-zero solution in 1981. It was the United States with full suport from their allies. Following the Reykjavik Summit, the prospects for an agreement again improved. But we are still urging the Soviet Union to agree to eliminate all Long Range INF missiles, and to accept global zero for shorter-range intermediate nuclear systems. Not least because this would greatly ease the verification problems. We have all heard Soviet rhetoric which calls on others to reduce nuclear weapons. This is a first-class opportunity for them to prove their sincerity. Let us hope that the agreement is signed. Let us trust that it is implemented, and can be verified effectively. That could well stimulate progress in other areas of arms control.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

But we are not there yet. The momentum must be sustained and this is no time for foot-dragging. But we now see signs of just that on the Soviet side. We see a Soviet reluctance to arrange the necessary meetings to drive the talks forward. And we must be concerned that the progress so far can be stymied at this late stage. Such artificial obstacles imply a Soviet approach which we, our allies and the rest of the world would find hard to understand -- and harder still to accept. I fervently trust that such obstacles will be removed forthwith.

Turning to the Strategic Defence Initiative, I confirm our welcome that the Soviet Union has dropped its earlier linkage between Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces. The United Kingdom continues to see the United States SDI programme as prudent. Mrs. Thatcher agreed with President Reagan at Camp David in November 1986 that there was a need to press ahead with the SDI research programme, which is permitted by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. But it is just that, a research programme. And it matches the Soviet Union's activities in this field over many years.

I turn now to strategic nuclear arms. Both sides have accepted the target in principle of cutting them by half. I spoke of this target earlier as one of NATO's priorities. It remains that. Progress in INF should not divert us from the need for equal, and now greater efforts in the strategic field. We hope that the Soviet Union will now respond positively to the United States draft treaty which lies on the table. Failure to do so, or even further delay, would be a damaging indictment of Soviet intentions.

If we were able to implement both such agreements, we could indeed be proud of our success in bequeathing to future generations a less nuclear, but still safer world.

Finally, I come to constraints on nuclear testing. A nuclear test ban has long been one of the subjects on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda and you all know far better than I that, following the 1977-1980 negotiations, a committee of this Conference considereed the subject for two years. I regret it has not been possible since then to agree a mandate for further discussion.

Meanwhile, the group of scientific experts has continued its very valuable work. I hope that this will continue free from any sort of politicization. The scientific group demonstrates how the Conference on Disarmament can best contribute to the discussion of nuclear testing constraints. The 1977-1980 negotiations were not brought to a successful conclusion. Nor is it useful to see those negotiations necessarily as the starting point for what we now need to do. Instead, I believe that the Conference on Disarmament should look to its own strengths, the sort of discussions which resolve technical problems and expose remaining difficulties. The present group does just this in the technical field. A committee could perform the same role in relation to other issues. Among them is the need to address verification problems. These remain unresolved, despite ill-informed claims to the contrary. Such a prospect was laid down in the Western programme of work and, indeed, in the draft mandate proposed earlier by the distinguished Czechoslovak delegate, Ambassador Vejvoda. Both were acceptable to us.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

Progress in reducing nuclear weapons -- that is our aim. And we do not exclude constraints on nuclear testing as well. Far from it. We very much welcome the separate United States-Soviet talks on these. We hope they will soon be able to ratify their two treaties from the 1970s, before moving on to other constraints. This step-by-step process is the right way to make substantive and lasting progress. It also takes full account of real security concerns. And the Conference on Disarmament can make its contribution to this process by deciding soon how to structure its own discussion.

May I turn now to conventional weapons. We do not want to see controls on nuclear weapons -- as I have consistently emphasized -- but we cannot ignore the threat and the damage caused by conventional weapons. We remember only too well the history of Europe for more of the last 1,000 years. It is a history of one appalling war after another. We are deteremined it shall not be repeated. May I remind you of some wise words of Lord Carrington who said last December, "So many arms control discussions seem concerned only with nuclear weapons ... they almost seem to suggest that conventional warfare is acceptable. But no one who lived through the last World War would agree".

I am young enough to have missed the last War in Europe. But let me make one thing perfectly clear. The British Government and its NATO allies are not in the business of making Europe safe for yet another conventional war. That would be epic folly, a step backwards into darkness and despair. I have already spoken of the role for nuclear weapons in preserving security in Europe. As we move towards reducing nuclear weapons of different categories, the need to do something about huge and costly conventional armies -- equipped with ever more destructive weaponry -- becomes increasingly urgent. This is why it is so important to redress the existing conventional imbalances. By our estimates these favour the Warsaw Pact three to one in tanks; over three to one in artillery; almost two to one in tactical aircraft. And since the early 1970s we have seen the Warsaw Pact forces configured not for defending Eastern Europen soil, but instead able to initiate a surprise attack and all-out invasion of Western Europe.

For some months now in Vienna we have been discussing the possibility of establishing a new negotiating forum for conventional arms control negotiations, to cover the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. At their Reykjavik meeting last month, NATO Ministers made proposals designed to take this forward through two distinct negotiations, both within the CSCE framework; one among all 35 European countries, on measures to build confidence in the military field; and the other among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to achieve stability at lower levels of forces. A Western mandate for further work on confidence-building was tabled in Vienna on 10 July. And we hope in the near future to make formal proposals for the conventional stability negotiations.

Stability and security mean eliminating disparities. We were encouraged to note what Mr. Gorbachev said at a Moscow forum in February: "Should there be inequality in any elements, we must redress the situation, not by letting the one short of some elements build them up, but by having the one with more scale them down". We endorse this approach whole-heartedly. But, of course,

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

I say again, it needs to be translated into action, because action speaks so much louder than words. However, so far there has been no agreement on the size of inequalities. Warsaw Pact countries have not made available the essential facts and figures about their forces and, if "glasnost" is to mean anything in this area, this must be put right.

Meanwhile, Warsaw Pact representatives have proposed discussions aimed at ensuring that military doctrine is essentially defensive. Now, as everyone knows, NATO has declared for a number of years that none of its weapons will ever be used except to respond to attack. It is self-evident, it is beyond any semblance of doubt, that our forces and those of our allies are not deployed or designed to invade anyone else's territory. These NATO declarations can actually be tested. Information on our force numbers and dispositions is freely available. But the Warsaw Pact does not provide the same sort of information on its forces. If it did, we might be better placed to assess their declared aim on doctrine. This is not an area for debate or abstract theorizing. It requires practical and verifiable agreements affecting actual forces on the ground.

These problems, of course, have been with us for many years. We will not solve them overnight. But the disappointing lack of progress in the Mutual and Balanced Forced Reduction talks in Vienna shows those obstacles all too clearly. Nevertheless, we still hope for progress in that forum. This would provide the best possible start for new negotiations on conventional stability.

Mr. President, I hope I am not outstaying my welcome and you will not regret your kindness in inviting me to come here, but I did want my contribution to be comprehensive, to set out the totality of our stance and to conclude with an area that I think is well known around this table, is one where we particularly want to see progress made and where we particularly feel that in the United Kingdom we might have a role to play in bringing agreement about, and so it is to chemical weapons that I turn finally and perhaps most relevantly to the concerns of the distinguished Ambassadors around this table.

Chemical weapons are, of course, the classic example of the futility of unilateral gestures. The United Kingdom gave up its chemical weapons capability in the 1950s and the United States stopped making such weapons in 1969. But it was only in April this year that the Soviet Union announced they had finally ceased production. And even if this is so, the West now faces a truly massive Soviet stockpile. Very few countries are prepared to admit their possession of chemical weapons, but the reports of the spread of such weapons are too frequent and too insistent to ignore.

I would like to pay tribute to the valuable work that has been done at this Conference. Our aim for chemical weapons is particularly ambitious. It is not to set limits. It is not to freeze existing levels. It is to abolish them completely, in an effective, verifiable, global ban. You were kind enough, Mr. President, to mention my predecessor, Timothy Renton, and since he spoke at this Conference last year we have seen encouraging progress: substantial areas of agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons and of their means of production; and acceptance of the importance of a verification

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

régime for civil chemical production. The momentum that developed last year under Dr. Cromartie has been maintained under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus and I was pleased to have the opportunity of an informal talk with him yesterday. I am heartened by the warm reception for the British paper on challenge inspection that we tabled last year and many problems of principle seem set for resolution. Nevertheless, as the solutions to some of our differences of principle become clearer, so it becomes more important to think through all the practical implications. Permit me to mention two areas in particular.

In the first place, we all accept the need to verify that chemical weapons are not secretly produced and that precursors made in the civil industry are not diverted or abused. But, at the same time, we recognize the need to reconcile the objectives of the convention with the legitimate concerns of civil industry if the convention is to be acceptable to all. This inevitably means looking at very detailed issues. The seminar held here in Geneva last week for representatives from many national chemical industries gave an opportunity for detailed and practical discussions of this crucial area. We must now build on this experience. We must agree among ourselves such crucial questions as those chemicals we wish to see subject to verifications; those levels of production which should concern the convention; and how to update the overall régime to take account of advances in science.

My second example has perhaps received less attention in the past. Once all the negotiating problems have been resolved, we have to move quickly and effectively from an agreed convention to implementing an actual global ban, which actually works in the way the negotiators intend. We in the United Kingdom have in the past stressed the case for having an international organization able to carry out this all-important task of overseeing implementation. Progress has been made. But we now need to give further thought to how the organization can be set up, so that everything necessary is done in good time.

That is why I am tabling today a new United Kingdom paper, which I think has been distributed, entitled "Making the chemical weapons ban effective". It contains our detailed ideas on what is needed. The paper suggests that some aspects can be left in the hands of a Preparatory Commission. However, the paper also notes that further work is needed here, in the Ad hoc Committee. We must ensure that adequate verification technology is available. And we have to obtain a clearer idea of the likely size and cost of the permanent staff of the organization.

Once more, openness should not mean more rhetoric but more disclosure. What we need is not more speeches, but more facts and figures. We need to know what other Governments have, where they have it and what they do with it. Now is the time, I believe, for all delegations, including those which have declined in the past, to indicate their likely future declarations. Only in this way can realistic estimates be prepared. And only in this way can the crucial confidence in this mutual endeavour be established. The new United Kingdom paper provides the framework within which, we hope, good intentions can be translated into effective action.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

Our negotiations on chemical weapons could lead to a treaty of both immediate and historic importance. The use of these weapons by Iraq in the Gulf conflict has emphasized how urgently a total ban is needed. These weapons are a dreadful scourge that threatens the whole international community. Let us get rid of them, once and for all.

In conclusion could I just say this:

"No man is an island", one of our poets said, and nor is any one area of arms control an island unto itself. Lack of progress in one area can stultify efforts in other areas. But the reverse is also true. One new breakthrough can build up momentum in other negotiations. And, as I have already described, this momentum has been generated in several of the current negotiations. What we now need is not a vicious circle of ever-increasing weapons stocks and obdurate rhetoric, but a virtuous circle of growing mutual confidence and steady, sensible arms reductions. Public interest and hopes in arms control are running high. Those of us who actually negotiate have a responsibility to the international community to turn these hopes into realities, to translate political opportunities into practical action.

I hope that what I have said today will make clear beyond peradventure that the United Kingdom does not shirk its international responsibilities. This British Government have played a full and active part in arms control. And, as we enter our third term of office, that is what we will continue to do.

May I thank you, Mr. President, and your distinguished colleagues for their patience and may I say that I shall leave Geneva with the warmest memories of the reception I have received and the valuable conversations I have had and that I wish you, and all of your colleagues, nothing but success in the vital work ahead.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I am sure that all members of the Conference have learnt with regret the information given to us by the Minister of State concerning the departure of Ambassador Ian Cromartie, C.M.G. Ambassador Cromartie not only represented his country with outstanding diplomatic ability, but also served this Conference with distinction, having contributed significantly to our work on a number of delicate issues and, in particular, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Conference will certainly miss him. I should like to ask the Minister of State to convey to Ambassador and Mrs. Cromartie our best wishes for their future.

I now give the floor to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam, His Excellency Nguyen Di Nien.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. NGUYEN Di Nien (Socialist Republic of Viet Nam): At the outset, I wish to express my deep satisfaction at seeing the presidency for this month of our very important Conference assumed by the representative of heroic Ethiopia, with which my country maintains close fraternal relations. I am convinced that, with your dedication and diplomatic skills, you will facilitate the success of the negotiations that take place within the framework of this Conference. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the Conference for giving me the opportunity to speak today.

With regard to the question of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, our representative in Geneva has on various occasions presented the views held by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. Allow me today to elaborate our positions on a number of issues to which my country attaches great importance.

On the threshold of the third millennium, we are faced with options for the future: the survival of mankind or its destruction. And the answer is not simple. To our dissatisfaction, a tense and complicated international situation still prevails. In their continued search for military superiority, some forces are accelerating the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, attempting to spread it to outer space. While it needs only one per cent of the existing nuclear arsenals to make our Earth a dead and frozen planet forever, more nuclear weapons and various other types of weapons of mass destruction are being stockpiled. With the very high pace of development of military technology, it is leaving less and less time for peoples, States and politicians to become aware of the real danger and the limits of mankind's possibilities for stopping the slide towards the nuclear abyss. The choice for the future, therefore, must be made boldly and responsibly by all States together, regardless of their social systems and levels of economic development. The time has come for us all to make jointly the greatest possible efforts towards ridding the world of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

In the nuclear age, every State must adopt new thinking on security. Experience of the past decades shows that the concept of security through nuclear deterrence, the notions of war as a means of attaining political objectives are outdated and if continued would only lead to an all-out conflagration. Our concept of security is based on that of a comprehensive security system providing for equal security for all States in a nuclear-free, demilitarized world with non-violence in international relations. We share the view of the Non-aligned Movement that the peace and security of a State cannot be ensured through the accumulations of armaments.

The threat of a nuclear war can only be permanently removed by completely abolishing nuclear weapons from our planet. We hold that it is incumbent on all States, first of all, nuclear-weapon States, to contribute to this effort. The all-embracing programme for total abolition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century put forth by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, constitutes an important contribution to the process of radical and comprehensive disarmament, displays a new political thinking and great responsibility for the destiny of mankind. The Eighth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Harare has welcomed this highly important proposal.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

Facing the serious challenges constituted by the continued nuclear arms race, an ever broader and stronger movement is developing the world over for peace, against nuclear war and against the militarization of outer space. A clear expression of this may be found in the Mexico Declaration of the leaders of the six countries representing four continents, in the Political Declaration of the Eighth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and in the New Delhi Joint Statement by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of India on a nuclear-free world with non-violence in international relations. The trend towards the establishment of nuclear-free zones developing in many parts of our globe such as South East Asia, Africa, Northern Europe, Central Europe and the Balkans displays the desire and determination of the majority of countries to strive for a nuclear-free world.

While sparing no efforts to contribute to the achievement of the final objective, namely general and complete disarmament, we are in favour of step-by-step disarmament and a realistic approach to that process. As viewed by the overwhelming majority of nations, a halt to nuclear tests, which would be most crucial and effective in checking the nuclear arms race, is a matter of the highest priority. Regrettably, negotiations on a ban on nuclear tests have remained deadlocked despite the fact that within the past two years one nuclear-weapon State has four times extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. It is clear to all who are responsible for this deadlock. In the continued tense situation, we urge all States, and first of all the forty members of this Conference on Disarmament, to join efforts to bring about a breakthrough on this extremely important issue.

Regional peace and security is inseparable from international peace and security. The main problem confronting mankind today -- that of survival -- is equally acute and urgent for Europe, Africa, America and Asia and the Pacific. The consolidation and strengthening of peace and co-operation in any region would constitute a concrete contribution to the preservation of peace and security at global level.

Asia and the Pacific remains one of the most turbulent regions of the world. It is where for the past forty years the peoples have never really known peace, but instead have had to undergo a succession of the longest, bloodiest wars such as the Korean War, and especially the Indochina War and the Viet Nam War in which the biggest quantity of bombs and toxic chemicals, including dioxin, was used against the local populations. At present, although Asia and the Pacific on the whole has not as yet been militarized to the extent Europe has, the potential for its militarization is truly immense, and the consequences are extremely dangerous. Major nuclear Powers are situated here. Large land armies, navies and air forces have been built. In this context, the will of the peoples of Asia and the Pacific for peaceful co-existence, co-operation and friendship is growing stronger and stronger. We join many countries in supporting the initiatives of the People's Republic of Mongolia on non-use of force or threat of use of force between the States of the region; we support every effort to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, and South-East Asia, the South Pacific region and the Korean peninsular nuclear-weapon-free zones. Viet Nam strongly supports the initiative of the Soviet Union on the establishment of a general system of security in Asia and the Pacific aimed at consolidating peace, security and co-operation on the basis of equality and mutual benefits among States in the region.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

In South-East Asia, having suffered too much from war, the three Indochinese countries, more than anyone else, treasure peace and desire friendship and co-operation with other countries the world over, first of all with their neighbours. While resolutely struggling for the preservation of their independence and sovereignty, the three Indochinese countries have spared no efforts to make South-East Asia a zone of peace, stability, friendship and co-operation. We want to seek through dialogue political solutions to the problems of this region, including the question of Kampuchea, on the basis of equality, respect for each other's sovereignty and mutual understanding. On this occasion, I would like to reiterate once again our proposals to sign with all other countries in the region treaties of non-aggression and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. We would also like to re-establish good relations with China.

We can recall that in 1978, at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the international community achieved, for the first time in the history of disarmament negotiations, a consensus on a Programme of Action on disarmament and established a rather comprehensive disarmament machinery with great importance attached to the Committee on Disarmament -- now the Conference on Disarmament. The consensus embodied in the Final Document of that special session reflects not only the improved international situation of the 1970s but also the international community's profound desire to attain far greater successes in the struggle to curb the arms race, for peace and disarmament. Most regrettably, as is well known, for the past ten years deadlock has prevailed in the field of disarmament and mankind is today faced with a new dangerous spiral of the arms race -- unprecedented in its intensity and scope. As far as the work of our Conference is concerned, it is a sad fact that no concrete agreement has been reached so far on any disarmament issue under negotiations here and negotiations on nuclear issues have not yet commenced under appropriate working arrangements. The expressed will of the international community to take the proper option for survival demands the utilization of all possible channels to bring about a turn in the cause of disarmament. Viet Nam concurs in the overwhelming view concerning the complementary relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament. The potential of the Conference on Disarmament -- the single multilateral negotiating body with the participation of countries from all political groups as well as from different geo-political regions, including all the five nuclear-weapon States -- should be further explored. While the Soviet-United States bilateral negotiations on the medium-range missiles in Europe are in progress, it is our hope that the Conference, acting upon its mandate and proceeding from the spirit of pertinent General Assembly resolutions, most recently resolution 41/86 M adopted at the forty-first session, will bring into full play its dynamism and its very important role in order to contribute to bringing about a new and lasting period of detente, effective disarmament, international peace and co-operation not only in Europe, but also in Asia and the Pacific, as well as in the rest of the world.

We have now before us a number of practical and reasonable proposals in the nuclear and other fields to form the basis of the work of the Conference. It is increasingly clear that compliance and verification are no longer

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

obstacles and should not be used as excuses to hold back or hamper negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty or on a new convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As shown by the past realities, the effectiveness of the Conference and new breakthroughs demand the political will of all the parties involved.

For several years, Viet Nam has applied for full membership in the Conference on Disarmament. Viet Nam's activities in the Conference have testified to its seriousness and its ability to contribute to the work of the Conference. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate our wish to become a full member of the Conference and our hope that we will enjoy the universal support of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam for his important statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to the Chair and to my country. I wish to inform the Conference that there has been a slight change in the list of speakers and I accordingly now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Tonwe.

Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): Thank you, Mr. President, but I can see that my distinguished colleague, the Ambassador of Mexico was already inscribed on the list. If the President has no objection, I will, of course, defer to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico.

The PRESIDENT: I recognize the Ambassador of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico): Mr. President, I was told that the distinguished representative of Nigeria has some important duties to attend to and that is why I said to the Deputy Secretary-General that I had no difficulty on leaving my place to him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of Mexico. Would the Ambassador of Nigeria now wish to take the floor?

Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): I thank you, Mr. President, and I apologize for that little hitch. I must express my gratitude also to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico.

Last week the Nigerian delegation submitted a paper which has been circulated among all delegations as CD/768, entitled "Proposal for the immediate conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Before I present this paper in a brief statement, permit me, as this is the first time I have taken the floor this month, to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. The combined force of your wide diplomatic experience, your personal qualities and your outstanding professional skill have been a source of energy and encouragement for delegations during the first half of July. We have no doubt that you will continue to guide the affairs of the Conference in the right direction during the remainder of your tenure. May I also take the opportunity to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Saad Alfarargi, who, in his usual discreet and effective manner, presided over the affairs of this Conference in the month of June.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

The Nigerian paper which is before delegations was intended to take the problem of negative security assurances out of the cooler and effectively put it back on the table of the Conference. Within these two steps the Nigerian delegation has naturally had to shake off the crust of ice that had neutralized the subject over the years and attempt to update the well-known elements of a possible arrangement. In making its proposals, the Nigerian delegation has also tried to face the issues, not run away from them. We must try to be realistic and accommodating of the reconcilable views and interests of all States and groups. Above all, we have sought in a modest way to serve the cause of nuclear disarmament.

The majority of States represented at this Conference and, indeed, of States members of the United Nations have renounced in an internationally binding agreement their sovereign right to manufacture nuclear weapons. By that singular act they have made an invaluable contribution to the cause of international peace and security. They have improved the international atmosphere and lessened international tension. It is only fair that those who have made this supreme sacrifice and have entrusted their security to fragile international discipline and the humanism of other States should at least have an unequivocal and binding international guarantee that those who have nuclear weapons will not use or threaten to use them against the former. In this connection, some of those States which have not yet signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty might decide to do so or to enter into a similar arrangement. The non-nuclear-weapon States which belong to military alliances including nuclear-weapon States or which have nuclear weapons stationed on their territories will have to concede that their special situation would require special arrangements and conditions. The Nigerian proposals do not constitute a panacea. They do not pretend to answer all the questions, but they should reactivate in a concrete manner the steps towards setting up an internationally binding agreement to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against most non-nuclear-weapon States. Having said that, may I say that, as the base of my assignment in Geneva and Switzerland will soon come to an end, I would like to take the opportunity to say a few words about our work here over the last three years; I will be extremely brief. The Nigerian delegation believes that the problems of this Conference are well known to all the delegations. Our positions have been well elaborated and comprehensively enunciated in the past and I would not intend to go into all of them. I would only say that during this period, three years, the Conference on Disarmament has certainly provided a valuable forum for the major military actors and other countries to state their positions. The Conference has succeeded in keeping the subject of disarmament alive and served as a pressure group which has had the desired influence on the attitude of the main military rivals in their current multilateral and bilateral negotiations.

There is nothing original in my saying that the Conference on Disarmament has achieved little that is conclusive over the last three years, but we should not take that to mean that the areas of usefulness of the Conference which I have just enumerated are in any way eroded. The Conference must continue to do what it can. It must continue to enlighten international

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

public opinion. It must continue to prevent the total bilateralization of the urgent disarmament issues which have grave consequences for all States. It must continue to search its own mind for the best way to accomplish its enormous tasks.

As I leave Geneva, I would like to say how much I have enjoyed my work in this Conference and how much I have benefited from interaction with all the distinguished Ambassadors here. I thank you all for your support, understanding and friendship. I wish you all well and I look forward to working with you again in other forums in the interests of international peace and harmony.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I am sure that the Conference agrees with me in wishing him success in his future assignment. Nigeria has contributed immensely right from the start of this Conference 25 years ago and it is with great regret that we see the Ambassador go. I am sure he will be succeeded by an important and very helpful member of his delegation to this Conference. I wish him luck and good success.

I now give the floor to my last speaker for today, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, to those of us who, like myself, had the opportunity to appreciate your pertinent qualities and your sound knowledge in the matter of disarmament during your earlier participation as representative of Ethiopia in the work of this negotiating multilateral body, it is a source of profound satisfaction to see you presiding now over our deliberations and to offer you the unreserved co-operation of the Mexican delegation for the success of your important duties.

We should by the same token like to take this opportunity to reiterate our congratulations to your precedessors, the distinguished representatives of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi, and of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, who so skillfully presided over the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the months of June and April respectively. Finally, my delegation, Mr. President, endorses what you have just said concerning the forthcoming departure of the distinguished representative of Nigeria, our esteemed colleague, Ambassador Tonwe.

A little over 15 years ago, on 10 April 1972, in London, Moscow and Washington, the Convention designed to eliminate biological and toxin weapons was opened for signature. In its preamble, the States parties to that instrument placed on record their conviction that the agreement enshrined in it represented only a first step towards the achievement of another, much broader agreement which was to be defined in article IX of the Convention in the following terms, and I quote:

> "Each State party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development,

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes".

This is a difficult task to which our Conference has justifiably devoted a good part of its time. Thanks to everyone's devotion since, in 1984, we decided for the first time to give the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons an authentic negotiating mandate, the pace of its work has risen appreciably and the political will of its members has enabled obstacles that appeared insurmountable to be overcome. Considerable progress was achieved in 1985 and 1986, when the work of the Committee was led by Ambassadors Turbanski and Cromartie respectively, to whom I should like to express my delegation's sincere gratitude for the work done. At the same time, as regards the second of them, I should like to express how grieved we were to hear the news of his forthcoming retirement for health reasons.

We are now entering a decisive stage in our negotiations, one that has rightly been described as crucial for the success of our work. Hence, it is a source of particular satisfaction for my delegation that the job of presiding over this has fallen to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, who already gave proof of his exceptional diplomatic skill when he occupied the same post in 1984.

To achieve the ambitious goal we have set ourselves, we have decided that the scope of the convention should be as broad as possible. Consequently, we have identified seven basic activities which would be prohibited: the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons. In addition to these, we have included the obligation for current possessors to destroy their chemical weapons arsenals as well as the facilities that produced them, thus giving the convention its nature as an authentic instrument of disarmament. There is general agreement concerning these categorical provisions, which is something that my delegation has welcomed with the greatest satisfaction.

In an attempt to cover all possible situations and taking into account the scope of the subject-matter at hand, an effort has been made to draw up all-embracing definitions. Thus, by chemical weapons are meant not only munitions and means of delivery, but also substances which pose a risk for the objectives of the convention, excluding substances produced for permitted purposes in quantities compatible with the ends for which they will be used.

When the convention enters into force -- something we hope will not take too long -- the States parties will have to tell the international authority whether they possess or do not possess chemical weapons and production facilities. The possessors will then have as their first duty to provide data in respect of their arsenals. My delegation deems it essential in this respect that the State should describe the location of chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control so that the accuracy of its declaration can be checked in situ. That is why we welcome the recent Soviet decision to agree to give the location of their arsenals and, while we understand that this involves delicate matters of national security, we hope that the State which still believes that it is not appropriate to provide this information will reconsider its position in the near future.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Once the characteristics of the arsenals are known, the basic obligation that the draft convention imposes on their owners is to destroy them. A period of 10 years is proposed for the total destruction of the chemical weapons currently in existence. My delegation has carefully considered the reasons that have been set forth to justify the length of that period, such as the capacity of destruction facilities and the precautions that will have to be taken to preserve the environment, but, despite that, it believes that the efforts to shorten that period as far as possible should continue. It seems to us excessive to have to wait at least 10 long years after the convention comes into force for the risk of a chemical war to disappear.

There is no agreement as yet on the order of destruction, a matter which is under negotiation by the main possessors of chemical weapons. As a position of principle, my delegation would like to place on record that it would prefer it if destruction began with the most dangerous weapons, so as to do away speedily with the greatest danger, and the least lethal were left till last. Unfortunately, this view is not shared by the possessors of chemical weapons, who want to keep intact until the very last minute their capacity to use the most toxic of such arms. We hope that they will reconsider this attitude, which seems to us a selfish one, and that they will give thought to the fact that confidence in the future convention depends largely on the rapid disappearance of the most significant arsenals.

We regret that it has not yet been possible to reach an agreement on production facilities. We know that the delegations concerned are continuing to hold intensive consultations on this delicate matter, and we hope that very soon they will be able to submit to us the solution they have agreed upon.

I shall now turn to two questions which, in view of their importance, will be crucial to the success of our work: I refer to what is termed "non-production" and to all that relates to verification.

As I said a moment ago, one of the paramount objectives of the convention we are now negotiating is to prevent the manufacture of chemical weapons in future. To achieve this objective, it will be inevitable to impose certain controls on civilian industry, including some restrictions on industries producing substances that might be diverted to prohibited purposes. This is something which will undoubtedly affect all States parties, whether they are possessors or not possessors of chemical weapons, developed countries or developing countries, and it has therefore been playing a preponderant role in our discussions for some time.

The substances of interest have been divided into three basic categories in keeping with the risk they entail. On the basis of this classification, a number of verification systems involving measures of varying stringency have been devised. Thus, the production of substances in schedule 1 -- mostly neurotoxic agents -- in amounts exceeding one tonne per year will be prohibited; the manufacture of compounds in schedule 2 -- key precursors -- will be subject to a strict régime of international inspections to avoid their diversion for prohibited purposes; and, finally, the production and use of the substances in schedule 3 -- those that could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons but are employed on a large scale for legitimate peaceful activities -- will have to be declared as precisely as possible to the international authority.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

To complete this system, we must consider the problem posed by the "commercial super-toxics", in other words, the highly toxic substances that are used in civilian industry, for instance, in the pharmaceutical branch and in the production of pesticides. It would appear necessary to set up for them a special category, one distinct from the three already established, in order to deal with them adequately. However, the differences of opinion that exist concerning the compounds that could be considered and the type of measures that would be applied to them have precluded our finding a solution to this issue -- which, as all parties to the negotiations recognize, is both necessary and urgent.

We all know that the present schedules cannot be exhaustive or definitive. Their first review will take place when States possessing chemical weapons declare the composition of their arsenals to the international authority. Maybe these will include chemicals which have not been considered in the course of negotiations; consideration will then have to be given to the incorporation of those substances in the schedules. Later on, if we want the convention to keep its full force, periodic updating of the schedules in the light of the progress of science and technology will be inevitable. That is why the importance has been recognized of a flexible, expeditious and reliable mechanism for this purpose. It will thus be possible to include a new chemical in the schedules, to withdraw it from them or to shift it from one schedule to another. We have worked to this end during this session and progress has been satisfactory.

My delegation considers that appropriate verification machinery is essential if an international disarmament agreement is to function effectively for all its parties. The convention on chemical weapons, of course, does not elude this general rule. Ambitious in its objectives, the draft which is now being drawn up also establishes a very broad system of verification designed to guarantee full compliance with all its provisions.

An independent international body created by the convention itself would be responsible for these very delicate tasks. This seems to us an optimum solution for ensuring the credibility of the instrument. As you will all recall, that was the course chosen by the Latin American States when, over 20 years ago, they negotiated the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the functioning of the body that was set up has been entirely satisfactory.

The problems posed by the verification of the numerous obligations the convention will impose are obviously considerable. To guarantee, on the one hand, that chemical weapons will not be produced in future and that prohibited activities will not be carried out, while taking into account, on the other hand, the protection of trade secrets and the need not to interfere excessively in national civilian activities makes the design of appropriate verification machinery even more difficult. We are all aware of the great difficulties this involves and we must strive to resolve them. Some sacrifices will be inevitable for the sake of the greater interest.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The main body will be a consultative committee made up of all the States parties. As it is hoped that the convention will have the greatest possible number of adherents, it will not be easy for the committee to take expeditious decisions and to intervene rapidly and effectively in case of crisis. Consequently, it will be necessary to establish a subsidiary body of the committee, of limited membership and called the executive council, which will be formally subordinate to the committee and will discharge all its functions while the committee is not in session.

Serious differences of opinion have arisen in regard to the composition of the executive council. My delegation believes that the only valid criterion for the selection of the members of that body is that of equitable political and geographical distribution. Using this method, as happens in the case of other bodies in the United Nations family, each group will freely select its representatives, taking account of the parameters it deems appropriate.

As for the difficult problem of decision-making, my delegation inclines in favour of adopting the simple and unambiguous procedure of a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. We believe that to demand consensus would seriously hinder the work of the committee and the council as it would give each of the parties a right of veto that it could exercise at any time, to the detriment of the proper functioning of the convention.

The international verification machinery that is going to be entrusted to the consultative committee and its subsidiary bodies contains two elements that will ensure its full effectiveness: on the one hand, a system of declarations and routine inspections that seeks to be as complete as possible and, on the other, a "safety net" for use only in exceptional cases -- challenge inspection -- designed to remedy possible deficiencies in the normal procedure.

In our negotiations, emphasis was, quite justifiably, placed on building a system with no loopholes, a mechanism that would give everybody full confidence that the provisions of the convention were being observed. A whole series of measures to be applied to the activities of States parties has been designed for this purpose, ranging from permanent verification of destruction of arsenals to systematic inspections, without prior notice, of civilian production facilities. My delegation is fully in favour of a strict régime in order effectively to guarantee the complete disappearance of the chemical threat.

"Challenge inspection" constitutes the essential complement to the routine system. My delegation sees such inspection as an exceptional event prompted by serious doubts about compliance with the convention that have not been dispelled through normal channels. In view of the political damage that it will inevitably cause, we do not believe that it will be frequent. However, we do consider that a State's right to request such inspection if it feels it to be necessary must not be limited.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

It has not been possible to reach agreement on reasonable procedures for challenge inspection. The excessive demands of some -- the immediate opening of facilities -- together with the excessive hesitancy of others -- the subjecting of inspection to the consent of the receiving State -- have prevented the finding of an intermediate position that could satisfy one and all. For its part, my delegation remains convinced that the text drawn up in the intensive consultations held by the chairman of the relevant working group last year and which could not even be included in the Committee's report because of the opposition of one delegation constitutes an excellent negotiating basis since it contains realistic proposals and limits to the minimum the possibilities of refusing an inspection.

This is a crucial year in the preparatory work for the convention. We regret that two States members of the Conference, the United States and France, recently deemed it appropriate to take the decision to add new devices of mass destruction to those they already possess, at a time when the negotiations on the convention, in which they play a dominant role, are in their final phase.

As a State which does not possess chemical weapons, Mexico attaches great importance to the conclusion of the convention, which will definitively eliminate this lethal category of weapons of destruction. As we always try to do in similar cases, this interest of ours has been proven through facts, such as the fact that, despite our delegation's being one of the smallest accredited to the Conference on Disarmament, one of its members has this year been devoting almost all his efforts to performing the task of co-ordinator of one of the three working groups that makes up the basic structure established by the Committee in 1985. We have been doing so because we are convinced of the need to step up our efforts in order to be able to transmit to the General Assembly as soon as possible an agreement as important as the convention, whose purpose is forever to eliminate chemical weapons, undoubtedly will be. Let us hope that, in the coming year, our efforts, which began so many years ago in this negotiating body, which then bore the title of Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, will be crowned with success.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. This exhausts the list of speakers for today, unless we have someone else? I recognize the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, I should like to welcome the contribution that the distinguished Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Comrade Nguyen Di Nien, made to our work by his statement. I also take note of the statement made this morning by the distinguished Minister of State of the United Kingdom, Mr. David Mellor, and it is in connection with it that I have asked for the floor. Before making my comments on that subject, I should also like to express my best wishes to the Ambassador of Nigeria, Ambassador Tonwe, who is leaving us, and to the retiring Ambassador of the United Kingdom, Mr. Cromartie.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

I do not intend to comment on the whole of Mr. Mellor's statement; I will merely limit myself to a few general remarks. The Minister of State of the United Kingdom called upon us to match words and deeds. In itself, that is correct: words and deeds should match. But I think that Mr. Mellor addressed his call in this connection to what is clearly the wrong quarter. Indeed, there is no shortage of fine words, and Mr. Mellor demonstrated that today in his statement, but what we really need is to transform these fine words into the corresponding action.

The Minister of State of the United Kingdom reminded us of the fact that NATO had declared that it would not have recourse to any of its types of weapons except in response to an attack. We can only welcome that attitude. As you know, there is a similar provision in the military doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty too. However, behind this NATO slogan there is something entirely different from what we propose. Behind these fine words uttered by the West we see the continuing accumulation of all these types of armaments. As a result, the danger of war increases and stability deteriorates.

Apart from the provision to the effect that they will not use their armaments except in response to an attack, the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty States contains other provisions, including that concerning the non-first use of nuclear weapons. I would like to remind you that these are not simply words, but a commitment that the Soviet Union has already taken upon itself -- a unilateral commitment.

Now let us take the question of banning tests, to which the Minister of State of the United Kingdom also gave a certain amount of attention. The question of testing is at present being linked by the Western Powers both with nuclear disarmament and with the reduction of conventional weapons, so that this question -- one of the top priority, most important questions -- is being transferred into the category of long-term objectives. I think that such deeds do not match the words which we hear so often on the matter.

Mr. Mellor also referred to the question of Afghanistan. I must state in this connection that our words and deeds match completely. We have already withdrawn six regiments from Afghanistan and will recall our entire military contingent from there as soon as possible. But the solution of this problem requires reciprocity from the United States and from Afghanistan's neighbours; it requires international efforts too. The process of national reconciliation is proceeding in Afghanistan and must not be impeded.

Mr. Mellor referred to the statement made by General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev at the Moscow Forum, and in particular to his words to the effect that, where there is inequality in any elements, we must redress the situation, not through a build-up by the one who is behind, but through a build-down by the one who is in front. He welcomed these words and said they must be transformed into action. That is a question on which I would particularly like to dwell.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The question is truly an important one -- how to transform words into deeds. Words can be used to criticize each other ad infinitum. Words are an expression of intent. To transform them into deeds requires agreement. The achievement of agreement, in its turn, requires dialogue. And we do propose this dialogue, but regrettably, we do not always -- we far from always -- receive a positive response. This is also happening with the words of General Secretary Gorbachev to which the United Kingdom Minister of State referred. With a view to transforming these words into concrete deeds, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have proposed to the NATO member States the holding of consultations to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances and, in the document on this subject which was adopted in Berlin, it is stated, and I quote, "Other possible subjects for the consultations are the existing imbalances and assymetrical levels that have emerged in certain categories of armaments and armed forces, as well as the search for ways to eliminate them through a reduction by the side which has an advantage over the other, on the understanding that these reductions lead to ever lower levels". Thus, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are proposing a concrete way to transform words into deeds. But -- as I have just said, regrettably -- we have not received the NATO countries' consent to the holding of such consultations. I think that it is time for us to move from mutual reproaches to a mutual dialogue on all aspects of arms limitation and disarmament. Only such a dialogue, and not mutual reproaches, can lead us to measures, deeds, that will strengthen general security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union for his comments. Are there any further speakers who wish to take the floor today? I see none.

Before I adjourn the plenary meeting, I should like to recall that the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet immediately afterwards in this conference room. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 16 July, at 10 a.m. After that plenary meeting and in accordance with the timetable for meetings to be held this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at noon.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.422
16 July 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 July 1987 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)

GE.87-62813/9649E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 422nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

To begin with, I should like to welcome, on behalf of the Conference, a distinguished visitor: we have among us today the Director-General of International Security and Disarmament Affairs of Spain, Ambassador Carlos Miranda, who is addressing the Conference at this plenary meeting. This is his first visit to the multilateral disarmament negotiating body since he took up his important functions and I wish to thank him for the interest that he shows in our work.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure however, any member wishing to do so may take the floor on any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Spain and Mexico. I have pleasure in giving the floor to the first speaker, the Director-General of International Security and Disarmament Affairs, Ambassador Carlos Miranda.

Mr. CARLOS MIRANDA Y ELIO (Spain) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first of all I should like to thank you both for the very warm welcome just extended to me and for this opportunity to speak in this Council chamber dedicated to the Spaniard Francisco de Vittoria. Permit me to congratulate you on your appointment as President of the Conference on Disarmament for this month and to express the hope that under your expert guidance we can continue making progress towards our common objectives. At this Conference, observer delegations generally do not speak in the plenary as frequently as its members and we lack the opportunity to greet and congratulate all the distinguished persons who have occupied or will be occupying the Chair during the many months in the year that it meets; permit me, therefore, to express my gratitude for the efforts of your predecessors in the Chair and to pledge our full co-operation to your successors.

Not long ago, the Spanish observer at this Conference, Ambassador Lacleta, announced the decision of the Spanish Government to take the necessary steps for Spain to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; at that time reference was made to the Spanish Government's security and disarmament policy. I have the pleasure to be in your midst today precisely for the purpose of setting forth, albeit briefly, our views on this subject in the context of the items appearing in the programme of work of this Conference. I am pleased to be doing so at a time when the disarmament process seems to be receiving a truly important impetus in the bilateral negotiations between the two major military Powers of our age and when there is also a chance of this Conference entering the final phase of a new and very necessary multilateral contribution aimed at achieving the elimination from the face of the Earth of an entire category of extremely cruel weapons of mass destruction -- chemical weapons.

Spain's interest in, and concern with disarmament problems -- which are of long standing -- have been given new impetus in the past few years through a series of measures of which at this time I shall, at the risk of being

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

immodest, mention only one, that is the establishment of the newest General Directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Directorate of International Security and Disarmament Affairs, which I have the honour and responsibility to head.

Security and disarmament are intimately linked. Thus, while it is true that disarmament which is balanced in its results and achieved through agreements compliance with which can be rapidly and effectively verified must help to enhance security, it is also true that we cannot progress on disarmament at the sacrifice of the necessary security, that is, the possibility of defence in case of attack, or the capacity to deter a potential aggressor.

According to paragraph 19 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, our ultimate objective is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. But until it becomes possible to reach that ultimate objective, arms limitation and reduction agreements can, and must, prevent arms races by maintaining security at the lowest possible level of armaments and in an equilibrium deterring all tendency to aggression. Since the end of the Second World War the balancing capacity of nuclear weapons seems to have guaranteed that deterrence, since the surplus of power of those weapons and their capacity to generate a threat of total destruction are what enable us to dispense with determining other, far more delicate balances.

But the highest authorities of the two major military Powers of our time, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, declared in November 1985, in this very city, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. We must draw the conclusions that follow from that assertion, which we all share: we must make that war impossible and the only way to make it impossible is, ultimately, the disappearance of nuclear weapons.

Now then, on the path leading towards that goal it is necessary to bear in mind the essential considerations of balance and security. This can only be achieved in a gradual process that takes account not only of nuclear weapons, but also of all other weapons, including chemical weapons, and conventional weapons, within the context of global consideration of that balance and, obviously, bearing in mind the fact that the equalizing factor should in principle not be an increase in the strength of the party that is at a disadvantage at a given time or in a given category of weapons, but rather a reduction in principle of the forces of the party that is in the situation of superiority.

In this respect, it must be pointed out that the term "balance" does not of itself ensure security or peace. A "balance", be it nuclear or conventional, at the high levels of forces that are now current and without having proceeded to the elimination of all possibility of a surprise or mass attack is not enough. That is why this term has to be qualified, complemented by the expression "at lower levels of forces". It is then when we reach conventional stability at lower levels, with no possibility of mass or surprise attacks, that nuclear armaments will begin to lose their meaning. If we want, and I think we do want, to make progress in the nuclear disarmament process, we must also strive to make progress in the conventional field.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

In this connection, I should like to refer for a moment, to the informal and exploratory discussions for the drawing up of a mandate on conventional stability that are currently taking place in Vienna between 23 countries of those participating in the CSCE process. These discussions must be viewed in the light of the context of the process that began with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and of the adoption at the Stockholm Conference in 1986 of a whole series of measures to enhance security and confidence. May I be permitted here to point to the essential link between the confidence represented by these measures and the discussions, which have as their final goal the adoption of disarmament measures: without a minimum basis of prior confidence, it is unthinkable to make progress in the field of disarmament proper. As regards the discussions to which I am referring, I should like to emphasize that they involve the 23 States which, in view of the existence of two political-military alliances, undoubtedly have major responsibility in the matters affecting the security of this continent. Last Friday, 3 July, Portugal submitted a proposal on questions of security in the CSCE that was also sponsored by 15 other countries, among them Spain, participating in the Conference. This proposal contemplates the holding of two distinct sets of negotiations, but both within the context of the process of the CSCE: one to expand on and deepen the confidence-building measures adopted in Stockholm and possibly to adopt new such measures; the other to achieve conventional stability in Europe at lower levels of forces, and which would take place among those countries whose forces have the most immediate impact on the essential security relationship in Europe.

Let us now turn back to the subject of nuclear disarmament. In this process, the special responsibility of the major military Powers and the importance of their bilateral relations cannot be disregarded. But that reality should not lead us to conclude that the Conference on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body in this matter, should confine itself to awaiting the outcome of bilateral agreements between these Powers. The Conference on Disarmament has its own agenda and, without disregarding the limitations imposed on it by reality, it should face up to its own responsibilities. May I then say that in our view the Conference on Disarmament should include in its agenda all the topics appearing on its programme. At present, we are especially concerned about the fact that, except to the extent to which it is included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament -- and we should like to congratulate Ambassador García Robles for his unstinting efforts at the head of the Ad hoc Committee dealing with that programme -- the Conference on Disarmament has not studied item 4 of this programme, conventional weapons, for, despite its peculiarities in various geographical zones, conventional disarmament constitutes an essential aspect of the overall disarmament equation.

It is not just that conventional weapons are the weapons to have been used in all the armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War, and it is not just that 80 per cent of the huge sums spent on armaments throughout the world are devoted to the perfecting or procurement of conventional weapons. It is, rather, that the reduction of conventional armaments or, to put it better, a reduction in such armaments that was balanced as to its results would facilitate the reduction, or increase the possibility of our one day achieving the disappearance of nuclear weapons. And I must add that it

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

was prudent and far-sighted to agree that, as paragraph 22 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament states, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level -- a statement that is, moreover, confirmed in paragraphs 45 and 46, in chapter III, of the Document with regard to the Programme of Action.

The Spanish Government has repeatedly declared its intention to keep Spain as a non-nuclear country, an intention which, moreover, is in keeping with a popular decision expressed through a referendum. So far Spain has been a non-nuclear country de facto. Soon now, before the end of this year, with the deposit of the instrument of Spain's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, concerning which the Government already has the unanimous approval of Congress and matters are in hand for the Senate to give its approval after the summer, once the parliamentary recess is over, when we will then deposit this instrument of accession, our country will renounce in international law the acquisition of nuclear weapons. That will also strengthen the ban, which was approved by the referendum of 12 March 1986, on the installation, stockpiling or introduction of nuclear weapons within Spanish territory and will dispel all possible suspicion that Spain has not renounced turning itself into a nuclear Power. In this connection, I should like to add that Spain hopes that in this field it will be subject to the same régime as the non-nuclear countries of the European Community that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

With reference to the first item on the agenda of this Conference, it cannot be a surprise to anyone that my country, which is a contracting party to the Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests, is also decisively in favour of the conclusion of a treaty totally banning nuclear tests. In keeping with that desire, we are pleased at the successive Soviet moratoria and we regret their recent interruption.

We also regret that this Conference has not yet been able to establish an ad hoc committee entrusted with considering in all their aspects the banning of nuclear tests and the problems of verification involved in the total prohibition as well as in the limitation of testing. On the other hand, it is with great interest and hope that we are following the current negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which, we hope, will pave the way for a gradual advance towards the final objective through the acceptance of a progressive reduction of the number and yield of the tests carried out.

It is obvious that there is also a link between the implementation of certain nuclear tests and the fact that these weapons remain an element of deterrence. I have referred to this matter before and I must point out that my Government is aware of the role played by nuclear weapons, but at the same time we also believe that that deterrence can be maintained and general strategic stability can be improved by undertaking gradual, significant, balanced and verifiable reductions in the nuclear weapons currently deployed and that as a first step towards the ultimate goal of their final elimination.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

Consequently, it is with great hopes that we view the development of the negotiating process between the United States and the Soviet Union that is taking place here in Geneva and will, we hope, because we consider success is necessary, enable the medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe to be eliminated rapidly and, if that is possible and, in addition, desirable -- because it is -- totally, without any missile of that description remaining in the Asian part of the USSR or in the United States. Similarly, it is necessary to realize the prospects that exist for a 50 per cent reduction of Soviet and United States strategic nuclear arsenals by signing a treaty to this end as soon as possible. We mean that both things should, if possible, be signed this year.

So far I have referred to matters relating to items 1, 2 and 8 of the Conference's agenda. I shall add a few words in the context of item 3, for the consideration of which, as of items 1 and 2, it has not yet been possible to establish an ad hoc committee, something we regret because item 3 also deserves special development. It is true that the prevention of nuclear war appears to be a broad question and one related moreover to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear testing, but it also has other specific facets. In our view, it is hardly conceivable that a war could be exclusively nuclear from the outset -- except in the case, which unfortunately cannot be ruled out, of a war that began accidentally: the degree of sophistication of the systems involved and the brief span of time that would be left for direct intervention by officials make it impossible to discard that hypothesis. In any case, we are convinced that the best way to prevent nuclear war is to forestall, to prevent all war. Once again, we see the inescapable link between nuclear and conventional armaments and the danger there would be in the beginning of a conventional war between nuclear Powers that could turn into a nuclear conflict of universal consequences.

I am pleased to express our satisfaction at the progress now being achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It is well known that Spain does not possess such weapons today and does not wish to possess them and that it is in favour of the completion as soon as possible of a treaty prohibiting not only the use but also the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons and imposing the destruction of those that already exist.

The 1925 Protocol, to which Spain is a contracting party and which meant a large step in the right direction, none the less reserves the possibility of possessing chemical weapons and the legitimacy of their use as a reprisal. And, although these arms were not used in the Second World War, we have seen with indignation that they have been used in other conflicts, and especially in the conflict raging today between Iraq and Iran. Consequently, only the radical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of these weapons will be an absolute guarantee of the impossibility of their use. Of course, a treaty of this kind requires in its turn rigorous procedures for verifying that its terms are being respected by all its parties and also requires universal participation and, first and foremost, the participation of the great military Powers.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

Consequently, my country is in favour of rapid, effective and sure verification systems and we believe that the necessary efforts should be made to resolve the greatest problem still outstanding: in our view, the problem of challenge inspection, whether in the case of chemical weapons storage facilities or in the case of production facilities. We welcome the favourable disposition that has been shown in the area of principles and we hope that it will swiftly be transformed into texts that will ensure the necessary rapidity and effectiveness in the functioning of this final "safety net" in the implementation of the future convention. We continue to believe that the proposal by the United Kingdom in document CD/715 provides an excellent basis for this work.

As you know, our delegation is participating actively to that end in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, where, of course it is still necessary to resolve other detailed questions, such as those of the schedules of chemicals to be subject to various verification procedures, the declaration of arsenals, obsolete weapons, the order of destruction, the institutional systems, and also the sanctions or measures to be adopted in the event of proven violations of the future convention. And I should like to stress that, if the possibility of reprisals is excluded, it will be essential to guarantee absolutely that the convention will be respected.

In connection with the order of destruction of existing chemical weapons, the Spanish delegation has submitted a working paper whose purpose is to achieve a reduction through "equal gradients of risk" of each chemical in each annual destruction period, taking as a basis for computation the median lethal dose or the median incapacitating dose, which are the most significant parameters in the military utilization of chemical weapons. On that basis, the equivalent masses of risk of each chemical can be determined, which enables a comparison to be made of the chemicals to be destroyed, or the substances to be replaced when that is necessary because of imperatives relating to the handling of stocks, the capacity of the destruction facility, or any other considerations, including political considerations, that make it advisable to have a solid basis of comparison. Our proposal is compatible with others and we would be prepared to study any combinations capable of yielding the desired result. However, we must point out as of now that we do not deem it desirable to establish provisions designed to permit, even temporarily, chemical rearmament in order to achieve a new equilibrium which today does not exist or provisions that would imply an invitation to countries which today do not possess chemical weapons to acquire them.

I should now like to devote a brief comment to agenda item 5, the prevention of the arms race in outer space. In an agreement recently approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Parliament, it is declared that Spain advocates disarmament measures which, while preserving the necessary levels of security and stability, will reverse the arms race on Earth and prevent its extension into outer space. I am not going to discuss the question whether there are armaments deployed in outer space or not, but we do believe that there is no doubt that outer space is already being used for military purposes. In many cases, this utilization, even though it is military, has stabilizing, and hence advantageous consequences. However, we are also convinced that the legal rules applicable in outer space are inadequate to guarantee that space weapons will not be installed there.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

My Government has grave doubts that new systems of weapons, whether space- or Earth-based, that are designed to destroy space objects can contribute to creating greater stability or security. Much the opposite, we believe that such systems of armaments would inevitably initiate a new race, this time in space, with the consequential weakening of strategic stability. This, of course, a question where the main responsibility devolves on the two major military Powers. Spain has already expressed in other fora, and I reiterate it here, its support for the view that these two countries should comply with the ABM Treaty in the terms in which it has been interpreted so far, and that any other interpretation must be agreed by the contracting parties and be without detriment to strategic stability and security. Consequently, we are in principle opposed to any deployment of strategic defences, be they based in space or on Earth, without an agreement in this connection and without taking account of European interests.

Given the inadequacy of the existing legal order, which only specifically prohibits the deployment in space or on celestial bodies of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, we are concerned first and foremost about the development of anti-satellite weapons and we are pleased that the United States Congress has not authorized testing of this type of weapon against real targets, and that Soviet testing in this regard has ceased. In this situation, we think that an agreement should be possible and that it is necessary to study the possible machinery for the verification of compliance with that agreement, a subject of whose difficulties we are not unaware.

We are pleased that an Ad hoc Committee has been re-established which is to complete the consideration of the diverse and difficult problems linked to the necessity of preventing an arms race in outer space. Likewise, we are pleased at the resumption of work on agenda item 6 and we have taken note with great interest of document CD/768 submitted by the distinguished delegation of Nigeria, which we believe offers an excellent basis for the discussion of the assurances that States not possessing nuclear weapons ought to obtain against the use or the threat of use of these weapons.

We are also pleased that the Ad hoc Committee dealing with agenda item 7, new types of weapons of mass destruction, that is radiological weapons, is continuing its work. On this matter I shall confine myself to saying that, in our view, the two questions at issue -- the prohibition of radiological weapons and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities -- are very distinct questions linked only by a common characteristic, namely the consequences for human lives and the environment of the dispersion of radioactive substances. But the treaty mechanisms need to be so different that, in our opinion, the trend towards separating the study of the two items within the Ad hoc Committee is correct although that study can continue simultaneously.

I have already referred in earlier passages in my statement to the comphrehensive programme for disarmament and I made what is, to our mind, a fundamental point concerning the priority items. I shall not repeat what I have already said and I shall confine myself now to expressing my hope that there will be expeditious completion of a document which should be submitted no later than the forthcoming third General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

As you know, Spain does not possess nuclear weapons in its territory, neither its own nor those of third parties. Nor does it possess chemical weapons or any other type of weapon of mass destruction. In the programme of peace and security as submitted by the President of the Spanish Government to Parliament in 1984, a specific item devoted to disarmament was contemplated. Also, the interest with which the Spanish people follow subjects related to security and disarmament is great and is growing day by day, constituting in terms of the public opinion that is so important in parliamentary democracies, such as that of Spain, a considerable element in the resolve of the Spanish Government to progress in these fields.

Lastly, I should like to refer, even if only briefly, to the significant role that the Conference on Disarmament has been playing throughout its history and to the importance that Spain attaches to its work. We believe that it is precisely this importance and significance which make it advisable that States wishing to take part in its work should, as far as possible, be able to do so. In this connection, Spain hopes that the question of the forthcoming expansion, which today is blocked, will be resolved as soon as possible and it would also like to reiterate here and now, once again, its interest in becoming, and resolve to become a part of this Conference as a fully fledged member as soon as possible. Its political demographic, economic and also military importance more than warrant this aspiration.

It is true that disarmament and military deterrence are not sufficient goals to guarantee the peace and security of humanity: détente, the search for peaceful solutions to conflict and the defence of human rights are imperative needs and consequently also constitute a basic guideline in my country's foreign policy. It is true that these questions go beyond the sphere of competence of this Conference, but the contribution that the Conference can make through the adoption of agreements containing disarmament measures that are equitable, balanced in their results and verifiable is an element of vital importance to progress in the relationship between disarmament and détente, such that we can be confident that peace and security will be guaranteed to our generation and to coming generations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Spain for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my delegation subscribes with particular pleasure to the words of welcome you addressed to Mr. Carlos Miranda, the Director-General for International Security and Disarmament Affairs of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Spain. I should also like to thank Mr. Miranda for the very kind reference he has made to my modest contribution to the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament.

On 3 December last year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by the overwhelming majority of 135 votes in favour resolution 41/46 A. which is entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". In that resolution, the international community's most representative body recalled inter alia that "the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

more than 30 years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority" and stressed that "on eight different occasions it has condemned such tests in the most strongest terms" and that since 1974 it has stated its conviction that their continuation "will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war". In the same resolution the General Assembly, after reiterating "once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States", appealed "to all States Members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular to the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Profileration of Nuclear Weapons, to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1987 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions".

The delegation of Mexico, along with the delegations of the countries which were the most active in promoting in New York the adoption of resolution 41/46 A to which I referred a minute ago, has tried since the beginning of the work of the Conference for 1987 to implement the recommendation of the General Assembly. Regrettably, that was not possible in what we call the spring session, nor has it been possible in what there has been so far of the summer session, which is going to end very soon, as is the session for this year.

Consequently, these delegations, the delegations of Indonesia, Kenya, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico, have decided jointly to sponsor the draft mandate which has just been circulated today and whose first paragraph faithfully reflects what was agreed by the Assembly since the Conference would, through that paragraph, establish "an Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of its agenda with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty". I shall venture to open a brief parenthesis here to say that, in the translation into Spanish of the English original of this document, which bears the symbol CD/772, a few errors have been made in paragraph 1; consequently, the secretariat is going to circulate a new version of this draft.

We venture to hope that the objective study of this draft and its comparison to those circulated between 1984 and now will highlight its constructive spirit and its flexibility, which allows for interpretations that are not in conflict with any of the points of view which can legitimately be maintained in connection with this matter, a matter to which the Assembly has quite rightly been giving the highest priority and which also takes pride of place on the agenda of our Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there is any other speaker who wishes to take the floor? I see none.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

I now turn to the timetable of meetings for the next week which has been circulated by the secretariat. As usual, it is merely indicative and is subject to change if necessary. Chairmen of subsidiary bodies were consulted in its preparation. If I see no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

I have one announcement to make. At the request of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, I wish to inform the Conference of a change in the announcement appearing in the timetable for this week. The meeting scheduled for tomorrow, Friday, 17 July, at 3 p.m. will be preceded by a short meeting of the Ad hoc Committee chaired by Ambassador Meiszter and immediately afterwards the meeting of Contact Group A will be held as envisaged in the timetable. In conformity with the timetable for this week, may I recall that we shall hold immediately after this plenary meeting an informal meeting on item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 21 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.423
21 July 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 July 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)

GE.87-62861/7307e

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 423rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure, however, any member who wishes to do so may take the floor on any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Australia, Argentina, India, Canada, New Zealand and China. I now give the floor to my first speaker for today, the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, it gives my delegation very great pleasure at seeing you occupying the Chair of this Conference. We have already deeply appreciated your guidance and we look forward to working further with you for the month of July. I must, too, express our very deep gratitude to the Ambassador of Egypt, your predecessor Ambassador Alfarargi, for the immensely skilled and capable way in which he guided our work last month.

Work towards a treaty which would ban all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time -- a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty -- has been carried out in this Conference and in its predecessor bodies for a number of years. That work has proceeded on two main fronts: the political and the technical. It is no secret that work on the political front is, in some respects, in an unsatisfactory state, but I will address that subject in a later intervention. However, work on the technical front has proceeded and proceeded well. Indeed, it has developed so positively that we Australians believe that we are on the verge of a real leap forward.

I am referring to the fact that next week the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) will reconvene in Geneva and will work towards the second global seismological monitoring experiment, an experiment which, for the first time, will include the exchange of wave-form data. This will be a remarkable and significant instance of international co-operation, not only for scientific purposes, but to demonstrate that a comprehensive nuclear test ban will be able to be verified. On the occasion of the first global experiment, 37 States participated, 75 seismological stations were linked. Clearly there will be at least a similar number on this next occasion.

In the interval between the last global experiment, in 1984, and today, work has not stood still, either nationally or in terms of international co-operation, in the field of seismological monitoring. Allow me to describe briefly Australia's own work, both nationally and in co-operation with others as an example of such continuing developments.

In view of its geographical position and because it is a large "quiet" continent in terms of background noise, Australia is particularly well placed to play a major role in seismic monitoring. This was recognized in the decision of the GSE to designate Australia as one of four International Data

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Centres (IDC) for the major network trial planned for 1988-89. The four IDCs will fulfil the requirement for the framework of the international seismic monitoring network. In 1984, the Australian Government decided, in keeping with its support for the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, to upgrade Australia's own capacity to contribute to an international seismic monitoring network. In September 1986, the Government opened the Australian Seismological Centre (ASC) in Canberra which draws together seismic information from seismic stations and arrays on the Australian continent and in Antarctica. In June 1987, the Government dedicated a new seismic array processor (ASPRO) that will provide enhanced analysis of seismic data. This system is capable of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions down to yields of a few kilotonnes at the main United States, French, Soviet and Chinese nuclear test sites and, of course, it is well known that the United Kingdom's tests are conducted at a United States site. It is our intention shortly to commence publication, on a regular basis, of an Australian Seismological Centre Bulletin which would give all details of nuclear tests monitored by the Centre. We see this among other things as in keeping with the spirit of last year's General Assembly resolution 41/59 N on the notification of nuclear tests, in which we urged all States, including the nuclear-weapon States, to comply by making available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations all information they have on time, location and yield of nuclear explosions.

Australia's own national seismic capability is derived in large measure from international co-operation: with New Zealand; with the United States, which jointly operates the recently dedicated Alice Springs Seismic Array Processor; with other countries participating in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. Our co-operation with New Zealand has now been formalized in the Australia-New Zealand Seismic Monitoring Agreement which was signed by the two Prime Ministers in Apia on 30 April this year. I have the privilege now, on behalf of the delegations of New Zealand and Australia, to circulate to members of the Conference English-language copies of that Agreement. I might mention that the Agreement is being issued by the Secretariat in all languages as document CD/775.

With respect to this Agreement between Australia and New Zealand, I would make the following main points. The Agreement complements the efforts being made in the Group of Scientific Experts, in which both Australia and New Zealand participate actively. The Agreement demonstrates the importance both countries attach to the seismic monitoring of nuclear tests. The Agreement reiterates Australia and New Zealand's strong and active commitment to the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. It demonstrates the importance we attach to early progress towards the verification régime needed to support a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, both as a necessary task to be accomplished before such a treaty can come into operation and as something the effective operation of which would in itself enhance prospects for a treaty. We believe that bilateral co-operation such as this, as well as being intrinsically positive, has a valuable demonstration effect, stimulating interest in international co-operation in seismic monitoring and, in particular, in the possibility of an international monitoring network. We hope that the Agreement will give added momentum to the conviction that the time has come for the establishment of a global seismic network.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Exactly one year ago, on 18 July 1986, I tabled in this Conference document CD/717. It is the Australian proposal for the immediate establishment of a global seismic network. A decision on this proposal was not able to be taken last year, but the proposal was noted in the records and report of the Conference. And, as already mentioned, events have moved on. The reality is that the forthcoming global experiment will for all effective purposes establish such a network for the period of the experiment. The adoption of the proposal made in CD/717 would ensure that that network was established permanently. We are asking that, before this 1987 session of the Conference concludes, the Conference adopt our proposal. It is simple, it makes sense, it is utterly consistent with the stated policy on nuclear testing of all who sit at this table. It would represent a major concrete achievement by this Conference.

Some may ask "Why do this now? or "What, at root, is at issue?" The fact is that, while various bilateral talks are proceeding, while we are talking here, while resolutions are being adopted at the Assembly, and important declarations issued elsewhere by specific groups, such as the six-country group, on the political level, it is clear that agreement to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has yet to be settled. That agreement will come, and we believe it, because it is necessary. Even those who say it is not ripe yet never say it will not come. What do we do in the meantime? Do we simply wait? Our answer is no. We believe that we should follow what is the only sensible course of action under such circumstances: build every necessary piece of this structure -- the structure of a treaty -- so that, when the last piece is ready, no time will be lost in fitting it in and in completing the treaty. It would be tragic if we were unprepared, if we were not ready when agreement comes. Building a global seismic network now will mean that we will be ready. And, by demonstrating that a comprehensive treaty can be verified, we will forge a positive interaction between the political and technical aspects of the nuclear testing problem.

A central part of that positive interaction is the signal we will send to testing States. They say verification is a problem. What does it mean to them, what does it do to political prospects, if we deny that and say, "Let's have the negotiation first and worry about verification later"? Surely it is better to respond by saying, "If you have a problem with verification, then let's fix that problem"? On a political level this would respond to seriously-expressed concerns and would answer them. The establishment of a global seismic network is precisely such a response, precisely such an answer. We should give that response this year: we should adopt the proposal outlined in CD/717.

If we had an Ad Hoc Committee under item I of our agenda, the proposal could be discussed there. But it can be discussed in the plenary, in the Group of Scientific Experts. My delegation stands ready to discuss it in any way. Let us take this step as a real advance in international co-operation, as an essential step on the path towards an end to nuclear testing and let us do it now, this year, in the name of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the President and I give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Campora.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish) Mr. President, the Argentine delegation is pleased to greet you on the occasion of your return to the Conference on Disarmament to preside over it during the current month of July. Your renewed presence here after a number of years as representative of your country gives us confidence and assurance that there will be progress in our work in the penultimate month for the 1987 session. To that end, your acknowledged experience is a firm guarantee of better results within what it is possible for us to achieve. I should also like to welcome the new representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Max L. Friedersdorf, with whom I certainly hope to entertain as close a friendship and working relationship as I had with his predecessor, Ambassador Lowitz, who remains unalterably in our affection. Unexpectedly, I find myself in the situation of simultaneously bidding farewell to Ambassador Cromartie, to whom we should like to extend our best wishes, to Ambassador Dhanapala, to whom we wish every success in his new function, and to Ambassador Tonwe, to whom we express our wish for the greatest possible professional good fortune.

The Argentine delegation has put its name on the list for today's plenary meeting in order to refer to agenda item 5, Prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Ad hoc Committee is doing the job it was mandated to do. Its deliberations are moving ahead gradually under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese, whose competence in the field is certainly up to the measure of the antecedents of Italy, a country that has been a forerunner in studies and research aimed at establishing a régime for the exploration and peaceful use of outer space. The Ad hoc Committee has already completed deliberations on the first and second items of its programme of work, which, as we know, concern respectively issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race and the legal régime established in the area of disarmament by the treaties in force.

One of the issues of greatest interest which emerged in dealing with the first item was that of determining whether outer space is currently free from the deployment of weapons. The space Powers, which are few in number, have not provided a clear-cut reply, declaring, for instance, that they have not deployed weapons permanently in outer space. We believe that the international community would be truly relieved to hear that so far there are no weapons deployed in outer space. In our view, the means to be used to inform public opinion of that situation, that is, that no weapons have been placed permanently in outer space could well be the report that the Conference on Disarmament submits to the General Assembly. It would be sufficient in that respect for the Ad hoc Committee to include a paragraph stating that none of the member States represented in the Conference on Disarmament has permanently deployed weapons in outer space. That assertion avoids the complex issue of defining what a space weapon is, since what is sought is a simple statement to the effect that the member States represented in the Conference on Disarmament have not deployed weapons of any nature or kind. It is simply a matter of asserting that there have been no weapons deployed. It would then be enough, as we have said, for such an assertion to appear in the report of the Conference on Disarmament, and we hope that none of the States

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

members of the Conference on Disarmament will refuse to include such a paragraph. A declaration to that end could well constitute the point of departure for more specific and binding initiatives in future with appropriate verification measures.

In dealing with item 2 of the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee, which concerns the legal disarmament régime which has been established in the sphere of disarmament by the multilateral treaties in force, we had occasion to witness an interesting exchange of views that has, in our opinion, clarified several aspects of the matter. Firstly, it is an accepted fact that this legal régime establishes that celestial bodies can be used for exclusively peaceful purposes and that, moreover, that régime excludes the military use of celestial bodies as well as the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and also of other weapons which are neither nuclear nor weapons of mass destruction. As regards outer space, it is accepted that it cannot be the subject of testing or deployment of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. It is also accepted that it is not permitted to place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit. Regrettably, there is no agreement on the multilateral legal régime governing outer space with respect to the testing and deployment of weapons that are neither nuclear weapons nor weapons of mass destruction.

We must say that it worries us to hear from time to time that the legal régime for outer space should draw on that for the high seas. We believe, on the contrary, that this item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament which has as its purpose the prevention of an arms race in outer space corresponds to a basic goal, which is to avoid the legal régime for outer space resembling in any way the régime for the high seas. We believe that, were we to establish a régime for outer space similar to that for the high seas, we would have failed completely in our aim of preventing an arms race in outer space. It is enough to observe the situation obtaining on seas and oceans permanently criss-crossed by military fleets equipped with all types of weapons to conclude that there could be no more deplorable picture of outer space than to conceive of it traversed by space objects of an offensive and defensive military nature such as those that travel the high seas. The phenomenon that characterizes the navel arms race must not be reproduced in space.

The Ad hoc Committee has now begun its deliberations on the third item on its programme of work, which concerns proposals and future initiatives for preventing an arms race in outer space. It is obvious that, to prevent an arms race in outer space, the first measure that must be taken is to avoid the deployment of weapons, and that requires both a binding commitment in that sense and the adoption of verification systems that will ensure compliance with that commitment. The Conference on Disarmament is giving proof within the context of other items that it is possible to draw up complex verification procedures when there is the political will necessary to reconcile the goals of disarmament with those of national security and industrial and commercial secrecy. Why should it not be possible to establish a binding régime for the registration of objects launched into space? That is very simple to do given political will. Regrettably, the space Powers wish to reserve a wide measure of freedom of action for themselves in the military use of outer space and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

prefer to keep secret the nature of the vast majority of objects that they launch into space. It is then inevitable that the secrecy of the activity of some should generate a similar attitude in others.

The 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space provides an appropriate basis of rules that can be perfected, first of all, by establishing their binding nature and then by incorporating in them verification clauses enabling it to be checked that the information recorded is reliable. The efficient operation of a register of objects launched into space and a corresponding verification system would solve a series of problems relating to the immunity of satellites intended for peaceful use, since it would be possible, as a result, to ascertain the purpose of a space object and, consequently, its right to enjoy immunity. Similar arrangements could be made for the registration of those satellites which have special functions, such as observation satellites, early-warning satellites, satellites for the purpose of monitoring compliance with disarmament agreements, etc.

There is, perhaps today, no greater focus of attention among the issues linked to the drawing up of disarmament treaties or agreements than that of verification. For almost two years now -- to be precise, since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 40/152/O relating to verification, a resolution supported by the two military alliances -- we have undoubtedly been witnessing a real diplomatic competition as to who is more enthusiastic about verification formulae. Verification is today the essential and preliminary step for any disarmament agreement. Very complex formulae are being tested in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and we are all aware too of the situation with regard to the verification of nuclear-weapon tests and to other items such as radiological weapons, negative assurances and so on. Verification in the context of the items we have mentioned should provide a solution to intricate situations such as, for instance, avoiding non-permitted production of substances within an industry as common and widely scattered as the chemical industry. None the less, gradually and with admirable creativity and imagination, verification mechanisms are being worked out.

But we cannot help feeling surprised at the fact that the analysis of the item relating to verification within the framework of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space has not been the subject of greater attention despite the fact that activity in outer space originates here on the Earth's surface in a very limited number of places. The space Powers, which are few in number, also have only a few places for launching objects into space. Verification of the nature of the objects that are placed in space could be effected at the launch sites themselves and that would entirely dispel all doubts as to the military or peaceful nature of an object sent into space. It is obvious that the implementation of monitoring and verification machinery at the bases for the launching of vehicles with cargoes of a military and strategic nature would be resisted by the respective space Powers. It can be deduced therefore that the opening of such sites for the verification, albeit only visual, of loads to be placed in orbit would require a political decision by the space Powers, aimed at achieving a certain transparency in their policy for the use of outer space. To sum up and to conclude this statement, it just remains for me to point out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space depends solely on simple acts of political will by the space Powers.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and the kind words he expressed to the chair and I give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Teja.

Mr. TEJA (India): Mr. President, permit me to take this opportunity to extend to you the felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of July. We are happy to see the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, a country with which India has maintained long-standing and historical ties of friendship and co-operation, preside over our deliberations. I should like to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation in the discharge of your responsibilities. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey our appreciation for the manner in which your predecessors, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt and Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, presided over the Conference during the months of June and April. Let me extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who have joined us, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi of Indonesia and Ambassador Max Friedersdorf of the United States of America; I look foward to working closely with them. We shall, of course, miss Ambassador Tonwe, Ambassador Cromartie, and Ambassador Dhanapala, and I would like to join others in wishing them well in whatever they may be doing. I am sure that Ambassador Tonwe, who is returning to his country, will have a very successful tour of duty in his new and important assignment. I should also like to convey our thanks, through their respective delegations, to the Governments of Canada for organizing the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and to the Government of Norway for the Holmenkollen Symposium on Chemical Weapons Convention organized in Oslo earlier this summer. These workshops were extremely useful and have helped us in generating new ideas on two of the major issues facing us in the Conference today.

I would like to devote my statement today to the subject of prevention of an arms race in outer space. This new chapter in the unending race for nuclear superiority is not only the most expensive but also potentially the most threatening to the cause of disarmament as we see it. In the Conference on Disarmament, we have a mandate to negotiate and while it is unfortunate that we have been prevented from doing so in the critical area of the nuclear arms race, it would be doubly unfortunate if we did nothing to prevent this new threat that looms over the planet.

We are aware of the diplomatic skills with which Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during 1986, addressed himself to his tasks. We are confident that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy we will be able to register substantial progress on this item during 1987.

Since 1983, there has been rapid progress in the development of anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile defence systems. Yet in our Conference, there is unfortunately little progress and the Conference seems bogged down in peripheral issues. What lends urgency to our plea for negotiations on this question is our apprehension that the pursuit of space-based defence can lead to a breach of existing arms control agreements,

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

thereby precipitating unrestrained competition and, in the process, unravelling the entire web of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, increasing the likelihood of a nuclear war, not to speak of the enormous resources deployed in this area.

The debate between offensive and defensive weapons is an old and unresolved one. I would not like to enter into a discussion of the technical possibilities and/or limitations of the ballistic missile defense systems currently being researched. It would be sufficient to note that extending the arms race into outer space will not lead us from mutually assured destruction to mutually assured survival; the only logical means to achieve that is nuclear disarmament.

The non-aligned and neutral countries have been sceptical of such theories and exposed the dangers of basing doctrines of security on the so-called logic of nuclear deterrence. We have consistently taken the position that the development of space-based weapons and arms race in outer space must be prevented. The Six-Nation Initiative has placed particular emphasis on this issue. The Delhi Declaration calls for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. The Harare Declaration adopted at the eighth non-aligned summit calls upon "the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations urgently to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension of arms race in all its aspects into outer space and thus enhance the prospects of co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space." In particular, the leaders of the non-aligned countries stressed the urgency of "halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, the dismantling of the existing systems, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapon systems into outer space in order to ensure that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances". It is clear that, once the fragile web of existing arms control arrangements begins to be unravelled and these treaties are violated, it will become progressively more difficult to undertake any constructive disarmament negotiations.

The reasoning that there does not exist a specific agreement prohibiting the introduction of a ballistic defence missile system is, in our view, no justification; the fact remains that there does exist a corpus of international law, adequate and coherent, though not comprehensive, which, if interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, cannot only prevent an arms race in outer space but also indicate the areas which require strengthening in the form of additional legal instruments to provide for a comprehensive legally-binding structure. At present, the law in relation to arms relations in outer space consists of treaty provisions. These treaties are both bilateral and multilateral, the most significant among them being the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972. The two have to be viewed against the backdrop of other agreements. Until recently there has been uniform compliance in keeping with the ultimate objective but, of late, differences of interpretation have arisen. These differences can be reconciled if we acknowledge that impartial interpretation is based upon compliance with treaty obligations in good faith.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

A number of detailed analyses have been made of the existing international legal régime. Without going into details at this stage, I should like to state that the most fundamental of these agreements is the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the "threat or use of force". The Charter, which is applicable to outer space in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty exemplifies the concept further by recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. The term "peaceful purposes" has been traditionally understood to imply non-military purposes. Until the mid-1970s, this interpretation was accepted by both the super-Powers, More recently a new, qualitatively different interpretation has been advanced by one of the space Powers, according to which peaceful purposes is defined as "non-aggressive". This is tantamount to sanctioning militarization of space. My delegation believes that the reference to the Charter of the United Nations in the Outer Space Treaty makes the interpretation of "non-aggressive" redundant. This view is also strengthened by the understanding of the Antartic Treaty, where the term "peaceful purposes" is still interpreted to imply non-military purposes.

Another significant treaty is the bilateral United States-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Certain technological developments and on-going research programmes have led to divergent opinions about the scope of this Treaty. These issues need to be resolved urgently while keeping in view the basic objective of the Treaty, and, if need be, through strengthening the provisions in the light of recent technological advances.

Semantics will lead us to involved discussions on the meaning of research and advanced research, development and testing, laboratory testing, field testing or demonstration testing, but these exercises will not be conclusive. Language is intended as a means of communication. We believe that the only valid criterion for deciding when faced with such semantics is to accept that which is compatible with the widest, broadest and universally acceptable principle of peaceful purposes, in outer space. United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/53, which was adopted with an overwhelming majority of 154 votes, refers to the activities of "exploration and use of outer space" as to be carried on "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding". Given this criterion, which, we think, we can all accept as reasonable, we feel that there need not be any dispute about interpretations of what is prohibited and what is permitted.

So far I have alluded to the first two aspects of the mandate given to the Ad hoc Committee of our Conference. An impartial consideration of the technological aspect of the proposed BMD systems reveals its inherent shortcomings, which in turn only confirm that development of such systems cannot lead us away from nuclear deterrence, but merely heighten the precarious edge of deterrence by leading us into a new cycle of the arms race. Secondly, I have tried to bring together some of the strands of the current international legal régime which, if seen in their complementarity, clearly indicate its adequacy. There is, none the less, a need to make it more comprehensive. Before I move to suggestions in this sphere, I would like to refer to another aspect of the arms race in outer space, namely, anti-satellite weapons.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

Satellites, for our country as for many others, are a part of an effort to use technology for the benefit of our peoples. We are all aware of the applications of satellites in telecommunications, meteorology, remote-sensing, navigation and scientific research. At the same time, these very functions also have another aspect: the verification of arms limitation agreements. More recently, wartime combat support functions have also been included in satellite capability. While some may be indirect, i.e., in the areas of communications and navigation, others may be more direct, such as radar location of targets and navigational guidance for attack missiles. Perceptions of these attributes and their development have, side by side, also spurred attempts to develop anti-satellite weapons. If satellites have been accepted as an aid to confidence building by virtue of their role in verification, then putting them at risk would only serve to exacerbate tensions and have a destabilizing effect on any crisis.

In virtually all missile defence concepts, satellites are foreseen to perform essential functions, either as sensors or as relay stations in the attack, and they must, therefore, possess a defensive capability. This is the close connection between the development of the BMD systems and the development of the improved anti-satellite systems, in addition to the inherent ASAT potential of many BMD systems. It is, however, the distinctions between BMD systems and the ASAT systems which are more significant for us, as these indicate the approach that can be adopted to develop a treaty banning ASAT weapons. The significant ASAT methods like spacemines, jamming and deception measures and attacks on ground stations, have no BMD analogue. The levels of performance for a BMD and for attacking satellites are very different. ASAT can be mounted from a friendly territory, its targeting is relatively easier and can be undertaken over a long period of time, its survivability is easier as it is likely to operate in a crisis situation rather than in a hostility situation -- in short, while the technology is similar, the technical differences between an effective BMD system and an ASAT system are significant.

These distinctions are relevant in designing any ASAT ban -- which, to be comprehensive and effective, must not only ban testing, development and deployment of all ASAT weapons but also eliminate existing such weapons. Even at present, the issues of verification and compliance are likely to require considerable reserves of political goodwill and trust before they can be resolved; with any delay in the undertaking of negotiations and possibly if faced with deployment, it would become that much more difficult. One possible structure for such a treaty could be in the form of a general formulation, with specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites. Evidently, the categorization of today may not remain as exhaustive for tomorrow. This explains the necessity for separate protocols, which can be derived from and placed under the umbrella of the general treaty formulations. For the present, three categories for which specific protocols could be relevant would be NEO (Near-Earth Orbits), HEO (Higher Earth Orbits) and GEO (Geosynchronous Orbits). However, this is merely indicative and not an exhaustive listing. The formulation of the general provision would be an indicator of the underlying political commitment. Elements of such a proposal have already been tabled in this Conference and it is now necessary that we take a comprehensive look at it.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

Closely related to this, but wider in scope in terms of its applicability to all objects launched into space, is the Registration Convention of 1975. My delegation believes that this convention needs to be strengthened, especially the provisions relating to article IV, which provide the information about the characteristics of the objects launched. Such an exercise is fully in consonance with the objectives of the Convention, as stated in the preamble, namely to "contribute to the application and development of international law governing the exploration and use of outer space". Under the existing scheme, while we know from independent reliable sources that about three fourths of the satellites launched are used for military purposes, the description most frequently provided under the requirements of the Registration Convention read "Exploration of upper atmosphere and outer space". Admittedly, the dividing line between military and non-military uses is thin, but to be able to examine it and judge it impartially, we need to be able to get close to it. My delegation would be in favour of the idea that an expert group be convened to help the Ad hoc Committee in such a task. To begin with, the mandate of the expert group would be to devise the necessary parameters on which information needs to be provided under article IV of the Registration Convention. Such an activity would not only further the objectives emphasized in the preamble, but also be a significant aid to confidence-building.

A better understanding of this aspect would contribute to our discussion on the proposal for a multilateral agreement conferring on space objects immunity from attack or interference. Clearly, such an agreement would need suitable verification, on which, too, proposals have been submitted to this Conference.

We have the means to begin to consider specific provisions and measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. It is the earnest desire of the delegation of India that, with the wholehearted commitment and co-operation of all other delegations, the Conference on Disarmament will be successful in safeguarding outer space, as the common heritage of mankind, for the generations to come.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, in an earlier intervention, I paid tribute to you and your predecessors for the wise and skilful way in which you have directed our deliberations. I will not repeat that, but I hope that it is understood that I remain even more convinced of our wisdom. May I take this opportunity, however, of associating myself with the views expressed by so many of my colleagues who have made known their regrets at the retirement of Ambassador Ian Cromartie, our British colleague, and the transfer to other duties of Ambassador Dhanapala and Ambassador Tonwe. We will miss them all and I hope that our paths will cross again.

May I also say, since the main topic of my comments will be verification, how really encouraging it is to have heard so many references to verification in each of the speeches we have heard this morning. I do not know if we have had a previous occasion where that has proven true, and I doubt if it would

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

have occurred a year ago, and this is extremely encouraging. Indeed, I have asked for the floor today to table two documents. The first of these is a summary report of the Outer Space Workshop which was held for heads of Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987. The second is a Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals compiled by the Verification Research Unit of the Canadian Department of External Affairs. Delegations may recall that in my comments to the Conference on 30 April I drew attention to Canada's emphasis on practical work towards arms control agreements. Consistent with this approach we have undertaken continuing research on the verification of such agreements. The two documents that I am tabling are both examples of this practical approach.

It is the essence of an arms control and disarmament agreement that contracting parties agree to renounce, limit or destroy armaments or military forces in return for treaty commitments by other parties to do the same. To ask States to renounce or scrap weapons in return for treaty obligations as a preferable way of protecting their security is to demand of them a very serious and difficult decision. In effect, a State accepts a treaty in lieu of weapons as a means of protecting its security. This is an extremely important undertaking, since a primary responsibility of all Governments must be to protect the security, however defined or perceived, of their respective countries. Given the traditional and contemporary concern with national security, the importance of verification becomes evident: it is the means by which a party ensures confidence, throughout the life of an arms control agreement, that other parties are complying with their obligations, while at the same time demonstrating its own good faith.

It is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful negotiation and drafting of adequate and effective verification provisions is essential to preventing a deterioration of confidence in an arms control or disarmament agreement. This applies a fortiori to agreements involving nuclear weapons and nuclear tests. In a world where there are relatively few internationally effective sanctions, verification inevitably must play a critical role in ensuring that a treaty is and remains effective, and does not become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening or eliminating it.

As pointed out during a seminar in Ottowa on 19 June at the Conference on Nuclear Weapons and the Law, verification can be perceived to perform a series of central functions, but there would seem to be four of particular importance: deterrence of non-compliance; confidence-building; removal of uncertainty; and treaty assessment.

Through its primary role in holding out a credible prospect of detection of non-compliance with an agreement, verification serves to protect the security of all the parties to an agreement. When adequate and effective verification increases the risk of detection that a prospective violator would face, the temptation to seek advantage by violating an agreement is reduced and deterrence is enhanced. There are political costs to a violator in being exposed.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

Second, verification also seeks to demonstrate compliance, not merely non-compliance or possible non-compliance. Continued evidence of compliance with an agreement can develop and maintain confidence in the intentions of other parties. The concept of good faith is central to the law of treaties as a whole, and arms control in particular, and is applicable both to the fulfilment of treaty obligations and to their interpretation. Thus, increased trust based on demonstrated good faith could have positive benefits for the conduct of relations between the States in question as well as for international relations generally. Equally so, the cynical assumption of the automaticity and inevitability of bad faith on the part of the other side negates the whole arms control process and risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Verification has a third role, however -- perhaps even the most important -- that of clarifying facts and removing uncertainty where doubts arise. When an ambiguous activity is detected, an effective verification system will counteract false alarms by producing clear evidence. If uncertainty continues with respect to an activity's legitimacy, it may be an indication of an inadequacy in a treaty provision, as much as an indication of bad faith.

Finally, verification can provide a means of surveillance and appraisal of the effectiveness of the treaty itself. By providing a broad range of objective, operationally relevant data, verification provisions can provide an invaluable information base for the continuing review and assessment of a treaty's operation in practice and, perhaps, point the way to possible changes in either the substance of the treaty or its manner of application, as well as providing useful and instructive guidelines for future treaties.

It was with these considerations in mind that we invited heads of the Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations to attend the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987. The Workshop was intended to provide tangible evidence that the Canadian Government takes seriously the responsibility which the Conference on Disarmament has accepted "to examine, and to identify, through susbtantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space". It will be recalled that the Canadian delegation has already submitted a series of working papers to the Conference on Disarmament on this subject. We have tabled three working papers dealing respectively with the stabilizing and destabilizing characteristics of arms control agreements on outer space; with international law relevant to arms control in outer space; and with terminology relevant to outer space.

These working papers were not meant to propound a specifically Canadian governmental viewpoint, but rather to build upon and contribute to the pool of information in this area and to outline the issues as comprehensively as possible. Consistent with this objective, the purpose of the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and I thank the distinguished representative of India for his kind comments, was to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views, in an informal setting, on a number of broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, focusing in particular on the current legal régime relevant to outer space. The Workshop also exposed

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

participants to the presentation of some of the results of Canadian PAXSAT research concerning the use of space-based remote sensing techniques for arms control and disarmament verification.

Today, I would like to table a summary report on the Outer Space Workshop as CD/773, together with its annex, the detailed report. The report seeks to provide a distillation of the issues and viewpoints which emerged during discussions at the various segments of the Workshop. In keeping with the aim and atmosphere of the Workshop, the report does not attempt to draw conclusions or recommendations from these deliberations, and we must apologize if any delegate, any observer, feels that his or her views were not adequately reported, but we have certainly done our best.

We are pleased that representatives of 35 countries, in addition to Canadian officials, and an honourable representative of the Conference on Disarmament secretariat, were able to attend the Workshop. The positive response to the Canadian Government's invitation attests, in our view, to the importance attached by all member and observer delegations of this Conference to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Canadian Government fully shares this interest and this concern. It is hoped that the Outer Space Workshop has stimulated some new ideas and approaches to this subject and brought out the complexity and variety of viewpoints on many of the questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- complexities and varieties which we must try to develop into common ground. Clearly, there can be no "quick fixes" in this area. It is our hope that the Outer Space Workshop has contributed, in a modest way, to our efforts to achieve progress.

I now turn to the Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals. It will be recalled that when I last spoke, I mentioned that I had carried personally the message from the Prime Minister on the Peace Run. I am glad I did not have to carry this particular Compendium with me on that occasion -- it's pretty heavy stuff. But one principle that underlies the Verification Research Programme of Canada's Department of External Affairs is that verification can be profitably examined independently of specific treaty contexts. While the verification provisions of a particular treaty must be determined by the purpose, scope and nature of that agreement, much valuable work on general principles, provisions and techniques can be done well before actual negotiations begin and, of course, during such negotiations. The work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which recently began examining the question of "verification in all its aspects", is an example of a potentially profitable international study of procedures to assist arms control negotiators.

It is for the foregoing reasons that Canada has undertaken considerable research work of a specific nature relating to verification. One aspect of that research relates to the multitude of verification proposals now extant. In the years since the Second World War, during which time arms control negotiations have been almost continuously in progress, large numbers of verification proposals have been put forward from many sources from which many lessons can be drawn. Many proposals have been made by Governments in connection with arms control topics that are still under discussion, if not active negotiation; others have been developed by interested analysts and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

published in open literature. Even those proposals which are several years old may remain highly relevant to current conditions. It is for this reason that the Canadian Government has compiled a Compendium which is intended to be a quick reference catalogue to almost 700 arms control verification proposals originating in publications and statements of Governments and intergovernmental bodies as well as in academic literature on the subject. We are making this Compendium available to the Conference on Disarmament so as to ensure that all delegations have an opportunity to work from the same comprehensive information base compiled in a readily available format. The Canadian Government hopes that this will contribute to progress towards developing arms control and disarmament agreements.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement. I give the floor now to the representative of New Zealand, Dr. Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand): New Zealand joins Australia in submitting the Seismic Monitoring Agreement between our two countries to the Conference on Disarmament for its information. This Agreement formalizes the co-operation and exchange of information that has occurred between our two countries over many years and which will continue to develop and expand in the years ahead. Among other things this Agreement reflects the important part which seismic technology can play in arms control, especially a comprehensive nuclear test ban, something which both our countries take very seriously indeed. Pending some breakthrough on the policy issue of a CTB, it is important that the interim time be used productively to perfect a technical infrastructure which will permit verification of a complete test ban when one is concluded. We are happy to play our part in that process. It is our belief that the wisdom of concluding a CTB sooner rather than later will be accepted before very much longer by all the parties involved.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and now I give the floor to the last speaker for today, the representative of China, Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, not so long ago I extended my congratulations to you and today I wish to express warm congratulations to you on your outstanding achievements. I wish also once again to express our gratitude to the Ambassador of Egypt for his work. I wish also to express my respect to those outstanding colleagues who have left or are leaving us, namely Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria, who is leaving us soon, and the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, who has got another assignment. This is a normal thing to happen in the Conference on Disarmament, people coming and going. However, when I see so many outstanding colleagues leaving us, I feel rather sad.

In my statement today, I wish to offer some comments on the prevention of arms race in outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space has become an issue of increasing concern to the peoples throughout the world. This is well justified. There is a Chinese saying, "The tree leaves do not rustle unless there is wind". With the intensified efforts of the two major space Powers to develop space weapons, people cannot but worry about the dire

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

prospect that weapons might be deployed in outer space. When the first man-made Earth satellite entered into orbit and when the first Apollo spacecraft made a successful landing on the Moon, the people of the world warmly hailed these remarkable achievements as pioneers to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space by man. At that time, people were not concerned about an arms race in outer space.

However, today, 30 years later, outer space is congested with various types of satellites and space vehicles for military purposes. Besides, as land-based weapons capable of hitting objects in outer space appeared a long time ago, the emergence of exotic space-based weapons is no longer something inconceivable or remote. It has become a well-known fact that in recent years the two major space Powers have increased their efforts to develop space weapons. While one major space Power, investing huge amounts of financial and human resources in developing space weapons, has claimed from time to time that "breakthroughs" have been achieved, the other major space Power, not willing to be outdone, has openly declared that it will never allow itself to lag behind. Chasing each other, the two are locked in a fierce competition. Naturally, people will not turn a blind eye to all this. Although the two are conducting negotiations on space weapons -- talks between them are better than no talks -- they have not hitherto been able to make any substantive progress in banning space weapons. At present, they differ only on the speed and scope of the development of space weapons. What they are seeking is a timetable based on their respective needs for the development of space weapons rather than a true prohibition of all types of space weapons. The stark reality that the two major space Powers are vying with each other in the development of space weapons has naturally aroused grave concern in the international community. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament was able to establish smoothly an Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space fairly early in 1987, is in a certain sense, a reflection of the sense of urgency that the people of all countries have in their grave concern about the arms race in outer space.

The international community has another reason for its concern about the arms race in outer space, for it will lead to a qualitative escalation of the arms race between the two super-Powers. Their strategic nuclear forces are now in a rough equilibrium, with neither side being able to overwhelm the other. An extension of the arms race into outer space is bound to bring about new changes in the strategic stances of the two sides, make nuclear disarmament even more complicated and difficult and exacerbate the spiral escalation of the arms race, thus jeopardizing international peace and security. The grave consequences of such extension of the arms race into outer space affect more than the security of the two major space Powers. Many countries are already worrying that the various types of missiles with nuclear warheads produced by the two major nuclear Powers might fly to and fro over their airspace. Once weapons are deployed in outer space, disaster may befall any country at any moment. The peoples throughout the world are naturally more worried about this. Therefore, prevention of an arms race in outer space and of the weaponization of outer space is an issue of major importance that concerns the security of the people of all countries.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

As already stated, the two major space Powers are at present the only countries that possess and are continuing the development of space weapons. They have naturally become the focus of attention of the international community. They ought to assume special responsibility for halting the arms race in outer space. If the two major space Powers truly have the political will to stop the arms race in outer space, they should adopt practical measures in undertaking not to develop, test or deploy space weapons, and on this basis conduct negotiations with a view to concluding as soon as possible an international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons. Resolution 41/53, on prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was adopted by the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, also "urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in the constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space".

Since prevention of an arms race in outer space was placed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, quite a number of delegations have advanced propositions and proposals on the subject, covering a wide range of elements relating to the issue. The Ad Hoc Committee on outer space may address these proposals in an orderly manner on the basis of a consensus view on their priorities to be determined according to their relevance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Attention should be focused on the study and solution of the issues that are most directly related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. At present, there are already many proposals before us on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Some delegations suggest that an agreement on the prohibition of ASAT weapons should be reached first. Since ASEP weapons are the space weapons that exist at present, to start with their prohibition is of certain practical significance. The Chinese delegation, therefore, can go along with this proposal. However, I wish also to point out that the prohibition of other types of space weapons should by no means be ignored. These include the exotic ABM space weapons, such as directed energy weapons, kinetic weapons and other types of space weapons currently being developed by the two major space Powers. We should prohibit all kinds of space weapons.

Last year, in my statement on prevention of an arms race in outer space, I noted that the existing international agreements on outer space were reached under respective specific circumstances at the time of their conclusion. Therefore they all have certain limitations. With the development of space science and technology, especially due to the fact that the two super-Powers have been using new technologies to extend their arms race into outer space, These legal instruments, though of positive significance, no longer entirely suit the present needs and are not adequate for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in a fundamental way. In order to attain the ultimate goal of the "demilitarization of outer space", it is necessary to conduct negotiations on new international agreements, with the "non-weaponization" of outer space as the main objective at the present stage. If the arms race is to be prevented from extending into outer space, this work should no longer be delayed.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

Outer space, a common heritage of the whole of mankind, should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. China is opposed to an arms race in outer space. We oppose it, no matter who conducts it. We have consistently advocated that the exploration and utilization of outer space must be carried out in the service of peace and of the economic, scientific and cultural development of all countries and for the benefit of the entire human race. China, the first inventor of ancient rockets, once made its contributions to human civilization and progress. Today, the Chinese people are also engaged in peaceful uses of outer space. Our space technology, though still at the stage of research, experiment and initial application, has already started its service in peaceful uses of outer space. China has already entered into co-operation and exchanges with some countries and international organizations in the peaceful exploration and uses of outer space. China has launched and is going to launch a variety of applications satellites covering geodesy, geo-resources surveys, communications, broadcasting, meteorology, etc. They have contributed and will continue to contribute vigorously to China's economic modernization and to its economic, scientific and cultural exchanges with other countries. The Chinese people will do their best to this end.

Thanks to the able guidance of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and the active participation of many delegations, the 1987 Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space has made some progress in its work. Through an extensive exchange of views, some issues have been clarified. This has contributed to a better understanding of the positions and views of all parties. This year, some delegations have submitted new proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Meanwhile, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has also conducted deliberations on the issue of outer space, particularly on its priority position. There has been a deeper understanding of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and a willingness to work actively for the realization of that goal.

Before concluding my statement, I wish also to avail myself of this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to Ambassador Beesley of Canada and, through him, to the Government of Canada for the opportunity accorded to me to participate in the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal. The valuable efforts made by the Canadian delegation to promote the work of the Conference on Disarmament on preventing an arms race in outer space are recognized by all.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement. This concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the representative of India, Ambassador Teja.

Mr. TEJA (India): I am taking the floor in my capacity as the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 on agenda item 3. I would like to introduce, on behalf of the Group, the draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 3, as contained in document CD/515/Rev.3, dated 21 July 1987, which has already been circulated. It is universally accepted that the subject of the prevention of nuclear war, as covered by this agenda item, is of critical importance to the international community. This importance is also reflected in the joint statement of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, issued in November 1985, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. The Group of 21 believes that the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee with the proposed mandate would enable us to commence serious

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

discussions on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that the draft will facilitate a discussion being taken in the Conference. I would therefore request you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Group of 21, to put this mandate to the Conference on Disarmament for a decision at the earliest possible time.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambasador Teja for introducing this document.

In conformity with the timetable for this week, I should like to recall that, immediately after this plenary, a meeting of Contact Group "A" of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will be held in this same room.

Before I adjourn today's plenary meeting, I should like to inform you that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency Leo Tindemans, will be addressing this Conference as our first speaker. On that particular occasion, I should like to announce that our plenary meeting will start at 10.30 a.m., instead of at the usual time of 10 a.m., in order to accommodate the Minister's schedule. If I see no objection, I shall take it that we can proceed accordingly.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will meet on Thursday, 23 July, at 10.30 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.424
23 July 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 23 July 1987, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)

GE.87-62909/9788E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 424th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before I read the list of speakers for today, I would like to welcome the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Mr. Nihal Rodrigo.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Belgium, the United States of Amercia, Japan, New Zealand and Hungary. Since the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium is coming a little bit later, I will give him the floor as soon as he comes. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, the United States delegation welcomes you on your return to Geneva to preside over Conference work this month. You have a long record of distinguished service to this Conference; it is now being extended by your tenure in the Chair during July.

I am also pleased to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency Leo Tindemans, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, whom we are looking forward to hearing later this morning.

Our delegation also bids farewell to our departing colleagues, Ambassadors Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and Tonwe of Nigeria. We wish them every success in their new endeavours. In addition, I want to convey to Ambassador Cromartie, through our friends on the delegation of the United Kingdom, our deep regret at the announcement of his departure from this Conference. Ian Cromartie worked long and hard with the delegations in this Conference to advance our shared objectives. The significant progress recorded in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under his able leadership will stand as eloquent testimony to his dedication to the cause of peace. To him and his family we send our heartfelt thanks and best wishes.

Today I would like to devote my statement to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Looking back for a moment, much important and useful work was accomplished during the spring part of the 1987 session under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden. The Ad hoc Committee developed text on the activities of verification and monitoring of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. Additional text was developed outlining the makeup and functions of the technical secretariat, preparatory commission and modalities for revision of lists. Work began on elaborating the composition and tasks of an inspectorate. This new material, along with other texts, was appended to the rolling text to serve as the basis for further discussion. The rolling text itself was updated and revised in April to reflect the work in the spring. This valuable, detailed work, and important changes in the positions of some delegations, generated a sense of momentum. The spring part of the session ended with an air of optimism.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

At the midpoint of the summer part of the session, the atmosphere has somewhat changed. I have begun to hear from a number of delegations that morale is low, and that people are pessimistic regarding the negotiating pace, and unhappy at the amount of time required to achieve a convention. I am concerned that such a perspective will have a negative impact on work remaining to be done. I believe that unexpectedly rapid developments in the spring raised unrealistic expectations that a chemical weapons convention would be in hand by the end of this year. This unfounded optimism masked what remained to be done.

This summer, as the negotiations have delved more deeply into key aspects of a chemical weapons ban, new issues surfaced. Additionally, delegations have begun to grapple with some of the difficult issues which had in the past been set aside for future discussion to allow work on some less controversial areas to proceed. These are natural developments in any negotiation as work progresses from one level to the next.

I do not entirely share the pessimism expressed by others. We have been doing some constructive work this summer. More delegations are participating actively in the discussions. Difficult issues previously put aside are being addressed, and this is a reason for encouragement. However, no one should expect the negotiation of an effective chemical weapons convention to be an easy task. It is a complex undertaking in which elaboration of certain details is of great significance. To have an effective convention, we must thoroughly think through the issues, work out our differences and develop the necessary detail. We must, throughout this process, keep our focus on what we are trying to achieve -- not on artificial deadlines that could only yield a worthless agreement, but on a convention which will provide us with security and a true sense of confidence that the threat of chemical warfare will be removed.

This effort requires constructive suggestions, not polemics. We need ideas, not rhetoric. In this spirit, I would like to respond to some comments made before this Conference on 2 July by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin.

The statement of 2 July mischaracterized my own plenary statement of 30 June to assert that the United States is not committed to the completion of an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons as rapidly as possible. Let me reassure all of the delegations to the Conference that the United States remains committed to this goal. We introduced a comprehensive draft convention in 1984 and have contributed numerous papers and proposals since then to help advance the negotiations. However, development of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban requires careful work and consideration, and we should not and will not be pressed to proceed hastily at the expense of ensuring the convention's effectiveness.

I was disappointed by the critical Soviet remarks about the United States invitation to visit the chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah,

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

a facility which many other CD delegation members visited during our 1983 workshop. I believe that, when Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed in April to an exchange of visits to the American and Soviet facilities, they saw this as an opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union to build mutual confidence by exchanging information on the subject of the destruction of chemical weapons. This is, after all, a vital part of a chemical weapons convention. I hope that the Soviet Union will soon respond positively to the United States invitation.

Ambassador Nazarkin's statement also indicated that he felt that the United States position on challenge inspection remains unclear. The United States view that challenge inspection should cover all relevant locations and facilities of a State party without distinction between private property or government ownership was correctly noted. The United States specifically amended its draft convention in April 1986 to make this position even clearer, in response to Soviet concerns. If the Soviet delegation continues to have difficulties, I would suggest that they propose alternative language for consideration.

The Soviet statement of 2 July characterized the Ad hoc Committee's work on Cluster III, concerning the non-production of chemical weapons, as "walking in circles". I cannot agree with this characterization. The Committee has made advances in this area this summer under the leadership of Ambassador Ekéus and Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico. As examples, a successful chemical industry experts' meeting clarified a number of issues and identified areas of general consensus and areas needing further work. Another example: discussions on commercial supertoxic lethal chemicals resulted in a text that will serve as a basis for further discussions. Another example: for its part, the United States tabled a well-received working paper on production capacity.

In the Soviet statement of 2 July, the United States was criticized for planning to produce chemical weapons while negotiations are under way in Geneva. The recently announced cessation of Soviet production of chemical weapons suggests that their production continued during the eighteen-year period since the United States stopped production unilaterally in 1969. Our delegation sees no reason why the long-overdue modernization of the small United States stockpile is an obstacle to successful completion of the negotiations under way here. Chemical weapons negotiations in fact began and continued throughout the period of the large Soviet build-up of chemical weapons stocks. There is no good reason why the negotiations should not continue to progress as the United States responds to the large imbalance that has been created since the United States ceased the production of chemical weapons eighteen years ago. The massive Soviet stockpile of chemical weapons, unmatched by any other nation, puts all our security at risk and requires remedial action until the storage of chemical weapons can be eliminated from all military arsenals by an effective, comprehensive, global ban.

Also on 2 July, the problem of activities taking place on the territory of States not parties to the convention was raised. This is a serious issue that is much broader than the narrow question of multinational corporations. In fact, the United States does not believe that production of chemical

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

weapons by multinational corporations on the territory of a State not a party to the convention is a special problem. Any corporation incorporated under United States law, wherever its activities actually take place, would be prohibited from aiding a non-party in chemical weapons production. In the United States view, the real question of relevance to all parties is activities related to the convention taking place on the territories of States that are not parties to that instrument, regardless of who is conducting them. The source of the problem, in fact, is apt to be the Government of the non-party State. In such a case, political pressure, including pressure to join the convention, would be the appropriate response. The Soviet approach to dealing with activities on the territory of non-party States is not at all clear at this time. Our delegation would ask the Soviet Union to present its own position so that we may study it.

To date, only two countries -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- have stated that they possess chemical weapons. There are approximately 15 other States that are believed to possess, or to be seeking to acquire, chemical weapons. It is of considerable concern to the United States that some of these States might remain outside the convention and continue to possess chemical weapons after States parties destroy their deterrent stocks. Such States would pose a risk to States parties. Clearly, such a situation would affect the United States decision on ratification, and, I am sure, other countries' as well. We should focus our attention here in this forum on measures that can be taken to reduce this risk.

The United States statement of 23 April proposed that confidence-building in this area start with greater openness on the part of all members of the Conference on Disarmament. It expressed concern that some other States participating in these negotiations have been secretive about their chemical weapons programmes, and noted that confidence is seriously undermined when countries possessing such weapons refuse to acknowledge such capabilities during the negotiations.

Several countries have indicated that they do not possess chemical weapons. However, many States members of this body have remained silent on this issue. Our delegation calls upon its negotiating partners to indicate whether or not they possess chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities. We also request the Soviet Union, and others who may acknowledge possession of chemical weapons, to provide detailed information on their chemical weapons capabilities, as the United States has already done. The United States raised this point with the Soviet Union three years ago, but no response has been received. We are hopeful this information and data will be forthcoming during current bilateral talks which began this week. Serious intentions of progress on both sides have been expressed. We believe data exchange can be the keystone of such progress.

Greater openness should also apply to commercial industrial information. As the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Minister of State David Mellor, remarked in his plenary statement on 14 July, "What we need is not more speeches, but more facts and figures. We need to know what other Governments have, where they have it and what they do with it". My delegation

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

supports Minister Mellor's call for the Soviet Union and other States to be more open about their commercial chemical activities, as well as about their chemical weapons capabilities.

Before I conclude, I would like to note that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has yet to take up challenge inspection this summer. As my delegation noted on 23 April, informal discussions in the spring indicated some areas where views appeared to be converging. I look forward to efforts to record and build on these areas of convergence.

Finally, when the report on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is adopted in August, it will likely reflect that much work has been accomplished this year. It may also reflect that much remains to be done, not only to resolve key issues, but also to develop detailed procedures that are necessary to implement the convention. One particularly important result of this summer's work will not, unfortunately, appear in the report. That is the gradual convergence of views of delegations on many issues. Such convergence will serve as the basis for the further development of text. We have made progress this year and we have laid the groundwork for even further progress. We should be proud of this accomplishment. It should cause us to renew our commitment to pursue the work ahead.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): At this half-way point in the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the summer session, I wish to make an overview of the current stage of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention and to express the views of my delegation with the hope of contributing to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

In the spring part of this session, under the able and active chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, we adopted a new work formula and achieved many concrete results. Among them are:

(a) Agreement on the destruction of all declared chemical weapons, eliminating the possibility of diversion. Diversion would have complicated verification;

(b) Agreement on the framework of the detailed procedures for destruction of chemical weapons, with the exception of the issue of the order of destruction;

(c) Detailed consideration for the first time of the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, in line with the framework for the destruction of chemical weapons;

(d) Consideration, in the context of draft article VI on permitted activities, of the modalities for revision of lists and of guidelines for schedule (1) chemicals;

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

(e) Consideration, with regard to the organizational aspects, of the preparatory commission and of guidelines on the international inspectorate.

I wish to express the high appreciation of my delegation for these results which have opened new ground, to help us through this complex and advanced stage of the negotiations. I wish to call upon all delegations to maintain the momentum of the spring part of this session and to build upon it, so that we may be able to conclude the convention at the earliest opportunity, thus meeting the fervent expectation of the international community.

As the negotiations get more complex -- as they are at present -- it is all the more important never to lose sight of what the basic objectives of the chemical weapons convention are. These objectives are: first, "destruction", namely the destruction of existing chemical weapons and related production facilities; and second, "non-production", namely the prohibition of the future development or production of chemical weapons. These two objectives of "destruction" and "non-production" are inseparable, as it were the two wheels of a cart. They must occupy balanced places in the convention régime. I must also emphasize that our work is to ban chemical weapons. Nothing else. We must not create impediments to the legitimate activities and development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, which advances the welfare and the standard of living of mankind.

My delegation attaches significant importance to the destruction of existing chemical weapons and related facilities. Japan possesses no chemical weapons and has no intention of acquiring them. By adhering to the convention, she legally binds herself as a non-chemical-weapon State, while chemical-weapon States have 10 years to dispose of their chemical weapons. For the security of my country, it is indispensable that all the existing chemical weapons and production facilities be placed, from the beginning of the entry into force of the convention, under strict international control and be eliminated according to the internationally agreed formula.

As I have already stated, we were able to agree on a framework of the detailed procedures for destruction of chemical weapons in the course of the spring part of this session. I would like to note that we have the following common understandings on this important issue:

(a) The chemical weapons to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons "under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location",

(b) All chemical weapons shall be destroyed "beginning not later than 12 months and finishing not later than 10 years",

(c) States parties may destroy their stocks at a faster pace;

(d) Chemical weapons shall be destroyed only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facility(ies).

And, with regard to the verification measures:

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

(a) States parties shall take such measures as they consider appropriate to secure their storage facility(ies) and shall prevent any movement of their chemical weapons;

(b) States parties shall provide access to any chemical weapons, destruction facilities and the facilities' storage for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification;

(c) International Inspectors shall have unimpeded access to all parts of the storage facilities and may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection.

My delegation earnestly hopes that, taking due account of these common understandings, we will bring our work to a successful completion.

Security of a State during the entire destruction stage is a legitimate concern which we must attend to. While the procedures for destruction of chemical weapons stocks should start simultaneously for all chemical-weapon States, the mechanism of destruction at an accelerated pace for the State possessing larger stockpiles should be explored in view of the considerable imbalance in the size of existing stockpiles.

I should also like to call upon all chemical-weapon States to announce at an early stage their possession, as well as the composition of, and other factors pertaining to their stockpiles. Such actions on the part of chemical-weapon States, as well as the announcement of non-possession by non-chemical-weapon States, as is the case with Japan, will not only contribute to our work for the solution of the problems facing us, but will also help planning of the verification work at the outset of the Convention. I sincerely hope that other States will follow the example given by the United States in 1986 and provide the relevant information.

The other aspect with regard to destruction is the issue of chemical weapons production facilities. Much has also been developed in the past on the issue. We have the common understandings which we should not undermine. They are:

(a) The chemical weapons production facilities will be declared and destroyed within 10 years;

(b) Such facilities to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons production facilities "under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location";

(c) Chemical weapons destruction facilities shall be declared within 30 days, which declaration shall be promptly confirmed through on-site inspection;

(d) States parties shall immediately cease all activity at each chemical weapons production facility and, within three months, close such facility;

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

(e) International systematic monitoring shall be initiated as soon as possible after the closure of such facility and shall continue until this facility is eliminated within 10 years.

As destruction of chemical weapons stocks proceeds and controls are placed on the civil chemical industry, the prolonged existence of chemical weapons production facilities may increase the potential danger to the convention régime. It is the desire of my delegation to see that such facilities are dismantled at the earliest opportunity.

Next, I should like to deal with the issue of "non-production". I wish to express our appreciation of the work done so far in identifying the chemical substances to be controlled and the régimes to which they would be subject under the convention. The recent meeting of the representatives of the industry was also extremely useful. Despite the detailed discussions which have taken place on this matter, I nevertheless feel that it is important to place the issue in perspective so that the problems may be sorted out and progress made towards final agreement.

The negotiations on the issue of non-production have dealt with two different aspects:

(i) the non-production of chemical weapons per se; and (ii) the monitoring of the production, etc. of certain substances in the chemical industry. The discussions to this date may at times have tended to confuse these two differing aspects. Under article VI, those chemical substances whose production is to be prohibited or subjected to other controls are subdivided into three categories. They are listed in one of the three schedules of the annex, on each of which methods of control are being developed.

Schedule (1) relates to the first aspect, that is non-production of chemical weapons per se, which is the main objective of the convention. On the other hand, schedules (2) and (3) relate to the second aspect, the chemical substances listed in these schedules are intended for peaceful purposes, but are placed under a monitoring régime to preclude their misuse for weapon purposes. The aim is to enhance confidence in the convention régime. We feel that there are distinct conceptual differences between the two.

The lists and the control régimes developed to this date are, in our view, generally reasonable. In order to expedite our work for final agreement, we must have a clear idea of the correlation among the various chemical substances in the schedules. We must also give due consideration to the legitimate concerns raised at the recent meetings of representatives of the industry.

We have not addressed ourselves to the issue of definition for some time now. The existing wording in draft article II was formulated before the recent development in our negotiations. We have now clarified many aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities. We have

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

identified chemical substances to be controlled and the régimes to which such substances will be subjected. In the light of these achievements, we should re-examine the issue of definition, bearing in mind the general purpose criterion.

The issue of challenge verification, the verification safety-net, is by its nature a complex and difficult problem. I wish to note that four areas of common understanding identified by Ambassador Ian Cromartie on this issue (CD/734) are very relevant. The interrelated aspects of the procedure for requesting challenge, the time frame for the dispatch of international inspectors, their access to the site and facility, the safeguarding of the legitimate security concerns of both the challenging and challenged States and the necessary follow-up will all require much examination and careful elaboration through businesslike considerations of the various aspects of the issue.

The verification measures envisaged to ensure compliance with the convention will comprise data exchange, routine inspections, the use of monitoring equipment, and challenge inspections, etc. These verification measures will be required to monitor the various declarations concerning chemical weapons stockpiles, production facilities, destruction facilities and non-production, as well as the issues concerning "use", and clandestine stockpiles and production facilities. They will require much manpower, and material and financial resources. I feel that we should keep a realistic perspective in our work on the convention in identifying the substances to be controlled and the extent to which they will be so controlled so that a practical, rational and cost-effective verification régime may be established under this convention.

In the very crowded schedule of meetings at this advanced stage of negotiations, we sometimes fail to see the wood for the trees. Let us always remember the basic and original purpose of our work and the principles which we have already agreed upon. We should also bear in mind that we are aiming to draw up a convention which must enjoy universal acceptance, and which will not be overly difficult to implement and thus not be too complex. The time reamining in the summer part of this session is not too long, but I hope that it will be put to good use in building common and tangible agreements one by one.

In closing, allow me to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, and the three Item Co-ordinators, Messrs. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Macedo Riba of Mexico and Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, for their untiring efforts, and pledge my delegation's commitment to the cause of the early realization of chemical weapons disarmament.

I would also like to pay a tribute to Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom for what he has done for us on our work in chemical weapons. I wish him an early recovery and a life in comfort. I also associate myself with my distinguished colleagues in wishing Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria every success in their new assignments. May I

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

extend my delegation's warmest welcome to the new representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo, to our Conference. I am looking forward to working closely with him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement. I now bid a warm welcome to the Conference to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency Leo Tindemans, who will address this plenary meeting at this time. Mr. Tindemans has held his high position since 1981 and it was in that capacity that he also spoke in the then Committee on Disarmament on 14 June 1983. He has had an outstanding role in public affairs, having been a member of successive Governments in his country since 1968 and was Prime Minister between 1974 and 1978. I am sure that the Conference will listen to his statement with particular interest and wish him a successful visit to Geneva.

Mr. TINDEMANS (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I must thank you for your kind words of welcome. May I congratulate you on your election as President of the Conference for the month of July. You have a reputation as an experienced and shrewd practitioner of multilateral disarmament and you have confirmed that reputation during your presidency, an office you are not, in fact, holding for the first time, because you were already in the Chair in 1981. You are, I know, admirably assisted by the secretariat of the Conference under the direction of Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui, whose diplomatic skills are known to all.

This morning I was the victim of an air traffic controllers' strike, that is why my plane arrived too late. I do apologize for that.

When Belgium became a member of the Conference when it was established in January 1979 it entered, as stated by its Minister for Foreign Affairs at the opening meeting, with the firm intention of pursuing through dynamic action the common disarmament goals of the world community. Those goals had just been set by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Final Document of that session established the priorities. It highlighted the universality of the cause of disarmament, which is the responsibility of all Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear, and in this spirit set up a single multilateral negotiating body that took over from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which was too limited. These developments came in the wake of the 1960s and 1970s, which had seen considerable effort devoted towards limiting and eliminating arms. The atmosphere in international relations was propitious and gave hope that the establishment of a multilateral negotiating body would lend decisive impetus to the cause of disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament is indeed the only negotiating body that brings together permanently a group of States representative of the entire international community. As such, it bears within itself the legitimate aspirations of all those throughout the world who, whether members of the Conference or not, place their hopes in the strengthening of peace, the halting of the arms race and gradual arms reduction.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

When we measure the modicity of the distance that we have covered since 1979 and the still greater modicity of the contribution the Conference on Disarmament has made in the course of almost 10 years to the disarmament process and when we look at the reasons behind this, a number of inescapable conclusions emerge that it would be wise to bear in mind for the future. First of all, disarmament falls within the context of political reality and its progress is dependent on the international situation, and not the reverse. Next, disarmament cannot be reduced to the status of a mere slogan or a remote goal forming the subject of ritual, almost incantatory prayers. But disarmament is not, either, an end in itself. It is an instrument in the service of peace and stability. The goal must be to strengthen the security of all, which implies a realistic approach, a gradual process, steadfast effort, and the taking into account of the major political and military balances, which it would be futile to ignore.

In addressing the Conference in 1983, I stressed how far the deterioration of international relations that we witnessed at the start of this decade was responsible for the sudden, almost total paralysis of negotiations in the sphere of arms control and disarmament. There is now a serious hope of seeing the negotiations between the super-Powers lead to concrete, perhaps even spectacular results. I say this all the more readily as those results would not be without impact on Belgium, since the elimination of INF is of direct concern to us. The other negotiations in Geneva -- bilateral, as is only normal since they relate only to United States and Soviet systems -- are, admittedly, outside the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, but they will unquestionably have, by their repercussions, an entrancing effect on its work. It will, after all, be the first time that an arms control agreement leads to a significant reduction in capabilities in the particularly sensitive area of the weapons known as weapons of mass destruction. That will be an achievement that goes considerably beyond the context of European security.

There is no doubt that a great deal remains to be done before we see the treaty on the elimination of INF to which we aspire drafted and signed. I would like to express the hope that the last few difficulties can be ironed out in time for an agreement to be concluded before the end of the year. My country will provide all the support it can to the negotiators. In particular, it will, together with its allies concerned by deployment, strive to ensure progress in the resolution of the problems linked to verification. As of now I can declare that it is prepared to accept, for its part, the application of strict measures in its territory.

Disarmament should be seen in terms of processes and priorities. The indissociability of the constituent elements of security does not mean that we should try to negotiate on everything at one and the same time. It is all a matter of sequences and priorities.

Belgium, whose security needs fall within the specific context of the East/West balance of power, sees its priorities as follows: first of all, conclusion of the INF agreement that I have just mentioned and, if possible, conclusion in the very near future of an agreement on the 50 per cent

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

reduction of the Soviet and United States strategic arsenals, establishment of conventional stability in Europe at a reduced level of forces (the opening at the start of next year of a new conference on this matter would make an essential contribution to the development of the efforts already being undertaken in the sphere of arms control), early conclusion of an agreement on the total prohibition of chemical weapons (at present, this is the main activity and, I would even say, the main responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament). These priorities, which should not be seen in a chronological order, cover all the areas in which efforts at arms control will certainly have to develop further. However, progress cannot be envisaged without first securing the preservation of what has already been achieved. I am thinking in particular of the ABM Treaty, an essential instrument if we wish to prevent the development of an arms race in outer space. The ABM Treaty clearly raises serious problems of interpretation that the parties will have to resolve among themselves. It does not appear reasonable to us to seek to put a veto on thinking about transition to a form of deterrence that would include more of a defensive element than is the case today. It goes without saying that the overall balance must not suffer from it and that stability must emerge strengthened to the benefit of all, if possible at a reduced level of forces.

All these areas -- space, strategic, nuclear and, finally, conventional weapons -- are closely linked, but each also has its own peculiar features and therefore requires specific treatment. Each negotiation should therefore be conducted in parallel as far as possible, without, however, giving rise to disequilibrium such as would challenge the internal consistency of the security system which each State is free to adopt in the light of its own geostrategic context. Substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers, beginning with the elimination of INF, are possible and desirable without challenging that consistency. Similarly, we would all welcome total elimination of the chemical threat. There remains the issue of conventional weapons, which, in a way, is destined to dominate the arms control scene in the coming years, especially if the objectives that I have just mentioned in the nuclear and chemical areas are achieved, as I hope.

The Western defence system is based on an interrelationship between conventional and nuclear weapons. As the balance of forces now stands, for the allies to subscribe to a proposal for total denuclearization would be inconceivable. There is therefore a limit -- which I am not in a position to identify -- beyond which pursuit of reductions in nuclear capability would have the effect of threatening their security. It would, indeed, call in question the bases of the system of deterrence which for 40 years has proven that it continues to maintain peace.

I would now like to touch on issues which directly concern the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the most important of them being, to my mind, the prohibition of chemical weapons and the halting of nuclear tests. Belgium is of the view that the possibilities of progress, even success, are now real.

It is high time, more than 70 years after the first use of chemical weapons on Belgian soil, finally to put aside the mutual hesitations and suspicions which have so far impeded progress towards the concretization of a

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

complete ban on this particularly inhuman type of weapon. Despite significant progress in the negotiations that concern us here, the use and proliferation of chemical weapons remain, sadly, a reality. These weapons are still being used, particularly in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. This has been observed by investigations organized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. An escalation is in progress in which not even the civilian populations are spared. Aware of the growing number of countries that possess chemical weapons, Belgium is participating, together with its European partners and other countries, in an international system for controlling the export of several important chemical substances so as to reverse this trend and make it more difficult to produce such weapons. This system is only a temporary measure aimed at ensuring compliance with the Geneva Protocol pending the appearance of a universal convention.

My country has actively supported the attainment of this objective since it entered the Conference on Disarmament this year. This year, Belgium is chairing Working Group B, which has responsibility in particular for preparing the provisions of the future convention on chemical disarmamemt, especially the destruction of existing stocks and of chemical weapons production facilities.

The international verification of the storage and destruction of chemical weapons has been accepted as regards its principles and numerous modalities have already been defined. The same applies to monitoring of the closure and elimination of production facilities.

The system for the verification of non-production is also under preparation. The known combat agents and their precursors have been taken stock of and it has already been agreed that they will be placed under international surveillance because they can all be used for peaceful purposes, if only for research. Significant progress has been made in this area that it was essential to cover. We welcome the dispelling of the apparent confusion between chemical weapons and chemical substances produced for non-prohibited purposes. We also appreciate the fact that the need to avoid unduly impeding the development of the chemical industry and of research is now beginning to be recognized by all.

Whatever progress has been or may yet be made in the areas of verification that I have just mentioned, they will none the less be incomplete until a satisfactory solution has been found to the crucial problem of challenge inspection. The very usefulness of the verification of installations coming under the convention depends, in the final analysis, on compliance with the obligation to declare them, whether they be chemical weapons stockpiling facilities or factories making dual-purpose substances. The régimes for systematic verification must, therefore, be complemented and strengthened by an effective and binding régime for challenge inspection so as to form a coherent set of measures to discourage violations by making them detectable wherever they may occur.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

The international organization to be set up will be the spearhead of verification of chemical disarmament. It should be able to begin its activities as soon as possible after the entry into force. We welcome the fact that, as can be seen from the excellent working paper that the United Kingdom introduced here on 14 July last, there has been concrete thinking on the subject. In this regard I am pleased to be able to announce that my country would give favourable consideration to hosting the international organization if the Conference so requested.

The negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament aim at ensuring lasting compliance with the ban on the use of chemical weapons established by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. But it must be stressed that the success of such an endeavour will depend on the support that it gets from the international community in the form of accession and ratification by the greatest possible number of countries. That implies broad participation in the negotiating process. Each and everyone should be able to present his proposals and describe his position with respect to the various aspects of the draft convention.

Universal acceptance of the future convention will be encouraged if we manage to take into account certain concerns. Of these, the need for undiminished security is probably the most important and it should be resolved in the context of the order of destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons. In this regard, it is clear that account will have to be taken of the very marked differences, both quantitative and qualitative, between the stocks that countries hold.

The universal character of the future convention could be jeopardized if the convention is not legally consistent. It will be important for the future convention to be structured logically around the fundamental principles expressed in its first article so that the wording used lends itself as little as possible to dubious or ambiguous interpretations.

Finally, it is essential that there should be no confusion as to the actual definition of chemical weapons. My country advocates a legal definition of the weapon itself and hopes that it will be possible to go beyond a mere enumeration of the material elements of which such weapons may consist. Suggestions have been informally advanced by the delegation of Belgium to other delegations with a view to discussion of this matter.

Belgium has no chemical military capability and has no intention of acquiring such a capability. The obsolete chemical munitions that are to be found in a part of Belgian territory and which date from the First World War pose specific problems. My country insists that the future convention must not uselessly complicate the problems that these old chemical munitions already pose for the countries that have inherited them.

The halting of nuclear testing is another priority topic for the Conference on Disarmament. In this area, too, the need is to be realistic and to proceed step by step. The total halting of nuclear tests is justified from the point of view of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As far as we

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tindemans, Beligum)

are concerned, I have said that such elimination seems to us unlikely in the short or medium term. None the less, Belgium subscribes to the objective of halting nuclear testing once the conditions have been met and significant progress has been made beyond the 50 per cent reduction of the strategic stockpiles of the two super-Powers.

Meanwhile, we must tackle the problem of halting nuclear tests in the form of a gradual process. Belgium welcomes the contacts and discussions taking place between the super-Powers on this matter. Significant progress seems to have been made in the area of verification. I am also pleased to note that a more open and constructive attitude seems to be emerging. The halting of nuclear tests can only be achieved on the basis of a verification system that gives everybody the necessary assurances. The entry into force of the TTBT and of the PNET would unquestionably mark a step in the right direction. The development of a system for the exchange of information concerning test programmes, their prior notification, and the invitation of experts to monitor yields would also contribute to our objective. In the same line of thought, the placing of a maximum limit on the number of tests and, perhaps, the reduction of that number in the light of the progress made in arms control and reduction of nuclear capabilities would also be useful measures. They would permit the initiation of a process that would lead to a total halt, even if the time required for that cannot be set in advance. It seems to me that this is the direction the work of the Conference on Disarmament should take. I believe that realism compels us to see things in this way if we are not to doom our proceedings to sterile declarations.

I shall now briefly address two further points that the Conference on Disarmament discusses, namely outer space and radiological weapons.

Belgium welcomes the examination by the Conference on Disarmament of a number of concerns relating to the arms race in outer space. The problem of the protection of satellites, the elaboration of an appropriate multilateral régime and the drawing-up of an international code of conduct are, in particular, the questions that the Conference on Disarmament could usefully debate at the multilateral level. They are independent of the ABM Treaty and the SD I, which, in our opinion, remain within the direct competence of the two super-Powers concerned.

As regards radiological weapons, the new approach prevailing within the Conference on Disarmament gives hope that it will be possible to negotiate the convention on the abolition of such weapons without artificial linkage with the negotiation of a convention prohibiting attacks on nuclear power stations. That being so, a positive outcome should be possible in this area too.

By way of conclusion, I should like to say that it is heartening to see encouraging progress in our work. Permit me, also, to repeat, for the point is essential, that Belgium considers the definitive elimination of chemical weapons to be an urgent priority and will spare no effort to achieve it. To

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

that end, it readily endorses the suggestions that have been made for a possible prolongation of the work outside the official sessions of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should like to make a strong appeal for the elimination, through reciprocal political will, of everything that may still impede the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons. The credibility of the Conference on Disarmament and, beyond that, the credibility of all the efforts in the sphere of disarmament are at stake.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Fortune.

Mr. FORTUNE (New Zealand): Mr. President, this is the first time I have taken the floor as representative of New Zealand in the Conference on Disarmament; it is indeed an honour, especially to follow such a distinguished and important speaker as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Tindemans, and also to speak during the period of your Chairmanship. New Zealand's support for this body is well known. Our observer status is something to which we attach a great deal of importance, since it allows us to follow the work of the Conference closely. When the opportunity arises New Zealand plans to seek full membership of the CD.

We believe small countries have a particular role to play in the disarmament process. The CD, as the single multilateral body tasked with negotiating arms control agreements, provides a vehicle through which small and non-nuclear Powers can make a contribution.

It is important that the CD fulfil the expectation of the international community that it will negotiate effective measures of arms control, and also complement and support the steps being taken to this end by the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the super-Powers. Nowhere is the need for urgent and effective action more evident today than in the area of chemical weapons. My delegation is reassured by the progress that has been made this year towards agreement on a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, but much remains to be done.

The need for such a treaty is not in dispute. It is only two months since the Secretary-General issued the report of his mission of specialists confirming that chemical weapons were continuing to be used in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. As the Secretary-General noted, the unanimous findings of the specialists -- that there has been repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, that civilians in Iran have also been injured by chemical weapons, and that Iraqi military personnel have sustained injuries from chemical warfare agents -- must add new urgency to the grave concern of the international community.

We cannot too strongly condemn this continuing use of chemical weapons and those repeated violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The message and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fortune, New Zealand)

law of the Protocol is that chemical poisons are cruel and barbarous, and that their use in war can never be justified. That Iranian civilians, including women and children, have been subjected to attacks with chemical weapons is a new and abhorrent aspect of recent reports. It is of profound concern to us that the appeals of the Secretary-General have been disregarded, as have the demands of the Security Council that the provisions of the Protocol be strictly respected and observed.

All this reinforces the need for a new convention that will strengthen and extend existing prohibitions against chemical warfare. The New Zealand delegation looks to the CD to give renewed impetus to its negotiations so that a comprehensive chemical weapons convention can be adopted soon.

Just as there is reason for optimism that chemical weapon negotiations can be brought to a conclusion before long, so are there grounds for hope that negotiations towards the elimination of intermediate range missiles from Europe -- perhaps even global elimination -- may be concluded even sooner. If the outstanding issues can be resolved, there will be a very real prospect of a summit later in the year and the signature by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev of an intermediate range nuclear forces treaty. It goes without saying that this would be warmly welcomed by New Zealand.

The significance of such a treaty cannot be over-emphasized. Granted, intermediate range forces constitute only a small fraction of the nuclear arsenal. But agreement on their elimination will be much more than a confidence-building measure. As the first ever nuclear arms reduction agreement, it will signal an about-turn in the arms race. It will prove that security is not necessarily dependent on an ever-increasing number of nuclear weapons but can be enhanced by their reduction or, as in this case, by the elimination of entire classes of weaponry. Such a major shift in thinking about security is, in New Zealand's view, long overdue.

Like any arms race, the nuclear arms race had its roots in the search for security and the need to deter aggressors through the assertion of power. There is nothing new about deterrence -- it has provided the basis for mankind's security for thousands of years. Although it was given a new dimension with the coming of the nuclear age, and although that development raised enormously the stake of all countries in not upsetting the balance of deterrence, it is a theory that can never be proved successful. It remains a paradox that, although one can be certain, when it is too late, that deterrence has failed, one can never have absolute proof of its success.

Another paradox is this: in order to deter war you have to be able to convince potential opponents that you can win the war you are trying to deter. But the power of nuclear weapons is so awesome that such calculations of superiority are meaningless. Even a limited nuclear war would be devastating to both combatants, and possibly the rest of the world as well. As President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed at their November 1985 summit: "A nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought". The idea of "us" deterring "them" has, in the nuclear age, a new and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fortune, New Zealand)

New Zealand has made a real move to break out of the cycle. The Nuclear Free Zone Act, our commitment to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and our determination to continue to meet regional security obligations in conventional terms, all complement each other. They are the end result of a serious analysis of New Zealand's security imperatives. Having assessed the threats to our security, we have developed policies appropriate to the level and nature of those threats. That analysis is no different from that undertaken by every other country. The outcome -- a non-nuclear South Pacific -- is a reflection of the particular strategic circumstances which exist in our region.

We acknowledge that Europe has different security imperatives. That is why we do not expect our policies to be replicated by countries in Europe. Equally, however, New Zealand does not accept that Western security must be indivisibly reliant on nuclear weapons. We believe that alternatives to nuclear deterrence do exist. As a responsible Western member of the international community, we need to help promulgate that message. We do so in a way that we believe does not compromise Western security interests. Indeed, it would be short-sighted and ultimately self-defeating for us to push for policies which had the effect of weakening the security not only of Western countries but also of those neutral and non-aligned countries which depend for their existence on a stable and secure world. Our policies demonstrate that there are other than nuclear options and that these should be seriously explored.

We take heart from the positive outlook of the current bilateral talks that this is finally happening. It is the responsibility of every country, and particularly those which are members of the Conference on Disarmament to support the United States and the Soviet Union in their negotiations. If they fail, we all fail. But if they succeed, the whole world will take new heart in its efforts to achieve a more secure and certain future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to express our congratulations and best wishes to you on the occasion of your presidency. Being near to the end of your presidency, it is not simply a compliment when I express our satisfaction for the calm manner in which you have conducted our deliberations and our high appreciation for your contribution to the substantive advancement of the work of the Conference. The same goes to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi, who guided our proceedings successfully and with remarkable devotion.

Let me also seize this opportunity to say how pleased my delegation is to have seen in our midst, a few moments ago, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, His Excellency Mr. Leo Tindemans, and to have listened to his interesting statement. I would like at the same time, to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, and may I assure him of the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fortune, New Zealand)

absurd meaning. It is now a case of the nuclear arsenals threatening the security of all of us. The search for security has, in the perception of many, left the whole world less secure than ever before.

Despite this, reliance continues to be placed on nuclear deterrence. In Europe, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries confront each other with heavy concentrations of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons. The theory of deterrence has been used to justify this situation. But the size of the nuclear inventory in Europe is clearly excessive. So, too, is the size of the other arsenals. Effective deterrence would be possible at a much lower level of weaponry than exists today and, in the right circumstances, without nuclear weapons at all. We can only be thankful that this has at last been recognized, and that the move away from dependence on nuclear weapons to preserve security has begun in earnest. Agreement on the elimination of intermediate range missiles from Europe will be heralded everywhere as the turning point in the arms race. We all welcome, in the words of Sir Geoffrey Howe, "the prospect of a less nuclear world".

In such a world, it seems inevitable to New Zealand that there will need to be a greater emphasis on regional, conventional security co-operation. In Europe, a common defence posture, working through a revitalized Western European Union, or a European defence force is, we understand, one option being canvassed. Around the globe, similar reassessments of regional commitments and obligations are being made. The goal must be a world freed from the threat of nuclear annihilation.

Because of the huge arsenals of nuclear as well as chemical and conventional weapons possessed by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, it is perhaps inevitable that perceptions of global security are coloured by concerns about security in Europe. As a Western country in the South Pacific, New Zealand has difficulty in accepting that security in our part of the world is indivisible from that in Europe. Statements to that effect ignore the reality of the situation.

The fact is that, in contrast to Europe, there are no nuclear weapons deployed in the South Pacific. We in the region appreciate our good fortune in living in an area free of great-Power confrontation -- let alone nuclear confrontation. Security has already been preserved by a -- thankfully -- low level of conventional forces. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which entered into force on 11 December 1986, is aimed at ensuring that the existing balance is not upset through the introduction of nuclear weapons. New Zealand's domestic anti-nuclear legislation, passed last month, fulfils a similar purpose.

The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act prohibits the entry into New Zealand of ships or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. As a serious restraint on the deployment of nuclear weapons, it goes to the heart of what constitutes real arms limitations. For too long, nations have proclaimed the importance of nuclear disarmament, while the proliferation of nuclear weapons has gone unchecked.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

co-operation of my delegation. Among my words of courtesy, may I bid farewell to our colleagues: to Ambassadors Tonwe, Dhanapala and Cromartie, who have left us or are about to leave us, and wish them all the best in their future activities. I would especially like to ask the delegation of the United Kingdom to transmit to Ambassador Cromartie our wishes for his quick recovery.

As the Conference on Disarmament gets deeper into the substantive consideration of the disarmament issues on its agenda, a remarkable exchange of views is unfolding around a subject which strictly speaking, may not be a disarmament question, but which has a crucial bearing on the fruitfulness of the efforts aimed at achieving results in this field. I have been following with interest the views expressed in connection with the concept of nuclear deterrence and its impact -- direct or indirect -- on the negotiations on priority tasks of disarmament. Let me refer only to some of the statements, for instance, to that of Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Vladimir Petrovsky, on 9 June, to the statement made by President Raul Alfonsín of Argentina on 11 June, or to that of Ambassador Fortune of New Zealand a few minutes ago.

It is commonplace to say in our days that efforts aimed at achieving real measures of disarmament remain unfruitful. The question rightly emerges: is there a direct interrelationship between professing and practising the concept of deterrence and the fruitlessness of disarmament efforts?

Supporters of the concept of deterrence consistently profess that nuclear weapons or, in a wider sense, credible military force is the guarantee of the security of their States. They hold that the doctrine of deterrence has prevented war for the last four decades between East and West. With the same effort, one can say that there has been no war in Europe against and irrespective of the operation of the doctrine of deterrence. Such an opinion may equally be true as far as the perception of causes of the absence of war is concerned. If one adds to this that deterrence has not prevented war elsewhere outside Europe, then the myth of the might of deterrence becomes even less credible.

Supporters of the doctrine of deterrence assert that the guarantor of peace is the force of arms. According to this line of thinking, there are arms because there is mistrust among nations and not vice versa. Nevertheless, the suggested remedy, instead of eliminating the causes of distrust, is to uphold and strengthen the credibility of deterrence -- which, in practical terms, means modernization and development of new weapons and weapons systems, increasing their destructive power and precision, that is, their credible and actual war-fighting capability.

Opponents of the doctrine -- and I am one of them -- hold that the myth of deterrence is a self-deception, an effort to avoid facing the realities of our world. Upholding the credibility of deterrence is the code-word for the arms race. In a world where security of States depends on deterrence based on the lack of trust, the arms race inevitably becomes a self-generating

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

process. It reproduces mistrust, because it produces the dubious substitute for trust: ever more sophisticated weapons. The main deficiency of this way of thinking is -- even if I accept for the sake of theoretical analysis that the starting point is right -- that this way of thinking is completely a static one. It does not take into account that the end-products of this process, the ever more sophisticated weapons, carry in themselves the seeds of everyone's insecurity, including that of the owners of these weapons, and the more sophisticated they become, the more they are the inherent source of insecurity, independently of the wish of the Governments in question. The way out of this vicious circle in which lack of trust leads to an arms race and the latter in its turn amplifies distrust is to identify and build-down the causes of mistrust on the one hand. On the other, practical steps should be taken for the gradual elimination of the means of war, which in its turn will result in strengthening confidence. This may bring about a self-sustaining, self-generating process -- like the arms race, but in the opposite direction -- which is bound to lead to real comprehensive security for all States. To bring about such a security system requires the joint efforts of all the participants in international relations in the crucial and interrelated areas of disarmament. Any result in this -- small or big, partial or comprehensive, symbolic or sustantive -- is of paramount importance. The first result that is achieved in this process will have a special psychological significance in setting the ball rolling.

This is why we welcome and attribute the greatest importance to the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States of America on crucial issues of nuclear disarmament and on preventing an arms race in outer space. This is why we attribute equally great importance to the achievement by the Conference on Disarmament of tangible results on any of the items on its agenda. The possibilities are there. While we recognize the weight of the so-far-unresolved problems, a convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons would be within reach given the firm political determination of all parties concerned. A step towards a CTB would be of paramount importance in curbing the nuclear arms race. And finally, there are specific possibilities in the prevention of the arms race in outer space, a subject I would like to dwell on in some detail. But, before turning to the substance of the matter, I would not miss this opportunity to express our thanks and appreciation to the delegation and, through it, to the Government of Canada for arranging the Workshop in Montreal this May on issues related to outer space.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space has a special place in the line of thinking that I was expounding in the previous part of my statement. Outer space is an area where the military technical means of a credible deterrence has not yet been deployed although the existing aspirations are well known. Consequently, any tangible result in preventing an arms race in outer space, even if concerning only a specific aspect of it, would be most welcome.

The proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space under the able and devoted chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese testify to a need for more streamlined work directed towards working out specific measures to strengthen

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

the international legal régime governing the activities of States in outer space. Positions show a great divergence of views as far as the issue of outer space as a whole is concerned. Statements made at the plenary meetings or in the proceedings of the Committee, however, tend to converge on the necessity to provide protection for the satellites in orbit around the globe, that is to assure their immunity for the sake of their unimpeded functioning. Statements made on this issue have generally declared this wish, but delegations have not elaborated on the concrete ways and means of providing protection for satellites.

In our opinion, this could be an aspect to which the Committee on Outer Space should pay specific attention in its future work. Even during the remaining part of the present session the Committee might consider if its work could be focused on examining and perhaps outlining specific measures aimed at ensuring the unimpeded functioning of satellites. In this regard, I listened with great interest to the statement of His Excellency Leo Tindemans, referring to the possible steps in this field in connection with outer space. Concerning this question some important questions may arise which perhaps would merit serious in-depth consideration from the Committee.

Some of those questions are relatively easy to answer, for instance, the one whether all the parties concerned are interested in providing immunity to satellites. The answer, it seems to me, is an unequivocal yes. All States, irrespective of whether they possess or do not possess satellites, are vitally interested in the normal and safe functioning of satellites. It seems to me that there is widespread recognition that the world would run into chaos without them.

Some other issues are not so simple to answer, although positions show a convergence to a considerable degree. These questions are the following: Is the present international legal régime sufficient to guarantee beyond doubt the safe functioning of satellites in orbit, or are some further, appropriate multilateral legal measures required to provide the necessary guarantees? Should all satellites -- military and civilian -- enjoy adequate protection? Is it necessary and possible to make a distinction between civilian and military satellites, taking into account that none of them -- at least as of now -- is equipped with weapons? Do the satellites with military assignments perform functions vital enough for international security to make them eligible for protection? Should the problem of the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons be appropriately dealt with in this context? Can the existence of ASAT weapons be considered compatible with the aim of guaranteeing the normal functioning of satellites? Should the measures to be worked out be of a legally-binding character? Is it desirable that the measures to be worked out should be multilateral, with an appropriate adherence?

These are but some of the fundamental questions to be addressed by those taking part in the proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The expert of my delegation will elaborate on these questions in further detail in the forum of that Committee. I am sure that thorough consideration of such issues would give a concrete and useful direction to its proceedings.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this time? I see none.

May I now turn to the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. The timetable, which has been circulated by the secretariat, is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. It has been prepared in consultation with the chairman of subsidiary bodies, with whom I had a meeting yesterday. As a result of our exchange of views, there may be a need to make further arrangements in the timetable. If this is the case, a revision will be issued by the secretariat. If I see no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

In accordance with the timetable for this week, I should like to recall that immediately after this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I wish to inform the Conference that the Group of 21 has requested that the draft mandate for an Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 3 which is contained in document CD/515/Rev.3 be put before the Conference for decision at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 28 July. I shall proceed accordingly. In accordance with existing practice, we shall take up that question at the end of the list of speakers, first at an informal meeting and then at a resumed plenary. There is one further announcement. The Co-ordinator of Contact Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons invites delegations for informal consultations regarding issues presently under discussion in Contact Group B on Thursday, 23 July 1987, at 4 p.m. in Room I.

As there is no other business for today, I intend to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 28 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.425
28 July 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 July 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)

GE.87-62954/7373e

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 425th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning, I should like to welcome the presence at this plenary meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Ali Akbar Velayati, who is listed as the first speaker for today. In that connection, I should like to note that Mr. Velayati has already visited the Conference on several occasions to convey the views of his Government on various questions relating to the work of the Conference.

I should also like to welcome among us the new representative of Brazil to the Conference, Ambassador Marcos de Azambuja, who is joining us today. Ambassador de Azambuja is a career diplomat with vast experience in multilateral diplomacy who has also been involved in disarmament matters during his career.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, in conformity with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject pertinent to the work of the Conference.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, we shall today take up the draft decision submitted by the Group of 21 concerning the establishment of an ad hoc committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference. That draft decision has been circulated as document CD/515/Rev.3 and is on the table today. As I informed you at that plenary meeting, once the list of speakers is exhausted, I shall convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider that document. After that, we shall resume our plenary meeting to take up again the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21.

I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The world is moving towards arms proliferation and arsenal expansion with accelerated speed. The arms race has been extended from land, sea and air to outer space, which can lead to the extinction of humanity. In the current state of affairs, the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body sheds rays of hopes to prevent the "doomsday scanarios" from happening. The existence of the risk is enough, for the worst only needs to happen once. This is why I am delighted to be here among you once again today to rehearse the information on the issues together.

As a country of great strategic significance, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not only under constant and direct threat from conventional and chemical weapons, but also faces the perils of nuclear weapons indirectly. As a result, we accord special importance to the deliberations and endeavours of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

the Conference. The continued and wide-scale use of chemical and toxic weapons by Iraq at a time when negotiations on a new convention on chemical weapons are under way has drawn our attention to the items being discussed in this Conference.

You should recently have been informed about the terrifying reports coming from the Iranian city of Sardasht, which seem to have numbed us with their repetition. The residential areas in this city were subjected to the most brutal chemical bombardments, causing the death of hundreds of innocent people. This was not the first time that Iran was subjected to chemical weapons attack and it was not the first time that civilian areas and residential quarters were targets of chemical assault. But this was the first time that a city in its totality was poisoned by the Iraqi forces. The use of chemical arms was so vast that even several days later, when the United Nations specialists despatched to the area arrived in the city, the afflicted areas were still highly contaminated. A number of wounded inhabitants are still in European hospitals. I strongly urge you who are directly involved in important negotiations on the new chemical weapons convention to visit these patients and see for yourselves the dreadful effects of these destructive weapons. Among the injured there are individuals who were witnesses to the loss of members of their families while they themselves were chemically afflicted. I am confident that observing such crimes will contribute to the redoubling of your efforts and the reaching of definite and final agreement on a chemical weapons convention.

Despite achievements being made in these talks which have made an agreement closer at hand, the non-compliance with the present instruments reveals grim prospects for the future. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 may be more primitive than the present convention and of less complexity than the present deliberations. The undertakings of countries have, however, given sufficient strength to the Protocol. In the meantime, it has not set concrete measures for verification, compliance or use, which constitute the main part of the new convention. Yet the confirmed use of chemical weapons by Iraq shows vividly that verification can be successfully conducted. But, in the absence of firm political will, prevention of the use of chemical weapons -- which is definitely less complex than prevention of production, development and stockpiling of these weapons -- will not be possible.

We are formulating and preparing a convention in the Conference whose application will in the end depend on the activities of other organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It is, therefore, proper to pose the question whether the Council has been able to reflect the necessary capability and political will vis-à-vis the confirmed reports of the use of chemical weapons. The answer is axiomatic. If the Security Council has been faced with political considerations as regards the repeated violation of the Geneva Protocol by Iraq and has not been able to take effective measures, it is evident that no decisive decision can be expected of this body as regards assuring compliance with the provisions of the new convention.

In the latest report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council, it is declared that "technically there is little more that

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

we can do that is likely to assist the United Nations in its efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons in the present conflict. In our view, only concerted efforts at the political level can be effective in ensuring that all the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 abide by their deliberations and obligations. Otherwise, if the Protocol is irreparably weakened after 60 years of general international respect, this may lead, in the future, to the world facing the spectre of the threat of biological weapons". We can therefore conclude that there is no technical obstacle to a political decision.

The Security Council, in response to this important report, issued a statement on 14 May 1987 which contained nothing more than the statement of 21 March 1986. The Council knew well that the previous statements not only did not prevent Iraq from repeating such barbaric acts but, rather, encouraged Iraq to violate the Protocol more flagrantly and freely. In fact, following the 1986 statement, Iraq celebrated 1987 by generalizing the use of chemical weapons to civilians. The toothless statement of 14 May 1987 proved that the Security Council substantially lacks the capability for "concerted efforts at the political level", despite the open request of the Secretary-General. And the prevailing political atmosphere has prevented the Council from taking any fundamental position, let alone any just decision. We warned the international community at the time that such compromising and weak moves would embolden Iraq to intensify its crimes and we desperately regret that it so happened.

The Iraqi chemical attack on the city of Sardasht was without precedent in the history of contemporary wars. The name of Sardasht should castigate the consciousness of mankind along with the names of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the first city in history whose inhabitants were massacred by poisonous gases. Encyclopedias and history books should record the name of this innocent city as a shame on humanity. Yet the Security Council remained motionless and submissive and, even worse than that, discouraged the Secretary-General from any future action or initiative.

The Iraqi régime, in a bid to justify its crimes, has announced that it will halt its violation of international law only if the war is ended. Ironically enough, the United States, which had previously condemned the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, has now gone so far in supporting Iraq that it even prevents the Council from discussing the subject and receiving the technical report on the genocide of the people of Sardasht. In other words, the United States is condoning deployment of chemical weapons in the war and justifies its control only in peace time. The countries having clear stances on the issue in the past are now following the United States policy, due to their bilateral political considerations.

While the NATO alliance considers a nuclear attack in retaliation to a chemical assault on cities possible, how can this indifference vis-à-vis the Sardasht catastrophe be interpreted? Do not claim that the Council has not ignored the fact and has condemned the use of poisonous gases in its latest resolution. This has been the third consecutive year that such a showcase position has been repeated while the Iraqi crimes are constantly increasing.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The Council has not only refrained from concerted efforts at the political level; it has not even made a binding call to Iraq to end its chemical attacks. It is evident that the weak positions of the Security Council have given carte blanche to Iraq to perpetuate its illegal and inhuman crimes.

It may be argued that these issues are irrelevant to the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament, but that is not so. What I have just stated is an important matter dealing directly with the fate of the activities of this Conference on this subject. I hereby call on the representatives of all countries, particularly those of the permanent members of the Security Council, to pose this question to the representatives at the United Nations, and I quote, "Will the Council have the same approach towards non-compliance with and violation of the new convention?" If that is so, another régime must be worked out to guarantee the implementation of the provisions of the convention, particularly in the field of preventing the use of chemical weapons. If the Council is faced with certain political considerations vis-à-vis naked violations by Iraq, you should rest assured that the same results will be derived from new endeavours and it will be discredited in the same manner as the Geneva Protocol.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is constantly and strongly calling for an effective international régime for compliance with provisions on the use of chemical weapons. Concerted, all-out action for strengthening the present Protocol is a necessary prerequisite for fortifying the new convention. The theoretical views on verification and prevention should be accompanied by practical experiences of violation of the Geneva Protocol by Iraq. We have started compiling these experiences and we hope that we will be able to provide this Conference with the results at a convenient time.

The efforts of the Conference in the field of chemical disarmament are noteworthy. The decisions of the Conference regarding the convention on prohibition of the deployment, development, production and possession of chemical weapons will be a litmus test of how far the Conference has been successful in carrying out its obligations. The plans proposed by various countries regarding the new convention reflect the comprehension by delegations of the urgency and importance attached to the subject.

One of the positive elements in the draft convention is the destruction of the present world arsenals of chemical weapons. We believe that the expressed concerns regarding the prolongation of the time-limit for the destruction of all chemical weapons are justifiable because, during the 10-year period proposed, the possibility of the use of such weapons will continue to exist. Therefore it is advisable that the Conference should consider the reduction of this time-limit to the shortest possible and that during this period of time all the stockpiles should come under international supervision.

In the meantime, progress in the formulation of the chemical weapons convention should not prevent us from progress in other areas of disarmament. If the use of chemical weapons has given an incentive to expedite

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

deliberations on the banning of chemical weapons, we hope that the international organizations will not wait for the same experience to move towards nuclear disarmament.

Technological and scientific advancements pave the way for new military theories, and this by itself is a starting point for new scientific development causing revision in military strategies. The gap between technological progress and military doctrines constantly neutralizes the disarmament measures and leads to quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons. This is at a time when the threat of accidental nuclear war remains unchecked.

On the other hand, possession of nuclear weapons by Israel and South Africa intensifies this peril. If the present trend continues unabated, then other countries inevitably will resort to nuclear weapons to guarantee their own security and, in a short while, any political or military tension will be a recipe for nuclear confrontation. Despite all the warnings and concern about the consequences, the world has on many occasions been dragged to the verge of a nuclear war and catastrophe. The amount of nuclear weapons present in the world is sufficient to annihilate the world several times over. Yet the lunatic arms race is continuing unabated and, on the other hand, the talks on nuclear disarmament between two major nuclear-weapon States are proceeding very slowly. Since between 1 and 2 per cent of the nuclear arsenals is enough to erase civilization from the face of the globe, disarmament by less than 95 per cent will not be effective. The nuclear-weapon States, therefore, shoulder a very heavy responsibility to arrive at the earliest possible agreement for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. The prerequisite for moving towards this goal is denunciation of nuclear deterrence through a balance of terror. The means of destruction of human civilization should not serve as a guarantee of national security. The constructive proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000 has not yet been translated into practical terms. The pledge of some nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any condition has not received the consent of all parties although it by itself is not sufficient. Under these circumstances, we hope that scrapping medium-range missiles from Europe and Asia will be a first effective step towards universal disarmament.

We are of the opinion that a ban on nuclear tests is among the agenda items which should receive high priority. The continuation of nuclear tests has not only intensified the nuclear arms race but has also imperilled human life. The studies show that, should nuclear tests continue till the year 2000, the resultant radiation will cause the early deaths of 150,000 people in the world, of whom over 90 per cent will be from the northern hemisphere.

Regarding the pledge of nuclear-weapon States not to threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, although the most effective guarantee is a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States should meanwhile announce their adherence to this decision through internationally-binding commitments. We hope that the ad hoc Committee dealing with this subject will be able to reach tangible results.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The unabated nuclear arms race has gained momentum in such a way that it is going to contaminate outer space soon. It seems that the whole globe is not vast enough for the super-Powers to fill it with terror. Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and using it for any other than peaceful purposes is a crime against mankind. The development of space weapons has complicated the race qualitatively and has entangled the trend of nuclear disarmament with more complexity and problems. We believe that strengthening the legal régime for outer space can prevent the escalation of the arms race in new domains.

There is nothing to substantiate the claim that military satellites have a stabilizing role. If the presence of reconnaissance satellites is necessary in space, this can only be acceptable under strict international observance pending comprehensive disarmament. It is unfortunate to say that no sizable progress has been made in any of these areas. I hope that, by finalizing the convention on chemical disarmament the Conference will be able to gain momentum towards solving other disarmament issues.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, since I have the floor for the first time under your presidency, I wish to express the deep satisfaction of my delegation in seeing you perform in such a successful manner the important duties of President of our Conference. The relations between our two countries are those of traditional friendship and close co-operation. It is also my personal pleasure to have the opportunity to work with you once again and to benefit from your vast professional experience, which you display anew in guiding so skilfully and efficiently our work during the month of July. I wish also to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, for his able chairing of our meetings during the first month of the summer session.

The Conference has been honoured today by the presence of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati. We have listened with interest to his statement.

We shall be missing our colleagues who intend soon to leave, or who have already left the Conference, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria. We wish them every success in their important new appointments.

Today I wish to speak only on two items of our agenda, "Negative security assurances" and "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

As you know, Bulgaria has always considered the security of non-nuclear-weapon States in the nuclear age as an important matter. My delegation is also co-ordinator of the socialist countries on this agenda item. Those countries have repeatedly reaffirmed their interest in advancing

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

the consideration of this subject. It is so because we believe that the need to strengthen the security of non-noclear-weapon States in the present circumstances has not decreased. Some negative developments have underlined the urgency of arriving at international arrangements to effectively, uniformly and, possibly unconditionally assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We believe, therefore, that the Ad hoc Committee on item 6, working under the chairmanship of Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, should not give up its efforts to find a meaningful common solution of the problem -- a solution which is acceptable to all and could be vested in an international instrument of a legally-binding character.

In the Ad hoc Committee, my delegation has pointed out that various specific measures may be useful in seeking to increase the security of non-nuclear-weapon States:

Non-use of nuclear weapons in general would best serve this purpose. The CD has been requested to start the elaboration of an international legal instrument to exclude the use of nuclear weapons;

Pledging of non-first use by all nuclear-weapon States, not by China and the Soviet Union only. Such undertakings would have an important confidence-building effect;

Regional security arrangements, either unilateral or multilateral, providing for non-use assurances to States parties to agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Tlatelolco Treaty and the Treaty of Rarotonga now appear as two major elements of a future network of such arrangements that have been opted for by many non-nuclear-weapon States in various regions of the world. My country has, as you know, been actively pursuing this goal in the Balkans. One week ago, Bulgaria and Greece adopted at top political level a joint document aimed at undertaking practical actions to establish a Balkan nuclear-free zone. They appealed to all Balkan countries to take part in this process and expressed their determination to make bilateral contributions to this effect. We strongly favour also the conclusion of an international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

This "global approach" to the negative security assurances problem has been discussed for several years already in the Ad hoc Committee on item 6, still inconclusively. We regret that those States which practise a policy of nuclear deterrence based on first use of nuclear weapons have not yet deemed it proper to re-examine their position -- a fact which has appeared as a major obstacle to completion of the negotiations. We recognize, however, that there have been some -- perhaps still academic -- attempts to rethink the security perceptions of at least some of those States. Suggestions to this effect have recently been made by representatives of various schools of strategic thinking. We look forward to seeing appropriate formal actions at State level reflecting the growing need for fresh political and military approaches to urgent security problems. Such a doctrinal reassessment may help also this forum to arrive at a common solution on negative security

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. In the search for a solution to the NSA problem, priority should be given to the legitimate security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which, by virtue of forgoing the nuclear option and of not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories, have every right to be most effectively guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They do deserve this, since there is no way such States can become a source of nuclear threat to other nations.

The socialist countries believe that the Ad hoc Committee on item 6 should try to solve the difficult problems relating to the substance of the negative security assurances. It is our firm conviction that a fresh approach is really needed if we are to find a meaningful solution. Recent developments in international politics provide a reliable basis on which to seek for and arrive at such an approach. I will confine myself to mentioning the important political understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States of America that "a nuclear war can not be won and must never be fought", which should have positive impact on the subject of negative security assurances as well; the non-first use tendencies at doctrinal level which are slowly becoming a standard prerequisite of strictly defensive military postures; the positive results of the Stockholm Conference in building confidence between European States; the Berlin document on the military doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. All these developments may encourage us to explore new ways and means to resolve the problem of effectively and uniformly assuring, in a legally-binding way, non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

An interesting new proposal has been tabled in document CD/768 by the delegation of Nigeria. My delegation has extensively commented on it in the Ad hoc Committee and will continue to take part in its future consideration. We concur with the basic thrust of this proposal seeking to find a way out of the present impasse and put the NSA problem back on the negotiating table. The Ad hoc Committee will, however, need some time before being able to reach a common solution which would be in line with the non-proliferation commitments of many of the States represented in this Chamber and could be submitted to the next United Nations special session on disarmament.

The Ad hoc Committee on item 5 has been discussing the subject of prevention of an arms race in outer space for three consecutive years. This session it is working under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy. In spite of the efforts of many delegations to move us closer to some kind of agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the current proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee are widely perceived as repetitious in many respects of the Committee's work last year. The decreased intensity of the Committee's deliberations might well be indicative of an already exhausted and apparently inadequate mandate. What we need now, and maybe next year, is more concrete, purpose-oriented and structured work on this item, with the eventual identification of points of convergence in the positions. Elaboration of specific treaty language and mutually agreed definitions on areas of generally recognized interest could well be the most logical next step in our work. The proposals put forward would be a natural focal point in this respect.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

A subject which already seems ripe for concerted action is an agreement on an ASAT ban. The existing legal régime for outer space places some important restraints on the nature, deployment and possible use of such weapons. These restraints do not seem, however, to be comprehensive enough. Non-nuclear ASAT weapons, for instance, could well be developed and deployed in outer space despite the established legal restraints.

We consider that there are available, at least currently, two important prerequisites conducive to concrete negotiation and early conclusion of an ASAT ban agreement. Firstly, the two leading space powers now observe an actual moratorium on testing and deployment of such weapons. Secondly, the majority of the countries today favour an early agreement to ban all dedicated ASAT weapons and dismantle the existing ones. Many CD delegations have already tabled specific proposals on how to achieve such a ban.

Appropriate measures, designed also to produce a confidence-building effect, could lead us to the accomplishment of this objective. Ensuring the immunity of satellites and, possibly, their associated ground stations, for example, may be viewed as an important step towards attaining an ASAT ban in a more comprehensive and realistic manner. Such an agreement could take care of the need to prevent development, testing and deployment of new dedicated ASAT weapon systems and to eliminate the existing ones. There could also be a prohibition of the use of force against space objects. Such a provision would have the merit of outlawing interference with the normal functioning of space objects by systems which usually serve other purposes but could, in principle, be used in an ASAT mode. This would address the problem of the so-called dual-capability space weapon systems.

The view has been expressed in the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 that the problem of dual-capability systems might present certain difficulties in banning all dedicated ASAT systems. Such apprehensions do not seem, however, to be justified. There are ways to overcome possible difficulties in this respect. The key criterion to be used, for example, in assessing the actual capability of a system to be a military significant ASAT weapon could be the testing of such systems. Opponents of a CTB have insistently tried to convince us that nuclear testing is of immense importance for ensuring the military significance and reliability of new weapons designs. If we are expected to believe such an argument regarding the CTB, I fail to see why we should have to belive otherwise in the ASAT context. To be reliable, a space system meant to perform ASAT functions should be tested extensively enough in such a mode. Given the existing monitoring capabilities of each side, these tests cannot remain hidden. Thus, military significant ASAT systems would inevitably be known to the other side, something that would facilitate verification of the ban on them.

Another reservation with respect to the suggested agreement on satellite immunity contends that, under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, space objects are already protected against use of force. We do not recognize the importance of the Charter in international law. A careful consideration of Article 2, paragraph 4, in its entirety would, however, reveal that its provisions actually prohibit the use of force against

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

the territorial integrity and political independence of States. It seems very hard to imagine how the specific case of outer space -- this common heritate of mankind -- could reasonably be linked with the notion of "territorial integrity and political independence of States". A more feasible alternative is the elaboration of a special agreement to provide immunity for satellites, which would specifically complement and enhance the general provisions of the Charter.

In my statement of 2 April this year, I dwelt in detail upon a valuable idea relevant to all measures providing for the non-introduction of weapons into outer space. I refer to the Soviet proposal of 3 February 1987 to establish an international inspectorate for the purpose of verifying such agreements. The concrete elements of this proposal deserve very careful consideration. The suggested team of international inspectors could serve to monitor the implementation both of an ASAT ban and of a comprehensive prohibition of the deployment of any other type of space weapons. The Ad hoc Committee should, in our opinion, take up the proposal seriously and examine, in practical terms, its specific provisions.

All the Ad hoc Committees are entering now that final stage of their proceedings in which delegations will start considering the respective reports. We hope that these reports will reflect some progress reached during the current session. My delegation believes that such a development could lay the ground for even more productive work in the following session of the Conference, which may well be the last one before the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to myself and my country. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, to begin with, I would like to congratulate you very warmly on the assumption of the presidency of our Conference for the month of July. It gives me satisfaction to see this important office entrusted to the representative of a country with which the German Democratic Republic enjoys deep friendship and close co-operation. We have already benefited from the valuable service you are rendering to the Conference thanks to the many years of experience and your diplomatic skill.

My delegation welcomes the presence at our Conference of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We listened with great attention to his important statement.

I regret very much, Mr. President, that your predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi, will leave the Conference. I take this opportunity to thank him once again very sincerely for his work as President of this forum and for his friendly way of co-operating with my delegation. I wish him good luck and all the best for his future activities. That is exactly what I wish also to our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria. My delegation is also sorry that Ambassador Cromartie will no longer be present

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

at the Conference. I wish him good health and I shall always remember him in particular for his dedicated work as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I take great pleasure in welcoming in our midst a good old friend, Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. I am certain that the excellent relations existing between our two delegations will be maintained under his ambassadorship.

Today I would like to make some observations on item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". But, before I come to that, let me comment briefly on the most recent developments regarding the envisaged elimination of medium-range and operative-tactical missiles.

All relevant statements at this Conference have made it clear that we are well aware of the far-reaching implications an accord between the USSR and the United States in that area would have for the entire disarmament process and the strengthening of international security. Everyone is agreed about that. The German Democratic Republic believes the successful conclusion of the negotiations currently under way would literally constitute the key with which the door to disarmament can be opened wide. The impact on the work of the Conference would unquestionably be a positive one, since the mere commencement of the negotiations brought about a significant improvement in the political climate.

A few days ago, General Secretary Gorbachev granted an interview to the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, in which he presented a new offer aimed at giving a fresh impetus to the negotiations and bringing them closer to a conclusion. The Soviet Union is totally renouncing medim-range and operative-tactical missiles, based on the concept of the double-zero option. Given reciprocity, it will, therefore, no longer insist on retaining 100 warheads for medium-range forces in its Asian territory, as was agreed in Reykjavik. Thus, it does appear comprehensible that the Soviet Union expects the United States not to increase its nuclear presence in certain regions of Asia. It is up to the other side now to remove the remaining stumbling blocks obstructing progress in the bilateral negotiations. And this would have to include the destruction of United States warheads for Pershing-1A missiles.

In making this new proposal, the USSR has met the wishes of Asian nations. At the same time, it has drawn our attention to the need for, and the concrete possibilities of, promoting disarmament security and confidence in the Asian and Pacific region. Obviously, this is of special interest to the countries in that part of our planet. The very discussion about the global double-zero option has, however, seen all sides stress the worldwide dimension of disarmament and security. That is why my delegation welcomes all relevant efforts not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the globe.

Let me come back now to item 5. In a few months, it will be 30 years since the signals of Sputnik 1 were first received, signals which ushered in the space age. The striving to put weapons in outer space and to create regional SDI offshoots is today casting shadows over the prospects space is holding out in terms of peaceful uses. There is not much time left to ensure, through international agreements, the exclusively peaceful use of outer space including the immunity and protectin of satellites.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese has been doing a useful job. A valuable set of ideas and proposals has been accumulated and a rather good basis has been laid for conrete, businesslike and goal-oriented work. To this end, working papers have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament by, for example, Italy (CD/9), the Soviet Union (CD/274 and CD/476), Canada (CD/678 and CD/716), Pakistan (CD/708) and Venezuela (CD/709/Rev.1). Item 3 of the Committee's work programme, entitled "Proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space", should really be used to conduct discussions and, later on, negotiations on appropriate measures.

In the course of the debate, various delegations have addressed the question of what a treaty banning ASAT weapons should look like and how the immunity of satellites could be ensured in a legally-binding manner. At the plenary session on 24 July 1986, my delegation described the principal elements which it felt ought to form part of a future treaty. Today, I intend to develop a number of ideas which concern the scope of a future accord, verification of compliance, and the relationship between a ban on ASAT systems and the peaceful use of outer space. In so doing, I will take into account suggestions and proposals put forward by various other delegations.

Even though the Committee has not been able so far to agree on the objects to be protected in outer space, it seems to us that a common denominator is emerging on what the envisaged treaty should cover. The assumption to proceed from, in this context, is that there are no weapons in outer space and that, consequently, all objects in space must be protected. Given this assumption, it should be within the scope of the treaty to: (a) ban the use of force against any space object; (b) prevent the deliberate destruction or damaging of space objects; (c) prohibit interference with the normal functioning of any space object; (d) proscribe the development, production or deployment of ASAT weapons; and (e) provide for the destruction under international control of any ASAT weapons that may already exist. It ought to be possible on this basis to meet the concerns expressed by a number of delegations, which have said that it would be difficult to distinguish between dedicated and non-dedicated ASAT capabilities. "Rules of the road" or a "code of conduct" could find their place under the type of scope I have outlined just now. It goes without saying that all these things require in-depth study.

Ensuring compliance is undoubtedly one of the most crucial and thorniest problems. Various options would be conceivable individually or in combination: (a) broadening of information exchanges on trajectory parameters and functions of space objects; (b) use of national technical means of verification; (c) creation of a multilateral consultative mechanism complementary to other forms of consultation; (d) establishment of an international inspectorate provided with far-reaching powers, including the right to conduct stringent on-site challenge inspections. The details of these measures and methods need to be worked out.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In this connection, allow me to comment briefly on the role an international inspectorate could play. The USSR delegation has suggested the establishment of such an inspectorate for the purpose of verifying that no weapons are deployed in outer space. The proposed body should, for instance, have the right to conduct on-site inspections of all objects designed to be launched into and stationed in outer space. The creation of that inspectorate would also be of major importance for ascertaining compliance with a future ASAT accord. In fact, the inspectorate would serve to verify reliably the non-deployment of whole classes of possible ASAT weapons. With this Soviet proposal and the French suggestion that an international satellite monitoring agency be set up, plus Canada's PAXSAT concept, a full-fledged system of possible verification measures is shaping up. At this stage, it would seem desirable to probe its potential. Therefore, the Ad hoc Committee should have a closer look, in the near future, at all the issues related to that matter, preferably by enlisting the help of experts, who could function as a working group of the Committee.

In view of the above-mentioned possibilities, an international inspectorate would be quite capable of verifying the non-stationing of ASAT weapons in outer space. As for verification in regard to ground- and air-launched ASAT weapons, it may be a good idea to draw on the experience gathered also in other disarmament negotiation fora.

There is another aspect of broad importance for the verification of compliance with multilateral treaties. Their effective operation is in the interests of every signatory. It is against this background that my delegation believes it to be necessary to discuss how information on compliance, obtained by national technical means could be made available to all States parties, either directly or through a multilateral machinery.

We must seek not only to prohibit arms in outer space, but also to advance co-operation in peaceful research into and use of outer space. Any disarmament agreement will have to be a direct contribution to the strengthening of international collaboration. This very endeavour is behind the proposal the Soviet Union tabled on 10 June 1986 concerning the establishment of an international outer space agency, which could be placed in charge, among other things, of monitoring compliance with multilateral treaties. This idea was pursued further in the Soviet proposal that an international centre for joint space technology research for developing countries should be set up with the assistance of the leading space Powers.

There is no denying that an intrinsic interrelationship exists between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its peaceful use by all peoples. We should always think of that in our practical work.

Nobody is overlooking the problems negotiations on the prohibition of ASAT weapons will be posing. To point them out is a legitimate thing to do. The time is ripe, however, to proceed to their solution.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and to my country. This concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there any other member who wishes to take the floor at this time? I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Just a comment on Ambassador Rose's remarks: I appreciated his statement and found it very interesting, but I would just remind the Ambassador that the discussion of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces was a proposal that the United States tabled five or six years ago, and Chairman Gorbachev's recent acquiescence on that came after five or six years of deliberations. I would also point out that, as far as the Pershings are concerned, that is a matter for the Federal Republic of Germany. It involves their sovereignty, and not the United States and the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States for his comments. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I do not want to comment very extensively on the remarks just made by the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, but it was always my understanding that the warheads of the Persing-1As are in the ownership of the United States. Maybe I am in error?

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. von STULPNAGE (Federal Republic of Germany): I wish just to remand the Conference that my delegation set out the view of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on this question a few weeks ago.

The PRESIDENT: May I now turn to another subject? As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I intend to suspend this meeting and to convene an informal meeting of the Conference to deal with the proposal of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/515/Rev.3. Immediately after, we shall resume our plenary meeting to continue our discussion of that document. The plenary meeting is supended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.15 a.m. and resumed at 11.25 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: the 425th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I now put before the Conference for decision document CD/515/Rev.3, submitted by the Group of 21 and entitled "Draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament". I should like to know if there is any objection to the draft mandate.

I give the floor to the representative of Belgium.

Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium) (translated from French): I wish to make a statement on behalf of the Western Group. The Western Group is somewhat disappointed to see draft mandate CD/515/Rev.3 proposed once again for decision by the Conference. That has been done without consultation with the Western Group, which cannot share the view that the submission of this draft mandate will facilitate discussion on this agenda item. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that we are once again unable to associate outselves with a consensus on this draft mandate.

The Western Group attaches great importance to agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". For many years, we have repeatedly emphasized, both within this Conference and in the General Assembly, that we are ready to have an indepth discussion and exchange of views on this important issue. This year, too, we have shown outselves willing to renew our efforts to define within this Conference an appropriate framework for indepth consideration of this agenda item.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that my Group attaches the greatest importance to concrete policies and actions aimed at preventing all war, including nuclear war. We share the view expressed by the leaders of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in their joint communiqué of November 1985 concerning the importance of avoiding all war, nuclear or conventional, between them.

The PRESIDENT: Are there any further speakers? I give the floor to the representative of China.

Mr. FAN GUOXIANG (China) (translated from Chinese): Prevention of nuclear war, an issue of universal concern to the peoples of all countries, has all along been placed on the agenda of this Conference as a priority item. For the past several years, delegations of all member States have on numerous occasions conducted discussions and consultations on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this item. The Chinese delegation has all along been opposed to the nuclear arms race and attaches great importance to the issue of prevention of nuclear war. On many occasions the Chinese delegation has stated its positions and views on this issue and it has submitted its working paper, CD/691.

We maintain that the CD should intensify its work on this item, including through the establishment of a relevant subsidiary body. In our view, the Group of 21 has all along attached importance to this item and the draft

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

mandate submitted by this Group contained in document CD/515/Rev.3 is a rational one for which we express our support. Meanwhile, we can also agree to the CD carrying out its work on item 3 in other forms.

The PRESIDENT: I give the floor now the representative of Bulgaria.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): As everybody knows, the Group of Socialist Countries considers the prevention of nuclear war an issue of the highest priority. We believe that concrete negotiations can, and should be undertaken to elaborate urgent measures to help prevent a nuclear war. The socialist countries have always maintained that this issue should be addressed in a comprehensive manner, considering all related matters. To this end, a number of specific proposals have been put forward by our Group and by members of the Group of 21. This underlines our firm belief that the solid bases for starting such negotiations do exist and an appropriate subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament should be established for this purpose. The Group of Socialist Countries fully supported the formal proposal for a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference as contained in document CD/515/Rev.3 of 21 July 1987 submitted by the Group of 21. The establishment of such a committee would have permitted the Conference to consider, as a first step, all proposals relevant to agenda item 3, including appropriate practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. In a United Nations General Assembly resolution, A/RES/41/86 G, the overwhelming majority of the international community requested the Conference on Disarmament "to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures which could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1987 session".

I must reiterate the urgency of adopting measures on the prevention of nuclear war. The socialist countries firmly believe that, as was stated in the Berlin Declaration on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty States in May this year, "in the nuclear and space age, the world has become too fragile a place for a war and politics of violence. ... A world war, notably a nuclear one, would have disastrous consequences not only for the countries directly involved in such a conflict, but for all life on Earth".

The Group of Socialist Countries will continue to accord priority to item 3 of our agenda and to insist on the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body of the Conference to deal with it in concrete and practical terms. The draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 is realistic and has taken into account other delegations' points of view. Thus, it could have represented a meaningful basis for productive joint work. Consequently, we regret all the more the unwillingness displayed by the Western delegations to join in the consensus and to allow the Conference on Disarmament to make its concrete contribution to the efforts in this area.

The PRESIDENT: We have listened to the representatives of the various groups on this topic. In view of the exchange of the views held at this plenary meeting, I have to state that there is no consensus at present on the draft mandate contained in document CD/515/Rev.3. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage?

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. TEJA (India): Mr. President, earlier this month, I had the occasion to congratulate you and to convey the assurances of our delegation's co-operation in the discharge of your responsibilities. Today, as this month draws towards an end, I would like to compliment you on the able and efficient manner in which you have conducted the work of the Conference during this month. Today, we have also had the privilege of listening to the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Ali Akbar Velayati.

We, the Group of 21, would like to express our deep regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3. We have shown ourselves ready to exchange views on this subject here, or in the General Assembly, but some delegations have been unable to accept this view, perhaps because they attach different priorities to this item.

I do not need to emphasize the importance that our Group attaches to this subject. We believe that the greatest peril facing the world is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war and that consequently the removal of this threat is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. While nuclear-weapon States possess the primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear war, all nations have a vital interest in the negotiation of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, in view of the catastrophic consequences that such a war would have for mankind. The Harare Declaration adopted at the eighth non-aligned summit also emphasized this point, and I quote: "use of nuclear weapons, besides being a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, would also be a crime against humanity. In this regard, [we urge] the nuclear-weapon States to agree, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, to the conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

It is a matter of grave concern for all delegations present here that no progress has been possible on this item since its introduction as a separate item on the CD's agenda in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/183 G. During these years the arms race has accelerated, leading to the expansion and introduction of still more lethal warheads into the nuclear weapon stockpiles. The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on this subject.

During the 1986 session of the General Assembly, there were three resolutions on this subject, which were adopted with overwhelming majorities. Two of these resolutions, A/RES/41/60 F, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", and A/RES/41/86 G, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", were introduced by members of the Group of 21.

I would like to recall here the results of recent atmospheric and biological studies which indicate that, in addition to blast, heat and radiation, a nuclear war, even a limited nuclear war, would trigger an arctic nuclear winter, freezing the Earth into a darkened frozen planet. The conclusions of the studies have already been compiled in a report by the Secretary-General. In view of the irreversible consequences, it is clear that

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

conventional wars cannot, under any circumstances, be equated with nuclear war, since nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. In view of this unique destructive character, invoking the Charter to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right to self-defence against conventional armed attack is neither legitimate nor justifiable.

We remain convinced that the shortest way to the removal of the danger of nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons and that, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. We have welcomed the declaration of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". Now is the time to translate this will into a binding commitment.

In deference to the position of the other delegations, the Group of 21 has put forward, in CD/515/Rev.3, dated 21 July 1987, a non-negotiating mandate that will permit a thorough consideration of all aspects -- legal, political, technical, military -- of all the proposals before the Conference. We believe that such consideration will not only contribute to a better understanding of the subject, but also pave the way for negotiations for an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Such an objective cannot be achieved through discussions in the plenary or informal meetings. We are disappointed, therefore, that, despite the urgency accorded to this subject and the flexibility displayed by the Group of 21, we are witness to the spactacle of the CD not being able to justify its own mandate, which comes from the General Assembly and is reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We would like to hope that the gravity of the matter will lead to a rethinking on the part of those who have expressed reservations concerning the mandate proposed by the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement on behalf of the Group of 21.

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I should like to recall that the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances will meet in this conference room immediately after the adjournment of this plenary meeting.

In accordance with the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference this week, I should also like to recall that, on Thursday, 30 July, immediately after our regular plenary meeting, we shall have an informal meeting to consider the report of the Chairman of the Group of 7 on "Improved and effective functioning of the Conference". That informal meeting will be followed immediately by an informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 30 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 July 1987, at 10. a.m.

President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)

GE.87-62978/9943E

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 426th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues its consideration of agenda item 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

May I recall that, as envisaged in the timetable of meetings being held this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting immediately after this Plenary Meeting to receive the report of the Group of Seven on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. That informal meeting will be followed by another informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Yugoslavia, Australia, Czechoslovakia and the United States of America. I now give the floor to my first speaker, the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, may I again congratulate you, the representative of friendly Ethiopia, on your presidency for the month of July and on your able discharge of high responsibilities during your term of office. I would like, too, to express my appreciation to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, for his dedication and wise guidance of the Conference during the month of June.

I extend my best wishes to Ambassador Dhanapala in the directorship of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). My best wishes also go to the departing Ambassadors of Nigeria and the United Kingdom, Ambassador Tonwe and Dr. Ian Cromartie. We are grateful for their contribution to the work of the Conference.

I take this opportunity to warmly welcome amongst us the new head of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the new Ambassador of non-aligned Sri Lanka, Mr. Nihal Rodrigo, and the new head of the delegation of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja. I wish them all success and fruitful work, and they can count on my full co-operation.

This year's session of our Conference is drawing to a close. I do not intend to discuss what has or has not been done in the Conference in the course of 1987. It is clear that, notwithstanding some achievements, the Conference has fallen short of the major objectives for which it was created, in particular in the vital area of nuclear disarmament, which has not been tackled in a substantive manner at all. Instead of reviewing the situation with regard to individual agenda items, I would like to dwell upon the role of our Conference in the broader context of the dialogue on disarmament.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

We are approaching a period in which it is realistic to expect intensification of international efforts to reduce armaments and to move towards disarmament. The international activities in the field of disarmament, whether on the regional, bilateral or the global level, have never been broader, more synchronized and more substantive than today. This does not mean that we are entering an era of global understandings. Nevertheless, the situation is changing for the better. At hand are the first agreements in the last decade. The dialogue itself, no doubt, and irrespective of the level on which it is conducted, is in essence an expression of confidence.

Next month will see the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in New York. The Conference is expected to redress the negative impact of the arms race on the world economy and welfare in an attempt to channel the vast resources away from armaments into the growth and prosperity of developed and developing countries alike. Let us hope the former will support it.

The forty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly will undoubtedly review a number of disarmament and security issues and add momentum to negotiations. It should also set the date for the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. SSOD-III is expected to give political impetus to accelerating the disarmament process. Drawing on the lessons of time, it should also strengthen multilateral negotiations and incorporate them in existing tendencies in security and disarmament policy-making in a changed environment, and work out realistic and forward-looking objectives. What we need today are not new and all-encompassing documents -- we have a lot of them -- but concentration on international action and mobilization of all potential.

These global activities are accompanied by regional ones, like those in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), including efforts to transform the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation, the Raratonga Agreement on the South Pacific, etc.

Encouraging is the fact that conventional weapons are more and more present in disarmament approaches. Due to technological evolution the destructive and destabilizing effect of these weapons is close to other weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, the stockpiling and development of these weapons poses a direct threat to the security of a number of countries.

On the bilateral level too, developments in the negotiations between the two militarily most powerful countries raise hopes that some agreements are imminent. This is of wider significance, because nowhere in the world have weapons of mass destruction been so densely concentrated in such a limited space as in Europe.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Reassuring is the convergence of views on verification as a political vehicle towards greater transparency, as well as the acceptance of strict and binding methods. That would permit not only verification of compliance with a treaty, but also the accumulation of experience for new treaties. Above all, this is a test of political will and interest in a new method of negotiation which is more political than technical in character.

Coming back to our Conference, how does the Conference as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament fit into these processes which entail a number of new approaches? This question has to be posed, because our work will soon be thoroughly examined by SSOD-III.

The answer to this question is not an easy and simple one. There can be no doubt that the Conference as the negotiating mechanism is more needed by the international community than ever before. Perhaps there were some unrealistic expectations, but it was not possible to make a move forward without an optimistic vision.

In order to answer this question, we should critically evaluate the conditions in which our Conference has deliberated, and the manner in which we have conducted our work. Needless to say, the Conference on Disarmament cannot alone change the strategies, perceptions and realities on which the relationships between the arms race and the disarmament process are estabished, and between the disarmament process and security. But what is needed and required of us is to make our full contribution to the clarification of this problem, to mutual information, and to preparatory work in particular. Our primary goal, as set out in our "charter" (paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I), is to negotiate and conclude an agreement. Yet progress towards agreement is nowhere so incremental and complex as in disarmament. In particular, it is hard to overcome the concepts relying on force or the possibility of using force in a situation when the danger caused by nuclear weapons looms large and when the military and political blocs act as separate and opposed systems of security. In addition, there are many political and technical issues that need to be clarified. For nowhere else are the disparities between aspirations, needs and possibilities so apparent as in the field of disarmament.

The foremost task of the Conference is to negotiate, but this requires stimulation of other negotiations and generation of wider common interests and broader understanding. My delegation favours direct negotiations on all issues. But we are aware that the conditions are not similar everywhere, and that not all actors in this process are equally willing to negotiate.

We have achieved significant progress towards the elaboration of a convention banning chemical weapons. But this cannot replace our failures on on other key issues. It is incumbent upon us to contribute to ways of expediting the implementation of the international consensus where it exists, and of creating it where it is still non-existent.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

The functioning of the Conference shows that, despite good intentions, it is often blocked by insistence on procedural matters at the expense of the Conference mandate as laid down in the Final Document of SSOD-I. The position of my delegation is that we should strictly abide by this mandate and give it precedence over organizational matters.

The efforts made so far to stop the "game of mandates" have been to no avail. It was useful therefore that a group of seven experienced colleagues was set up to examine the constitution of the Conference in the light of the new needs and new experiences. They are on the right track, judging by initial results. True, they addressed only two problems. But that is understandable.

In order that the work of the Conference may be expedited and its mechanism used in the best possible way for substantive consideration of the issues on the Conference agenda, it is indispensable that the mandates of the subsidiary bodies be based on the mandate of the Conference itself. Rather than reformulating the tasks of the subsidiary bodies through separate mandates, emphasis should be put, as my delegation has repeatedly stressed, on substance. This, in turn, is better reflected through programmes of work than through mandates. That is why we have always advocated the creation of conditions in which every opportunity offered should be used to deal with substantive issues, instead of letting them be tackled elsewhere. We have to actively participate in the solution of these problems.

It is high time that we looked as frankly into the roots of our inefficiency. What is the point of going back at each session to the very beginning, of agreeing on the agenda and re-establishment of the subsidiary bodies which have already been established? We should do all we can to ensure full continuity in our work, respect all that has been done thus far and move forward.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words expressed to the presidency, and I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Our next Plenary Meeting will take place in the month of August -- the month in which substantive work comes to its end and we begin the process of formulating our report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This year's report will be the ninth annual report of the Conference on Disarmament in its modern form. It will be the last annual report submitted to a regular session of the General Assembly prior to the convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

No doubt a special report on the work of the conference will be drawn up for submission to the third special session. But there is a clear sense in which, during the next few weeks, we will be bringing to a conclusion the first decade since the modern Conference on Disarmament was established. It is because we are conscious of this turning-point that I propose today to address a number of subjects on the agenda of the Conference and some other aspects of our work. But there is another reason. Since I last made a statement in the plenary session of this Conference a new Australian administration has been established, and ministers have now been sworn into office, following the conduct of national elections in Australia on 11 July. In those elections a Government formed by the Australian Labor Party was returned to office for an historic third successive term.

The Minister under whose portfolio responsibility falls for Australian Government policy on the work of this conference remains Mr. Bill Hayden, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Mr. President, as I have made clear in previous statements, the maintenance of peace and international security, and a deep commitment to the role that measures of disarmament must play in maintaining that peace and security, remain policies of the highest priority to the Australian Government.

Within our disarmament policies it continues to be the case that we attach amongst the highest priority to the forging of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time. We have pursued this policy both multilaterally and bilaterally. At the General Assembly of the United Nations we have co-sponsored, with New Zealand and others, a resolution calling for such a treaty. Our resolution has been unique with regard to its scope and with respect to the role that it has envisaged for the Conference on Disarmament -- to carry out the practical work that is required to ensure that, when such a treaty is able to be forged politically, it will be able to operate immediately.

At last year's General Assembly there were a number of resolutions on the nuclear testing issue. Our resolution attracted the highest level of support. But I do not make this point in any sense competitively. It would be wrong to have such a narrow outlook when what is at issue is so important. There is in fact little difference between the numbers of votes cast on the two main resolutions on nuclear testing.

My point, rather, is that our resolution provided the focus for the most remarkable and significant degree of convergence of views on the nculear testing issue seen at the Assembly during the last decade. States from all political and geographical groups voted for the resolution. No one voted against it, and the number of abstentions was also consistent with the phenomenon of an extraordinary convergence of views.

A study of that resolution shows that what States were converging around was the simple, central idea that we should waste no further time in this Conference in formal dispute about mandate language or in other forms of shadow play. Instead we should agree, without delay, that this Conference resume practical work on the key issues involved in a nuclear-test ban treaty.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

That resolution, 41/47, also called for the immediate establishment of a global seismic monitoring network.

So, Mr. President, what went wrong?

Nine months after the passage of that resolution, and just a few weeks before the end of our work for 1987, no ad hoc committee has been formed and another year of delay in practical work towards a treaty has occurred. Why was the convergence demonstrated at New York in November last year not seized by this Conference between February and August this year? Perhaps it is not possible to be exact, and if it were, it might be counter-productive to give expression to an exact answer to this question.

But in general terms what is clear to every interested delegation in this room is that the clear majority of members of the Conference on Disarmament voted for our resolution, and were and are prepared to solve the mandate question on a reasonable and flexible basis and then get on with practical work.

I believe the implication of what I have just said is clear, but let me be very clear. We in this Conference have been prevented from doing that work by the smallest handful of delegations. Such a result is always possible in a conference that works on the basis of consensus, and it would be pointless to carp about that result because it is clear that the nature of work on disarmament agreements, given their substance, requires that consensus be the rule.

So what we have to do is build consensus. May I mention that, in the MacQuarie Australian dictionary, consensus is defined as a "general agreement or accord, a majority of opinion". Now I admit that no dictionary is perfect, even an Australian one But the point I am making is that the rule of consensus should not in practice mean the rule of veto.

By the way, the MacQuarie dictionary provides four definitions of the word veto, and perhaps the most apposite of them for our purposes here is "to refuse to consent to".

Consent, consensus is what must be built, because even those who have withheld consensus on the majority approach towards work in this Conference on a CTB never say that they are against such a treaty.

It is perhaps irrelevant that an outsider could be forgiven for interpreting their actions as constituting precisely such opposition. What is important to us, in this Conference, is that they say they want a test-ban treaty. What is deeply disheartening is that, in the name of that policy, they in fact prevent us from working on the treaty in the only practical way in which that work can occur in a Conference which operates on the rule of consensus.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

We must appeal again to those who have withheld consensus from what is clearly, in the words of the dictionary, the "majority of opinion", to reconsider their position because of the importance of the test-ban issue as such and in the life of this Conference.

Because there can be little doubt that the Conference's failure, once again, to work directly on the test-ban issue will be judged harshly when the work of the Conference is reviewed at the third special session.

I mentioned that we Australians have acted both multilaterally and bilaterally on this subject. With regard to our bilateral actions, it is sufficient to say that we have discussed repeatedly with other States our concerns regarding an end to nuclear testing, and we have entered into agreements such as our bilateral agreement with New Zealand on seismic monitoring designed to advance work on the verification régime required for a nuclear-test ban.

It will not be surprising to anyone to hear me report that in our bilateral discussions we have found a deep and widespread conviction around the globe that the promise to end nuclear testing, made three decades ago, must be fulfilled as quickly as possible.

Finally, with regard to the nuclear testing issue, the Group of Scientific Experts is at work this week and next and we expect that, inter alia, consideration will be given to the Australian proposal for the immediate establishment of a global seismic monitoring network.

The work of the Group of Scientific Experts is an example of how we can proceed irrespective of the unresolved issue of a mandate. But we must proceed on both fronts, the political and the technical, so that both of these aspects of a ban on nuclear testing can be joined together at the earliest possible time and give us a treaty.

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban is not the only item on our agenda relating to nuclear weapons. Indeed, concern about nuclear disarmament is more than adequately reflected in the agenda of the Conference. Our ability, or some would say inability, to work on measures of nuclear disarmament in this Conference touches upon the fundamental issue of the role of the Conference. Repeatedly in this Conference declarations and demands are expressed with regard to nuclear disarmament.

Expressions of concern, statements of what is desirable, are always important politically and morally, and this is surely especially the case with regard to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons. The Australian Government shares the view that nuclear weapons constitute a central problem in the field of arms control and disarmament. We believe that radical reductions in nuclear weapons should be achieved as soon as possible, and therefore we welcome the commitment, made by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

We certainly agree too that even though the overwhelming number of nuclear weapons are held by only two States, all States are or must be concerned with the issues of survival raised by the existence of the nuclear arsenals.

It is therefore legitimate for non-nuclear-weapon States to express their concerns about nuclear disarmament and to seek to work within the multilateral disarmament machinery towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. What has been made clear to us, however, is that the two major nuclear-weapon States prefer, at least at the present stage, to conduct their nuclear-arms control and disarmament negotiations bilaterally. We can understand the reasons for that preference, and we have made that clear in both their capitals, just as we have made clear in those capitals the urgency and importance we attach to the implementation of their stated policies on nuclear disarmament.

These circumstances do mean a limitation upon the role that a Conference such as ours may be able to play, at present, in negotiating measures of nuclear disarmament. But this is not to say that it is pointless for the Conference to discuss nuclear disarmament in the way that it is presently able to.

We believe that such a discussion should have two main outcomes, both of which are important. First, it should serve as a means of making clear, repeatedly, to the nuclear-weapon States the concerns of the world community in the field of nuclear disarmament and chiefly, of course, our fervent wish that such disarmament be brought about without delay. Second, it should demonstrate that the multilateral machinery is available for the development of treaties or agreements of a wider kind than might be encompassed by bilateral agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament, as and when multilateral action is required.

Some might say that such an approach is merely to allow us in this Conference the crumbs from the table. We would dispute that view, and say instead that this approach holds out the prospect of a larger table at which we can all be seated as we move towards a safer world, a world from which nuclear weapons are disappearing.

But our participation will not be assured, or will not come early, if the debate we hold on the nuclear issues in this Conference becomes a forum for accusation, distortion of reality, or even abuse.

In the informal consultations under item 2 of our agenda, for example, we have heard the extraordinary assertion by one major nuclear-weapon State that the nuclear arsenal it holds, its strategic and targeting doctrine and its alliance relationship in some way does not constitute deterrence, whereas the nuclear-weapon posture and alliance relationship of its opponent does. Now, apart from being intellectually unrespectable, such an argument hardly encourages the future use of this forum, the future integration of this forum into the development and management of a non-nuclear world.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Other States have assigned priority to attacking the doctrine of deterrence on the ground that it inevitably generates an arms race. Clearly, what is had in mind here, but never stated, is the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Again, we wonder whether such a specious argument enhances respect for the role and possible future role of this Conference.

Surely the distinction should be drawn between the unhappy reasons for which nuclear arsenals have grown -- and those are substantially reasons of mutual political apprehension and military and foreign policies -- and the doctrine under which those arsenals have been deployed.

In addition, deterrence cannot be assigned a purely nuclear status. There are key and disturbing instances of competition in arms on a regional rather than a global level, and such competition has taken place typically in conventional arms. In these cases too, surely the competition in arms which we have witnessed is the product of mutual suspicion and military and foreign policies, rather than the "automatic" mechanism of a deployment doctrine such as deterrence.

I do not wish to be misunderstood for a moment on this subject. My Government believes deterrence is a flawed doctrine. And it certainly knows that it is practised by all nuclear-weapon States, and indeed in certain regional situations by States armed with conventional weapons.

Because we believe that nuclear deterrence is a flawed doctrine, because we believe that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", we believe that measures of nuclear disarmament are required urgently. Such disarmament would reduce if not remove the need for anyone to rely on nuclear deterrence.

We know that the only way in which nuclear disarmament can be achieved is through the negotiation of balanced and verifiable agreements. We see that process under way today between the two major nuclear-weapon States, and we welcome it. Indeed, we wish them success in their negotiations, and as soon as possible.

We do believe that this Conference can and should play a role in what we see, now, as a global trend leading towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

The objective of preventing an arms race in outer space appears to be shared universally, although there is some disagreement about how this can best be achieved and who should bear the primary responsibility for achieving it.

My delegation acknowledges the significant responsibility of the two super-Powers in this field. As the distinguished Ambassador of Japan has pointed out, progress in their bilateral negotiations has a critical impact on our discussions in this Conference. But we are also firmly convinced that the international community, through the multilateral disarmament machinery, must play a role in assisting in the fulfillment of this urgent task, not least because outer space is not and will not be used exclusively by the two super-Powers.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

It is also true that existing and future uses of outer space have and will have a profound impact on the security of all States.

The crucial issue that needs to be addressed by the international community if it wishes to prevent an arms race in outer space is the need to monitor the military uses of space, and in particular the issues of whether the space Powers can agree not to use space for purposes that others consider would require a response, defensive or otherwise, and whether compliance with a non-arms-race régime can be verified effectively.

Regarding the first question, this is a matter currently under negotiation between the two major space Powers, and is of course inextricably linked with efforts to halt and reverse the arms race on Earth. However, it is also relevant to the activities of other space-using States. In seeking to determine whether the international community needs to devise additional legal instruments in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, a thorough understanding of what the existing legal régime covers is a fundamental prerequisite.

It is our view -- and we believe that it is also the view of the majority of delegations here -- that the existing legal régime is not a foolproof guarantee to prevent an arms race in space. The application to space of general international legal norms, including the provisions of the United Nations Charter, as for example reference to the right of self-defence, does not necessarily reduce or significantly diminish the prospects of an arms race in outer space.

Preventing an arms race in space involves, in our view, preventing the development and deployment of arms against space assets, not just the prevention of the use of force in space. For example, the existing legal régime offers very little in the way of specific protection for satellites. The variety of views which there is on the meaning of such terms as "peaceful uses", "militarization" and "stabilizing" introduces a wide area of uncertainty and ambiguity into attempts to establish what are permitted or prohibited uses of space, and into attempts to define which satellites should be protected.

The question of whether compliance with a non-arms régime can be verified effectively is, of course, of fundamental relevance to our work. It is true that with ever-increasing technological sophistication, verification of what functions space objects are capable of performing becomes increasingly difficult. But we must not forget that sophisticated technologies are also helpful in devising increasingly sophisticated techniques of verification.

This Conference can and should make a contribution in the area of verification, not least because the technology is not limited to the major space Powers alone. This was admirably demonstrated by the workshop and the presentation given to us in the Conference on Disarmament on the PAXSAT concept by the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

In this respect, I would like to address briefly verification proposals regarding the possibility that surveillance and monitoring functions of satellites should be entrusted to an international agency.

Australia supports the concept of international means of verification as an extension of the principles that the issue of global stability are the legitimate business of every nation, and that together with the right to be heard on these issues comes the obligation to play a full role in making possible a more stable and secure world with a minimum level of armaments.

We also believe that national technical means will need to be supplemented by new measures, and that they will need to be protected for the indefinite future.

We therefore see an international satellite monitoring agency as a positive contribution to existing arms control efforts in terms of its verification, confidence-building and transparency objectives.

Such an agency might also help to provide for a system which could verify that the threshold between permissible and non-permissible military uses of space, once identified and agreed upon, is not crossed.

But considerably more work needs to be done in defining the scope and application of the proposal -- technological feasibility and cost being two major factors.

The concept of an international satellite monitoring agency is yet another area where this Conference clearly has the resources to make its own contribution towards seeking the most effective ways and means of meeting the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The effectiveness and viability of the existing and future legal régime pertaining to outer space ultimately depends on two factors -- participation in and compliance with such a régime, and the ability of States parties to verify that the agreements are being complied with. This involves both a political decision as well as adequate technological means to support that decision. That decision will be based on a cost-benefit analysis of whether an agreement is cost- and security-effective, and whether it will deter non-compliance.

Accordingly, this Conference must continue to seek to demonstrate in a scientific and rigorous way on what basis we might need additional multilateral agreements to regulate activities in outer space, and how this might practically and realistically be achieved.

Several statements have been made in the plenary recently about the current state of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. Concern has been expressed that the negotiations are marking time, that there has been a change in atmosphere.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

If there has been a perceptible slowing of the pace of the negotiations, we should not be discouraged. The rapid progress which was recorded during the latter part of last year and in the first half of this year naturally gave rise to expectations that the momentum would be sustained. But the convention we are negotiating is a complex one. And progress cannot always be even. Indeed, we have reached a stage now where we have narrowed the remaining issues, but those issues necessarily require careful consideration and discussion in order to arrive at solutions. This is the process we are now engaged in.

It is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the initiative of the Chairman of the CW Committee in holding informal open-ended consultations yesterday on the key subject of challenge inspection.

We all recognize the importance of reaching agreement on a challenge inspection régime for inclusion in the convention. Thus a number of proposals and ideas have been put forward by delegations. I believe we are building a solution through a process of careful consideration and discussion of the various component parts which have been suggested. We encourage Ambassador Ekéus to continue the initiative which he has taken on this suject.

Important work has also been undertaken during the current session on, inter alia, the important questions of commercial super-toxic lethal chemicals, and the composition, powers and functions and decision-making of the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council.

In addition, a very productive two-day meeting of chemical industry representatives was held which made a significant contribution to our consideration of aspects of the convention relating to the civil chemical industry.

So a lot has been going on, and we have hardly been marking time.

Clearly, the need to conclude a convention as early as possible continues to be of vital importance.

Australia, like other members of this Conference, deeply deplores the fact that chemical weapons continue to be used. The conclusions of the United Nations team of experts that chemical weapons have once again been used recently in the Gulf war is a matter of the deepest concern to us.

Simply, the use of chemical weapons must cease.

We also share the view that has been expressed by other delegations that all members of this Conference should indicate whether or not they possess chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities. Several countries, including Australia, have indicated that they do not possess such weapons or facilities, but many member States have remained silent. They should break that silence. It would contribute to the strength of the convention to which we are all committed if each member of this Conference were to frankly state its position. Otherwise, confidence in the convention will be seriously undermined.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The CW Committee's report for this session will record the substantial progress made so far this year in the negotiations. But it is imperative that the process of negotiation continue after the formal conclusion of the Conference session. As in previous years, we strongly support the carrying out of inter-sessional work, at the very least in the same pattern as existed last year. We cannot afford to let these negotiations falter. Useful work is being done, it must be sustained so that we can achieve the objective of a comprehensive convention as soon as possible.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is a project the Conference has had in hand for a number of years. It should be completed this year.

The work on the programme has been intensified, and my delegation believes that the interests of the Conference would be best served by it being able to send forward to the General Assembly a programme if not completely then certainly substantially free of disputed sections. Such a result will be able to be obtained if delegations show the necessary flexibility and avoid as far as possible reopening differences which have been resolved or set aside in the past.

Our action on the comprehensive programme of disarmament is not only intrinsically significant but will, like the nuclear-test ban issue, have a direct bearing on the review of the work of this Conference which will take place at the third special session of the General Assembly.

Later today the plenary will consider in an informal session two papers which have been prepared by the Group of Seven. One of these papers relates to the preparation of our annual report. In the view of my delegation, the suggestions made in that paper should be applied to the preparation of this year's report.

Those suggestions are based on established practice and some new approaches. If applied, they would ensure the production of a report which would be factual, clear and freed from some of the sterile and repetitious recording of disputes which has been characteristic of past reports. I think we would do credit to the Conference by acting, now, on these proposals.

The other paper relates to the establishment of subsidiary bodies of the Conference. In the view of my delegation, it provides a sensible solution to the problems we have experienced in the past with respect to mandates for such bodies.

This issue is perhaps more complex than that of the preparation of our report, and may be one on which further reflection by the Conference is required. My delegation will take part in such reflection and discussion. It is sufficient for me to re ord, at this stage, that we believe the generic mandate provided to the Conference in paragraph 120 of the final document is sufficient for the effective functioning of the Conference, and does not need supplementation or modification.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Related to this is the possibility -- and I mention this merely for consideration -- the possibility that the terms of rule 23 of the rules of procedure may, in fact, derogate from what is stated in paragraph 120.

What we Australians want to see is an end to the argument about mandates in a situation where the Conference in fact has a generic mandate. Instead we believe that it would be valid for there to be a thorough discussion of -- and indeed, as appropriate, negotiation on -- a suitable programme of work for each subsidiary body, because such a discussion or negotiation would relate to substance, whereas the discussion we have had in many cases in the past with regard to mandates has related merely to form.

In conclusion, I recognize that some of what I have said this morning in this statement has been critical of Conference procedures and results. I want it to be clear that it has been my purpose to be constructively critical, because any other approach would be contrary to the policy of my Government towards this Conference. That policy is one of full support to this Conference, and to the process of the multilateral negotiation of disarmament agreements.

Simply, we want to see this Conference work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. I now give the floor to my next speaker, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, in my statement today I am going to express the position of a group of socialist countries towards the work of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Before doing so, however, I would like to express the regret of my delegation over the fact that Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt will soon be leaving us. I will miss him both as my neighbour in the CD and as a partner with whom I had excellent relations. Let me also bid farewell to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom. We wish him a speedy recovery. Within the same perpetual process of our colleagues coming and going, we welcome the new representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, and the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja. I am certain that the excellent relations my delegation had with their predecessors will continue.

As we all know, the task of elaborating a CPD was advanced at SSOD-I, and the complete draft was to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament, which took place in 1982. The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was one of the first committees established by this body back in 1980. Since 1981 this Committee has worked under the chairmanship of Ambassador Robles of Mexico, and his tireless efforts, supported by many delegations around this table, gradually led to the drafting of texts on practically all basic problems of disarmament. Even today, five years after SSOD-II, I still see around this table some of us who participated personally in the effort to finalize the draft CPD so that it could be sent to the United Nations General Assembly in

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

time and completely free of brackets. And it has to be emphasized that we almost succeeded. We offered SSOD-II a draft CPD with the overwhelming majority of its provisions jointly agreed. Just a very limited number of problems remained in brackets. Unfortunately, these bracketed parts contained some high-priority items, like the nuclear-test ban or the prevention of nuclear war.

During SSOD-II and afterwards, a long and arduous debate took place on whether a CPD without these priority measures of nuclear disarmament could be agreed. The position of the socialist countries was and continues to be that a comprehensive programme which did not in its first stage encompass the achievement of a nuclear test ban, effective measures aimed at the prevention of nuclear war and initial, specific measures of nuclear disarmament would by no means be comprehensive and would not ensure the commencement of a process of nuclear disarmament, let alone general and complete disarmament. At the same time, the members of the socialist group proceeded from the fact that the CPD should build on the Final Document of SSOD-I and should in no way be a step backwards from that document. Let me point out that this basic position was shared by an overwhelming majority of delegations participating in the work on a CPD.

For a number of years after SSOD-II the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD focused on the bracketed parts of the draft programme, hoping that the countries which insisted on these brackets would reconsider their approach and would finally stop blocking the consensus on the international strategy towards general and complete disarmament. In the meantime, the members of the socialist group advanced, at the highest level, comprehensive proposals suggesting a framework for a gradual, stage-by-stage approach to the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In this regard let me mention especially the proposal made by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986, suggesting a three-stage programme which would, by the end of this century, ensure that nuclear weapons as well as chemical and other weapons of mass destruction disappeared from the face of the Earth. No one can deny that this initiative has much in common with the concept of the CPD discussed so far, and that its individual provisions would fit well into the standing draft CPD.

As time went by some disarmament problems gained new importance, in view of recent developments in arms technology and the threat emanating therefrom. This applies, in the first instance, to the problem of prevention of an arms race in outer space. Almost five years ago it was preliminarily agreed to place a couple of paragraphs on outer space within the section on "Related measures". But a reservation on the part of many delegations, including the socialist countries, on the placement of these paragraphs in the CPD, was attached to it. It is becoming increasingly clear that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the central problems affecting efforts to stop the nuclear-arms race and to proceed to nuclear disarmament. It is not by chance that space arms have become a subject of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was thus only appropriate to suggest that a new, more prominent place be found in the CPD for the section on outer space, preferably within the main section on disarmament measures.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In view of the fact that our Conference had been requested to submit a finalized draft CPD to the forty-first United Nations General Assembly session before it formally concluded its work, and also bearing in mind the approaching SSOD-III, the delegations of the socialist countries presumed that all participants in the CD would now focus on an effort to increase the agreed parts of the draft CPD and to reduce the area of discord and find generally acceptable formulations for still bracketed texts. It was sincerely hoped that the spirit of give and take which characterized the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD in the past would regain ground. Unfortunately, the opposite seems to have taken place recently. The United States delegation, with certain support from some of its allies, has apparently reassessed its approach towards the CPD and launched a process of bracketing a large number of provisions which had already been agreed previously. That applies to a number of important aspects of nuclear disarmament, the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, zones of peace, verification, the principles, priorities and objectives of the CPD and some of its other parts. It is most disquieting that even some key formulations of the Final Document of SSOD-I are now being disavowed.

The socialist countries have always approached work on the CPD in a constructive and flexible way, trying to understand and take into account the positions and preoccupations of other delegations. But if it is now suggested that we should engage in a process of revising the Final Document of SSOD-I and bringing the draft CPD back to an even more contentious stage than what we started from in 1981, the only answer to an invitation to such a course of action will be resolutely negative. We cannot agree that the CPD should be brought into line with the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which envisages a first use of nuclear weapons and reliance on it for the indefinite future.

We continue to maintain that the only way to achieve a meaningful comprehensive programme is to include in it specific measures which would lead towards cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and which would ensure that no weapons are placed in outer space. We are also in favour of dividing the CPD into stages, it seems that three stages will be the most practical approach, with the inclusion of time frames, even if they are only indicative in nature. The socialist countries have already clearly stated that they are prepared to agree to a ceremony of signature of the CPD that would emphasize its high political significance.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me express to you personally good wishes in the performance of your further diplomatic duties. It was nice to have you here again, and the manner in which you conducted our deliberations proved that you still belong to the Geneva multilateral disarmament mafia, even if you now work on the other side of diplomatic duties, namely bilateral relations.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, in his plenary statement on 28 July, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran described recent attacks with chemical weapons against his country by the military forces of Iraq. He reminded us at that time that such attacks violate the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Foreign Minister also expressed bitter disappointment that the international community has done little to stop such attacks.

It is extremely unfortunate that these important points were accompanied by charges that the United States "is condoning deployment of chemical weapons in the war and justifies its control only in peacetime". This, of course, is an unfounded statement.

Quite the contrary -- the United States Government has deplored and strongly condemned the illegal use of chemical weapons whenever and wherever it has occurred, specifically the repeated violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by Iraq. The United States has also established export controls to help curb the flow of chemicals that could be used for weapons.

The reaction of the international community to the use of chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq war has been meagre. This has very serious implications for the effectiveness of any future convention banning chemical weapons. If vigorous action is not taken by the international community when there is clear-cut evidence that people are being killed by chemical weapons, can we expect vigorous action against less dramatic violations, for example, of a prohibition on possession of such weapons? The United States calls upon other nations, especially other members of the Conference on Disarmament, to join in condemning the use of chemical weapons to prevent erosion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and to make clear that compliance with existing agreements is essential to progress in arms control.

The United States will continue to remind others that treaties that can be violated with impunity, offer nothing but a false sense of security. That is why delegations in the Conference on Disarmament must concentrate on negotiating a chemical weapons convention that is truly verifiable, in order that nations can be confident that violations will be detected. The international community must not look the other way when violations are discovered.

The United States has condemned the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war, and has called on the warring parties to put an end to the bloodshed by agreeing to end the war itself. It is in this spirit that the United States supported the recent United Nations Security Council resolution, adopted by unanimous vote, I believe, which, in addition to deploring the use of chemical weapons, includes a call on Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate cease-fire as a first step towards a negotiated settlement.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

In this connection, I refer to comments made by officials of the United States just this week. On 28 July, Assistant Secretary of State Redman referred to the recent Security Council resolution, noting that the United States wants the war to end and both parties to facilitate the Secretary-General's efforts to make the resolution work. He added that the United States welcomes steps by both Iran and Iraq to decrease the tension and the level of violence on land, sea and air. The same day, Assistant Secretary of State Murphy told the United States Congress that while the United Nations Secretary-General works to implement the initial resolution urging a cease-fire, the United States will press for a second resolution containing enforcement measures should either party refuse to comply under the first resolution.

The United States opposes the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, as well as opposing the war itself. Our position is clearly on the side of peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this time? I see none.

I wish now to put before the Conference the timetable for meetings to be held during next week. It has been prepared in consultation with the incoming President of the Conference, as well as with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. It is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If I see no objection, I shall consider the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: This being my last plenary session, I would like to make a few concluding remarks.

We had, as you know, both formal and informal meetings of the Conference. In particular, informal meetings of co-ordinators were held during the month of July to consider matters dealing with certain agenda items.

Draft mandates for an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban were under discussion before my presidency. The draft mandate emanating from the Group of 21 was considered by two other groups in the CD to be a good basis for negotiation. However, further progress was not possible on the basis of this initiative. As I stated at the time of my assumption of the presidency, one cannot over-emphasize the fact that a nuclear-test ban deserves the highest priority in the multilateral negotiating forum. Initiatives directed towards this goal should therefore receive positive responses in the future lest the international community judge the CD for failing to exercise the responsibility entrusted to it.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

With respect to item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", it will be recalled that three informal meetings were held in which discussions were guided by the list of topics provided by the President of the Conference for the month of June, and within the terms of reference described by him in his statement at the 415th plenary meeting of the Conference.

We have not found an acceptable organizational framework to consider agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Consensus could not be achieved on the draft mandate presented by the Group of 21 for an ad hoc committee on this item, despite the fact that the position was supported by two other groups.

The Group of Seven on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference under the chairmanship of Ambassador Fan of China will introduce its report to the informal meeting of the Conference.

Existing organizational arrangements still cannot satisfy all the requirements of the ad hoc committees, especially in the case of those which are reaching a critical stage in their work. Following a meeting with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been provided with additional meetings since its report needs to be submitted to the resumed forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. The secretariat has also arranged for additional meetings for the seismic group now in session.

On several occasions I have raised with the co-ordinators the question of expansion of the membership of the Conference, and particularly how to deal with the section of the annual report dealing with this question. There is no new movement in this regard, and therefore it would seem that the secretariat will have to rely on decisions already taken by CD and on past experience in drawing up draft reports on the item.

So much for organizational and logistic matters. But what about progress in the substantive work of the CD? The Conference is about to conclude its 1987 session. During the month of August, much of the remaining time will be devoted to the preparation of the report to the forty-second session of the General Assembly. It seems appropriate, therefore, to recall some of the unresolved issues and the rationale behind them.

The Conference has been unable to reach agreement on the establishment of subsidiary bodies on a nuclear-test ban and on the prevention of nuclear war and related matters. This was not feasible despite the position of the two major nuclear Powers declaring that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". Unable to arrive at a negotiating mandate for the ad hoc committees on these agenda items, the CD continues to face serious obstacles in achieving the objective of halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects. Both formal and informal statements, endorsed and documented by previous studies, have reminded us again that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, and that those member States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

The grim scenario following global nuclear catastrophe includes the fact that any survivors of a first strike will have to live in a "nuclear winter" condemned to a state below the prehistoric level. This has been vividly described in the statements and studies. Is this where the world is consciously or unconsciously proceeding to? It seems that no country or groups of countries can afford to ignore this question. Nor should anyone fail to recognize the risks and the consequences of a nuclear war.

The question should not be how effectively nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction can be used. It is rather how effectively and reliably they can be prohibited. For as long as such weapons exist there will be the possibility that they will be used, and such a first use would open the way for further use of nuclear weapons, thus escalating the process which may end in disaster. It is also a fact that over the last decade and half an increasing consensus had emerged among States on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The expected breakthrough in the elimination of shorter- and intermediate-range nuclear forces will no doubt reduce anxiety and mistrust which causes and constantly feeds the arms race.

Resolutions related to disarmament adopted at the forty-first session of the General Assembly have been referred to by many speakers as guidelines for the work of the CD. I shall refer to the message embodied in a few of them, for it is likely that they will reappear in the CD's future work.

In recent years in many parts of the world, mass peace and disarmament movements have been demanding the cessation of weapon tests and the arms race in outer space and its termination on Earth.

The political declaration adopted by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, believed that the renewed escalation in the nuclear-arms race, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war.

The Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, called upon the CD to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Ensuring security on an equal basis for all States and in all spheres of international relations, as called for by the General Assembly in resolution 41/92, would strengthen the collective security system embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

In making this statement I wish to underline the fact that the most crucial task of the Conference remains that of conducting negotiations to ban weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, before it is too late.

Before concluding, I wish to express the hope that the ad hoc committees will reflect some progress in their reports to the Conference in their respective mandates.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

I am particularly grateful to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and to his deputy Ambassador Berasategui, as well as to the members of the secretariat, for their assistance to me and for their highly competent and efficient work. My gratitude also goes to the interpreters for their highly professional work.

I wish Ambassador Morel of France, the next President of the Conference for the month of August and the remaining part of the 1987 session, success in his work.

This concludes my remarks. As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, the Conference will immediately after this meeting hold an informal meeting on its improved and effective functioning, followed by a discussion on the substance of agenda item 2. I have another announcement. At the request of the Chairman of Contact Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, I wish to inform delegates that an open-ended informal consultation will be held this afternoon at 3 p.m. in room C-108.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 4 August at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CD/PV.427
4 August 1987

ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 August 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

GE.87-63029/0020G

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 427th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to start by making a statement.

First, I would like to thank my predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe, for the very effective way he presided over our meetings during July, and to express to him the gratitude of all the members of the Conference. I would also like to convey to him on behalf of all of us our very best wishes for the success of his mission in Bonn. I should also like to welcome the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo, and the representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Azambuja, on behalf of France, and assure them of my delegation's full co-operation. I would also like to express personally my regret at the departure of Ambassador Ian Cromartie, head of the delegation of the United Kingdom. His work as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons made it possible, in particular, to take a decisive step forward in the negotiation of the draft convention. I would ask the delegation of the United Kingdom to be kind enough to convey to him in London my wishes for his speedy recovery.

Serving as President in the month of August is not an easy task. That is a point on which I think the Conference can easily reach a consensus, to judge from the encouragement I have been given by my colleagues. I think that one may even speak -- for once -- of a rare unanimity. In other words, I feel that this presidency is an honour to my country, but it is also a heavy burden for me and for my delegation. Believe me when I say that I will do everything I can to ensure that our work runs smoothly, and you can be sure that I will also call on your experience and your good will, individually and collectively. I would like to thank you for that in advance.

Preparing the report is the main task in August, even though we must not neglect the continuation of political work on each of the items on the agenda, when that is possible. The moment has therefore come to step back and take an overall look at the work accomplished during this session. A number of delegations have already started to do this, and now we must all prepare together the balance sheet of our activities. And it is in this spirit that I would like to take a brief overview and propose a few reflections on methods.

First of all, on nuclear matters, the situation for the first three items on the agenda is well known. For item 1, the nuclear test ban, will it be possible to break out of the present impasse at the last moment? For item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", a final informal session of the Conference is scheduled for next Thursday. As last year, these meetings have proved to be a useful complement to our discussions in plenary, by allowing more direct and more lively exchanges. On item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", the absence of a consensus might offer an opportunity for some reflections concerning what is to follow. For my part, I wish only to stress as President that I remain available to delegations for any new contribution on agenda items where there is no agreement on the procedure to follow, that is items 1 and 3, which I have just mentioned, and also item 7, weapons of mass destruction. More generally, I would like to note that on nuclear matters, where my country's position is

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

well known, we are engaged here in various forms in a very lively debate on the question of nuclear deterrence. This exchange is important because it goes back to what is basically at stake in security in the world of today.

It is natural that on this point we should have different views, even very different views. Nuclear matters are and will long remain a source of controversy. It is enough to call up the explosion of Hiroshima 42 years later, give or take a couple of days, to see that it retains its dual nature. It is a terrible event that goes beyond its time and place to make us think of the very destiny of mankind, but it is also a decisive turning-point in the history of international relations. Today I would simply like to express the wish that the necessary continuation of this discussion, both during this month and in future sessions, will avoid becoming a sort of ideological confrontation, leading instead to joint thinking on conditions of security, in which no one can say he has had the last word. On this topic, more than any other, we must continue the dialogue along the road of reason.

Second, on the subject of chemical weapons, I think that all delegations are aware of the importance of the month of August, when we have to adopt the report of the Committee, an important part of the final report, while still as far as possible pursuing work on substance, including the most sensitive items. The Ad hoc Committee, under the very active chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, helped by the three group co-ordinators, Messrs. Nieuwenhuys, Macedo and Krutzsch, has already made considerable progress during this session. Although it may seem that their pace has slowed in recent weeks, this is because we have been able to isolate the main problems which will require very thorough discussions so as to produce solutions that are acceptable to everyone.

We can already weigh up the constructive work that has been done in the negotiation of the various parts of the draft convention. On the essential matter of the procedure for challenge inspection, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee is seeking the necessary clarification. I would add that the recent meeting of industrial experts made a useful contribution to consideration of the aspects of the Convention relating to the civilian chemical industry. As President, I must also remind you that delegations must rapidly take a decision on the possible continuation of work during the period between the sessions, as happened in previous years. This decision is now becoming urgently necessary, if only for practical reasons concerning the scheduling of the resources required.

Third, regarding the other items on the agenda, I will simply note that the preparation of the reports of the committees seems to be proceeding smoothly, and express the wish that they will be adopted rapidly and in the best possible conditions.

However, I would like to refer to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, which has entered a very active phase. We are coming up to the deadline set by the General Assembly for transmission to it of the draft programme requested at the first special session of the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We must all hope that the Ad hoc Committee will be able to produce a text which will, to the greatest possible degree, reflect a consensus on the various elements of a document which should constitute a disarmament guide for the international community. In view of the special effort that this deadline implies, special arrangements have been made for next week, thanks to the kindness of the other ad hoc committee chairmen. We must hope that the result will be commensurate with the effort made.

I would also like to report on the first results of the work of the Group of Seven chaired by Ambassador Fan of China on improving the procedures of the Conference, which have just been presented to the Conference. This is a set of issues that deserves close and attentive examination. Everyone can see that the effectiveness and therefore the influence of the Conference are at stake. In particular, we must try not to take too procedural an approach to the questions of procedure. Initially, we must improve the Conference's report to the forty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and prepare the way for a better procedure for the subsidiary bodies. Let us try, during this first exercise, to work in the same spirit as that which governed the work of the Group of Seven.

I must also bring up a topic that is not on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament but one which we cannot ignore during this month of August: the relationship between disarmament and development, bearing in mind the Conference which is to be held in New York starting on 24 August. There is an inevitable overlapping of activities here which I feel particularly acutely because I participated personally in the launching of this initiative at the beginning by the President of France. I understand all the better the inconvenience this deadline might cause for various delegations during the third week of August, and I would like to express the hope that in order to deal with this constraint we will work even more effectively and harmoniously so that each delegation will be able to perform a useful function both here in Geneva and in New York.

Finally, I would remind you that the Conference must continue its efforts to put into effect the expansion in membership decided upon in 1983.

These, my dear colleagues, are the few thoughts that I wanted to outline to you at the beginning of this month, the last month of the 1987 session. They reflect my concern to make as much as possible of the potential offered by the Conference in large matters and in smaller ones. I think that we have a sort of appointment with ourselves, as happens each year in August, but also because of the upcoming deadline of the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Once again, we are led to acknowledge the limits and shortcomings of the Conference. But should we therefore throw in the towel or shut ourselves away with our bad consciences? The answer I suggest is: No, quite the contrary. Following the example of the wise men of antiquity, we must recognize what does not depend on us so as to adapt to it -- knowing the world around us moves, and moves fast. And we must recognize what does depend on us, so that we may tackle it actively, together and without delay. That is the invitation that I address to you today, an invitation to join forces at an important moment.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

Turning to today's work, the Conference is starting its consideration of item 8 of its agenda, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who wishes to raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

On my speakers' list I have the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Romania and Mongolia. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, allow me to begin my brief statement by cordially congratulating you on behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on your assumption of office. Since you joined the Conference, you have demonstrated your great diplomatic skills. In this last phase of the session, I am certain we can all benefit from your excellent abilities. Please count on my delegation's support and good will. I take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia who guided the work with judiciousness and dedication, and I express a very warm welcome to Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja of Brazil, to whom I wish good luck in his work, and I look forward to fruitful co-operation.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is an international task of the highest priority. There is far-reaching agreement on that. In an effort to speed up the conclusion of a treaty and, at the same time, pave the way for a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, the USSR has just recently submitted a draft treaty in its bilateral negotiations with the United States. The German Democratic Republic welcomes this initiative. I think the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, too, will have to make its contribution to ensuring that no type of weapon is stationed in outer space and that space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Many delegations believe that the Conference should devote more attention to practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. It was in this context that I presented some ideas in my speech of 28 July on what a treaty banning ASAT weapons could look like and how the immunity of space objects could be guaranteed in very practical terms.

Today I would like to introduce, on behalf of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic and my own, a working paper in which we suggest the main provisions of a future treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects. The paper has come out as CD/777. It focuses on the scope of such a treaty, compliance with its provisions and the safeguarding of the peaceful exploration and use of outer space for the good of all peoples. Various verification methods and techniques are proposed, among them on-site challenge inspections under the auspices of an international inspectorate. Information obtained through national means, as well as data on launch parameters and the general function of space objects, should be made available to all parties to the treaty.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

We offer this document as a basis for discussion and trust it will be useful in the ongoing search for understanding at the Conference, especially in the Committee on agenda item 5. In conclusion, I wish to thank the secretariat for having distributed our working paper so promptly.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for his kind words to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, His Excellency Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I should like to congratulate you most heartily on your accession to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. Our satisfaction is particularly great in that you represent France, a country with which Romania has had traditional relations of friendship and co-operation in all fields. We are convinced that you will guide our efforts with skill and wisdom as this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament enters its final phase.

I should also like to express our very sincere appreciation and our warmest gratitude to the representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe, who steered the work of the Conference with such devotion and effectiveness during the month of July. I should also like to underscore here how much we have appreciated the activity and co-operation of the distinguished representatives of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie, and Nigeria, Ambassador Tonwe, who have recently completed their assignments to the Conference. We should like to express to all our colleagues who have left us or are going to leave us our best wishes for good health and success in their future endeavours.

Allow me lastly to extend a very cordial welcome to the distinguished representatives of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, the United States, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, and Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, and to express the hope that we will enjoy the same close co-operation with them as with their predecessors.

One might say that, more than ever before, international life is characterized by the search for ways and means to move to concrete disarmament measures. In that context, Romania has consistently come out in favour of the implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, focused on the elimination of nuclear armaments, which should also include measures to reduce conventional armaments, armed forces and military budgets. We have called and continue to call for the adoption of urgent measures to eliminate all nuclear weapons in stages, between now and the year 2000, and for the independent solution of the various problems and aspects of general nuclear disarmament without tying one to another.

In Bucharest last week, the President of Romania, Nikolae Ceausescu, and the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, adopted an important declaration and appeal. The two leaders urgently called on the President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, and the General Secretary of the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, to pursue and intensify efforts to arrive as soon as possible at an initial agreement to eliminate all intermediate range missiles in order to open the path to the conclusion of further agreements required to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.

They also called for efforts to be made to arrive speedily at a complete halt to nuclear tests and the renunciation of any action to militarize space.

The declaration and appeal underscore the responsibility of European States, and first and foremost the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, to work actively for disarmament, security and peace. These countries are called upon to intensify their efforts to ensure that an agreement is reached on nuclear weapons, to support the conclusion of such an agreement, the elimination of all problems that may remain. Romania and Greece reaffirmed their long-standing position on transformation of the Balkans into a zone of good-neighbourliness, understanding, co-operation and peace, free of nuclear and chemical weapons, and supported proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones in the Nordic part of Europe and a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe.

Romania is in favour of a new approach to problems of security, national and international, which would exclude the nuclear element and would require that a military balance be established at the lowest possible level of armaments. That is why my country co-sponsored the document adopted recently by the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, on the military doctrine of those States. This doctrine is founded on the defence needs of the States parties and is strictly defensive in character, categorically excluding any offensive action aimed at other States that would impinge in any way upon the independence, frontiers or territorial integrity of other States. This military doctrine is based on the theoretical and practical conclusion that recourse to war is inadmissible given the existence of nuclear armaments, and that war must be eliminated from the life of society. The corollary of this conclusion, as well as of the principle of equal security for all States, is that the two military groupings should proceed to the identification and gradual elimination of any imbalances that may exist in the various categories of weapons, with the objective being to achieve a situation in which none of the parties, while maintaining a defence capability, would possess the means to carry out a surprise attack against another party or, in general, to mount offensive operations.

On the basis of Romania's constant position on the need for a halt to nuclear tests, our delegation has come out in favour of substative consideration, in an appropriate framework, of agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". Document CD/743 of 4 March 1987, which was co-sponsored by Romania, proposes the establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference to examine item 1 of the agenda with two working groups, one of which would study the substance and purpose of a future nuclear-test-ban treaty, and the other compliance and verification of the implementation of such a treaty. This proposal basically draws on the recommendations included in resolution 41/54 adopted by consensus at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

The provisions of the resolution also underlie the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1 of the Conference proposed by Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia in document CD/772 presented to the plenary of the Conference on 15 July 1987. The Romanian delegation supports the adoption by the Conference of a decision along these lines.

The Romanian delegation also co-sponsored document CD/756 dated 9 June 1987, presented by a number of socialist countries which are members of the Conference on Disarmament, entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". As has already been emphasized in this forum by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Vladimir Petrovsky, in a plenary meeting on 9 June, this document takes into account developments and new elements that have emerged recently in this field, particularly in so far as verification is concerned.

Our delegation welcomed the consensus achieved on the holding of special informal plenary sessions to consider substantive issues which arise in the context of agenda item 2 of the Conference, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". We consider the list of issues drawn up by the President of the Conference for June, Ambassador Saad Alfarargi, when the decision was taken on holding informal plenary sessions for item 2, offers important guidance to ensure that this work is placed within a certain framework and is structured, even if only to a modest extent. The debates thus far have gone a good way towards demonstrating the usefulness of this approach.

In the same context of nuclear problems, the Romanian delegation would like to underscore that agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war", also deserves all our attention, including the establishment of appropriate discussion machinery. The delegation of Romania would have been prepared to support the adoption by the Conference of a decision along these lines, on the basis of the proposals made by the Group of 21 in document CD/515/Rev.3 of 21 July 1987, and regrets that it was not possible to take such a decision. My delegation commends the implementation of the decision taken by the Conference on the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. We should like to express the hope that the work of the Ad hoc Committee will highlight the genuine possibilities that exist for concrete steps in this direction.

The deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space have shown once again that the existing legal régime is still a long way from being able to ensure a complete and effective ban on the spread of the arms race to outer space. It would appear that a large number of members of the Conference share this opinion.

We consider that the work of the Committee, particularly its consideration of item 3 of its programme of work, namely "Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space", have registered appreciable progress under the competent chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese which could in the future serve as a basis for a

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

substantive approach to the issues of such complexity which arise in this area. We support the proposals made by the delegations of Argentina, Venezuela and Sri Lanka, aimed essentially at drawing up a list of issues and proposals formulated to date that would offer a basis for a possible reference "rolling text" for future debates, without such a document necessarily figuring already in drafts of new legal texts.

The Romanian delegation supports the intensification of efforts to develop and strengthen the legal régime to be established by the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in keeping with the principles that have thus far underlain its elaboration by the Conference. We would like to express appreciation and thanks for the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus, and the co-ordinators of the negotiating groups. At this very advanced stage of the negotiations, all possible efforts should be made to find constructive and unanimously acceptable solutions to still unresolved problems, taking care not to jeopardize the effectiveness of the future convention either in the transitional stage or afterwards.

Our delegation also welcomes the initiation and continuation of the activities of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, under the enlightened chairmanship of Ambassador D. Meiszter. We note and welcome the positive and concrete stamp of the work, its orientation towards substantive efforts and in-depth consideration of problems in the two negotiating groups.

Like many others, the Romanian delegation attaches special importance to fulfilment by the Conference of the mandate to prepare a draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. This is a task which all regard as linked in particular to the special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It would be regrettable if the Conference was unable to present a draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for consideration at the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Our delegation appreciates and fully supports the tireless efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Ambassador García Robles, to discharge this important mission.

The fundamental problem of our era remains the cessation of the arms race, and primarily nuclear disarmament, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the radical reduction of conventional weapons, the promotion of new relations, equality and active co-operation among all nations of the world, and the guaranteeing of lasting peace on our globe. An important role in efforts to resolve this problem falls to the Conference on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating forum. We should like to express the hope that, in the short period that remains until the end of this year's session, all efforts will be made to conclude our work with the best possible results in the Conference's endeavours to fulfil the mandate that has been entrusted to it.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, His Excellency Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I would like on behalf of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic to offer my warmest congratulations on your accession to the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August, a particularly important and certainly difficult period because our tasks include the drafting of the report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. I am sure that thanks to your talents as a diplomat and your personal qualities, you will guide our work skilfully, effectively and productively. My delegation undertakes to co-operate with you in the performance of your task.

I would like to add my voice to those of preceding speakers to express to your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, our gratitude for the valuable contribution he made to the work of the Conference. I would also like to welcome the new representatives of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, and Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, and to assure them that my delegation will continue to co-operate with theirs. Finally, I would like to express my best wishes to Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria and Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt on their departure and thank them for their contributions to the work of the Conference.

(continued in English)

In his recent interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, announced the Soviet Union's decision to eliminate all of its medium- and shorter-range missiles in the Asian part of the country.

As everywhere in the world, this decision was widely acclaimed in the Mongolian People's Republic. We consider it a new and extremely constructive proposal aimed at speedy agreement on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles on a world-wide scale. We express our hope that the United States side will demonstrate the same responsible approach to this vital issue and show in deeds, not in words, its will and readiness to come to an agreement. We are highly gratified by the fact that the decision of the Soviet Government fully meets the aspirations of the peoples and States of Asia and the Pacific basin to turn this vast region into a zone of reliable security, a zone free of nuclear weapons. For us the problems of disarmament, peace and security are no less pressing than for the peoples of Europe and other continents. In addition to that, the other important proposals contained in the interview also deserve the highest appreciation -- in particular, the proposal on reduction of the number of nuclear-capable aircraft in Asia and the activities of the Soviet and United States naval fleets in the Pacific, strengthening of security in the Indian Ocean, and the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

limitation and complete prohibition of nuclear tests. In our opinion they are in full harmony with the wider conception of all-Asian security, and their implementation would considerably facilitate the lessening of military tension in our region, the strengthening of confidence and the development of constructive interaction among all States in Asia and the Pacific basin, in the interests of establishing lasting peace and security.

The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is now about to wind up this year's work. As the Co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries, my delegation ventures to sum up in a preliminary way the results of the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 of the Conference's agenda for the year 1987.

The delegations of the socialist States, determined to block every possible means by which weapons could be stationed in space, have actively participated in and contributed to the work of the Ad hoc Committee during the 1987 session, by introducing proposals which took into account the views of other States. Here I wish to recall some of them: the Soviet Union introduced initiatives on the establishment of an international inspectorate to verify compliance with an international agreement on the prevention of stationing any weapons in space, studying the possibility of eliminating existing anti-satellite systems and ensuring immunity for artificial Earth satellites not carrying weapons of any kind on board, and prohibiting weapons of the "space-to-space", "space-to-Earth", and "Earth-to-space" types. The German Democratic Republic and Mongolia submitted a draft set of "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibitons of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" which have just been introduced by Ambassador Rose; the German Democratic Republic proposed a structural discussion on item 3 of the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee; and previous proposals tabled by Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union were reaffirmed. The Ad hoc Committee has worked actively this year under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy.

However, we share the opinion of a number of delegations that the work of the Ad hoc Committee, which to a large extent repeated last year's discussions, has not made any tangible progress, despite the efforts of many delegations. This is obviously linked with the lack of new elements in the mandate and the programme of work. In fact the first two items in the programme of work, "Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space" and "Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space", have been thoroughly considered during the last two sessions. Giving careful thought to the fact that there is a limited number of international agreements constituting the international legal régime of outer space, the Ad hoc Committee has practically completed its work on the definition and identification of the existing bans and limitations. As a result it has been able to outline the areas which urgently require the elaboration of a new agreement or agreements.

During the discussions the overwhelming majority of delegations noted both the urgent need for maintaining and strengthening the existing legal régimes governing the activities of States in outer space -- first and foremost such an important one as the Soviet-United States ABM Treaty -- and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

the necessity to start serious substantive negotiations with a view to preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space. We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament is capable of carrying out this task. This sole multilateral negotiating body has on its table a considerable number of initiatives and proposals which could serve as a solid ground for further concrete negotiations.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the jointly agreed priority goals of the Conference. Unfortunately, not all States have yet come to realize this sine qua non. A number of countries, while speaking in favour of preventing an arms race, are in fact blocking the immediate start of the multilateral negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, and are attempting to replace the negotiations by purely general discussions around the problem.

Such is the thrust of statements to the effect that it would be appropriate to keep the Ad hoc Committee's programme of work in its present form for the next year. In this context, references are being made to the fact that during the discussion of the programme of work it was not possible to arrive at generally agreed positions. This is not in the least surprising, given the positions currently taken by certain States which reject even such proposals as the idea of distinguished Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina about the inclusion in the Conference's report of declarations by States members of the Conference on Disarmament that they do not possess weapons in space deployed on a permanent basis. I would like to state that the socialist countries have no difficulties with this proposal, and we are ready to include a relevant formulation in the Conference's report. In our opinion, the idea expressed at the last meeting of the Ad hoc Committee -- that the annual report should be divided into three parts corresponding to the items of the programme of work -- would facilitate a clearer reflection of the positions of all groups and a better understanding of the essence of these positions.

Now, when we come to the report-writing stage, it is necessary to give serious consideration to ways and means of making the work of the Ad hoc Committee more substantive and its activities more practical. The work of the Ad hoc Committee should be oriented to the future rather than to the past. In this respect, we believe that the work of this Ad hoc Committee should be concentrated on the existing proposals and initiatives aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which would no doubt make the work more substantive. In other words, we all should do our utmost so as not to be compelled tomorrow to talk, ex post facto, about disarmament in space.

My Government continues to consider that in the present situation, which requires immediate and redoubled efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its cessation on Earth, every State, especially those with major space capabilities, should refrain from actions contrary to this endeavour. Following this logic, we cannot but express our regret at the fact that the Government of Japan has taken a decision to allow its companies to participate in the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative, widely known as the "Star Wars" programme.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Mongolia, being an ardent advocate of the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the elimination of the industrial base for their production, is eager to make its modest contribution towards the speedy conclusion of an international convention on this subject. We believe that the elaboration of the convention can be successfully completed in the very near future if all the parties to the negotiations demonstrate their political will to reach the accords which are now so essential and not to create artificial obstacles.

One cannot overlook the fact that, during the second part of the current session of the Conference, the negotiations on banning chemical weapons have notably slowed down while there are still many major issues to be tackled. At the very outset of this year's session, my delegation suggested that the Ad hoc Committee on item 4 of our agenda should continue its work without interruption this year with a view to completing the early elaboration of the convention. This is called for both by the present state of the work of the Ad hoc Committee and by the existence of various technical questions with political implications which we will have to solve sooner or later.

The discussion in the Ad hoc Committee on questions related to the order of elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles shows that solution of this issue will to a large extent determine success not only with regard to article 4 of the convention but also the elaboration of the convention as a whole. The participants in the negotiations are well aware of my delegation's position on this score, which has been clearly formulated in working paper CD/CW/WP.162.

In my previous statements I have tried to clarify the essence of our proposal, according to which the order of elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles should be determined by comparing chemicals on the basis of their mass within categories which include chemicals of like effectiveness. Such an order solves the problem of what quantitites of chemicals are subject to destruction, including both chemical warfare agents of different categories and munitions, devices and equipment. This approach also automatically settles the problem of what should be eliminated first -- chemical warfare agents or munitions, devices and equipment -- since they are all subject to parallel and simultaneous destruction. Therefore the suggested order provides that each State party to the covention possessing chemical weapon stockpiles should in each destruction period destroy no less than a ninth of each category of its stockpiles.

It must be underlined, in this connection, that the comparison of all chemical warfare agents, especially all super-toxic lethal chemicals, on the basis of their mass, within a category or even between categories which include a wide range of chemicals, without taking into account their properties and degrees of filling, is over-simplified. In our opinion, not all super-toxic lethal chemicals are comparable. Therefore such an approach could considerably complicate work on elaborating the order of destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles.

In formulating our proposal, we proceed from the main principle of undiminished security of all States during the entire destruction period.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The convention must immediately put an end to the development and production of any type of chemical weapon, and in accordance with its stipulations all the existing stockpiles should be eliminated by the end of a 10-year destruction period. That is why we, as well as a number of other delegations, consider that the idea of creating so-called security stocks, and even the possible continuation of chemical weapon production after the convention enters into force, are incompatible with the spirit and objectives of the future convention on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to speak? I give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I appreciate this opportunity to speak, and I just want to respond very briefly to the distinguished Ambassador from Mongolia. I wanted to tell him that I certainly share his support for the progress that is being made here in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on the INF talks, but I would also want to remind him that the current proposal which he mentions that the Soviet leadership has endorsed, and which he represents as a new and constructive proposal, was originally presented in 1981 by President Reagan, and I think that he need not worry about the United States showing a constructive attitude towards this treaty.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any other speakers who wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): I listened with care to the remarks made by the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf. In that connection I should merely like to reiterate my wish that this time the United States of America will refrain from further procrastination and reservations regarding efforts to reach agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in the talks with the Soviet Union. That was merely a wish.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to remind you that the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet immediately after the plenary meeting in this room.

I would also like to inform you that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, will be the first speaker at the next plenary meeting, which will be held next Thursday, 6 August 1987, at 10 a.m. I hope that we shall be able to open the meeting punctually in order to facilitate the arrangements relating to the Minister's visit.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.428
6 August 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 August 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

GE.87-63056/7517e

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 428th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, who has come to Geneva to address the Conference. Mr. Shevardnadze's visit is the most important visit by a senior political representative of the Soviet Union since the establishment of the Conference. We are all aware of the high-level responsibilities of the Minister as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His presence here reflects the importance that the Soviet Union attaches to the Conference. I am convinced that the members of the Conference will follow his statement with the keenest interest, bearing in mind the Soviet Union's decisive role in disarmament and the present political situation.

Today the Conference continues consideration of agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, in keeping with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who would like to raise any issue relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

In accordance with the schedule for this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting immediately after this plenary meeting to take up the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. That meeting will be followed by an exchange of views on substantive issues concerning agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Argentina and Peru. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze.

Mr. SHEVARDNADZE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I am pleased to extend my greetings to you and express confidence that under your guidance the Conference will be able to achieve positive results.

There are numerous agencies in the world dealing with the misfortunes of the human race, ranging from the torment of hunger to threats to the biosphere. However, these miseries and threats cannot be eliminated unless a solution is found to the main problem -- that of destroying the material base for waging war. That is the problem of disarmament, the problem with which you are dealing as the world's only body established for that purpose.

Documents of vital importance for the future of the world have been drawn up within these walls -- the treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the conventions on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and on the non-use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes. Remarkable in themselves as major landmarks in the development of international legal thinking, they have also enhanced our common security by an order of magnitude.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

They offer proof of the possibility of a nuclear-free and non-violent world, of an era without wars or weapons, as described by M.S. Gorbachev in his statement of 15 January 1986. In other words, they were, to some extent, a prelude to the conclusion reached by the Soviet leadership following a thorough analysis of the realities of the nuclear and space age.

We may differ as to the interpretation of particular issues, but all your previous activities and the documents adopted on the basis of consensus demonstrate that, in the sphere of security, States are capable of exercising voluntary self-restraint for the sake of the common good.

We view your activities as a manifestation of new political thinking which must be built into the machinery of inter-State relations in the nuclear age.

This thinking starts with a clear understanding of the realities of this age. Not only those realities, but the words themselves -- the nuclear age -- should make people shudder. However, too many people utter them calmly, as if they were absolutely indifferent to the possibility that all the preceding ages -- the Stone or the Bronze age, the Renaissance or the Enlightenment -- which offered mankind new and increasingly more advanced methods of meeting its spiritual and material needs, will be wiped out by an age which has brought forth the means of mankind's self-annihilation.

Can we remain calm?

Can this be called progress?

Can this be considered fatally inevitable?

To all these questions the only answer is: No.

Great ideas do not grow old; they are just filled with new content. The call of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the great citizen of this city, to "the natural human condition -- equality and freedom" can and must be interpreted in the context of our time.

Such a condition cannot be attained so long as there are weapons capable of destroying all life on Earth. It is regrettable that the advocates of so-called nuclear deterrence pass over this fact in silence.

The concept of deterrence is dangerous also because it dooms all States to life in constant fear, making them nuclear hostages.

If they complete the logical chain of arguments, the proponents of nuclear deterrence must admit that it pushes one towards total nuclear deterrence -- a situation where every State would wish to acquire such weapon systems.

I am absolutely convinced that your Conference, which made the idea of nuclear non-proliferation a reality, is aware of this danger.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

Therefore, when we say that a nuclear-free and non-violent world is the only reasonable alternative to the doctrine of deterrence, we hope for a sympathetic response.

Although some have described such a world as fantasy, it is already emerging before our very eyes. Two weeks ago, prior to M.S. Gorbachev's interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, a nuclear-free world was more than 200 warheads further away from us. And since Reykjavik that distance has become shorter by almost 2,000 warheads.

If I am asked why I am referring to this as something that has been accomplished, I will say that for the Soviet Union this is indeed so. For we have done all in our power, we have removed everything that could stand in the way of an agreement based on a "global double zero".

We have dropped the condition concerning the British and French nuclear forces. We consider intermediate-range missiles separately from the problem of strategic and space arms, even though we would prefer to discuss them together. We have called for the total elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe. Finally, we have arrived at the concept of a "global double zero", that is the total removal of two classes of nuclear weapons from the Soviet and United States arsenals. It is no secret that the Soviet side would have to eliminate a significantly greater number of missiles than the United States side.

So what is holding things up now, ladies and gentlemen?

Our partners have found the snags. The main one is the Pershing 1A missiles.

We are being asked why we have raised this issue, and why we did not raise it earlier.

Let me say this. The question of what the West knew about the Soviet position, and when it knew it, is utterly irrelevant in this particular case. After all, determining which arms are to be eliminated is what the negotiations are all about.

What we are discussing in essence is which specific Soviet and United States nuclear systems with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometres should be subject to elimination. The agreement in principle on that score states that all such systems without exception must be eliminated, which also means Pershing 1As.

If, however, someone has chosen to start a dispute about who those missiles belong to -- well then, we are quite prepared to discuss that point too.

We would prefer to discuss it only at the negotiating table, but we are being forced into a public debate in which we have to engage so that the truth of the matter and our position are not distorted.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

To begin with, we are negotiating with the United States, and only about Soviet and United States nuclear weapons. We fail to see any reason for the Federal Republic of Germany to intrude in the Soviet-United States negotiations. Why? By what right? Has it not assumed an obligation under the non-proliferation Treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons?

Let me repeat that it is only with the United States that we are negotiating an agreement which, if reached, will eliminate all nuclear warheads on two classes of arms of the two States. But if we speak of all warheads that certainly includes those on Pershing 1A missiles too. How can it be otherwise?

As to who owns the missile's fuel, the missile's airframe, or, say, the wheels of its transporter, this is of no interest to us. We simply proceed from the principle that zeros must have the same meaning for both sides. If, however, the United States does not want a "zero option", as is clear from its present "72 equals zero" formula -- that would be a different matter.

We too have allies, who are concerned at the fact that a neighbouring country retains shorter-range nuclear missiles which pose a great threat to their security. They could ask for the stationing of similar systems on their territories, and the Soviet Union could meet their request.

But what would a Soviet-United States agreement be like as a result of all this? It would be truncated, emasculated and anaemic.

Literally in the past few days the opponents of the "zero option" have found another argument to try to bolster their untenable position on the Pershing 1As. They are now saying that there is an imbalance in conventional and nuclear tactical arms in Europe, and that therefore these missiles have to be retained.

But is Bonn itself, or Washington, not aware that the Soviet leadership has been persistently calling for a start without delay on negotiations to reduce conventional and nuclear tactical arms and eliminate any disparities or imbalances where they exist?

Let me say frankly: these tricks leave a grim impression. And they do not enhance trust in relations with our negotiating partners.

The Conference on Disarmament is not directly involved in dealing with the issue of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, but it does deal, and should deal, with the problem of nuclear disarmament; it acts as a moral depository of the non-proliferation Treaty. Therefore we believe that the Conference could voice its authoritative opinion on whether the practice of joint ownership of nuclear arms by a nuclear and a non-nuclear State is consistent with that legal instrument.

This must be done to prevent the non-proliferation Treaty from being undermined. There can be no nuclear weapons on Earth that are "no one's" weapons. It is extremely dangerous to create such a "legal fiction".

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

If, as some United States Administration officials and their West German partners contend, these notorious Pershing 1As are third-country systems, then the question arises again: How and by what right does that third country, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, possess nuclear weapons? As far as we know, it has no legal or moral right to have them.

But if it is deliberately trying to arrogate such rights to itself, if the Federal Republic of Germany has indeed illegally acquired nuclear weapons -- then this would certainly cause anger and indignation in the world, and could confront the world with a political crisis.

We believe it is appropriate to ask the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at this forum directly: Has his country any nuclear systems in its arsenal?

Equally legitimate is the question that we are addressing to the United States delegate: Who actually controls the nuclear warheads for the Pershing 1As?

A great deal depends on the answers to these two questions: the fate of an agreement on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles; the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the reassessment that the Soviet Union would be forced to make of the overall strategic situation in terms of the threat to its national interests posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a State where even today the delirious slogans of revanchism are being heard, trying to drown out the voices of sober-minded political and public figures and mass movements calling for a responsible approach to European and world affairs.

The Soviet Union hopes that the Federal Republic of Germany will duly clarify the situation and remove the concern now being felt by many European States because of the ambiguity of its position with regard to the Pershing 1A missiles.

We wish to make it perfectly clear that unless this is done, the Soviet Union will find the situation as it exists now unacceptable and will make known its views on that situation in a clear and unambiguous manner. The Soviet people will never acquiesce in West Germany becoming a nuclear Power.

I should like to hope that all this is well understood in the Federal Republic of Germany, and that in the end healthy forces which stand for détente and for major progress in nuclear disarmament will prevail there.

I would like to believe that the Federal Republic of Germany will not become an obstacle to the achievement of a historic agreement. For the time being 72 nuclear warheads stand between us and an agreement on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Under United States-West German rules of "dual accounting", they are being made to weigh more than the mountain of 2,000 nuclear warheads that could be deactivated and scrapped starting later this year.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

A Soviet-United States accord on the total elimination of two categories of nuclear arms is a necessary prologue to solving the main problem -- that of eliminating strategic offensive arms and preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space.

Mr. President, it is my privilege to inform you, upon instructions from the Soviet leadership, of the objectives which the Soviet Union is seeking to achieve. They include:

The conclusion of treaties with the United States of America and international agreements on the complete destruction of nuclear weapons worldwide;

A strict and universal ban on deployment of any arms in outer space;

The establishment of an international régime under which there will be no chemical weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in the world;

The reduction of conventional weapons to the lowest possible levels required for defence;

The establishment, on the basis of co-operation among all States in the world, of a comprehensive system of international security, under which the United Nations could, in accordance with its Charter, effectively maintain peace and security.

Allow me to outline the sequence of our practical actions to achieve these objectives.

First, at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the Soviet delegation has been instructed to proceed on the basis of the "global double zero" formula. Agreement has been reached to hold a meeting with the United States Secretary of State in mid-September, as a separate event not linked to the session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Second, at the Geneva negotiations we have submitted a draft treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms, and a draft agreement on strengthening the régime of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. These are compromise drafts taking into account and seeking to accommodate the positions of the other side.

Third, the Soviet side has sponsored, together with other socialist countries, and submitted to the Conference on Disarmament for its consideration, a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". We have put forward an initiative concerning the establishment of an international verification system to prevent the deployment of any weapons in outer space.

Fourth, a proposal by a group of socialist countries for the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security is being discussed at the United Nations.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

I would like to address specifically the question of verification -- matters of principle and matters of application.

The experience of the past few years has shown that there is verification spoken of for propaganda purposes, and there is real, permament verification.

Now, I would say that the philosophy underlying our approach to the problem of real verification gives a particularly full and clear idea of the evolution of our outlook, which has now developed into a system of unorthodox political views, in other words, a new political thinking.

Foolproof, indisputable, reliable and extremely strict and rigorous methods providing 100 per cent confidence that weapons are being eliminated, that obligations relating to the remaining weapons and permitted military activities are being complied with, and that the bans are not being circumvented -- this, and no less than this, is the verification that we envision.

The Soviet Union is proposing an exceptionally wide variety of forms and methods of verification -- both national and international. All of them have been set forth in detail in the document submitted to your forum on 9 June 1987, concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests -- and, by the way, some of them have alredy been and are being used in practice. I would like to remind you that United States scientists equipped with appropriate monitoring instruments stayed for a long time in the area of our nuclear test site. The USSR Academy of Sciences has reached a new agreement with United States colleagues for the installation of monitoring equipment and the exchange of data.

It is worth recalling that a short time ago our country made an extraordinary effort to achieve a cessation of nuclear testing. For a long time we maintained our unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, and tried to persuade the United States by the force of example.

We ask the Conference on Disarmament to assist in achieving a Soviet-United States agreement banning nuclear tests. I wish to emphasize that this is not a plea to take sides, but rather an appeal for moral and political assistance in attaining a truly universal objective, which is to make nuclear testing a thing of the past.

However, for the time being nuclear testing continues, and you know who is to blame. Nuclear testing is still a fact of life for mankind.

It would be easier to reach agreement at the Soviet-United States talks if one could be sure that other States, too, support a ban on nuclear testing and stand ready to become parties to an international treaty on the subject. This is why we believe that the search for agreement at the Soviet-United States negotiations and the preparation of a comprehensive treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should be undertaken concurrently.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

As a practical step to advance the preparation of such a treaty we propose that a special group of scientific experts should be set up, which would be assigned the task of submitting to the Conference well-founded and agreed-upon recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of verification for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests.

We believe that there is also a need to establish an international system of global radiation safety monitoring, involving the use of space communication links. Such a system would be useful for more effectively verifying compliance with a ban on nuclear testing, once such a ban is imposed. At the same time it could be used to monitor the extent of pollution of the atmosphere, the soil, ground water and the sea on a global and regional scale. It would also provide an additional safeguard in case of any malfunctions or especially accidents at nuclear power plants.

We establish a strong link between nuclear arms reductions -- at this stage, reductions in intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles -- and an accord on measures of verification.

These include an exchange of initial data concerning the two sides' missiles, and verification of such data through on-site inspections.

We insist on continuous monitoring of the process of destroying the missiles. The elimination of the missile production base and infrastructure will also be subject to verification.

The system of verification that we propose is designed to create an atmosphere of absolute confidence that the agreement will not be circumvented in any way.

And finally, we believe that there should be mandatory access to Soviet and United States military facilities in third countries where missiles could be stationed.

As you can see, we are expanding the area of confidence to the maximum by opening up the territory of the Soviet Union to inspections. However, complete confidence naturally presupposes complete reciprocity. An example and a confirmation of this is Stockholm and the decisions adopted there. This, I would say, is the material expression of the principle of confidence; this is new political thinking in action. Naturally, we would like its geographical scope not to be confined to one continent.

In our opinion, verification will have a particularly important role to play in preventing an arms race in space.

We would be extremely grateful if you took a close look at the proposal for the establishment of an international verification system to make sure that outer space remains peaceful. Is not the idea of inspecting every space launch a reasonable one? There are as yet not that many space launch centres in the world, and the presence of international inspectors there would reliably guarantee that the objects placed in outer space are not weapons and are not equipped with any weapons. But we go further, and propose not merely

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

a presence but a permament presence of groups of inspectors at all space launch sites. Information about each upcoming launch, including the location of the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of launch would be given in advance to representatives of the inspectorate.

What doubts can there be about the sincerity of verification proposals made by a Power which is very actively involved in launching space objects?

All States engaged in space activities would be placed in an absolutely equal position, and permanent monitoring by inspectors would guarantee the reliability of verification. After all, a space launch complex is something that cannot be hidden. In this case the technology itself ensures relatively simple and effective verification. Furthermore, our proposal provides for the right to conduct an on-site inspection should suspicion arise that a launch was carried out from an undeclared launch site.

And, in the event of a total ban on space strike arms, the Soviet Union would be willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc.

If a State has no intention of putting weapons in space, there can be no reason for it to object to international inspections of its space activities.

Space is a common asset of all mankind. It is much more than a training ground for military technocrats who cast away traditional humanistic ideals. It is a sphere for the peaceful application of peaceful efforts. It is this vision of outer space that the Soviet Union intends to pursue most vigorously.

Reflections about space inevitably lead one to think about the distances that humanity has to travel in order to reach its cherished goals. Some of those distances have yet to be covered from beginning to end, others have been covered half of the way, and there are still others where the end of the road is already in sight.

I would like to make a few comments about one long-sought goal which is within reach and which the Conference on Disarmament has almost attained, an event of great significance for all of mankind -- a complete ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles. Two thirds of a century have passed since the first gas attack at Ypres, which marked the beginning of the military use of this barbaric weapon of mass annihilation. Ever since, Governments of many nations and various international forums have sought to devise legal constraints on the production and use of lethal substances, but only now, in our time, is it becoming possible to adopt a historic convention to that effect.

What could stand in the way of this? Only attempts to outline the draft of a future treaty with one hand while assembling canisters of binary chemical weapons with the other.

Need one say how immoral this is, how incompatible with the goal before us?

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

The Soviet Union will continue to co-operate actively with all the participants in the Conference on Disarmament so that the long-awaited convention becomes a reality. We did not dramatize the debates and differences that emerged in the process. One thing alone was considered absolutely imperative -- that the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles should be adopted, and as early as possible.

I am instructed to inform you that the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal. This decision is another vivid manifestation of our commitment to genuine and effective verification, in accordance with the principles of new political thinking.

In order to build an atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of an early conclusion of an international convention, the Soviet side invites the participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of our chemical weapons and observe the technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile facility. Later we will invite experts to the special chemical weapon destruction plant now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk.

In making this announcement I hope that the participants in the Conference will duly appreciate our desire to untie the most complicated knots that have appeared in the process of drawing up the convention.

Our external affairs are inseparable from our internal development, and the policy of restructuring, renewal, democratization and openness prompts us to act in a positive manner wherever the Soviet Union is represented, including here at the Conference on Disarmament.

Today, as never before, the most pressing problems of the contemporary world determine the role and importance of the Conference. In fulfilling its mission, this representative Conference can assert itself more forcefully by practical deeds matching the magnitude of the tasks before it.

There may be a need to consider the possibility of adopting a more intensive schedule of work. We would consider favourably a year-round schedule for the Conference with two or three recesses.

Why not hold an additional session of the Conference this year to complete the bulk of the drafting of the convention banning chemical weapons?

At present it is impossible for the Conference to work with high efficiency without establishing an optimum balance between bilateral and multilateral negotiations on security problems. There should be no antagonism here, but rather the principle of complementarity and mutually enriching interaction.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

Promptly informing the participants in the Conference about the status of Soviet-United States negotiations, particularly on questions relating to items on the agenda of your forum, could be a first step in this direction. We intend to discuss this with our United States partners and establish an appropriate procedure. We hope to be able to find mutual understanding with them.

Why are we talking about the need to intensify the work of the Conference? Because the negotiating machinery is running at a rate that is significantly slower than the pace of the arms race. A dangerous gap is emerging between political thought and political will, and military technology. This is evident from the records of the Conference itself: 15 years have passed since the conclusion of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention, and the Convention banning the military use of environmental modification techniques was drawn up in 1977.

The Soviet Union regards improvement in the functioning of the Geneva forum as one way of redressing this disparity. We believe that in time the Conference could become a permanent universal body for disarmament negotiations.

And, of course, the Conference on Disarmament should not become accustomed to the fact that the issues involved in ending the nuclear arms race, though they appear on its agenda, are actually not discussed here. Indeed, these issues should be made the focus of its activity. Today there is no other way. Nuclear disarmament cannot be the province of just a few Powers. No Government can stand on the sidelines in this matter, for the nuclear threat is global in its consequences. Those consequences transcend national boundaries and ideological differences. They do not recognize neutrality and they spare no one.

If that is so, it is unjust to keep non-nuclear States from participating in solving the problems of nuclear disarmement. As M.S. Gorbachev has repeatedly emphasized, a maximum degree of internationalization is needed in these efforts. Genuine democratism and humanism in international relations call for just such an approach.

Proceeding from this premise, the Soviet Union will act constructively to enhance the prestige of the Conference as the principal nuclear disarmament forum, not just for exchanging views but for adopting decisions of the greatest importance.

Time is bringing us closer to the moment when word will finally become deed. The time of accomplishments is at hand -- the accomplishments of which we have long been dreaming and towards which we have travelled along difficult roads.

May these accomplishments include your contribution, too. May it be tangible, substantive and significant.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union for his important statement, and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador Campora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we are all conscious of the fact that the term of the presidency for the month of August that you have begun as representative of France coincides auspiciously with the recognition given today to the Conference on Disarmament as a multilateral disarmament body through the address of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze. The statement made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union stands out in these times when the international situation calls for new initiatives and new ways of thinking. I am therefore very pleased to welcome Mr. Shevardnadze, and at the same time I wish to assure you, Mr. President, of my close co-operation and warm friendship, as may be expected of any Argentine diplomat in respect of a representative of France.

We would ask the delegate of Ethiopia to convey to Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe our congratulations on his business-like approach to the presidency of the Conference during the month of July. We also wish to welcome the new representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, whose experience in the multilateral world will be of benefit to us in our work.

With the agreement of all my colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to add special emphasis to the words of welcome that I will be extending as we greet the new representative of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja. The international community is aware of the close co-operation between Argentina and Brazil in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under the guidance of their heads of State, Presidents Raúl Alfonsín and José Sarney. This co-operation is the most significant contribution that the two countries can make to regional stability. It also provides world public opinion with proof that the nuclear policy of the two countries is of a transparency that leaves no doubt whatsoever as to its totally peaceful purposes. Mutual confidence between countries from the same geographical region, based on the exchange of information and scientists, visits to each other's nuclear facilities, joint projects, constitute the best safeguard that one can imagine to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In welcoming the Ambassador of Brazil, the delegation of Argentina wishes to reiterate the commitment that we have given his predecessors in the past, to work closely and unswervingly together to serve the cause of international peace and security at the world-wide as well as at the regional level. His diplomatic talent and the high level of the offices that he has held in serving his country fully justify our hope that Ambassador Azambuja's contribution to the vital work of the Conference on Disarmament will be of great benefit and importance.

We are convinced that the time has come to make the maximum effort to intensify negotiations to bring about a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons before a new arms race begins in this area. We believe that

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

it is quite possible to arrive in a reasonable time frame at a convention that would eliminate the danger of these weapons and strengthen the security of all States and, in addition, would not indirectly create situations of inequality or discrimination that may arise as a result of different levels of development.

In this area it is always essential to highlight the importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, better known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as this was the first instrument to prohibit the use of a type of weapon of mass destruction. None the less we should recognize that as a result of the situation created by the right of retaliation, the Protocol has become essentially a "no first use" agreement, and the fact that it is being flouted at present should lead us to think seriously about the convention that is being negotiated in this Conference. Almost half a century went by before the conclusion of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, which marked the first step towards the elimination of a whole category of weapons. This was the first measure containing a genuine disarmament element, not only because it prohibited the development and production of these weapons, but also because it provided for the destruction of stockpiles that then existed. The convention that we are negotiating should complete the process initiated through the 1925 Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention with a view to prohibiting this type of weapon of mass destruction fully and without delay.

The chemical weapons convention as we have known it so far would be a non-discriminatory treaty, since all the parties would be on an equal footing once the process of destruction of chemical weapons and existing production facilities had been completed. At that stage the treaty will serve as a model, because it will be unlike the non-proliferation Treaty, which lays down in law the existence of two categories of States: those that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. In the future convention there will be a single category of States with the same rights and obligations, and an identical verification mechanism applicable for all States, and it will not be a means of allocating world power, like the non-profileration Treaty, but an instrument with an egalitarian purpose within the international community. Thus we have within reach the possibility of drawing up a treaty that would not be discriminatory from the political and military standpoints. It is also important, that it should not be discriminatory from an economic and technological viewpoint. In this regard the future convention should not be devised in such a way as to allow for its use to maintain inequalities in the field of trade or technology or to prevent the development or transfer of chemicals, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

During the course of the negotiations, we have noted that time and again the need has emerged to reconcile three legitimate interests of States: Firstly, that of completely eliminating the possibility of the threat of chemical warfare; secondly, that of guaranteeing that a State's security would not be undermined; and, thirdly, that of ensuring unimpeded development of chemical activities for peaceful purposes. Clearly, a strict monitoring régime would offer greater safeguards, but it could affect the development of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

the chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Conversely, a less strict verification régime would detract from confidence in the convention and would create a lack of security at the international level. Consequently the aspect of security and the aspect of the peaceful uses of chemicals should be properly balanced in the convention. The way in which this question is resolved will determine whether the objective sought through the convention will be successfully attained. When these two aspects are raised, it is the ultimate objective that should guide the negotiations.

This criterion should be reflected, in the first place, in the definition of chemical weapons. We are all aware that article II of the convention is crucial to its effectiveness. The present wording was provisionally adopted in 1984, and should be studied at an appropriate time in the light of progress in our work and the clearer picture we now have of the convention. Progress in the negotiations has also highlighted the need for the toxicity criterion to be determined in a precise and practical manner, and that the concepts used should be uniform throughout the text of the convention.

The establishment of an order of destruction is another of the major tasks before the Ad hoc Committee. Just as the existence of chemicals that pose a greater risk for the convention is recognized, it should also be recognized that there are chemical weapons that are more dangerous than others and, consequently, they should be destroyed first, otherwise we would be jeopardizing the principle of promoting confidence at the start of the destruction phase.

The principle of not undermining the security of any State during the chemical weapon destruction phase of is of fundamental importance. The disparity between chemical-weapon and non-chemical-weapon States will be maintained during the period of destruction of stockpiles and even subsequently should there be chemical-weapon States that are not parties to the convention. Consequently, one cannot rule out the threatened or potential use of chemical weapons. To make up for that disparity and make the principle a reality, States parties, particularly those that do not possess chemical weapons, should be assured of the possibility of some capacity to defend themselves against chemical warfare. Bearing in mind that what is involved is defence against a weapon of mass destruction, protection measures should guarantee the safety not only of the military but also, and particularly, of the civilian population.

With respect to the non-production of chemical weapons, monitoring should in no way detract from the inalienable right of all States parties to the convention to research, develop, produce, acquire, transfer and use all chemical substances for peaceful purposes, with the only quantitative restriction applying to a certain limited quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals per year for non-prohibited purposes. Similarly, the provisions of the treaty should not be interpreted or implemented in a discriminatory fashion, as this would affect countries' economic, social, scientific and technological development. Agreement by States parties to the convention to renounce possession of chemical weapons, particularly States that do not possess them, should provide a guarantee of access to the exchange of all chemical substances, equipment and scientific and technological information and international co-operation for peaceful purposes. Just as the undertaking

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

to destroy chemical weapons and existing production facilities, and not to produce chemical weapons, will be subject to verification, commitments regarding assistance and co-operation in the field of peaceful uses should also be assessed. The future convention will set up a variety of bodies which could perform this function.

It should be emphasized once again that the future chemical weapons convention will mark an important milestone in international relations in the area of disarmament, because its significance lies in the mechanisms of verification and monitoring that will be adopted for on-site as well as challenge inspections. It is essential to make progress in sensitive areas such as challenge inspection, counting on the clear-cut determination of the great Powers to resolve those issues on which there is still no consensus, drawing on the guidelines that are being drawn up step by step under the wise guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus. The statement of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that we have heard today will no doubt facilitate a solution to the issues that remain pending in the area of challenge inspection.

We are convinced that the threat of chemical weapons will not be totally eliminated until we have universal accession to the convention. This objective would be facilitated through joint action by States at two levels concurrently: At the world-wide level, through effective and judicious action by military Powers possessing chemical weapons, and at the regional level, through the political handling of procedures for accession to the convention and the responsibilities deriving therefrom. In this way an appropriate and adequate regional balance would be achieved in a world-wide framework of confidence created by chemical disarmament by the countries with the greatest war-making potential.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. Peru is next on the list of speakers. However, I have received a request from the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who wishes to exercise his right of reply. With the kind permission of the representative of Peru, for which I offer him my special thanks, I give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): The distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has put a direct question to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the Conference on Disarmament -- whether his country, has nuclear systems in its arsenals. The answer, Mr. President, is no. The Federal Republic of Germany supports the position of the United States Government, the owners of the warheads of the Pershing 1A, that these warheads should not be included in the current INF negotiations. This is also the position of the North Atlantic Alliance. Since the nuclear warheads of the Pershing 1A are not in the arsenals of the Federal Republic of Germany, but in the arsenals of the United States of America, my country remains in full compliance with its obligations arising from the non-proliferation Treaty.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement, and I now call on the representative of Peru, Mr. Felix Calderón.

Mr. CALDERÓN (Peru) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Peru welcomes the presence of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Eduard Shevardnadze, at the Conference on Disarmament, on a day that is particularly meaningful for mankind, today 6 August. It is on this very day that our spirits are filled with unhappy memories of the devastation of Hiroshima. The hecatomb of Hiroshima is a vivid expression of the previously unthinkable extreme to which the violence of war can lead, and it is also a stark example of the contempt for the most basic norms of international humanitarian law that men can reach if they yield to the Faustian temptation of victory at any price.

Peru considers that the day on which the Hiroshima holocaust is commemorated should become a day for meditation and reflection throughout the world on peace and disarmament. We must remain true to our past to prevent inertia accustoming our minds to coexistence with nuclear weapons. If living under the threat of nuclear war is an offence to the human race, it is an even greater affront to the moral conscience of peoples that nothing or almost nothing has been done in 42 years to change this state of affairs.

Before turning to agenda item 8 on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which is the item before us this morning, I wish to make a few comments on four issues which in our view, notwithstanding the importance of those not covered today, require additional comment in the light of new developments since last April. First of all, we will address the question of a nuclear test ban. It would appear that the efforts of delegations represented here to come up with an agreed formula to allow for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this topic may well suffer a fate similar to that of Sisyphus in hell, because of the lack of political will on the part of certain of those involved. Clearly, the decisions of sovereign States may not be impugned, but we cannot silence the clamour of the entire world, over Governments' heads, calling more and more insistently for a final stop to be put to nuclear tests, not only because the military significance of nuclear weapons, whether outmoded or modern, is questionable, but because, bearing in mind the overstuffed nuclear arsenals, they reflect in themselves a self-destructive wish.

Peru has for several years been working with the indefatigable Ambassador Alfonso García Robles in his commendable efforts to find an honourable solution that would save the face of the Conference on Disarmament vis-à-vis international public opinion. It is regrettable that conceptual manoeuvring continues to conspire against this noble objective, and it is even more regrettable that those who bear primary responsibility for promoting nuclear disarmament have to a certain extent been encouraging the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in an attitude of arrogance and defiance which is at variance with the solidarity that should exist among peoples.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

We have noted a feeling of weariness at this interminable procedural struggle, giving renewed impetus to the proposal adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolutions 40/80 B and 41/46 B, for activation of the amendment procedure specified in article II of the partial test-ban treaty so as to extend the ban to underground tests. Peru also considers it appropriate to point out that, in its view it would be hard to expect satisfactory results from the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament or the fourth NPT review conference if the agreement reached does not include an unquestionable commitment to begin negotiations that would make it possible to bring about a definitive halt to nulcear tests within a reasonable period of time.

Quite apart from this overall perception of the problem, the continuation of nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll is prompting concern in the South Pacific. Peru is of the view that this situation cannot and must not pass unnoticed, as what is at stake is the ecological integrity of the South Pacific. It is for this reason, and not through any animosity, that Peru has sought the support of Colombia, Chile and Ecuador, which, together with our country, form the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, with a view to approaching the Government of France through the appropriate diplomatic channels to make it possible to send a new scientific mission to Mururoa atoll and neighbouring areas to verify that the nuclear explosions on the test site are indeed harmless and that the levels of radioactivity are below internationally tolerable limits. These steps could be carried out in accordance with the precedent established by the Atkinson mission in 1983.

In keeping with this position, a few weeks ago, during the tenth session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), which was held in Montevideo, Peru proposed that the Council of this regional body should embark on a study of alternative measures, which could include an additional protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to prevent radioactive contamination of the marine environment in the oceanic masses falling within the zone of application referred to in article 4, paragraph 2 of the main Treaty. This proposal was adopted by consensus, and its implementation will of course have to take account of the provisions of article 7 of the Treaty of Rarotonga. Within the same context, concrete steps have also been taken to promote co-operation between OPANAL and the South Pacific Forum.

The prohibition of chemical weapons has now become the major issue before the Conference on Disarmament, given the continuing possibility of arriving at a comprehensive treaty on the subject in the near future. It is true that progress has not been spectacular, but the important thing is that there is a determination to negotiate. Furthermore, we have observed a commendable effort to find imaginative solutions to unusual problems, with a particularly constructive contribution from the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, who, with dedication, sound judgement and skill, has set an appropriate pace for our work and maintained a high level of enthusiasm.

However, there are a variety of outstanding issues which undoubtedly require a great deal of work. We are thinking first and foremost of on-site challenge inspections, the question of jurisdiction and control, verification

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

of destruction and procedures to carry out such destruction, and the use of chemical facilities and products for peaceful purposes, including the strengthening of international co-operation. Furthermore, there is a problem which, even though it is not an urgent one, is none the less relevant to this forum. We are referring specifically to the procedure that will have to be followed once the Ad hoc Committee has successfully completed its work. The disagreeable recollection of the last multilateral instrument negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament leads us to proceed cautiously in this regard. As we are aware, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was opened for signature by States in 1976, despite the fact that there was no consensus in this negotiating forum regarding the scope of the obligations stipulated in article I. The same must not happen in the case of chemical weapons, and we are duty-bound to prevent this from occurring.

Within that context, it would appear desirable to envisage the establishment of a new body open to all members of the international community, whose task would be to give an official stamp to the work of the 40 States which make up the Conference on Disarmament. In a complementary manner, this would make it possible to define more clearly the process of transition that will necessarily take place between the adoption of the new convention, its signing and its entry into force. This would prevent unforeseen situations from arising in the interim period, and would rule out arbitrary procedures that could undermine all the efforts of nearly two decades.

With respect to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is clear that first of all a verifiable distinction must be drawn between the placing of objects in orbit with hostile military intent and the placing of those with non-hostile military intent. Under article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the prohibition, which extends only to objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, applies once the object is placed in orbit, in other words once a circuit around the Earth has been completed. On that basis Peru supports all initiatives aimed at amending the 1967 Treaty as a means of finding a partial solution to the problem, but it would advocate the simpler amendment of prohibiting the placing in orbit of any object carrying any type of weapon whatsoever. We do not think it would be necessary to introduce new elements such as the concept of "space weapons", as what defines the prohibition is non-placement in orbit. Nor is it possible to accept new criteria concerning the length of time the objects remain in orbit, because the approach followed in the 1967 Treaty is much more appropriate in that it prohibits even the temporary presence of a delivery system in outer space, provided it completes a circuit around the Earth.

Now, in so far as an amendment of this type would not involve weapon systems that can destroy objects in outer space from the air, land or sea through direct hits or using the principle of directed energy or other principles of physics, it is clear that their viability will depend on the concurrent effort being made to multilateralize the basic obligations of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as well as those that are necessary to prohibit all anti-satellite weapon systems which are not based in outer space. It is understood that all of this should not undermine any régime for the full use of space for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

By definition, if one wishes to prevent the transfer of the arms race to outer space, the set of prohibitions to be agreed on should be comprehensive and free of all unambiguity; in other words, there should be no problems of interpretation such as that posed by article V of the ABM Treaty, because that would simply undermine mutual confidence and thus weaken the scope of these obligations. But perhaps what would be really important would be to set up guidelines or parameters which would allow for the regulation of advanced technology. While not taking the existing non-proliferation régime as a model, because it is lopsided and discriminatory, Peru is of the view that it would be possible to explore formulas that would impose contractual limitations on the development of certain advanced technologies for hostile purposes that have a destabilizing effect on the status quo. Of course, the aim would not be to impede or discourage technological progress, but rather to regulate it so as to place it at the service of our needs and aspirations, and not to have it used for destruction and endless military competition.

This reflection leads us directly to another, relating to the important role that effective prevention of the arms race in outer space could play in halting and reversing the arms race as a whole. We think that there is a direct relationship here, and it is vital to avoid this new spiral in the arms race. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the real problem does not lie here but in the causes and epiphenomena which encourage the arms race urbi et orbi. In other words, it remains an urgent and top priority to fight against the untiring search for illusory security through the indiscriminate build-up of weapons, of which the extension to outer space is only the most sophisticated manifestation.

There has been great interest this year in item 7, on radiological weapons. A dual approach has been put into practice, which is most welcome. However, the results of the contact groups' work have been discouraging so far. It is of very little use to prohibit radiological weapons if these are going to be reduced to their most basic expression while nuclear arsenals are kept at their present levels; and as a discussion exercise an effort of this kind is discouraging. The question of banning military attacks on nuclear facilities should not continue to be linked to the above, because whereas in the first case we are speaking of weapons in the strict sense of the term, nuclear facilities are relevant if they are considered as military objectives or targets in the event of armed conflict, but can in no way be classified as weapons. In other words, radiological weapons may be the subject of disarmament measures, but this is not the case for nuclear facilities, protection for which falls under international humanitarian law.

In this regard it is useful to recall that article 35, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been supplemented by the provisions contained in the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

three protocols. The same could be said with respect to paragraph 3 of the same article and article 55 of the Additional Protocol, which cover one aspect of the protection of the natural environment not envisaged in the ENMOD Convention. Similarly, we are of the view that there is room for improvement in the provisions of article 56, paragraph 2 (b), which could be extended to all nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. In this case, it is politically counter-productive to seek to draw distinctions in this type of facilities on the basis of specific thresholds of radioactivity whose definition is questionable. It would be paradoxical to extend protection to nuclear facilities which have a military purpose.

In this context, one may wonder whether the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum to establish norms of international humanitarian law. In any event, one of the precedents that I have mentioned should enable us to keep open the possibility of resolving the problem of military attacks on nuclear facilities in the context of an ad hoc diplomatic conference that could be convened by the United Nations General Assembly.

Item 8, on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, has stirred up a great deal of interest because of the conceptual and programmatic elements that it involves. The Ad hoc Committee is approaching its 150th meeting, and the fruit of this work is not clearly apparent. This year we have even noted a certain step backwards in so far as we have seen the questioning of certain principles, priorities and activities enshrined in the Final Document of 1978, which constitutes the starting-point and frame of reference for the work of this Committee. We will go into the other aspects of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at other times; meanwhile, Peru is of the view that the priorities that should be enshrined in the paper should be the same as those stipulated in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of 1978 and supplemented by the provisions of paragraph 46 -- priorities that are interpreted in a certain order bearing in mind the urgency and elementary sense of preservation involved in the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

With respect to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Peru will not agree to this concept being distorted by identifying the establishment of these zones as an alternative means of halting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones is much more than this, and basically implies mutual obligations both for the States within the zone which renounce nuclear weapons and for States outside the zone, particularly the nuclear Powers, which are called upon to respect that status and refrain from using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons against the States in the zone. Thus there are no one-way obligations, nor can or should the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone be used to remedy the intrinsic shortcomings of the NPT. It is this singular nature of the concept which obliges the States parties to safeguard the balance of obligations both within and outside the area, ensuring that the right to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy will not in practice lead to a change in the levels of security prevailing in the zone. Of great importance here is the way in which the verification system is interpreted and, above all, the efforts made by the States of the zone directly concerned to prevent any over-broad interpretation which irreversibly damages the mutual confidence that should prevail among them.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

In more than 11 years the Conference on Disarmament has not been capable of producing a single agreement that would justify its existence. The proposals made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union are most welcome and timely. The fact that no results have been achieved over the past 11 years makes it imperative for us to conclude the convention for a total ban on chemical weapons and their destruction, failing which we could provide grounds for a belief that the "attack-defence" equation which underpins the arms race spiral involves an endless dynamic interaction similar to that between Eros and Thanatos in the Freudian conception of the life of the psyche.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to speak? I give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, very briefly, I know the hour is late, but I would like to respond if I might. Our delegation has listened with great interest to the statement of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in which he described proposals for various aspects of the chemical weapons convention. We will, of course, study this statement in depth during the coming days and we will no doubt have more detailed comments in the future. I would like to take the opportunity to welcome this initiative of the Soviet Union, and express our optimism that this proposal will bring our positions closer together.

Of course, our delegation recognizes that closing the gap between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union is but one step toward a CW convention, albeit an important one. There are 38 other equal negotiating partners, whose views must be taken into account. I remarked last month in this Chamber that we have seen, during this session, a gradual convergence of those views. We must acknowledge, however, that significant differences remain on some of our more complex issues, such as monitoring non-production in the civil chemical industry; the organizational infrastructure that will oversee the convention; challenge inspection; and security during the period between the treaty's effective date and the conclusion of chemical weapon stockpile destruction. Then there is a difficult problem of what to do with those chemical plants that do not fall within the present definition of a chemical weapons production facility, but which nevertheless have the capability to produce chemical weapons, or their key precursors. Further, after the Conference reaches consensus on a treaty text, how do we persuade other chemical-weapon-possessing States outside the Conference to accept it? This threat posed by non-parties is a problem we should address in future meetings. The issues I have mentioned are not all the issues remaining unresolved, nor are they necessarily the most important, but they illustrate that there are deep-seated differences, based on national interests, and they illustrate that we still have much work ahead of us. As we move toward conclusion of our 1987 Conference on Disarmament session, and begin preparations for next year, we know that our task is not an easy one, but we also know that, with constructive steps, such as the Soviet Union has taken today, that task will be considerably easier.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Our delegation also welcomes the opportunity to meet with Soviet representatives to gain a further understanding of these proposals mentioned today, before we return to our capitals to begin preparations for our future negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

As the Conference delegations are aware, Vice-President Bush, on behalf of the United States, tabled a draft chemical weapons convention here three years ago, and our delegation has been engaged in concluding a convention based on that proposal and the views of all delegations to this Conference, and will continue to do so.

With respect to the Pershing 1A missiles of the Federal Republic of Germany, the long-standing United States position is clear. The United States will not negotiate on third-country systems, or on existing programmes of co-operation with our allies, in these bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the German Pershing 1A missiles have not been, are not, and will not be on the table in the United States/Soviet INF missile negotiations. With respect to the situation beyond these bilateral negotiations, NATO has taken the position that the German Pershing 1A force makes an important contribution to deterrence -- an honourable policy -- and to the security of the NATO Alliance, especially in the context of a "double global zero" outcome for United States and Soviet land-based INF missiles. Future plans for the German Pershing 1A force will therefore be determined by the Federal Republic of Germany in co-operation and consultation with its NATO allies.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement, and I give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to say a few words in response to the statements made by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, and the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel. First of all, we should like to note Mr. Friedersdorf's comment concerning the ban on chemical weapons, and to assure him and all other participants in the negotiations on this important issue that the Soviet delegation intends in the near future to dwell in greater detail on the initiatives which were contained in the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Shevardnadze, and naturally, it will be available for discussions with all delegations, and will be happy to answer any questions that may arise in this regard, so as to expedite negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons to the maximum possible extent.

We have taken note of the fact that, in connection with the question raised by Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany gave us a clarification from which it follows that the 72 warheads in question do not belong to the Federal Republic of Germany, and that the Federal Republic of Germany possesses no nuclear weapons at all, and also that it does comply with the non-proliferation Treaty. The Soviet side takes note of this important statement, even though we are unclear how it can be reconciled with the other part of Ambassador von Stülpnagel's remarks

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

to the effect that his country supports the United States position on the bilateral INF negotiations. However, the United States representative, speaking after him, said that the United States would not conduct negotiations on third-country systems, that the question of Pershing 1A warheads, if I understood him correctly, would not be on the negotiating table, and that the future of these systems would be determined by the Federal Republic of Germany in agreement with its North Atlantic Treaty allies. So the question arises: where does the truth of the matter lie? And all this confirms the seriousness of the doubts raised and questions asked by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. For this reason we should like to continue to hope that this major question of principle will be fully clarified.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. I give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my delegation did not want to let the opportunity go by at this morning's meeting, despite the fact that the speaker is no longer with us, to express my delegation's appreciation for the important statement made to this Conference by Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. The statement was very weighty and cogent on a number of issues related to the bilateral negotiations being conducted between the Soviet Union and the United States, but it also touched on fundamental aspects of the work being done by the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral forum on disarmament.

In our view, Mr. Shevardnadze's statement was a vigorous manifestation of the Soviet Union's support for the Conference on Disarmament, and it highlights the importance that the USSR attaches to this forum. We consider Minister Shevardnadze's initiative in providing the Conference with important information concerning the state and progress of the bilateral negotiations to be of particular significance, and we also particularly welcome his statement that he would discuss with the United States side how an appropriate procedure could be established for keeping the Conference appropriately informed about the bilateral negotiations. My delegation, which has referred to this matter on several occasions, hopes that those consultations will indeed lead to the establishment of a mechanism through which the flow of information between the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations could be institutionalized. Finally, through the delegation of the Soviet Union, we wish to convey to Minister Shevardnadze our appreciation for his coming to the Conference and for the important statement he made this morning.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement. Are there any other speakers? There are not. Let me now inform you that the Secretariat has distributed this morning at my request an unofficial document that sets out the meeting schedule for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, this document is merely indicative and may be adjusted later if necessary in the light of the work of the Conference. If there are no objections, I will take it that the Conference accepts this timetable.

It was so decided.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to remind you that immediately after this plenary, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, following which which we will resume our consideration of substantive matters relating to agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 11 August at 10 a.m. The meeting is ajourned.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CD/PV.429
11 August 1987

ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 August 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 429th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Today the Conference begins its consideration of the reports of its subsidiary bodies and its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

On the speakers' list for today I have the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Following the welcome addressed to you on 6 August by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze, permit me for my part to express my satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair for August, the concluding month of our session. We are convinced that under your presidency the Conference will move forward successfully towards the objectives before it. I should also like to welcome you as the representative of France, with which we enjoy both traditional ties of friendship and relations of constructive political dialogue.

I would like to send greetings to your predecessor as President, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, in connection with his successful accomplishment of his tasks during the month of July. Permit me also to welcome the newly appointed representatives of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo, and Brazil, Ambassador de Azambuja, to wish them success in their new tasks and to express the hope for equally close co-operation with them as with their predecessors.

The new Soviet initiatives aimed at accelerating the negotiations on banning chemical weapons, which were put forward by the member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August 1987, are receiving, it seems, very broad support. I would like to express gratitude to those delegations which stated their positive attitude to those initiatives at the 6 August meeting.

In his statement the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR said that "the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal".

It would not be an overstatement to say that this is now the key problem in the negotiations. Progress on a number of other issues also depends on the speedy solution of this problem. We support the efforts being made to solve the problem of challenge inspections by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, R. Ekéus, and several other representatives. Our new initiatives are designed to make a tangible contribution to the early resolution of this issue.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet side stated some time ago that it supported the United Kingdom proposal in document CD/715. We continue to believe that this document could serve as a basis for an integrated solution of the challenge inspection problem. We note the support expressed by a number of delegations for the United Kingdom proposal. Unfortunately, the United States delegation is not among them.

Having considered the existing situation in all its aspects and wishing to facilitate an early agreement, and also proceeding from the need to establish the most stringent verification of the chemical weapons convention, the Soviet Union has decided to go beyond the United Kingdom proposal and adopt the principle of mandatory challenge inspections. As you know, we had earlier agreed that a refusal of challenge inspections would not be permitted in certain instances, e.g. in cases of the suspected use of chemical weapons, as well as in the case of declared locations and facilities. Now we extend this principle of mandatory challenge inspections to all possible cases, making it a universal one.

In our view, the procedure of challenge inspections must reliably ensure that it is impossible for a State to conceal the fact and the consequences of a violation of the convention. We think that no more than 48 hours should elapse between the time of the challenge and the arrival of the inspection group at the inspection site.

The fact that we have adopted the principle of mandatory challenge inspections does not, however, mean that we can disregard the possible disclosure of sensitive data, which can happen during such inspections, especially in cases of abuse. All the misgivings that we previously expressed in this regard obviously remain valid.

Nevertheless, in accepting mandatory challenge inspections we proceed from the understanding that measures should be adopted with a view to minimizing the danger of disclosure of sensitive data, and that all parties must be in an equal position as regards both the right to request a challenge inspection and the obligation to meet such request.

First and foremost we consider that maximum possible use should be made of the central idea of the United Kingdom proposal on challenge inspections -- the possibility for the requested State to suggest alternative measures for conducting inspections in order to demonstrate compliance with its obligations. We suggest that the search be continued for opportunities to elaborate such alternative measures, which may, if necessary and with a view to ensuring that secrets unrelated to chemical weapons remain undisclosed, offer a substitute for complete access to the facilities by the inspectors (for example, visual observation of the facility from the outside, photographing it, analysis of chemical samples, partial access inside the facility, etc.).

It would seem that technical means of international verification using remote control might also serve as a possible alternative measure.

It is our understanding that the possibility of using alternative measures is generally recognized by the participants in the Conference. We

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

note that in its statement on 23 April this year the United States delegation also spoke in favour of such a possibility.

It goes without saying that the time-limits for agreeing on the procedure for conducting challenge inspections must be clearly defined. We would not object if this time-limit does not exceed 48 hours. Whether the suggested alternative measures are satisfactory should be decided, in our view, by the State suspecting non-compliance with the Convention.

Apart from the alternative measures, in our view, attention should also be paid to the development of the so-called "managed conduct" of inspections suggested by the United States delegation. To preclude the possibility that challenge inspections might be used for purposes incompatible with the task of verifying compliance by States parties with their obligations, or for disclosing secrets unrelated to chemical weapons, the convention should, in our opinion, envisage concrete procedures for conducting such inspections. It would seem feasible to devise measures which would effectively preclude any possibility of using challenge inspections for obtaining secret data, and in particular, to ensure that the methodologies and instruments used by international inspectors in the course of inspections strictly correspond to their tasks and that the requested State has access to all such instruments for the purpose of testing them. The instruments used in the course of international inspections should be standard and uniform for all States parties. The technical parameters of such instruments must be strictly limited to the purposes of verifying possible violations of the convention.

Should the right of challenge be abused, the requested State would suffer certain material harm related to both the leak of information and the disruption of the normal operation of the facility or plant. In this connection we consider that thought might be given to the desirability of incorporating in the Convention a provision concerning States' liability, including material liability, for abuse of the right to challenge inspections and for any damage suffered by the receiving State as a result of an unjustified inspection. In particular, States parties to the convention might have the right to raise the question of compensation for the financial loss caused as a result of a halt to the operations of a facility or the disclosure of commercial or other secrets because of the conduct of challenge inspections, if the inspection does not confirm non-compliance with the convention.

Each request must obviously contain the necessary data: which provision of the convention has been violated, where and when the suspected violation has occurred or is occurring, the nature of the suspected violation. It is equally clear that without such basic data no request could be met.

In suggesting measures which would prevent abuse of the right of challenge and the use of inspections for purposes incompatible with the tasks of verifying compliance with the obligations under the convention and the disclosure of secrets which have nothing to do with chemical weapons, we consider that such measures should be elaborated within the framework of the principle of mandatory inspections, and not in opposition to it; they must not weaken this principle or make any exceptions to it.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

We believe that a request for inspection can be made by any State party to the convention without exception. Everybody must have equal rights. Similarly, there should be no discrimination as regards the form of ownership of those locations and facilities for which an inspection is sought. A request for inspection, in our opinion, can be submitted in relation to any facility or location on the territory of a State party, or under its jurisdiction or control, or belonging to any natural or legal person of a State party, wherever they may be situated. This, in our view, is a necessary condition to make challenge inspections a genuinely effective instrument.

We cannot accept the United States concept of a "fact-finding panel" made up of representatives of a limited number of States, which would play the role of a "filter". This concept seems to us to be undemocratic and would not ensure equal rights for all parties to the convention. We understood the United States delegation's statement on 23 April this year to mean that the United States side is ready to consider the possibility of abandoning this concept. We would like to learn the outcome of such consideration.

Furthermore, we are not quite clear about the status of article XI of the United States draft convention contained in document CD/500. In his statement on 23 July this year, United States Ambassador Friedersdorf said in response to our question that in the opinion of the United States side "challenge inspection should cover all relevant locations and facilities of a State party without distinction between private property or government ownership". In so doing he referred to the amendment made by the United States delegation in April last year to its draft convention (CD/685). That amendment, however, concerns article X, which deals with special inspections, and has nothing to do with article XI, which provides for ad hoc inspections. If the United States delegation continues to regard article XI as part of its position, we would like to know in which cases it allows for the application of this article envisaging the right to refuse challenge inspections.

To sum up the above, our view of the challenge inspections provisions is as follows:

Firstly, challenge inspections should be mandatory, without the right for the requested State to refuse such inspections.

Secondly, the period between the time of request and the arrival of the inspectors at the inspection site should not exceed 48 hours.

Thirdly, all States parties to the convention should have equal rights and obligations as regards both submitting a request and accommodating it.

Fourthly, the request should contain the necessary basic data (what, where, when, how).

Fifthly, it is necessry to adopt measures in order to prevent the use of challenge inspection for purposes incompatible with the task of verifying compliance with the convention.

Sixthly, the requested State may suggest alternative measures. Whether they are satisfactory shall be decided by the requesting State.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Seventhly, the time within which agreement should be reached on the verification procedure should not exceed 48 hours (during that same period inspectors arrive at the inspection site).

There is no need to reiterate the importance of confidence-building measures for speeding up the negotiations. Guided by the necessity to improve the atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of the early conclusion of the convention, the Soviet side has issued an invitation to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of our chemical munitions and observe the chemical weapon destruction technology at a mobile facility. At present the Soviet delegation is working out practical details in connection with this invitation. We are planning this visit for 7 and 8 October 1987. We intend to invite two persons from every delegation, including observers, participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Delegations will be informed of all the necessary details regarding this visit before the end of this session.

Later on, after the special chemical weapons destruction facility now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk has been constructed, we will invite experts to visit it as well.

Some time ago the United States side invited us to visit the chemical weapon destruction facility at Tooele, Utah. On 23 July United States Ambassador Friedersdorf recalled this invitation. We have already informed the United States delegation that we accept this invitation, which we view as a step towards strengthening mutual confidence.

The question of the organs to be established under the convention has recently been the subject of increasingly active and detailed debate. We would like to present our views in this regard.

We believe that after signature of the convention, a preparatory commission should be established, comprising States which have signed the convention. The commission would, in particular, draw up the necessary procedures for the entry into force of the convention and the beginning of its implementation (recruitment of Technical Secretariat personnel, elaboration of the rules of procedure for organs to be established under the convention, financial issues, etc.). Then organs should be established which would become operational after the convention enters into force. In our view both the organ composed of all the parties and the executive body should take decisions on substantive issues by a qualified majority of two thirds of those participating in the voting, and on other matters -- by a simple majority.

It is also necessary to consider such questions as conditions for the entry into force of the convention, who will be the depositary, etc. We think that ratification by 30-40 States is necessary for the convention to enter into force. The United Kingdom proposal for 60 ratifications seems to us somewhat excessive. As for the depositary, it seems appropriate that the United Nations Secretary-General should perform this function.

There is very little time left before the summer session of the Conference draws to a close. We believe that the early completion of work on the chemical weapons convention demands that we make the most intensive

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

possible use of the opportunities that we have. In this connection I would like to draw your attention to the question raised on 6 August by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the holding of an additional session of the conference this year to complete the bulk of the drafting of the convention. Such a session could be held from mid-November (after the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly has finished its discussion of disarmament questions) until the end of December, and would focus only on item 4 of its agenda.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, His Excellency Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): I wish to congratulate you most sincerely upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. With your experience and skills you will no doubt lead us to a successful conclusion of the summer session of the Conference. For my part, I will spare no effort in extending co-operation for your important task. To Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, who is leaving us, I wish every success in his new assignment. May I also extend my delegation's warm welcome to the new representative of Brazil to the Conference, Ambassador Castrioto de Azambuja. I look forward to working closely with him.

Today I would like to make a brief statement on behalf of a group of Western delegations on agenda item 1. As I stated in the 410th plenary on 30 April, a group of Western countries continue to attach high priority to agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", and share the hope, expressed by many delegations in the spring and summer parts of this session, for commencement of substantive work by an ad hoc committee on this item without further delay.

There are many issues and aspects related to a nuclear test ban on which the Conference can and must undertake serious work. Western delegations have tabled a number of working papers to contribute to the substantive consideration of this subject.

We believe that the draft mandate in document CD/521 tabled by a group of Western countries on 20 July 1984, as well as the draft programme of work contained in document CD/621 tabled by the same group of countries together with Norway on 24 July 1985, continue to provide a viable framework in which to commence and carry out the substantive examination of many issues relating to a comprehensive test ban. At the same time, we have stood ready to consider positively any initiative to solve the mandate question.

Thus the group of countries on whose behalf I am speaking today has approached this item throughout the spring and summer parts of this session with a willingness to start practical work in an ad hoc committee at the earliest possible opportunity and, for that purpose, to pursue actively the search for common ground among the various positions thus far expressed.

Indeed, towards the end of the spring session, there were considerable grounds for hoping that our efforts to find consensus might be successful, thanks to the initiative taken by the President for the month of April,

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, in proposing a draft mandate as recorded in the proceedings of the 410th plenary.

In the summer part of this session, our group has stood ready to take the draft mandate proposed by the President for the month of April as a basis for developing a consensus. There have been a number of delegations, not just in our group but also in other groups, who felt that consensus might be reached along this line, and we are curious as to why one group of delegations has not found it fit to respond to the April President's initiative, as we requested, and to join in this common endeavour.

We note in this connection that the draft mandate contained in document CD/772 does not involve a new approach, the ideas contained therein have been known to us since last year, notably through United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/46 A, which a majority of countries in my group did not find it possible to accept.

In concluding, let me reiterate the continued willingness of the group of Western countries to pursue the search for a mandate which will enable the Conference to start substantive and practical work on this item. We hope that the valuable initiative taken by the Czechoslovak Ambassador, which in our view continues to serve as a basis for reaching consensus, can be brought to fruition, and strongly urge other delegations to join in that effort.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to speak? I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, His Excellency Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor this morning for only a moment. Our delegation has been requested to make available the statement issued by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council at the conclusion of their recent meeting in Reykjavik, on 12 June. Our delegation is pleased to be able to respond positively to this request. I have asked that the statement be distributed to all delegations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Are there any other requests to speak? I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I am sure that I shall have the opportunity on another occasion before this session runs out to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation. For the moment, I should like to confine myself to the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Japan.

My delegation has always tried to back up its words with deeds. Thus, for example, when we stated and repeated that we are prepared to seek a formula that would lead to consensus on the issue of putting an end to all nuclear weapon tests, we tried to follow up our words with something concrete,

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

a text that would serve this purpose. And that has been the case this year. My delegation, together with seven other delegations which are members of the Group of 21, has submitted document CD/772 which contains a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda.

My delegation, along with the delegations of the Group of 21, had also tabled another draft mandate, some two or three years ago, and it has not been withdrawn, but unfortunately that draft mandate did not meet with consensus. Consequently, we wished to consider -- not only here but also in New York -- which formula we could submit that would secure progress to achieve consensus. This formula was recommended by the Assembly at the fortieth session in a resolution. Despite the fact that, naturally, it entailed concessions on our part, as compared with the draft we had submitted previously, it did not meet with the consensus we desired. So, at the forty-first session, we made new concessions, substantial concessions, as anyone who compares the two texts with the previous 1984 text will see.

The text to which I have referred, which appears in document CD/772, is before the Conference, and those delegations like the distinguished delegation of Japan, which has just taken the floor, may of course express their support for the draft if what they wish is to give concrete evidence -- practical evidence, to use the word that is customary in such cases -- that they really are seeking results.

What does the draft say? The draft says that the Conference on Disarmament wishes to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 of its agenda with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear test explosions. "With the objective" is a formulation which is open to a wide variety of interpretations. For my delegation it is an immediate objective, but for other delegations -- for example, the delegation of the United States, which has stated this in similar terms on several occasions -- it is a long-term objective. Fine, it has been said repeatedly that when this draft resolution is adopted, the delegation of Mexico can make a declaration indicating its interpretation. If the delegation of the United States, or any other delegation, can also state its own interpretation, this resolution can be approved by consensus without any of the delegations present here having to abandon its position.

What does the draft go on to say? The draft says that the ad hoc committee will set up two working groups which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: Working Group I -- Content and scope of the treaty; Working Group II -- Compliance and verification. This shows that we do not wish to overlook any of the aspects of this issue. I hope that if the words we have heard today reflect the feeling of delegations which had so far opposed a draft such as the one I have referred to, before this session ends, although it will be simply a symbolic gesture, that they will be able to say that they agree with the contents of this draft and that they will agree to our adopting it now so that we can start work in an ad hoc working group next year as soon as we begin the next session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement, and I give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, my delegation will present its position on the whole question of elaborating mandates of the ad hoc committees, and especially the ad hoc committee under item 1, in more detail at a later stage, but I would like to state today that my delegation supports the mandate contained in document CD/772 presented by members of the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Australia, His Excellency Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, I would prefer, if you would permit me, to follow the example set by Ambassador García Robles and confine myself at this stage to remarks consequent upon the brief debate we are now holding, and hope that I will have another opportunity later to convey my respects to you as President of this Conference for the month of August.

I last addressed the plenary of this Conference on 30 July, and in that statement made a number of remarks regarding item 1 of our agenda and regarding the role that mandates as such have come to play in the work of this Conference. I think I made it clear in that statement that my delegation is aware that we are within a hair's breadth of agreement on the issue of forming an ad hoc committee under item 1 of our agenda, but that the consensus required for such agreement was being denied to us by what I called in that statement "a handful of delegations".

It is relevant in the context of the debate we heard this morning to recall that statement, and to recall the contention of my delegation that we are being prevented from doing this vital work by only a very small number of delegations, and I think that this fact is reflected in the statement that has been made by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan this morning on behalf of a group of Western States, and I want it to be clear that my delegation was included in the group of States for which the Ambassador of Japan was speaking. And in his statement he made it very clear -- and I suggest that this is asbolutely relevant to the state of affairs of this Conference under item 1 -- he made it very clear that a proposal had been put to the Conference in April by the then President of the Conference, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, that that proposal is widely supported, and from a group of Western States, the clear indication has been given that we are prepared to seek consensus on the basis of that proposal. What has been made clear by the Ambassador of Japan this morning is that we have not even been given an answer to that position. Not an answer. And that, Mr. President, is very disappointing. The distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has said that his delegation prefers action rather than words. I accept that; so does mine, and I would put it to him that an action that would move us towards consensus on this issue would be for delegations to accept the proposal made by a group of Western States, that we start to do business, to work with each other towards a consensus on the basis of the proposal that has been made by the President for the month of April. In this sense I would draw attention to

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

that part of the distinguished Ambassador of Japan's statement that points out that we have made a proposal to which there has been no answer. May we please have an answer and then work, as Ambassador García Robles has said, towards consensus so that we can start in a committee on this item at the beginning of 1988.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor? As there are none, I should like to inform the Conference that the secretariat is now preparing the first draft of the technical part of the annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. The document will be available under the symbol CD/WP.288 in all official languages between Thursday 13 and Friday, 14 August. I intend to ask the Conference to hold an informal meeting on Tuesday, 18 August, immediately following the plenary meeting, to begin the first reading of the technical part of the report to the General Assembly.

At the end of this week the secretariat will also circulate document CD/WP.287, containing the technical part of the report of the conference to the forty-first session of the General Assembly on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We shall also consider this document in the course of next week.

The secretariat is now also preparing the substantive paragraphs on the agenda items on which the Conference has not set up subsidiary bodies, that is agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 7. As far as agenda item 2 is concerned -- "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" -- the secretariat will reflect in that draft the exchanges of views we have had during the informal meetings on this item.

Next I should like to point out that the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which was to be held today in room I at 6 p.m. has been cancelled. The Committee will meet on Thursday and Friday at 3 p.m. in this room, with full interpretation services.

I should like to remind you that the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet in this room immediately following the plenary.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 13 August 1987 at 10 a.m. The plenary is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.430
13 August 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 13 August 1987, at 10 a.m.

President Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 430th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies and of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

The secretariat has today circulated document CD/778, which contains the progress report on the twenty-fourth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Group, Mr. Ola Dahlman, of Sweden, will introduce this report to the Conference today at the end of the list of speakers.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Mexico and the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, His Excellency Ambassador Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, may I first express my delegation's delight at seeing you preside over the Conference during this difficult month of August. We are convinced that your many personal qualities will indeed help to steer us through the many difficulties facing the Conference and bring this year's session to a successful conclusion. My delegation pledges its full support to your endeavours. I would ask the delegation of Ethiopia to convey to His Excellency Ambassador Terrefe our gratitude for the calm and effective manner in which he directed the work of the Conference during the month of July.

Ambassador Saad Alfarargi is now leaving the Conference. His presidency during the month of June was characterized by the great diplomatic skills and political judgement with which he has represented Egypt in the Conference for more than four years. On a personal note, I must say that close co-operation with Ambassador Alfarargi during those years has been of great support to me and my delegation. It is also with great regret that we have noted the departure of Ambassador Cromartie from the Conference. I had from my arrival the privilege of working closely and for long periods, on a daily basis, with Ambassador Cromartie, particularly on the chemical weapons convention. His intellectual capacity, combined with a rare sense of fairness and reason, will be badly missed. I ask the delegation of the United Kingdom to convey to Ambassador Cromartie our wishes for a speedy recovery. I would also take this opportunity to bid farewell to Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria and to wish him every success in his important assignment in Nigeria. May I also take this opportunity to welcome His Excellency Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil and His Excellency Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. We are looking forward to co-operating with the two Ambassadors within the Group of 21 as well as within the Conference.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

In my intervention today I shall focus on the issue of radiological weapons, and specifically on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In doing so I should like first of all to express the gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary for his skilful chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, and to the two co-ordinators of contact groups A and B, Mr. Numata of Japan and Mr. Wayarabi of Indonesia.

Having introduced the item concerning the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities as far back as 1980, Sweden is known to give priority to the early completion of a draft treaty on this subject, which constitutes a major security concern for Sweden, as it does for many other countries. It is therefore natural that I should make special mention of the untiring efforts of Mr. Wayarabi of Indonesia, who, as Co-ordinator of Contact Group B, has been able through patience, dedication and skill to obtain some clarity on the different views and approaches to the subject entrusted to him.

Despite efforts by many delegations, work on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities in 1986 and 1987 has been disappointing. As far as the work is concerned, we are now back in 1983, but at that time at least we seemed to share a common goal and issues of substance were discussed among delegations. In the past two years we have seen how the very purpose of a prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations has been questioned. This has not only affected our chances of making progress towards banning attacks on nuclear facilities, but could also imperil the role of this Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

The first and foremost question to be addressed is this: What is the aim of the treaty or treaties that we are trying to elaborate in the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons? In this context we might well keep in mind that the Committee was set up under an agenda item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

A definition of weapons of mass destruction was given right back in 1948 in resolution S/C.3/30 of the then Commission for Conventional Armaments under the United Nations Security Council. "Radioactive material weapons" were then defined as weapons of mass destruction. Other such weapons were "atomic explosive weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above".

The specific question of radiological weapons was raised for the first time at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1969, when the Assembly in resolution 2602 C (XXIV), invited the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, inter alia, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare, independently of efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. It is interesting to note that as early as 1969 the General Assembly did not limit the issue to radiological weapons but addressed the whole concept of radiological warfare.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

This fundamental approach is equally valid today. It is thus our firm view that the main purpose in dealing with this agenda item should be to prohibit radiologically-caused mass destruction. This means that the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes causing destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material should be prohibited irrespective of the method applied. From this point of view it matters little whether the radioactive material causing mass destruction comes from the attacker's weapons or from nuclear installations in the country of the attacked.

One delegation has argued -- its position is reflected in a footnote to the report of Contact Group B -- that a treaty based on the criterion of mass destruction would "weaken the protection afforded to nuclear facilities under present international law". My delegation is not aware of any international law that provides such protection. The only specific international norm in this respect is contained in the 1977 additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions on the rules of war. The Swedish delegation considers the articles in question far too vague and conditional to be satisfactory. They do not cover all kinds of installations capable of producing mass destruction if destroyed, but only "nuclear electrical generating stations". Furthermore, they leave far too much scope for subjective assessments by individual commanders for the protection to be satisfactory. Let me quote article 56, paragraph 2 (b) of Protocol I: it states that the protection against attack shall cease if the nuclear electrical generating station "provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support".

The insufficiency of such a prohibition was recognized by the negotiators of the Protocol themselves. In article 56, paragraph 6 they state that the high contracting parties "are urged to conclude further agreements among themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces". It is thus difficult to understand how such a legal régime can be weakened by a prohibition based on the mass destruction criterion, which stems from the very title of the item addressed in the Committee.

Finally, I note with regret that very few countries have even ratified this Protocol. For instance, none of the members of the CD belonging to the two military pacts has ratified it.

It has been stated in the same context that a treaty as proposed by Sweden would amount to "legitimizing attacks on nuclear facilities" that are not covered by the specifications. Such an argument is unacceptable to my delegation. If any progress we make in any given field of arms limitation and disarmament that prohibits a particular kind of warfare or a special kind of weapon is interpreted as legitimizing other kinds of warfare or other kinds of weapons, then the whole process of disarmament will be called into question. For Sweden, the basic rule of the non-use of force is laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. Any specific agreed prohibition serves to strengthen the Charter, not to weaken it.

It has also been proposed that the treaty should cover nuclear reactors and "any other facility for the production, handling, treatment, processing or storage of nuclear fuel or other nuclear material". Such a definition is

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

meaningless unless the term "nuclear material" is well defined. As it stands, most industrial processes would be covered. Nuclear material is present in television sets, watches, hospital equipment, construction elements and, indeed, in the human body itself. However, no definition of the term has been forthcoming.

What is probably meant by such a proposal is that all installations connected with the nuclear power industry should be covered, that is to say, that the aim of a prohibition of attacks should be to protect nuclear installations themselves so as to ensure the sovereign right of States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The promotion of nuclear energy is not a task for a disarmament body. The task given to the Conference on Disarmament is not the protection of industrial installations but the prohibition of the use for hostile purposes of the radioactive material in nuclear installations as a means of mass destruction.

This calls for a clear definition that specifies which nuclear facilities contain amounts of radioactive material such as to cause damage substantial enough to qualify as mass destruction. Having endeavoured to identify the facilities that would meet this criterion, Sweden has concluded that a prohibition of attacks should cover four categories of facilities. They are nuclear reactors, intermediate spent-fuel storages, reprocessing plants and waste deposits. Furthermore, these facilities must be of a certain size or capacity in order to contain enough radioactive material to qualify as being potentially dangerous from the viewpoint of mass destruction.

The basic norm used by Sweden to calculate mass destruction is a military one: immediate denial of an area of more than one square kilometre would be considered mass destruction. This norm is different from the one frequently used in discussing radioactive protection in peacetime, which is the making of permanent residence in a specified area impossible for a certain period.

It has thus been estimated that the amount of radioactive material required -- uniformly spread over one square kilometre -- to kill people who stay in the area for a few hours would be of the order of 10^{18} becquerels. It has further been estimated that a reactor of more than about 10 megawatts thermal power operating at radioactive saturation level would contain enough radioactive material to provide 10^{18} becquerels or more for 10 hours after an attack on the reactor — the time required for release and settling on the ground.

The figures given -- 10^{18} becquerels and 10 megawatts -- are order-of-magnitude values. They are derived from a reasonable assumption related to area denial of one square kilometre. Therefore, they could certainly be subject to discussion. If a value higher than 10^{18} becquerels is chosen, fewer facilities will be covered and a lower value will increase the number of facilities covered. The increase in the number of facilities which results from lowering the value of 10^{17} becquerels and 1 megawatt is not very large, however.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

A significant factor in the release of radioactive material from a reactor in operation is the driving force provided by the reactor itself. Smaller reactors would provide a smaller driving force, and thus the effect would be less radioactivity.

It has been argued that the imposition of such thresholds would be considered discriminatory against developing countries, since in many cases their nuclear facilities do not reach the threshold. The fact is that a number of developing countries have nuclear installations that would be covered by the mass destruction criterion. Some 16 power reactors are in operation in developing countries, and almost 20 more are under construction. This adds to the importance of the problem for developing and industrialized countries alike. A dozen research reactors with a capacity of 10 megawatts or more also operate in developing countries. In the range 1-10 megawatts there are another 20 reactors.

Given an in-depth discussion of the criterion and negotiations on the relevant thresholds, the concept just outlined seems to have the overwhelming support of members of the Conference, in all kinds of groups too. The fact that this approach is based on the very premise of the 1979 joint United States-USSR proposal, namely a commitment not "to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material", gives us hope that both authors of that proposal will seriously consider an attack prohibition based on the mass destruction criterion.

However, many delegations which support the mass destruction criterion want to add yet another, namely that only installations used for peaceful purposes should be covered by the provisions of a treaty. Some delegations want the treaty to cover only IAEA-safeguarded installations. The concern is that military facilities and production for military purposes would otherwise be exempt from attack. While fully understanding such concerns, my delegation submits that the potential for mass destruction is the same whatever the intended use of a particular facility. In the opinion of Sweden, the necessity of preventing mass destruction should at any given moment have priority over military interests.

Furthermore, typical military installations such as nuclear weapon production plants are not included. Secondly, the provisions cover only attacks that would cause the release or dissemination of radioactive material. Thirdly, the Swedish proposal includes on-site verification of installations proposed for inclusion in the register. Sweden is of the opinion that, if a State party chooses to comply with these regulations, the possible military or non-military nature of a facility would be considered to be of less concern to the international community than the need to prevent mass destruction. If our proposal is studied in detail, it should become quite clear that any concern about the possible sanctioning of military activities is not called for.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

It should be emphasized that this approach does not introduce additional criteria to that of mass destruction. It treats all nuclear facilities in an equal manner -- be they under IAEA safeguards or not. It treats all States in an equal manner -- be they parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or not.

When considering whether the prohibition of attack should apply irrespective of the peaceful or military use of a certain facility, the crucial question to ask is whether or not an attack -- apart from the mass destruction effect -- would effectively damage the war effort of the country attacked. As I have stated, the categories which do pose a mass destruction risk are limited in number. The relevant facilities are nuclear electricity generating reactors, reprocessing plants, spent fuel storages, waste storages and larger research reactors.

It is obvious that the first type of facility, the power reactor, could make a direct contribution to a country's war effort through that country's electricity supply. It therefore represents a credible military target. However, with the high precision of modern weaponry, the electricity supply could be cut without attacking the reactor itself.

It could also be urged that reprocessing plants, which can produce plutonioum for weapons purposes, pose a more serious problem. However, there is a considerable time-lag between plutonium production and subsequent nuclear weapon production. It is therefore difficult to see that any real military advantage could be gain during a conflict by attacking a military reprocessing plant, especially in view of the arsenals of nuclear weapons already existing in the world.

In the opinion of my delegation a treaty covering these kinds of installation with a view to preventing mass destruction is not only necessary, but also realistic and feasible from a military point of view. Finally, the other categories of nuclear facility such as spent-fuel and nuclear-waste deposits do not represent credible military targets and could therefore also realistically be covered by a prohibition of attacks.

To sum up, Sweden's position regarding a prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities is, we believe, clear, realistic and feasible. In the report of Contact Group B, my delegation would have preferred different sets of elements to be combined in a way that made the choices plain. We were, however, for some reason not able to reach a consensus on maximum clarity in the report. Still, a footnote to the "Scope" provision based on the mass destruction criterion makes clear that there exists only one approach that constitutes a consistent set of elements for a draft treaty. If we are to use the Conference on Disarmament to reach a global prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, a basis for such a ban is provided in that alternative.

Permit me in this statment also to make some brief remarks related to another item on our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The continued deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee, under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese, have been very useful. The Committee has benefited from valuable presentations, such as that of the Canadian PAXSAT for space-to-space and space-to-earth verification. The analysis of legal and technical matters, as well as definitions, which has taken place this year has made a valuable contribution.

Substantive proposals have been made. I can, for instance, refer to the main provisions of a treaty text submitted by two delegations, the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia. As nothing indicating the contrary has been brought forward in the Committee, my delegation also finds quite interesting the idea voiced by Argentina that the Conference's report could register statements by member States that they have not permanently deployed weapons in space.

The centrepiece of the work of the Committee has been and, in the opinion of my delegation, must continue to be proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. Only the need to examine possible measures to that end warrants the efforts of the Conference on the item. That such an examination takes place does as such not prejudice the conclusions to be drawn by the Committee. Statements made have illustrated substantial differences of opinion among States on the adequacy of present legal barriers to an arms race in outer space, on the urgency of additional measures and on the scope and contents of such measures. It has also been disputed whether such measures could be verified at all. The fact that positions are indeed divergent does not, however, detract from, but add to the importance of continued and deepened consideration of the matter.

One aspect of military space activities that might constitute a threat to the vital national interests of many States is the development of anti-satellite weapons. There is a strong case for pursuing the matter of a global prohibition of ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. A comprehensive ban would cover the development, testing, deployment and use of such weapons.

A number of political and technical problems would have to be solved before such a comprehensive ban could be realized. It has been emphasized that a workable definition of ASAT weapons must be laid down. Verification arrangements, possibly of a very far-reaching character, would have to be devised. The Ad hoc Committee should continue to explore problems of this nature in order to prepare the ground for substantive negotiations.

A number of partial measures to control or constrain ASAT developments have been discussed. They range from registration and information on relevant activities to arrangements to prevent incidents and restrictions on the testing and deployment of specific, dedicated ASAT systems. Substantive consideration of those proposals can also hopefully serve to bring about a common understanding on the role of various types of satellite for international security, and on desirable approaches to avoid the deployment of ASAT weapons.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The implementation of even limited measures to check such a development could be of major significance. Any measure restricting the possibility of carrying out an ASAT mission in a reliable way may reduce crisis instability, and thus benefit international security.

On several occasions my delegation has made it clear that the Conference on Disarmament would benefit from the contribution of scientific expertise on space technology. Scientific and technological development in outer space activiites is dynamic. Our work is suffering from a lack of up-to-date information on such developments. The deliberations in the Ad hoc Committee would be greatly facilitated if it became possible to obtain a jointly shared perception of basic elements in space technology and development that is of relevance for the work of the Conference. The Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, Canada, in May this year was an effective demonstration of the usefulness of a scientific presentation of the state of the art relating to outer space techniques.

With these considerations and experiences in mind, my delegation would deem it an important step if the Conference could consider the possibility of organizing a meeting of scientific or technical experts on space issues during its 1988 session, preferably during the first part of the session. During such a meeting, which should be of ad hoc character and of limited duration (one to two weeks), definitions and verification techniques relevant to anti-satellite weapons and anti-satellite warfare could be addressed. Furthermore, trends and long-term prospects regarding the possible or potential weaponization of space could be addressed. Deepened knowledge and expanded overviews would make the delegations better equipped to advance the work of the Ad hoc Committee in a serious and constructive way.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In its statement today, the Soviet delegation intends to concentrate on two issues, a nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Like many other delegations present in this hall, we cannot help being concerned about the fact that item 1 on the agenda of the Conference continues to be considered item 1 only formally, without finding expression in concrete negotiations leading to a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Cessation and prohibition of such tests undoubtedly depends above all on the Soviet Union and the United States, which, in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, bear special responsibility for achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union's position on this problem is imbued with awareness of that responsibility. Suffice it to recall that we

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

maintained a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions for more than 18 months. There is no forum -- bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral -- in which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to participate in order to work towards a radical solution of the nuclear test issue.

Unfortunately, the United States has a diametrically opposite position: both in the Conference on Disarmament and in the Soviet-United States bilateral meetings of experts in Geneva, the United States is objecting to the holding of full-scale negotiations on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The main "argument" in this respect has been that, in the current circumstances, the cessation of nuclear tests would undermine the concept of "nuclear deterrence" and that a stage-by-stage advance towards a complete cessation of nuclear tests will be possible in the future in proportion to the progress in the field of nuclear and conventional disarmament. This approach leaves the international community to console itself with the thought that, when there are no nuclear weapons, there will be nothing to test. And when account is taken of another statement by the United States delegation to the effect that nuclear weapons will, for the foreseeable future, remain the basis of the United States security, the present United States position can hardly be considered positive. That position signifies a notable withdrawal by the United States from what it had been advocating until a relatively short while ago.

The United States last reaffirmed its agreement in principle to a nuclear test ban as an independent priority measure in July 1980. I am referring to the joint report to the Committee on Disarmament by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as the participants in the tripartite negotiations on banning nuclear tests. Paragraph 4 of the report stated that:

> "The negotiating parties are seeking a treaty that for decades has been given one of the highest priorities in the field of arms limitation, and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States continue to attach great importance to it".

That report was transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to the Committee as document CD/130, of 30 July 1980. The report also emphasized the importance attached by the three sides to the prohibition of nuclear tests.

Paragraph 6 of the report stated:

> "The objectives which the negotiating parties seek to achieve as the result of this treaty are important to all mankind. Specifically, they seek to attain a treaty which will make a major contribution to the shared objectives of constraining the nuclear arms race, curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and strengthening international peace and security" (CD/130).

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

It is well known that these tripartite negotiations, which were close to a successful conclusion, were never resumed owing to the new position on the matter adopted by the United States under the Reagan Administration. That the United States position had changed was stated, in particular, in the speech made by the then Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Rostow, at the meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 9 February 1982. It was clear from that speech that the Reagan Administration had transferred test-ban issues from the category of first-priority goals to that of long-term goals, and that it had begun to relate a nuclear test ban "to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces". "We do not believe" said Mr. Rostow, "that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance" (CD/PV.152, p. 13).

Later, the United States expressed its position in the formula which was, in particular, repeated by Ambassador Hansen at the meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 24 February this year. That formula reads:

> "The United States sees a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective which must be viewed in the context of a time when the United States and its allies do not depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability" (CD/PV.391, p. 11).

I am recalling this since, even in the period prior to the 1980s, when the United States recognized the priority of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, it stood by the concept of nuclear deterrence. What has happened now? Why has the United States abruptly changed its position? I address this question to the United States delegation and I call upon it to demonstrate a more constructive attitude to an issue that rightfully occupies the first place on the agenda of the Conference.

It goes without saying that Soviet-United States agreement in favour of a test ban would be of great significance. However, because of their bilateral character the Soviet-United States talks cannot provide a complete and general solution to this problem. Consequently, we also consider it necessary to begin concrete negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament as well. The concurrent holding of multilateral negotiations -- within the framework of the Conference -- and bilateral negotiations with the United States would not be contradictory. On the contrary, the concurrent pursuit of negotiations in this way would merely hasten the achievement of the ultimate goal.

With a view to stimulating an immediate start on negotiations at the Conference, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have submitted a set of "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". It was introduced in the Conference on Disarmament on 9 July this year by Mr. V.F. Petrovsky, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and has been circulated as document CD/756. We regard this document as a possible basis for multilateral negotiations aimed at elaborating the treaty in question. At the same time, we are ready to study constructively any other proposals or views aimed at ensuring the early conclusion of such a treaty.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

In drafting the "Basic provisions", the sponsors took into account numerous views and ideas expressed earlier by other participants in the Conference. To a large degree, this concerns the problem of verification. The document proposes an extremely varied "assortment" of forms and methods of verification, both national and international, including some not previously suggested or discussed.

I would like to recall that the socialist countries' proposal envisages the use of national technical means of verification, the creation of an international seismic verification system with a network of standard seismic stations that would function with the participation of representatives of an international inspectorate, verification -- again with the participation of international inspectors -- of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions at test sites, and mandatory on-site inspections without the right of refusal. The proposal also envisages co-operation in the international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity. I should like to dwell on this matter a little later.

It is clear that the concrete needs for particular forms of verification, including seismic verification, can be determined only in the process of devising the entire system for verifying the non-conduct of nuclear explosions. In our view, the time has come to start developing such a system.

This is what prompted the Soviet Union's proposal for the establishment of a special group of scientific experts charged with preparing scientifically based recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests. This proposal was put forward in the statement by E.A. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, on 6 August. Such a group could consider all the aspects of verification in their relationship to one another, including seismic data exchange, on-site inspections, standard characteristics of seismic stations, means of monitoring atmospheric radioactivity, etc. Attention should also be paid to the possible financial implications of the establishment of a verification system.

In making this proposal for a group of scientific experts, we also proceed from the need to put work on a nuclear test ban on a practical footing as soon as possible. I should like to take this opportunity to express our support for the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda that was recently formally submitted by Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia as document CD/772. As is well known, because of the difficulties concerning a mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, no such work is yet being done.

With regard to the group of scientific experts on verification, we suggest that, before the end of this year's session, the Conference on Disarmament should take a decision in principle to establish the proposed group at the beginning of the Conference's next annual session.

The fact that the Soviet Union has put forward the idea of establishing a group of scientific experts does not, of course, detract from the role that we ascribe to the work of the seismic experts, on which their distinguished

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Chairman, Mr. Dahlman, is, it seems, to report to the Conference today. That group is currently working on an important development designed to lift the machinery for seismic verification to a qualitatively new stage -- the exchange of level II seismic data. It also has important tasks to fulfil in connection with preparations for the international experiment next year, 1988.

Our proposal for the establishment of a group of experts on verification is, on the whole, aimed at accomplishing the logical next step.

In his statement before the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August, Minister Shevardnadze mentioned that the USSR Academy of Sciences had reached a new agreement with United States colleagues on the installation of monitoring instruments and on the exchange of data from them. This agreement on the Soviet-United States "Verification of compliance with a nuclear-test-ban treaty" project provides in particular that, in Soviet territory, three seismic stations in Kazakhstan will continue work under the project until at least 15 December this year. In August or September of this year, a chemical explosion with a yield of up to 10 tonnes will be carried out at or near a test site in Kazakhstan in order to calibrate the seismic stations. Use will also be made for calibration purposes of industrial explosions in the vicinity of the stations.

Beginning in January 1988, the three stations in Kazakhstan will be relocated at a distance of over 1,000 kilometres from the test site. The purpose of this transfer is, firstly, to test the possibility of low-threshold monitoring of explosions of about 1 kiloton and, secondly, to support the international experiment in the exchange of level II seismic data in 1988.

However, besides seismic devices, there are also many other achievements of modern science and technology that can be used for verification purposes.

I should like to recall in this context that, in his statement before the Conference, Minister Shevardnadze proposed the establishment of an international system of global radiation safety monitoring using space communication links. The main functions of such a system could be making monitoring of compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests more effective; monitoring the status of pollution of the atmosphere, the soil, and ground and sea water on a global and regional scale; collecting, collating and analysing data on, and identifying trends in the radiation situation; prompt acquisition of data on the radiation situation as a result of accidents at nuclear facilities and nuclear power stations or of unauthorized nuclear explosions; forecasting of the possible consequences, etc.

We proceed from the idea that such a system of global radiation safety monitoring could be established even before the entry into force of the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The question of establishing this system could be discussed within the special group of scientific experts on verification that we are proposing.

Permit me now to move on to item 5 of the Conference's agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet Union considers the task of preventing the transfer of the arms race to outer space as one of the most urgent of our time and it intends, as the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, emphasized in his statement, to work towards "a strict and universal ban on deployment of any weapons in outer space".

Our proposals for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind and of a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth remain on the table.

We have reaffirmed on more than one occasion our willingness to come to an agreement even on partial measures, for example, on the immunity of artificial Earth satellites not carrying weapons of any kind on board and on banning the development of new anti-satellite systems and eliminating the existing ones.

The Conference also has before it a joint document from the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, entitled "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777 of 31 July this year), which we support.

The views expressed by a number of other delegations also deserve most serious consideration. For example, in his statement on 21 July this year, the head of the Indian delegation, Ambassador Teja, showed the urgent need for the prohibition as soon as possible of the development, testing and deployment of new anti-satellite systems and for elimination of such systems as already exist, and also expressed interesting ideas about ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. In his statement on 7 July, the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, also expressed support for the view that "space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not be attacked and should be duly protected". We have also noted the readiness expressed by the delegation of China to proceed, as a first step, to negotiations on the banning of anti-satellite systems and we are, of course, in full agreement with Ambassador Fan's view that this measure must be complemented by other steps aimed at preventing an arms race in space. Interesting views on agenda item 5 have been expressed today by the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus. We shall, of course, study those views attentively.

The socialist countries' proposals, together with the ideas of other delegations, constitute for the Conference on Disarmament useful assets that could serve as a good basis for business-like work on preventing an arms race in outer space.

It goes without saying that agreement on this issue without reliable verification is unthinkable. In this connection, I should like to recall that, on 17 March this year, the Soviet delegation proposed that consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing an international system, to include an international inspectorate, for verifying the non-deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind. Our proposal met with great interest and a number of questions were put to us in order better to understand its essence.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Many of those questions were answered in principle in the statement by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, on 6 August. Today, the Soviet delegation would like to make some further clarifications.

The Soviet Union is proposing that a start should be made on establishing a verification system right away, without waiting for the conclusion of the corresponding agreement on space, so that the system can be operational as soon as possible. The principal purpose of such verification would be to determine that objects launched into space were not weapons and were not equipped with weapons of any kind. The concrete list of the systems and devices that the verification bodies should not allow to be launched into space would have to be agreed upon in the course of negotiations. The intention is that the verification system could be refined if an international agreement or agreements are drawn up.

We are convinced that on-site inspection immediately before launch is the simplest and most effective way of making sure that objects launched into space are not equipped with weapons of any kind. The distinguished Ambassador of Argentina, Mr. Cámpora, also talked about this point in his statement on 21 July. Such inspection might begin not long before the object to be launched into space is installed on the carrier rocket or other launch vehicle. However, should the future agreement provide for a complete ban on space strike weapons, the Soviet Union would, as Minister Shevardnadze stated, be "willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc." The verification system we propose would provide for groups of inspectors to be present permanently at all sites for the launching of space objects with a view to verifying all such objects irrespective of their means of launching. In addition, representatives of the secretariat would be given in good time information on each upcoming launch, including the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of the launch. In cases where launches were infrequent, use could be made of inspections on the basis of prior notifications of the launches, instead of permanently stationing inspectors at the launch sites. Should an undeclared launch be suspected, the inspectorate would have the right to request the relevant information from specially designated observatories, a list of which would be compiled by the time the verification system became operational, and also to make, if necessary, a special on-site inspection if the launch could have been made from an undeclared launching site.

What is meant here is, of course, the verification of the non-stationing in space of weapons of any kind, and not the verification of launches of ballistic missiles unconnected with the placing of any devices in an orbit for an artificial Earth satellite or on a flight path towards other celestial bodies.

Although we view an international inspectorate as the principal element of a possible verification system, this does not preclude the possibility of establishing other structures, for example, means of tracking space objects, within the framework of the inspectorate.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

As experience of negotiations that have reached an advanced stage -- for example, those on prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons -- shows, it would be advisable to make provision within the framework of the verification system for some central executive body and secretariat. The corps of inspectors and the number of inspection groups would have to be defined taking into account the need for the verification to cover all sites or ranges for the launching of space objects. From the organizational point of view, the verification system could function either independently or within the framework of a world space organization once that is set up. It would be advisable to provide for a certain link between the verification system and the United Nations bodies to which States already, as is provided for by the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, send general information on the objects they launch into space.

Naturally, specific questions relating to the composition, structure, organization and financing of the verification system should be the subject of negotiation. Account might be taken in this respect of the experience in devising measures and machinery for verifying compliance with disarmament agreements in other fields.

In conclusion, I should like to express thanks to all the delegations which have expressed support for the Soviet proposal for a system to verify the non-stationing of weapons in space.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I have noted the reminder of his country's proposal of last week for a special group of scientific experts, which will entail the appropriate consultations.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would like to begin this brief statement by expressing my delegation's pleasure at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, and at the fact that this has happened in what could well be considered the most important month of each year as far as the work of the Conference is concerned. I take this opportunity to place on record once again my delegation's appreciation for the exemplary manner in which your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Terrefe, carried out his functions. I am pleased to welcome among us the new representative of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, and the new representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo. Lastly, I wish to state how much we regret the fact that Ambassador Saad Alfarargi will soon be leaving. For almost four years he has headed the delegation of Egypt, and just two months ago he gave us tangible proof of his skill in conducting the deliberations of a multilateral body such as this.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

At the latest meeting of the Conference on Disarmament two days ago, the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, speaking, in his words, "on behalf of a group of Western delegations" and referring to agenda item 1, said that they were still prepared "to start practical work in an ad hoc committee at the earliest possible opportunity" with a view to finding "common ground among the various positions thus far expressed."

Shortly afterwards, at the same meeting, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, said that his delegation "was included in the group of States for which the Ambassador of Japan was speaking", that they had "made a proposal to which there has been no answer", and that what could move us towards consensus on this issue "would be for delegations to accept the proposal made by a group of Western States ... on the basis of the proposal that has been made by the President for the month of April".

In order to place things in their context, it is important to have clear ideas which correspond to reality on the following basic points. First of all, the only -- I emphasize this, the only -- draft mandate submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in the current year 1987 is that reproduced in document CD/772 sponsored by the delegations of Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. This mandate faithfully reflects the request addressed to the Conference on Disarmament by the General Assembly in paragraph 5 of resolution 41/46A, which was adopted on 3 December 1986 by the overwhelming majority of 135 votes in favour and only 3 against.

Secondly, in submitting this draft to the Conference on behalf of the sponsors at the 422nd meeting on 16 July last, we stated the following:

> "We venture to hope that the objective study of this draft and its comparison to those circulated between 1984 and now will highlight its constructive spirit and its flexibility, which allows for interpretations which are not in conflict with any of the points of view which can legitimately be maintained in connection with this matter, a matter to which the Assembly has quite rightly been giving the highest priority and which also takes pride of place on the agenda of our Conference".

Thirdly, at last Tuesday's meeting I had the following to say in an off-the-cuff statement with respect to CD/772:

> "My delegation has always sought to back up its words with deeds. Thus, for example, when we stated and repeated that we are prepared to seek a formula that would lead to consensus on the issue of putting an end to all nuclear tests, we tried to follow up our words with something concrete, a text that would serve this purpose. That has been the case again this year. My delegation, together with seven other delegations, which are members of the Group of 21, has sponsored document CD/772, which contains a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda ....

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The text to which I have referred, which appears in document CD/772, is before the Conference, and those delegations like the distinguished delegation of Japan, which has just taken the floor, may of course express their support for the draft if what they wish is to give concrete evidence — practical evidence, to use the word that is customary in such cases -- that they really are seeking results.

"What does the draft say? The draft says that the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 of its agenda 'with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear test explosions'.

"'With the objective' is a formula which is open to a wide variety of interpretations. For my delegation it is an immediate objective, but for other delegations — for example, the delegation of the United States, which has stated this in similar terms on several occasions — it is a long-term objective. For this reason, if the draft mandate is adopted, the delegation of Mexico might issue a statement indicating its interpretation thereof. The delegation of the United States, or any other delegation, would also be able to state its own interpretation. Thus, this mandate can be approved by consensus without any of the delegations present here having to abandon its position.

"What does the draft go on to say? The draft says that the ad hoc committee will set up two working groups which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: Working Group I — Contents and scope of the treaty; Working Group II -- Compliance and verification. This shows that we do not wish to overlook any of the aspects of this issue."

We would like to know the position of the delegation of Australia with respect to the mandate we have proposed, which certainly cannot be criticized as being supported by only "a handful of delegations", since we can state without fear of contradiction that it enjoys the support of approximately two thirds of the membership of the Conference.

For our part, we make this offer: if the informal suggestion by the President for last April were to be formalized in a Conference document, as in the case of CD/772, whether under his sponsorship or that of the members referred to by the distinguished representatives of Japan and Australia, we would be prepared to express our position on this and explain the reasons for it in detail.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): In the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, remarks that were made by me at the last plenary session of the Conference were addressed and, at the end of the statement, a question was posed to my delegation. With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to respond briefly and I think it is appropriate that I do so immediately.

In the first instance, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico sought to quote from remarks that I made, as he did last week, on an unprepared basis, and in two cases I regret to say that what was quoted was not in fact what I said. But in particular, of those two cases, I would like it to be clear that I did not under any circumstances say, as is now suggested in page 4 of the Spanish version of the Ambassador of Mexico's statement, I did not in any way say that the text of a mandate provided in CD/772 was supported by only a handful of delegations. I said the reverse. I said that we are being prevented from working on item 1 of our agenda by only a handful of delegations, so that, having made that correction, it is easy for me to state that I agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico when he claims that the text he has tabled together with six other delegations in document CD/772 has the very widespread support -- I think he said support by at least two thirds -- of the Conference. It is perfectly clear to my delegation that that is a statement of fact.

He posed a particular question to me with regard to my own delegation's attitude towards the draft mandate in CD/772. I would hope it would be clear to him and every other member of this Conference that Australian policy on the issue of a nuclear test ban is such that, on a national basis, we would be able to accept the mandate provided in document CD/772.

But, Mr. President, that is not the point. I find it interesting -- I am not sure how useful -- that the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has asked me to say what our position is. I have merely repeated what is our well-known policy position. The point is not why my delegation's position is; the point is how do we find consensus on this issue? And I would like immediately to express my gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico for what he said in the closing paragraph of the statement he made this morning, namely, that his delegation would be prepared to participate with others in an examination of the draft mandate provided by the President for the month of April, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, with a view to achieving such consensus, that being our task: not to identify the views of individual delegations, but to find consensus. What I asked for on Tuesday was precisely such an expression, an expression of willingness to sit down together and work towards consensus on the basis of what the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia proposed as President in April, and what I have heard the distinguished representative of Mexico say this morning is that he, and he hopes others, are prepared to do just that. That is the answer to the question which had not previously been given, and I suggest that it has now been given this morning and I would hope it is not too late for us to start work on the basis of that proposal made in April and hopefully come to consensus this year so that we can begin our work immediately next year.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for some of the ideas in his statement.

Unfortunately, it would seem that the text on which he based himself does not correspond to reality, or is it perhaps that the Spanish text (because the text that we wrote is Spanish) is not really being interpreted correctly by the members of the Australian delegation? What I said in that text, in the final paragraph on page 4, I will now try to translate into English as faithfully as possible, and the members of my delegation inform me that the simultaneous interpreters interpreted that paragraph very correctly. The paragraph says the following (It will not be very elegant English, but I am going to put it into English as I have it in Spanish):

> "In what concerns us, we offer that if the informal suggestion that the President of last April were to be made a formal proposal in a document of the Conference, as is the case of the document CD/772, be it under the sponsorship of that President, or under the sponsorship of the members which were referred to by the distinguished representatives of Japan and Australia, we would be ready to express our position concerning that proposal and to explain in detail the reasons which are the basis for that position".

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico and I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I am grateful to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico for his clarification of the last paragraph of this statement. I can see now from his excellent English translation and from reading the Spanish as he gave that translation that I was mistaken as to one element of what he said in his statement.

I cannot purport to speak for the Western Group on this subject, on the proposal that he has made that the April President's proposal first be made a formal proposal of the Conference before we can consider it; I am sure that other delegations will want to think about that. I would have to say from my standpoint though, that I am not clear -- and perhaps we can solve this in informal consultations -- I am not clear why that proposal is made, what difference it makes. The proposal by the President of April has been there since April; we have since that time stated our willingness, that is, we, a number of Western States, have stated our willingness to enter into consultations on the basis of that proposal. We have not until today even had the degree of answer that we have now been given, of answer to our proposal that we discuss this issue on the basis of the April draft. I am not quite sure what difference it makes to actually table it formally, but I am sure others of the Conference will want to consider that. I would still remain

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

grateful, however, that for the first time this morning we have been given an indication that it will be possible, perhaps under formal circumstances, but that it would be possible, to talk about the substance of what was proposed in April, which, we have indicated since that time, we are prepared to discuss.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): It is rare for us to have an opportunity in the Conference on Disarmament for such a dynamic exchange of opinions among delegations.

I should like to say for the present that we fully subscribe to what was said by Ambassador García Robles in his statement. However, I asked for the floor to refer to a comment that Ambassador Butler made in his statement last Tuesday and reiterated in the statement he made a few moments ago, his comment that a handful of countries has prevented the formation of a consensus concerning the mandate for the ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. That in effect means that a group of countries, or the handful of countries to which he referred, is obstructing the work of the Conference. I am not going to comment on that assertion, but I do believe that it requires some reflection as to its implications. At the same time, I should like to emphasize that, according to the statement made by the representative of Australia, which was also quoted in the statement by the Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, it would seem that the point of view of the countries on whose behalf the Ambassador of Japan spoke and to which the Ambassador of Australia subscribes means that the only possibility of consensus is on the basis of the proposal made by that group, because it says here that that group made a proposal to which there has been no response and that what could "move us towards consensus on this issue would be for delegations to accept the proposal made by a group of Western States" -- that, to judge from that statement, the only possibility of consensus would be on the basis of the proposal by the Western States, which is in a way saying that there would only be consensus in one direction.

Those are just a few comments that I wanted to make to contribute to this morning's exchange.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Venezuela and I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): To respond quickly to what has just been said by my friend and colleague from Venezuela, two points. First of all, when I said on 30 July, then again yesterday and again today, that it is our perception that progress on this issue is being impeded by only a handful of States, I made clear that the reason for mentioning this -- what I believe to be a fact -- was to lament that we are so close to agreement that the step involved to find agreement is, and should be, quite small. Secondly, there is a misunderstanding with regard to the proposal of the West to enter into

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

discussion on the basis of the mandate provided in the draft by the President for April, and I think this misunderstanding is, in fact, repeated on the first page of the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico today. I cannot pretend to be in any way fluent in the Spanish language, but it does seem to me from the second paragraph of that statement, and this has just been reflected by what our colleague from Venezuela has said, that we have been understood, Ambassador Yamada has been understood, as saying that we are prepared to work only on the basis of the proposal advanced by the President in April, and indeed, the implication is given that we are saying, "Take this or leave it; this or nothing else".

Now, this is what has just been repeated by the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela, and it is not correct. The statement made on behalf of a group of Western countries said that we preferred the document in CD/521, but that we were prepared to enter into discussions, negotiations if you will, on the basis of the April President's proposal, and it should be very, very clear that what is not being said is "Take the April President's proposal or nothing else". In other words, it is not the one-way street that you have just been suggesting that it might be. What we have said is that we would hope to have an answer to the proposal, that we look into the matter, we have a discussion, on the basis of what the President for April proposed -- and, of course, that discussion would be one without prejudice in any way. It would be an open discussion to see whether or not there is the basis of consensus. It is a position that is not accurately reflected as being a demand that consensus be built in only one way, namely, our way.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia and I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Perhaps the most suitable procedure for making it very clear and very definite what the terms of a proposal are is to submit it to the secretariat for it to be circulated as a document of the Conference. At least, that is what has always been done in this connection. That would be the first step, and then the next one is the one that has just been made by the distinguished representative of Australia.

Our draft resolution, before being a formal draft resolution, was a well-known preliminary draft, known to all the members of the Conference on Disarmament from the "spring session", and we still hope that the delegations to which Ambassador Yamada or Ambassador Butler referred will come and discuss it with us. We then took the next step and made and formalized the proposal and it has been circulated as document CD/722. And, in my statement today, I said, in the final paragraph on page 4, "We would like to know the position of the delegation of Australia with respect to the mandate we have proposed". Naturally, instead of Australia, one could also say "the entire group of delegations for which Ambassador Yamada was the spokesman". We do not see why a proposal that does not even exist as a document should be taken as a basis for talks.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. Are there any further speakers on this matter? The representative of the United States has requested the floor; I give the floor to Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I do not want to prolong the session this morning unduly, but the distinguished Soviet Ambassador in his remarks this morning on a nuclear test ban and outer space, which contained much useful and interesting material for our consideration, did mention the United States in his remarks and again attacked the Western policy of deterrence. I would like to just respond very briefly if I might, because he asked a very direct question at one point. In referring to documents in the nuclear-test-ban area in July 1980, he referred to those documents, and then asked a rhetorical question: What has happened? Why has the United States abruptly changed its position? and he addressed this question to our delegation. I would just respond that what happened and what changed was that there was a Presidential election in the United States, which occurs every four years. Several parties compete and issues are discussed, and my recollection of that campaign was that the President of our country, Mr. Reagan, campaigned on a platform calling for strengthening of the United States defence and security posture in the face of an increased Soviet threat. I recall that campaign very well. As a result of that campaign in 1980, the American people responded overwhelmingly with a landslide election mandate, which was repeated in 1984 by an even larger majority. Part of this Reagan policy, enunciated during both these campaigns and overwhelmingly adopted by the American people, one of its cornerstones and concepts was nuclear deterrence, so I just want to point out to the distinguished Soviet Ambassador that these abrupt changes in policy do occur every four years in the United States through our electoral process.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before giving the floor to the Chairman of the Group of Experts and in view of the exchange of opinions that has taken place, I believe it may be helpful to remind the Conference of what I said in my opening statement and have said in each of the consultations that I, as President, have had with the groups, namely that I remain at the disposal of the members of the Conference should there be any development with regard to the agenda items on which it has not yet been possible to reach any procedural agreement, that is, items 1, 3 and 7.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Mr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the Group's report, which is contained in document CD/778.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): Mr. President, I am pleased to present to you the results of the recent meeting of the Ad hoc Group and to introduce its progress report contained in document CD/778, which is in front of you.

The meeting took place from 27 July to 7 August 1987 and experts from 25 countries attended the session; I am pleased to inform you that this is the widest representation we have had for many sessions. The World Meteorological Organization was also represented. As you may recall, we had a

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

resources already assigned to the Conference. The secretariat and the Group's Secretary, Mr. Cassandra, made, in my view, an admirable and successful effort to arrange an adequate number of meetings even during that first week and also by providing outstanding services throughout the session. I would also like to thank those CD Committees that kindly shared some of their scheduled time with us to make these meeting arrangements possible.

At our two previous sessions, in August 1986 and March 1987, we reached agreement in principle on the design and testing of a modern international seismic data exchange system, as documented in CD/721 and CD/745 -- a system which is based on the expeditious exchange of all available seismic information from all detected signals and the routine use of all data at international data centres (IDCs).

At this latest session we have been adding technical details to these general principles earlier agreed upon.

To work out all the technicalities of this new system is a demanding and time-consuming task which has to be supported by extensive work at the national level. A number of national contributions were presented. Some of these documents were quite extensive and detailed and reflected the fact that considerable efforts already have been initiated in some countries towards the practical design and development of the new system. Informal experiments on the exchange of wave-form data have also been undertaken by a number of countries and tentative results were reported.

The discussions were aided by several informal meetings and presentations. The Japanese delegation arranged informal meetings on waveform data exchange. The United States delegation gave a presentation on global satellite communication. The Group also received from the United States delegation an invitation to a workshop on IDCs to be held in Washington, D.C., in October this year. The Swedish delegation demonstrated, through computer simulation, possible ways to conduct the tasks at IDCs. This demonstration was followed by a number of informal meetings on how to design IDCs. Such informal and usually very technical activities are most valuable in supporting the work of the Group.

During the session, five open-ended study groups were established to further elaborate on the design concept and to assist the Group's Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdahl of Norway, in his important work to prepare a draft report describing a tentative design of the system. Each study group is headed by two convenors, as listed in annex I of the progress report.

An important task for the study group on stations and the station network is to pursue further the issue of modern prototype "CD stations". The ultimate aim is to achieve a standardized global network of modern stations. A "CD station" should be able to collect and exchange high-quality wave-form data from seismic events at all distances. Such a design concept should include array stations able to improve the detection capability and to provide preliminary locations of detected events.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

One study group is to focus on the functioning of national data centres, which are to be established in each country as an authorized point of contact with the international system. The group will primarily work on the technical means and procedures for the extraction of parameter and wave-form data from participating stations in each country to be transmitted to the international data centres.

Efficient and reliable data communication would be a most important component of the global system. The Group agreed earlier that high-capacity, dedicated data communication links, using satellite data transmission or other means, should be established between IDCs. These dedicated links should be operated in such a way that any data transmitted from a national to an international data centre would automatically and instantaneously be transmitted to all other IDCs. National data centres would communicate with the international centres using the most efficient and appropriate communication channels available in the regions concerned. There still exists some disagreement within the Group as to the practical arrangements needed to satisfy these requirements. Two study groups have been established to study communications between national and international data centres.

One of these groups will study data exchange through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO/GTS). This communication system was used almost exclusively during the Group's technical test in 1984. The representative of the World Meteorological Organization reviewed the status of WMO/GTS and its current capabilities and also the prospects for its further development. The far larger data volumes to be exchanged within the new system make it necessary to study carefully to what extent and in which part of the world WMO/GTS will prove to be useful. The Group greatly appreciates the continued co-operation with the World Meteorological Organization on these matters.

Another group will study data exchange between national and international data centres using other available means of communication. This could include modern computer-to-computer communication, or less sophisticated dial-up telephone connections.

The fifth group will study the international data centres. It will be headed by four convenors, each representing one of the four planned such centres. This group will elaborate the technical means and procedures for the collection and analysis of seismic wave-form and parameter data. This implies considerable new development, as the necessary methods and procedures for the joint analysis of globally collected wave-form data do not exist today and have to be developed. The Group will further elaborate on the establishment of high-capacity dedicated communication links between the IDCs and on the distribution of the results of their analyses.

The Group earlier agreed that a large-scale experiment should be conducted using a stage-by-stage approach to test proposed concepts for the envisaged system. The Group agreed to appoint Mr. Peter Basham of Canada as the principal co-ordinator of the experiment. This is in my view a most

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

important decision and I am confident that Mr. Basham will guide the planning and conducting of the experiment most successfully. I would like to express to Mr. Basham my great appreciation for his willingness to undertake this demanding task.

To facilitate the co-ordination of the test, assistant co-ordinators at each of the four IDCs have been appointed, as listed in annex II of the progress report. It was further agreed that a co-ordinator at each participating national data centre will be identified later.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be convened in Geneva from 7 to 18 March 1988.

This concludes my presentation and my introduction of the Group's progress report (CD/778).

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts for introducing the report. I give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, I should like to express my gratitude to the Ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. Friedersdorf, for his reaction to the question that I addressed to the United States delegation in my statement. Perhaps because of inaccurate interpretation, I unfortunately received no answer to that question. It goes without saying that a change of administration in the United States is an important event, but my question had to do with a somewhat different aspect. I will repeat it briefly. Nowadays, the current United States administration is linking changes in its position on tests to nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, the concept of nuclear deterrence lay at the basis of United States foreign policy even prior to the Reagan Administration, beginning in 1946. Notwithstanding, until the 1980s this concept did not prevent the United States from participating in negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, did not prevent it terming a comprehensive test ban a priority objective. So, my question is: why, with the advent of the Reagan Adminstration and although the concept of nuclear deterrence has apparently remained the same, has it begun to impede United States participation in negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and caused a comprehensive test ban to be transferred from the category of priority goals to that of long-term goals? That was my question.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement and I give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I would concede that the distinguished Ambassador's English is much better than my Russian and if I misinterpreted the remarks, I apologize. But I got the gist of it. I do not think [illegible] would like [illegible]

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

United States defence and security programme in the face of a Soviet threat, and if that strengthening requires the necessity of nuclear testing, I think that the President puts the security of our nation above disarmament. I think that all of us at this table represent 40 nations that are critically interested in the field of disarmament, or else we would not be here. I do not question anybody's, and certainly not our own, dedication to that field, but I think that each of our 40 national Governments does have a responsibility in the area of security for their own people and this is the decision that our national leader has made.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Are there any delegations that would like to take the floor either on the report of the Ad hoc Group or on any other matter? I see none.

I should like to draw your attention to the fact that paragraph 17 of the report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts that has just been introduced contains, as the Group's Chairman pointed out, a recommendation to the Conference concerning the dates for the Ad hoc Group's next session, which are proposed as 17 and 18 March 1988. In keeping with the practice of the Conference, I shall submit that recommendation to a decision by the Conference during the plenary session that will be held on Thursday, 20 August. I invite delegations wishing to speak on the work of the Ad hoc Group before that recommendation is adopted to do so no later than that date.

The secretariat has today distributed to you, at my request, an informal document containing the schedule of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. As usual, that schedule is only tentative and can, if necessary, be amended later as the work of the Conference requires.

As I announced on Tuesday, the schedule provides for an informal meeting on Tuesday, 18 August, immediately after the plenary meeting, to commence the first reading of document CD/WP.287, which contains the procedural part of the Conference's report to the forty-first session of the General Assembly on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the first reading of the report of the Conference itself to the forty-second session of the General Assembly, which will be distributed in the official languages between today and tomorrow under symbol CD/WP.288. Documents CD/WP.287 and CD/WP.288 will be available in delegations' pigeon-holes.

The schedule also provides for informal consultations, open to all delegations, on the substantive paragraphs concerning the agenda items for which the Conference has not established subsidiary bodies, that is to say, items 1, 2, 3 and 7. The relevant drafts will be available as from Tuesday, 18 August. The Conference will examine the results of the informal consultations at an informal meeting.

If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference accepts the schedule.

It was so decided.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

I have been asked to remind you that the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet in this room immediately after the plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 18 August, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.431
18 August 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 18 August 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 431st meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will continue today its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies and its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. Nevertheless, in keeping with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

I should like to remind you that, immediately after the plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting to begin consideration of document CD/WP.287, containing the technical part of the Conference's report to the forty-first session of the General Assembly on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and document CD/WP.288, concerning the Conference's report to the forty-second session of the General Assembly. These documents had been placed in delegations' pigeon-holes by last Friday at the latest.

Following the informal meeting, and if, as I hope, we make rapid progress on the technical parts of the reports, the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet in this room to finalize its report for presentation to the Conference.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and India. I give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, this year, the Conference on Disarmament has made sound headway in drawing up the text of a convention banning chemical weapons. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden and the three co-ordinators for their untiring efforts.

The presentation on 6 August by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Shevardnadze, has lent a fresh impetus to our work. My delegation appreciates the USSR's determined endeavours to resolve the challenge inspection issue on the basis of equality, and it considers the invitation to see chemical weapons installations in the Soviet Union as a valuable step to build the trust needed for the conclusion of the convention.

Regrettably, the negotiating pace has slowed down during the summer session. We are asking ourselves whether it is a coincidence that, at this very juncture, preparations for the production of binary chemical weapons have been entering a crucial phase. The attemps on the eve of the conclusion of the convention to increase the weight of chemical arms in military and security planning are bound to harm the negotiating climate, and can in no way be regarded as being helpful in finding solutions to unresolved problems.

We would all enjoy more security if we sought to finalize the convention text as early as possible so that the treaty may come into force soon.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

717

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Stability and security at the time when the convention becomes effective also presuppose that the ban on the production, acquisition and use of chemical arms, as well as any other obligation undertaken, are valid, and compliance with them is reliably verified from the very first day on. If all stocks of chemical weapons were placed under "international arrest" until the accord takes effect, we would have a useful additional security measure. No State party will be able, in its storage facilities for chemical weapons, to engage in any activity prohibited under the treaty since those facilities will be subject to stringent international control. The fears of all the sides in question would thus be allayed, including the concerns of those who do not possess chemical weapons, as is the case with my own country.

Let me now talk about some of the aspects of the work to be done during the inter-sessional period. Progress on the jurisdiction and control issue would be instrumental in establishing the responsibilities of States parties, which will have to ensure, for example, that anyone under their jurisdiction and control refrains from activities prohibited under the convention. Furthermore, it would be their responsibility to take appropriate measures guaranteeing that all their natural and juridical persons, even if they are not in the territory of their home countries, abide by the accord. The question of what would be "appropriate" will have to be answered on the basis of the constitutional and legal systems of the various States parties. Once this is recognized as a principle, it ought to be possible to come up quickly with a formula acceptable to everyone.

Negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban have progressed this year to the point where verification has moved out of the realm of non-committal polemics -- hopefully for good -- into the area of serious professional work on constructive solutions. Detailed verification provisions have been drawn up for articles IV, V and VI. A text setting forth guidelines on the international inspectorate has been agreed after thorough deliberations. The most important thing to do now is to lay down the ground rules governing challenge inspection and, in so doing, to put the keystone into the verification edifice. I am sure everyone will appreciate the fundamental significance of the steps which the Soviet Union has taken in this respect, and on which Ambassador Nazarkin elaborated on 11 August. We hope this will induce other parties to make their positions more transparent. If this were the case, we would be considerably closer to a text on the challenge inspection procedure.

In our efforts to solve the on-site challenge verification issue in such a way that the legitimate interests of the receiving State are taken into account, while ruling out any misuse, the functions to be performed by the inspectors are increasingly becoming the focus of attention. It will be their duty to record the facts needed to clarify cases of suspicion. This is exactly what must guide their conduct. They will have to act on the basis of guidelines issued by the technical secretariat. The Canadian and Norwegian studies on inspections in the event of the alleged use of chemical weapons are very useful in this context.

Whenever the requesting and receiving States are locked in dispute over an alternative measure suggested, tried and tested procedures should be

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

718

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The role of the Executive Council in the event of a challenge inspection is a major subject in discussions and negotiations these days. Challenge procedures are of particular interest not only to the parties immediately involved, but also to all other signatories to the future convention. That is why the Executive Council will have a crucial role to play, especially when it comes to assessing the findings of the team of inspectors. It is from those findings that the requesting country will draw its conclusions. However, the organization of States parties will only be in a position to react to the findings, say by taking action against a particular party to the convention found to be in violation of its obligations, if one of its organs -- namely, the Executive Council -- has had a chance to evaluate the inspection results independently. My delegation subscribes to the view expressed in the United Kingdom paper CD/715 that the Executive Council should be enabled to take into consideration the inspection report as well as any other material available and the opinions of the principal parties involved.

At this advanced stage in the drafting process, it would seem a good idea to have a closer look at the issues pertaining to the structure of the organization to be created. The wide range of important tasks to be tackled calls for an organizational framework that measures up to high political and professional standards. It is imperative that the organs to be set up be vested with political authority in order to ensure that States parties fulfil all their obligations. Moreover, in view of the host of details to be coped with in overseeing the operation of the treaty and verifying compliance with it, efficiency is needed. In our search for the most appropriate solution, the following notion is gaining currency: the system of organs to be established in consequence of the convention should have the character of an international organization with a legal status of its own, comparable to that of other international agencies within the United Nations system. The creation of such an organization would also undoubtedly enhance the international status of its officers, including international inspectors.

The powers and functions of the principal organs of the organization to be set up must be developed further on the basis of the concrete tasks defined in the convention. The maintenance of strict democratic principles and the effective use of existing means under a modern and rational style of working require that the responsibilities of the various organs and their interrelationships be sharply delineated. In formulating the provisions concerning the highest organ -- the conference of representatives of all States parties to the convention -- we must ensure that it establishes the organization's general policies and see to it that the process of implementing the treaty is properly overseen and continuously reviewed.

It would then be incumbent upon the executive organ to run the day-to-day affairs of the organization, represent the highest organ when it is not in session and take the decisions required for the work of the technical secretariat and other subsidiary bodies.

Democratic principles, respect for the security interests of all parties to the future convention, political weight and an efficient style of work are high standards which this body will have to meet. This is what must determine

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

71[illegible] (Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

achieved in a process of co-operation, and so that the possibility of its work being stymied or stalemated is largely excluded. For all these reasons, the organ must be composed of a relatively restricted number of members. The various political groups should be represented in a balanced fashion, and due regard should be given to the equitable geographical distribution of seats.

My delegation feels it is time that we conducted more purposeful consultations to solve those important issues. Any headway with regard to the problems posed by article VIII will most certainly have a favourable impact on our negotiating activities as a whole. In drawing up the convention, we are creating an element of the system of co-operation among nations which will ensure their security more reliably than ever before, since a dangerous class of weapons of mass destruction -- the class of chemical weapons -- will be eliminated from arsenals.

At the end of the 1987 session, we are again drawing up a balance sheet and seeking an answer to the question of how the Conference should proceed in the future. Conclusions for the next session of the United Nations General Assembly and the forthcoming special session on disarmament need to be formulated.

This year's meetings of the Conference have been marked by an obvious contradiction. On the one hand, the general climate has improved. On the other, the concrete results attained are lagging far behind what the Conference is supposed to accomplish according to its mandate. This is especially true of the efforts to curb the arms race and achieve disarmament in the nuclear field. I would like to make some observations on this particular subject.

High hopes are being pinned the world over on the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of two categories of weapons of nuclear mass destruction. In fact, those negotiations have also had a positive impact on the atmosphere at this Conference. By including the Pershing 1A nuclear warheads in the number of arms to be scrapped, the main obstacle to the early conclusion of the negotiations can and must be removed, as was so convincingly argued on 6 August by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The "double zero" option would pave the way for radical steps to end nuclear arms competition and arrive at nuclear disarmament. For the Conference to play a more active role, the following would be necessary.

Firstly, a consensus is needed under which the curbing of the nuclear arms race and the attainment of nuclear disarmament would be regarded as practical priority tasks of international politics on the road to peace and the safeguarding of man's existence. Any action based on that consensus would rule out invoking the so-called nuclear deterrence doctrine.

Secondly, recognition on the part of all the sides concerned that bilateral and multilateral negotiations must interact with each other in a meaningful way. Nobody is disputing the particular responsibility which the major nuclear States have. It is impermissible, however, to refer to it in order to prevent the Conference from commencing practical work. Clearly, the issue we are talking about touches upon the vital interests of all peoples and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

720

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Thirdly, the futile quarrel about procedural matters, which has been going on for so many years now, must end. Despite diametrically opposed philosophies, accommodation must be sought. Compromises are possible. In whatever we do, we should be guided by the mandate of the Conference, which we all approved.

What is particularly disappointing to us is the fact that we have once again been unable to set up a committee on item 1 of our agenda, i.e., on a nuclear test ban. There is a wealth of material waiting to be discussed in a business-like and detailed manner. Suffice it to mention in this context the "Basic provisions" which the socialist delegations have submitted to the Conference in CD/756. Yet nothing is happening. One simply cannot overlook the United States position and its undisguised opposition to a negotiating mandate, as well as the effect this is having on this forum. Still, it will always be worth trying to seek agreement on individual issues and to go as far as possible in the preparations for a treaty. We are not fatalistic about it. On the contrary, we are convinced that the political will to conclude an accord will finally prevail.

The delegations of the Group of Socialist States have gone a long way to bring about agreement on a mandate. They are also prepared to support the official proposal tabled by the Group of 21 in document CD/772, which could well serve as a possible compromise. My delegation is very appreciative of the considerable efforts of the presidence of our Conference, some of whom have put forward informal or personal papers in order to achieve an understanding. This goes in particular for Ambassador Vejvoda, who guided our meetings in the month of April.

I do hope it will eventually be possible, when the Conference on Disarmament opens its 1988 session, to start practical work on a wide range of problems. It is for this reason that my delegation welcomes Minister Shevardnadze's proposal that a special group of scientists be assigned the job of working out recommendations for the structure and function of a system to verify any agreement on the non-conduct of nuclear weapon tests.

In conclusion, allow me to address a word of goodbye to two colleagues of ours who will be leaving us at the end of this session. My warm thanks go to Ambassador Turbanski for four years of excellent and friendly collaboration. His expertise and dedicated work for progress at the Conference, which became particularly manifest when he chaired the Committee on Chemical Weapons, are truly exemplary. I wish him every success in his future activities.

Much to my regret, the Conference will also be losing Ambassador Beesley, who has represented his country at this forum with outstanding diplomatic skill. I should like to express to him my sincere gratitude for the relations of close co-operation which we have shared. I wish him good luck for the future.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, His Excellency Ambassador Meiszter, who in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will introduce the Committee's report, contained in document CD/779, which has been distributed.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, I have requested the floor today to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, but before turning to my main point, may I avail myself of the opportunity of having the floor to say a few words in my capacity as a national representative. As the head of the Hungarian delegation, I would like to welcome you on your accession to the presidency for the month of August. August, in the CD, is traditionally the month of winding up the business done in the course of the session, making last efforts to accomplish what the CD might have failed to achieve during the previous month and, of course, the month of report-writing. We are fully aware that this is not a simple exercise. But, Mr. President, I am confident that your diplomatic skills and personal capabilities will prove to be a valuable asset to the CD to successfully cope with that task. May I express my appreciation to you for the contribution you have already made to our work during the first half of the month, and wish you further success in discharging your responsible task. Speaking still in my personal capacity, I would like to extend a hearty welcome to our new colleague, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja of Brazil, and assure him of my readiness to co-operate with him.

I have taken the floor today to present the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons on its work during the 1987 session. The report of the Ad hoc Committee has been made available to delegations under symbol CD/779.

At the outset may I recall the decision of the Conference on Disarmament, taken at its 387th plenary meeting on 10 February, to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for the duration of the 1987 session, with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Committee was invited to report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1987 session.

When it embarked on discharging the task entrusted to it, the Committee paid due attention to the recommendation contained in the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for 1986 to the effect that the Committee should consider ways and means of how best to proceed further. In the course of the exchange of views held in that connection, delegations stated their readiness and desire that the Committee should pursue its task in a more vigorous manner and produce tangible results. It was recognized that the two questions before the Committee, i.e. the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, were both important issues requiring early solution. Delegations stressed their interest in making substantive headway, and proposed ideas to work out, or stated a readiness to go along with, a new method of work as a possible means of approaching the desired result.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

722 (Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

Following and on the basis of that exchange of views, the Ad hoc Committee decided to establish two contact groups: contact group A to consider the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense, and contact group B to consider the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. It was further decided that each contact group would be chaired by a co-ordinator, that the groups would meet parallel with each other, and that the Committee would periodically review the progress of work in the two groups and the results achieved.

The new procedure could not do away with, and has not done away with, the substantive differences which continue to exist concerning the two subjects under consideration. Nevertheless, I am confident that it is a step in the right direction. The substantive work contributed to the clarification and better understanding of the different positions and approaches in relation to both important subjects. Seeing in a clearer way the existing differences on substantive issues may facilitate advance in future work when the Committee resumes its work next year, should the Conference on Disarmament approve the recommendations made to it in the appropriate section of the report.

The clarification and better understanding of different positions and approaches, in my view, is a positive factor also in the sense that delegations participating in the work will have comparatively exact and structured guidance as to the future formation and perhaps modification of their respective positions on substantive issues. Such guidance may well prove useful when delegations prepare themselves for next year's work in the period between the two sessions.

I would like to use this opportunity to express my appreciation to the co-ordinators of the two contact groups, Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan and Mr. Hadi Wayarabi of Indonesia, who did the lion's share of the work. Beyond doubt they deserve the appreciation of all of us for the intensive work done in an innovative spirit that the Committee was so much in need of. I also thank them for the spirit of co-operation and friendship that I enjoyed and highly valued throughout our joint work.

The product of the substantive work conducted in the two contact groups is reflected in their reports, which are attached to the report of the Ad hoc Committee. The reports are attached to the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the understanding that they are not binding on any delegation, and do not prejudice the postions of delegations on any of the issues under considertaion. In my view, however, they represent a valuable asset for future work, and hopefully they have created and will create a momentum for advance in the consideration of the two issues.

In closing my short presentation on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for the 1987 session, I would like to express my gratitude to the Conference on Disarmament for having honoured me by entrusting the responsible work of the Chairman to me. May I express my thanks and appreciation to all delegations for the spirit of co-operation they displayed throughout the session, enabling me thereby to discharge my duties.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

723

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for introducing its report. I should like to inform the Conference that I shall submit the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for adoption at the plenary meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 25 August. I also thank the representative of Hungary for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, His Excellency Ambassador Teja.

Mr. TEJA (India): Mr. President, permit me to take this opportunity to extend to you the felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. We are happy to see the distinguished representative of France, a country with which India enjoys close bilateral ties of friendship and co-operation, preside over our deliberations. You have exhibited qualities of a skilful diplomat and effective negotiator, and I have personally enjoyed working with you both in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere. I would like to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation in the discharge of your heavy responsibilities during this crucial month. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey our appreciation for the manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, presided over the Conference during the month of July. Let me extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who have joined us, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, and Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja of Brazil. I look forward to working in close co-operation with them. We shall miss the presence of Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, who recently conducted the proceedings of this Conference in his usually able and competent fashion. I should like to wish him well in his new and important assignment. We shall also be missing Ambassador Turbanski of Poland and Ambassador Beesley of Canada. Both of them have made distinguished and signal contributions to our work, and I would like to join others of my colleagues in wishing them much success in their new assignments.

The month of August is of special significance for the CD. In this crucial month, we enter into a more intense phase of our activity -- drafting the annual report for the General Assembly, an exercise which calls for introspection, as this will be the last annual report before SSOD-III scheduled to be held next year.

It is only logical, therefore, that I should begin my statement today with reference to our work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, an undertaking that is almost as old as our Conference. The results have been rather meagre, though not for want of trying. Since 1981, the Ad hoc Committee has functioned under the able chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. Our first deadline for the CPD was SSOD-II, held in 1982, and now we are faced with another deadline imposed on the Conference by the General Assembly in decision 41/421. It is a matter of some regret that in this interim five-year period, not only have we been unable to resolve the outstanding issues, but we have succeeded in some cases in increasing the number of brackets, by the simple expedient of questioning previously agreed texts. The key issues of principles, priorities and objectives of the CPD are also being questioned, and what is of concern to my delegation is the fact that some formulations of the Final Document of SSOD-I

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

are now being questioned. Clearly our consensus on the CPD cannot be obtained by dismantling the consensus on the Final Document reached at SSOD-I! The CPD must build upon the Final Document, in accordance with the established priorities and in progressive stages, which can lead us to the universally acknowledged goal of general and complete disarmament.

My delegation attaches the highest priority to the first three nuclear issues on our agenda. To put it frankly, our record this year on these has been anything but satisfactory. For the fourth year in succession, we have found ourselves unable to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, to which my delegation attaches particular importance. A number of delegations had expressed optimism at the beginning of our spring session on the basis of perceived changes in the voting patterns of some countries in the General Assembly last year. It is a matter of regret that this perception of apparent flexibility was not reflected on the floor of the CD. The only concrete proposal tabled this year, in document CD/772, was put forward by eight Group of 21 countries. This has been rejected by one group of countries on the grounds that there was nothing new in it. At the same time, this very group of countries reaffirmed their commitment to their own four-year-old draft mandate. My delegation would find it rather difficult to interpret this as a sign of either flexibility or even serious intent to negotiate.

On the issue of the prevention of nuclear war, the situation is much the same. The CD has continued to ignore the repeated resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly adopted with overwhelming majorities, year after year, asking it to undertake substative work on this item. Once again, the flexibility of the Group of 21 reflected in the non-negotiating mandate contained in CD/515/Rev.3 has not found a matching response, despite assertions to the contrary.

We are grateful for the efforts of Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia and Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt during their periods of presidency, which enabled us to have a structured discussion on the subject of "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". It was a modest beginning, and we do hope that the positive approach of the delegations will enable us to take up this item in an ad hoc committee during 1988. In the view of my delegation, sufficient preliminary work on this item has been accomplished, as will be evident in the CD's report.

I would now like to turn to item 5 of our agenda -- "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" -- which has been under discussion in the Ad hoc Committee for three consecutive years. Despite the efforts of many delegations to move closer to concrete achievements, this year's proceedings in the Ad hoc Committee leave us with a sense of déjà vu. It might well be an indication of an apparently exhausted and all too inadequate mandate. What we now need is a more concrete and purpose-oriented mandate, which can enable structured work on the numerous proposals before the Conference.

The subject of an ASAT ban is one such proposal on which a considerable convergence of views is in evidence. The time is ripe to translate this convergence into concerted action. Since ASAT weapons are the existing space weapons, to begin with work on prohibition of ASAT weapons would reflect a sense of pragmatism and also open the path to the prohibition of other space

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

weapons, including those based on new technologies. In our opinion, the politicial climate too could not be more opportune, as both the leading space Powers are currently observing a moratorium on the testing and deployment of such weapons.

A number of proposals of a substantive nature have been submitted. Reference can be made to CD/777 submitted by the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, which contains basic provisions of a treaty text. Strengthening of the Registration Convention, declarations of non-deployment of weapons in space, amendment of article 4 of the outer space Treaty, are all possibilities containing merit and deserving serious consideration. Such work will also raise technical issues on which the CD would benefit from inputs from space technologists. Beginning with the ASAT weapons ban, such inputs from a group of experts would help in developing a shared perception of other elements of relevance to our work. As I indicated in my statement of 21 July 1987, the first such exercise could relate to the development of criteria pursuant to the 1975 Registration Convention in order to examine the possibility of making a distinction between military and non-military space satellites. Undoubtedly, the issues of verification and definitions of ASAT will require a considerable amount of work, but this should not prevent us from giving the Ad hoc Committee an adequate mandate within which such work can be undertaken.

I would now like to turn to the subject of chemical weapons. It would not be an exaggeration to state that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, we have achieved remarkable progress and are within sight of a convention. Difficult issues such as the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, challenge inspection, and the legal liabilities of States parties in terms of jurisdiction, are a few remaining areas, but here too agreement would seem to be close. At this stage I would, however, like to draw attention to the fact that the basic objective of the chemical weapons convention is the destruction of chemical weapons and related production facilities. A related objective is to ensure that these weapons are never produced again. This kind of monitoring is quite unique in the disarmament field, and none of the existing safeguard régimes provide us with a valid precedent. The Ad hoc Committee will need to exercise creativity, rather than look backwards to inadequate precedents. In this connection, I may add that the time has also come for the Ad hoc Committee to focus attention on articles X and XI of the convention. In the light of important linkages between disarmament and security on the one side, and economic development on the other, the CW convention should necessarily include provisions relating to the unhindered development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes, with special emphasis placed on the needs of the developing countries. Such an emphasis can be placed in two ways: by ensuring that none of the provisions will be interpreted so as to hamper the development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes, and in a positive way, by introducing special provisions intended to promote international co-operation to assist in the development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Naturally such undertakings would also include in-built means of verification.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

We can almost see the light at the end of the tunnel. In view of the widespread optimism, it would be worthwhile to look at our mandate which stops us short of the final drafting of the CW convention. We hope that the positive developments will enable the Conference to provide the Ad hoc Committee with a mandate which will remove the restrictions to enable the Conference to present to the world community a complete chemical weapons convention.

Before concluding, let me focus briefly on some of the procedural issues. We had a paper, CD/WP.286, developed on the basis of the deliberations of the Group of Seven. I myself had the privilege of being one of the Seven. I hope that the lack of open discussion on this paper and the ease with which it seems to have been passed over this year will not set a precedent for the future. A valuable effort had been made by Ambassador Fan, Chairman of the Group, to devise a consensus document. It is one single document dealing with the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. Any attempt to project it as two papers in the belief that report-writing should receive priority over other issues will not achieve the desired objective. My delegation does not share the belief that report-writing should be merely an exercise in cosmetics. The report must reflect the actual state of affairs within our Conference. It would, therefore, be reasonable to accept that the implementation of measures for improved functioning will naturally lead to a better and less time-consuming system for report-writing.

We are approaching a period in which it would be realistic to expect an intensification of international efforts towards disarmament. At the multilateral level, we shall shortly be participating in the United Nations Conference on the Realationship between Disarmament and Development. Next year SSOD-III will give a political impetus to accelerating the disarmament process, and also strengthen the role of multilateral negotiations. Elsewhere there have been positive developments such as the agreement at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The most reassuring is, however, the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, where we find a growing convergence of views. The "global double zero" which includes shorter-range INFs and longer-range INFs in Europe and Asia, if accepted, will open the way for the first genuine disarmament agreement and the first dismantling of an operational system since the Second World War. In one sense it proves the often stated point that it is not the increase but only the reduction of nuclear stockpiles which can lead to enhanced security. As Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stated at the inauguration of an international seminar on world peace held last week in New Delhi:

> "We hope that this will lead subsequently to the complete removal of all sea-based and air-based missiles and the dismantling of all nuclear presences in Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and all over the world."

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja, India)

Our Conference works on the basis of consensus, and it is but natural that differences of approach or emphasis should arise from time to time. At the same time we also share the common goal of general and complete disarmament. What is therefore needed is the mustering of the necessary political will to reach agreements on contentious issues. Only in this manner can we hope to make the Conference on Disarmament truly an organ for multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament, which we all agreed to a decade ago.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of India for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, on an earlier occasion during this month I participated in an impromptu exchange of views at the Conference table, but that did not permit me to do what I take great pleasure in doing now, which is to offer you my delegation's congratulations at your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. As you know, the relations between our two countries are deep and have existed for a very long time. We have always admired the diplomatic skill of France, of which you are the distinguished representative.

I have sought the floor on this occasion to respond briefly to remarks that have just been made by the distinguished Ambassador of India with regard to working paper 286, which incorporates some of the first results of the deliberations of the group called the Group of Seven. Like the distinguished Ambassador of India, I too had the privilege of being one of the seven persons that took part in that work, and I join with him instantly in commending the working paper to this Conference, and in expressing our gratitude to the guidance given to the Group of Seven by Ambassador Fan. I also join with him in expressing regret that we seem, at this session of the Conference, to have passed over with what the distinguished Ambassador of India called "ease" -- I suggest that in addition to "ease" there was perhaps a touch of haste -- that we passed over somewhat hastily the findings that are advanced in working paper 286. I think he would understand if I took issue with him over the view that he expressed with regard to the paper being a single document. It clearly is a single document in the sense that it represents one sheet of paper, but it is not a single document in our view, in the sense that it does include the recommendations of the Group of Seven, not on one subject but on two subjects.

It has been of particular regret to my delegation -- and I believe I can say this too on behalf of a group of Western delegations -- of particular regret that a degree of linkage between these two subjects covered in the paper has been drawn so that where progress may have been possible on one of the subjects covered in the paper but not on another, that degree of progress has been prevented because a link seems to have been drawn between the two subjects covered in the paper.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The subject on which I think progress has been available immediately is that of report-writing. The process in which we are now involved under your guidance, Mr. President, as you and others know, is proving as difficult or detailed as it has proven in the past, and one of the reasons why the Group of Seven under Ambassador Fan's guidance decided to address initially the subject of report-writing, as well as the other subject of the formation of subsidiary bodies, was because it was hoped that decisions could be taken now on the basis of the recommendations of the Group which would have had application now, this year, in the construction of our report.

And another reason why it was decided to address the report in that fashion, that is, to seek a new basis on which it is drafted, was because at this time last year there was a debate in the plenary following suggestions that were made for reform in the report-writing process, at the conclusion of which it was agreed by the Conference that we would change the rules this year. That was specifically agreed, and it was as a consequence of that agreement that the Group of Seven met and drew up the recommendations that now appear in document 286. I can only join the Ambassador of India again in regretting that the Conference has not been able to act on that paper. I do not agree that it is one paper and that we could not have acted on the part referring to report-writing even though we may not have been able to act now on the part referring to subsidiary bodies, and this failure is all the more regrettable because, as I have just mentioned, we did in fact at this time last year agree that we would implement this year new procedures on the basis of which our annual report would be drawn up. It is our hope that this paper will stay alive and that we will act on it in the future without further delay.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his kind words adressed to the Chair. I give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Teja.

Mr. TEJA (India): Mr. President, I appreciate Ambassdor Butler's joining me in sharing my sense of disappointment that the document produced by the Group of Seven was not the subject of any in-depth discussion which should have taken place. I would only wish to draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that of course it is not for me to interpret the recommendations of the Group of Seven as a member of the Group because our President has already made a statement on that when introducing the subject, and the views which I expressed were my views as head of the Indian delegation.

Speaking in the same capacity, I see that the document which has been presented in CD/WP.286 has a clear title which says "Report of the Group of Seven on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament", and then in paragraph 1 it lists certain proposals which the Group reviewed and on which it has submitted the report. If there were two reports then there would have been two papers, so I do not need to belabour the point that this is one paper. Of course it contains recommendations on one subject. Originally there were four aspects, and only two were discussed this year because of lack of time. Why these two? Because of the organic linkage between acts and deeds, between what we do and

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Teja; India)

how we present it. As I said earlier, I think the report should be allowed to speak for itself. Every delegation by virtue of its membership of the CD is, of course, free to interpret it in its own way, but I for one do wish that the Conference had spent more time and gone into precisely the kind of issues which Ambassador Butler raised.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of India for his statement.

I have no other speakers on my list for today, except for the representative of China, to whom I give the floor: Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): Thank you, Mr. President. First of all, as the representative of the Chinese delegation, I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for this extremely important month. The presidency of August is the longest as well as the most important, because in this month the results of our work will be reflected. China and France enjoy friendly relations, and our two delegations have maintained close co-operation, so I am pleased to see that a lot has been achieved under your presidency. I also hope that by the end of this month we will be able to make positive progress in drafting the report. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my regret that two of our distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland and Ambassador Beesley of Canada, are leaving us. Both of them have worked here for many years and have contributed a lot. I once again express my deep regret at their departure, and I hope they will achieve successes in their new assignments.

Secondly, I would like to say a few words in my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Seven. The Group met seven times in a period of six weeks. All seven of us enjoyed a good working relationship with each other. I would like to thank the other members as well as the Secretary-General and his deputy for their co-operation. Thanks to this co-operation we have achieved this result, i.e. CD/WP.286. During our discussions, I believe that all of us worked in a spirit of co-operation and mutual accommodation. Of course, everyone made his own contribution, and it was these contributions that made such a working paper possible. Naturally, as the Chairman of the Group, I also hope the plenary meeting of the CD will give the paper positive consideration, since the Group reached a consensus. In the meantime I am also aware that each delegation may have its own views with regard to the paper. In my view, even if we cannot achieve any result in the plenary this year we do have a basis for future work. As far as I am concerned, I have many personal views. However, to facilitate our work in the future, I think I can withhold them until the Group of Seven resumes its meeting, which may produce better results.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Do any other delegations wish to speak? I give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, I feel obligated to respond briefly to my good friend, the distinguished Ambassador from the German Democratic Republic, who laid a major share of the world's problems on the doorstep of the United States this morning. He mentioned the binary production start-up by the United States; he charged the United States with blocking the conclusion of a missile agreement with the Soviet Union because of the Pershings; and he charged that we were blocking a nuclear test ban. These are all old charges, of course, mentioned frequently here in this forum and responded to frequently, but I think I would like to remind my good friend the distinguished Ambassador that with regard to the binary programme, I think he knows that that is a modest response to an overwhelming Soviet build-up in chemical weapons that proceeded for 17 years despite a unilateral United States moratorium initiated in 1969.

With regard to the INF negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Pershing issue, I think that it is well established that the long-standing United States position is very clear. The United States will not negotiate on third-country systems, or on existing programmes of co-operation with our allies, in these bileral negotiations. In regard to the INF negotiations with the Soviets, I would like to just read a very brief excerpt from a speech the President of the United States gave recently, just in the last couple of days, to the American people regarding that negotiation. The President said:

> "In the months ahead I also hope to reach an agreement, a comprehensive and verifiable agreement, with the Soviet Union on reducing nuclear arms. We are making real progress on the global elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, the US and Soviet intermediate-range or INF missiles. I first proposed this idea to the Soviets back in 1981. They were not too keen on it and, in fact, walked out of the negotiations at one point, but we kept at it. Until recently the Soviet Union had insisted on the right to retain some of its INF missiles, but in mid-July General-Secretary Gorbachev announced that he was prepared to drop this demand. That was welcome news indeed. We have come this far because in 1980 you, the American people, gave me a mandate to rebuild our military. I have done that. Today we are seeing the results. The Soviets are now negotiating with us because we are negotiating from strength. This would be an historic agreement. Previous arms control agreements merely put a ceiling on weapons, and even allowed for increases. This agreement would reduce the number of nuclear weapons. I am optimistic we will soon witness a first in world history -- the sight of two countries actually destroying nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Imagine where that might lead!"

With regard to the nuclear test ban, I have often stated our position here, but I would reiterate to the distinguished Ambassador that the United States believes nuclear testing is necessary to maintain its deterrent capability. As long as that deterrent is necessary, we must continue to test.

Finally, as long as he brought up that issue of nuclear testing, I would be remiss if I did not mention a recent announcement in Washington last Thursday. State Department spokesman Charles Redman announced that a Soviet nuclear test explosion early this month vented radioactive debris into the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

1963 limited test-ban Treaty. The spokesman said the United States had conveyed its concern to the Soviet Union over "this failure to comply with its treaty obligations". He said it was the second such Soviet venting this year: the first occurred in February. Redman told questioners the radioactivity detected from the 2 August Soviet test -- and we are all fortunate in this -- "does not pose calculable health, safety, or environmental risks". "A Soviet nuclear test conducted on 2 August 1987 at Novaya Zemlya caused the release of radioactive debris into the atmosphere", a State Department statement said. I mention that because I think that an object of this nuclear test ban was to rid the atmosphere of those kinds of radioactive elements and protect the health of all the people all over the world, and I think it is sad that this event which occurred on 2 August was not announced to the people that might be effected by such an accident until almost two weeks later.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Do any other delegations wish to speak? I give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, I have listened with due attention to the remarks made by my good friend Ambassador Friedersdorf. I do not want to deal with all the aspects he raised here, but I would simply say that as far as a CTBT is concerned, I think we are in full agreement in describing the position of the United States on this question.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. Are there any other requests? I give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. JARKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. President. In connection with the statement by the distinguished Ambassador of the United States of America, may I say the following. The statement by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, E.A. Shevardnadze, the issues which were highlighted in that statement, showed the weakness of the United States position on a whole series of issues which are on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. This is the first point.

Secondly, I should like to acquaint those present here with a TASS communiqué regarding assertions that radioactive substances had been carried beyond the borders of the USSR in connection with the conduct of a nuclear test explosion on the island of Novaya Zemlya. The communiqué reads in part as follows:

> "When the nuclear explosion was conducted on the island of Novaya Zemlya, all necessary safety measures were taken so as to preclude radioactive fall-out, in keeping with the obligations of the Soviet Union under the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. The population was exposed to no risk of radioactivity, a fact which was confirmed by the Soviet national monitoring systems.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Jarkov, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

"Following requests received, the competent Soviet organizations conducted additional comprehensive checks, which showed that the explosion was followed by the emission of an insignificant amount of gaseous products which did not lead to the formation of radioactive fall-out. This rules out the possibility of radioactive fall-out in any States as a result of the underground nuclear explosion carried out on the island of Novaya Zemlya.

"The Soviet Union attaches great importance to strict and unswerving observance of the provisions of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, which it considers an important means of limiting the arms race. The appropriate Soviet organizations unfailingly carry out all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the requirements of this international instrument.

"Our goal is the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union once again reaffirms its proposal for immediate negotiations on this issue -- in any form and in any set-up. Whether nuclear explosions take place or not depends first of all on the United States of America. We wait their reply."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the USSR for his statement. Do any other delegations wish to speak?

Before closing the plenary meeting, I should like to remind you that at our last plenary meeting, the representative of the Soviet Union, His Excellency Ambassador Nazarkin, called on the Conference to adopt before the end of the annual session a decision of principle concerning the establishment, at the beginning of the 1988 session, of a special group of scientific experts which would be assigned the task of submitting to the Conference recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for a possible nuclear-test-ban agreement. I believe that consultations are under way on this proposal by the representative of the Soviet Union. I hope that the proposal will be examined at the group meeting tomorrow morning, so that we can take it up.

I also consider it my duty to inform you that the work of some of the ad hoc committees is not proceeding in accordance with the timetable. As you know, the Conference can no longer hold night or weekend meetings, with technical services, because of the budgetary constraints facing the United Nations. We are now approaching the end of the annual session, and we have nine actual working days left. We have yet to examine the technical parts of the reports to the General Assembly, adopt the reports of the subsidiary bodies, study the substantive paragraphs on the agenda items for which no subsidiary bodies have been established, and also take other decisions. I am sure I can count on your co-operation in the days to come so as to complete our work as scheduled.

As I announced to you at Thursday's plenary meeting, I will be submitting to the Conference for decision at the end of the next plenary meeting the recommendations contained in paragraph 17 of the report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President, translated from French)

I should also like to remind you that, after the informal meeting which we will be holding immediately following the plenary to consider the reports to the General Assembly, the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet in this same room.

Finally, I wish to inform you that, at Thursday's plenary meeting, the Conference will have as its first speaker His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Sten Andersson. As in the past, I would like to suggest that we begin the meeting punctually at 10 a.m. in order to facilitate the arrangements relating to the Minister's visit.

Before closing this meeting, I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you, Mr. President. I will not delay the proceedings for very long. I have listened now to your appeal for our co-operation in the production of the report, and I certainly assure you of my delegation's co-operation with you in that task.

I have sought the floor, Mr. President, because of the fact that you drew attention to a proposal that has been made by the delegation of the Soviet Union. I thank you for doing that. It is, of course, only one of a number of proposals that have been put to the Conference and, in this context, I would draw attention to the fact that my delegation has proposed that this Conference take a decision this year on the establishment of a global seismological monitoring network.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 20 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV/432
20 August 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 August 1987 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 432nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I should like to give a warm welcome to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden Mr. Sten Andersson, who will be addressing the Conference today as the first speaker. Mr. Andersson has long experience in politics, and occupying an important position in Swedish political life as a member of parliament and a minister. His presence among us reflects his personal interest, and Sweden's active role, in disarmament, especially at the present stage of work on the chemical weapons convention. This very active interest highlights more generally Sweden's significant contribution to advancing the objectives of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. Nevertheless, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I shall be submitting to the Conference today for decision, once the list of speakers has been exhausted, the recommendation contained in paragraph 17 of the report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, concerning the proposed dates for the Ad hoc Group's next session, i.e. from 7 to 18 March 1988.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Sweden, the United States of America, Brazil, Poland, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Australia, Japan, Pakistan and the German Democratic Republic. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Sten Andersson.

Mr. ANDERSSON (Sweden): Mr. President, my delegation has already had the opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August. However, at the same time as I cordially thank you for your kind words addressed to my country and to me personally, permit me also to express my satisfaction at addressing the Conference at a moment when it is presided over by such an eminent representative of France, a country with which Sweden has maintained relations of friendship and co-operation over centuries. I am confident that your authority, patience and skill will significantly contribute to the successful termination of the work of the Conference during its 1987 session.

We all know what it takes to fight for peace and disarmament. Knowledge is indispensable. Moral strength is also necessary. Violence feeds on fear. Peace is a fruit of trust. The strong search for peace. We all need patience and burning conviction.

Valuable treaties have been negotiated in this Conference. But the goal of disarmament still eludes us.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Andersson, Sweden)

Twenty-five years ago the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament convened to consider what seemed like far-reaching proposals for general and complete disarmament. The vision of these proposals held promise.

We know today that both substance and political will at that time proved insufficient to turn ideas into solid undertakings.

As the Conference on Disarmament now moves into its second quarter-century, visions of an end to the arms race have been put forth with renewed vigour. There are signs that nations are seriously beginning to look for a new and more solid basis for international security.

Political will is an obvious requirement to achieve the needed breakthroughs on disarmament. But hard work and realism are also necessary qualities demanded of delegations present around this table. The members of this Conference carry a special responsibility. It should also include other nations that by their commitment and capability could usefully contribute.

In one area, this Conference has in recent years shown that it is capable of generating considerable progress. The current negotiations on a convention to ban chemical weapons could lead to the first global, fully verifiable, disarmament treaty. Intricate legal and technical problems are tackled at these negotiations. New ground has to be charted. When the convention enters into force a whole category of weapons of mass destruction is to be destroyed and eliminated, together with relevant production facilities.

The political implications of these prospects can escape no one. The early and successful conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons would be a weighty demonstration of the capacity of this multilateral forum to handle politically and technically complex problems. It would strengthen the confidence of Governments in the multilateral approach to security. Momentum must not be lost. Chemical weapons have been used in armed conflict being fought at this very moment. Further, the production and development of new generations of chemical weapons are under way. These facts highlight the urgency of the matter. They also underline the need for a serious effort to achieve universal adherence to a convention.

The nuclear weapons born out of the ordeals of the Second World War present us with a new situation. The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction has once again brought us back to an era of weaponized international relations. A large-scale nuclear attack would not only destroy the enemy. There are strong indications that such an attack would have disastrous consequences for all life on Earth. The nuclearization of security decreases rather than increases the security of States.

In the nuclear age, absolute security for one State implies absolute insecurity for others. The technological complexity and intricate calculations of nuclear strategic thinking do not contribute to solving the fundamental problems of our time. What is ignored in the scenarios of nuclear

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Andersson, Sweden)

strategists is that international security is a political, not a technological problem. Nuclear diplomacy offers no solution to the social and economic security problems of the third world countries. It offers no solutions to political crises in the Middle East, southern Africa, Central America, Afghanistan and South-East Asia.

The huge amounts of weapons piled up in Europe do nothing to make it possible to cope with its political problems. On the contrary, they do little more than preserve division, distrust and tension.

The great problems of our time go far beyond East-West rivalry. They are global and often economic, as illustrated by the third world debt. Small countries are intimidated and threatened. Poverty, starvation, illiteracy, oppression and racial injustice are the fate of hundreds of millions of people. And the long-term survival of all peoples is imperilled by the global environmental situation: destruction of forests, pollution and acidification of lakes and rivers, the continuing desertification of great areas of our planet.

Complicated relationships and developments tend in the nuclear optique to be reduced to the primitive concepts of retaliation, threats and counter-threats. No wonder the nuclear shadow dominates all efforts to create international co-operation between States.

The great and powerful States neglect this challenge in their preoccupation -- yes, even obsession -- with each other. By their continued accumulation of destructive power they aggravate the problems instead of solving them.

We must now identify a new basis for international security. Policies of deterrence should be replaced by international co-operation directed towards the prevention of war. All nations have a right to security. This is clearly laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. New policies must reaffirm the renunciation of force as an instrument of national policy, without denying the right of any nation to self-defence. To make peaceful international co-operation a tool to achieve international security, nuclear weapons and nuclear policies must not remain the centrepiece of international relations.

There should be no more "atomic diplomacy"! Instead, security should be achieved through international co-operative efforts. Everyone should be able to agree that even ideological opponents and political rivals have a shared interest in survival.

Security and disarmament cannot be separated. Confidence- and security-building measures pave the way for progress in disarmament. At the same time disarmament will strengthen the security of nations and build confidence among them.

Some have a tendency to look at disarmament and arms limitation with scepticism and suspicion. Disarmament may be destabilizing, it is said, and there is always a risk of deception. The obvious answer is that the risks of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Andersson, Sweden)

disarmament fade in comparison with the dangers of a continued arms race. What could put a military balance more at risk than advances in military research and development, the driving force behind the arms race? Innovations with regard to new types of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction continuously knock over the most carefully balanced security systems and fuel the arms race.

Our foremost, inescapable, duty is to prevent the destruction of civilization through nuclear war. In a nuclear world we are all faced with one and the same choice; we can perish together, or build security together through common efforts and common undertakings.

The threat of nuclear war is of direct concern to all nations. The Six-Nation Initiative was taken to indicate some of the measures that could set us on the right course. We believe that the nuclear and non-nuclear nations alike can contribute to this.

Every era has cherished its own myth of peace and war. In this, the nuclear age, we often hear that the ultimate weapon of mass destruction is the real, maybe even definite, peace-keeper. The sheer awesomeness of nuclear arms is thought to prevent war.

While the political leaders of the major nuclear Powers have stated their conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought, their strategic planners still seem to base some of their scenarios on the opposite assumption. Elaborate war-fighting scenarios are worked out for the actual use of nuclear weapons on different levels. The dangerous illusion that a limited nuclear war is possible thus seems to persist. This illusion in itself increases the risk of nuclear war, be it calculated or unintentional. Such risks grow as the weapons become more accurate and warning times are reduced.

Military strategies will certainly not change overnight. Nor can the nuclear dilemma be overcome by any single statement by the leaders of the two main nuclear Powers. But the political message that has come across from them will soon be measured against actual developments.

As things have evolved, the first test will be the negotiations on an INF accord. Such an agreement would be highly significant, both in a European context and as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. It would also facilitate solutions to some crucial issues in disarmament negotiations generally, not least on verification. But at the same time, we are facing distinct dangers of a renewed arms race, threatening to undo what has so far been achieved in arms control.

There would be little point in eliminating one category of weapons only to transfer the arms race to other areas. The security and stability that new technologies are said to offer is accomplished far more simply, far less expensively and far less dangerously by mutual arms reductions. This, I am convinced, applies for instance to the field of space weapons. The net result in terms of security and stability is dubious, to say the least. It is

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Andersson, Sweden)

equally valid in the continuing development of naval forces. The Swedish Government is closely watching the naval military build-up and especially its consequences in northern Europe. Naval developments are a cause for concern not only in our part of the world. This is a problem of global dimensions.

The increasing deployment of nuclear weapons at sea is a particularly dangerous development. It is therefore necessary that sea-borne nuclear weapons be included in the arms reduction talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.

There is a need for confidence-building measures at sea, both on a regional and on a global basis. It would be natural to entrust this Conference with the task of negotiating concrete measures to increase security at sea. One such measure could be a multilateral treaty on the prevention of incidents.

Today there is consensus among experts that a nuclear test ban would halt the development of new generations of nuclear weapons. It would help to slow down the arms race. It would also constitute a basis for seriously addressing the question of deep cuts in existing arsenals. Furthermore, a nuclear test ban would give a badly needed boost to efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additonal countries.

In this field, as in disarmament affairs generally, the ultimate goal must always be kept clearly in sight. But all problems cannot be solved at once, and where there is an obstacle we must use our imagination and realism to overcome it and to achieve progress wherever possible. This Conference has a duty to be prepared the day a test-ban treaty can be a reality. Efforts to this end must be launched without delay. There is work to be done on the adequate verification of such a treaty, as well as on its exact scope and contents.

Sweden welcomes bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on this issue. Agreements to introduce new restraints on testing must be steps towards a global comprehensive test-ban treaty, negotiated in this forum. This matter is urgent. A comprehensive test ban is already long overdue.

National security in the nuclear age cannot be defined in a narrow regional context only. Sweden's active participation in international efforts to reduce tension, build confidence between States and achieve real disarmament is an essential element of its security policy. The United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament provide multilateral instruments for such efforts.

The problem of security and stability in Europe remains crucial to the whole world community. The military alliances face each other on this continent with an accumulated military might unmatched in human history. There are reasons of history, ideology and geography for this situation. It must be dealt with through co-operation, exchange and contacts in all fields of human activity. Links must be forged between all nations, and the divisions of this continent gradually overcome.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Andersson, Sweden)

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe attempts to handle these questions. This process has shown the strength of the multilateral approach. The basis for stability and peace is patiently built in a process where 35 States, big and small, participate on an equal footing.

Sweden welcomes recent proposals at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna for European disarmament negotiations with the participation of all States of the two military alliances, but within the CSCE framework. It is essential for all the 35 States to be adequately informed on the development of such negotiations, and to participate in a continuous exchange of views on the subject-matter, which is of obvious concern to all of them. The legitimate security concerns of all CSCE States must be taken into account.

Regional confidence-building measures could be useful complements to agreements covering the whole continent. One should, for example, give serious thought to what could be done to increase security in the most sensitive areas, such as the border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Sweden supports the idea of a corridor, free of battlefield nuclear weapons, in the border area between the two military alliances.

Sweden attaches great importance to the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area. Such an arrangement would be confidence-building, and constitute one step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

As this decade is drawing to a close, we continue to face dangers threatening the very existence of humankind. But there are also some encouraging signs that a safer course can be set. We expect the bilateral talks on nuclear and space weapons to yield early concrete results. This Conference continues to make progress in its vitally important work on a convention banning chemical weapons. The 35 States of the CSCE are poised for a new phase to negotiate confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe. There is an emerging understanding on the crucial issue of disarmament verification, implying new patterns of international co-operation.

There are thus positive new developments. This time, we must not let the opportunity slip out of our hands. Let us translate these promising developments into tangible international commitments.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden for his important statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, His Excellency Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, I want first to extend to you our delegation's congratulations on your presidency during the demanding final month of the 1987 session of the Conference. It is a pleasure to work under your leadership as a representative of a nation and a people with whom the United States has, since its founding, enjoyed close relations.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Our delegation also extends a warm welcome to Ambassadors Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Azambuja of Brazil. We look forward to working closely with them. Our best wishes go to our colleagues who are departing: Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, Ambassador Turbański of Poland and Ambassador Beesley of Canada. Each has made an important contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

We also welcome the appearance today of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Sten Andersson. We have listened with great interest to his important statement.

The 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament draws to a close at a time of renewed optimism in the field of arms control. In the bilateral nuclear and space talks here in Geneva, United States and Soviet delegations are hard at work on the issues entrusted to them. In the talks on intermediate nuclear forces, there is hope that a mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached in the months ahead.

In Vienna, East and West are seeking to develop an agreed mandate for new negotiations on conventional stability among the 23 nations most directly affected. In late July, Western delegations introduced a draft mandate to this end. Serious work continues within the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, especially with regard to follow-on efforts to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

Here in Geneva, in this Conference, our delegation has welcomed the positive proposals on chemical weapons introduced on 6 August by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

It is in this context of improved prospects for real progress that I want to address some of the issues before this Conference.

1987 saw renewed activity in the committees dealing with negative security assurances and radiological weapons. This was due in large measure to the leadership of Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, in the former case; and of Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, Mr. Numata of Japan and Mr. Wayarabi of Indonesia in radiological weapons. Nigeria introduced a new proposal regarding negative security assurances, which served a useful purpose in refocusing attention on the many difficulties involved in attempting to elaborate a common formula of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. We welcome the return to a more sensible way of separately handling the questions of so-called "traditional" radiological weapons issues, and of whether additional legal protection should be afforded nuclear facilities against military attack. It has become clear that the differences of view in the latter "track" may actually be greater today than they were some years ago.

With regard to the agenda item on outer space arms control, under the effective leadership of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy the Committee continued its examination of the difficult issues entrusted to it. Our delegation

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

believes that the Committee has not entirely exhausted its work. And our delegation has not been persuaded that a need exists to change the terms under which the Committee could continue its work.

Under agenda item 2, the Conference devoted a considerable amount of time this summer to discussing, in informal plenary sessions, nuclear disarmament issues. In our view, the Conference should reflect, early in its 1988 session, on whether or not another series of informal sessions would be productive.

Consideration of agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", produced mixed results in 1987. On a positive note, the Group of Scientific Experts, led by the skilful efforts of Dr. Dahlman of Sweden, held two productive sessions to design a new global seismic data exchange system permitting the wider use of full wave-form or level II, data, and to plan its forthcoming large-scale experiment. The United States welcomes this progress, and we congratulate the Canadian expert, Dr. Peter Basham, on his selection as principal co-ordinator of the experiment.

The United States strongly endorses the important work of the Group of Scientific Experts, in particular the advances toward full and open access to all seismic data by all participants in the global exchange. To facilitate that work, the United States will host a workshop on international data centres this fall in Washington.

I want to note that both Argentina and India have participated at the expert level in the most recent meeting, as well as States not members of the Conference such as Denmark, Turkey and New Zealand. Norway, the Western candidate for membership in the Conference, has continued its long tradition of contributions with the dedicated service of the GSE's scientific secretary, Dr. Ringdal. Norway also submitted a valuable working paper on seismic data exchange (CD/763). It would be helpful if other States would join in direct support of the work of the GSE.

On a less positive note, it again proved impossible to reach consensus on a mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1 to resume the substantive consideration of such important nuclear-test-ban issues as verification and compliance, which were last so addressed in 1983. In our delegation's view, such a resumption remains the appropriate course of action for dealing with these matters.

There has never been any doubt as to the importance the United States attaches to effective verification of arms limitation agreements, including those regarding nuclear testing. Our delegation is encouraged that other States are increasingly coming to share this view.

Over the years, the United States has devoted much effort and technical and financial resources to developing and sustaining verification capabilities. It is an effort that must continue, because verification requirements change in a dynamic way with the changing prospects for

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

agreements, the evolution of military technology, and the assessments that all States make of their confidence that other States parties to agreements will honour their commitments.

The United States developed and deployed satellite, seismic and other systems a quarter of a century ago to monitor compliance with the 1963 limited test-ban Treaty. It has developed electrical methods of measuring the yield of underground nuclear explosions, such as the CORRTEX system, whose application could permit ratification of the existing bilateral treaties limiting such explosions to 150 kilotons or less.

In co-operation with many States and institutions around the world, the United States installed a World-wide Seismic System Network and has made the enormous amount of data it collects universally available. It would be helpful if the Soviet Union also made this type of data available on past Soviet nuclear explosions. As referred to by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in his remarks before the plenary on 6 August, when he referred to the real need for establishing a "real, permanent verification" system.

Even a cursory examination of the record will show many other initiatives for verification that have been undertaken by the United States. The development of prototype remotely depoloyed, tamper-resistant seismic equipment producing authenticated data for text-ban monitoring, and the development of equipment used by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its vital task of safeguarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, are two examples that come to mind.

Thus the United States delegation welcomes the new willingness to address issues related to verification of and compliance with a nuclear test ban. Perhaps this will prove feasible in 1988, in an appropriately mandated ad hoc committee.

Let me turn now to agenda item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". Efforts to work out such a programme date back nearly 20 years. This year, under the able leadership of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, work in the Ad hoc Committee was serious and business-like in view of the deadline established by the forty-first General Assembly. In recent weeks, the Committee has carried out two complete and detailed reviews of the text of the draft programme. Our delegation believes that this has been very helpful, because the positions of delegations on points of disagreement in the draft programme are now clearly spelled out. It has not yet proven possible to resolve all of these issues and produce a consensus text, but the Committee has clearly focused on critical areas of disagreement. Our delegation remains, as it always has been, committed to achieving an agreed, effective and balanced comprehensive programme, a programme capable of providing the focused agenda needed to chart multilateral efforts toward our common goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

At the 30 July plenary session, the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, speaking for the Group of Socialist States, criticized delegations for making reservations on elements of the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

working draft within the Ad hoc Committee, and urged them to reconsider their positions. His remarks seemed to imply that, but for these actions, agreement would already have been reached on the draft programme.

In a CPD document, as in all other consensus documents, no delegation can be expected to agree to positions contrary to the policies of its Government. It is better to have differences clearly identified, so that they can be resolved, than to have them submerged so that agreement is never possible.

I would like to conclude today by giving our delegation's assessment of the current state of the chemical weapons negotiations.

When I spoke in plenary on 23 July, the mood was somewhat pessimistic. Since then a fresh mood of optimism has appeared. This, of course, may change again. However, we must not become so intent on day-to-day details that we lack a broader sense of how far we have come, and how far we have to go, and what we need to do to reach our common objective. The period since Vice-President Bush tabled the United States draft convention in April 1984 has been an especially productive one. We expect this trend to continue.

Let me suggest two criteria for assessing the current state of the negotiations. First, are the negotiators focusing on the real issues, or are they dwelling on minor points? Second, are the negotiators exchanging the same old views, or are new ideas being put forward? On both counts I believe there is reason for encouragement.

Since early 1986 there has been a pronounced trend toward dealing seriously with the security concerns that underlie these negotiations. This trend is reflected both in the converging of views on a number of the basic verification provisions of the convention, and in the increasing support for other measures to build confidence during the negotiations. The most recent evidence of this trend was the announcement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on 6 August that the Soviet Union supports a mandatory challenge inspection provision, and his invitation to Conference delegations to visit the Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhany. We welcome these steps.

During the summer part of the session, a number of new and important ideas were put forward. This makes it clear that the negotiations are not stagnating, and that delegations are searching for solutions to real problems. Let me cite a few examples. In CD/757, the French delegation identified a real security problem faced by States with small stockpiles and proposed possible solutions. Canada and Norway pooled their expertise on the investigation of use of chemical weapons and proposed, in CD/766, an annex on this important subject. The United Kingdom presented a thoughtful analysis in CD/769 of the steps that need to be taken to ensure that the verification system functions effectively from the very beginning of the convention. The distinguished Director for Political Affairs at the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Kahiluoto, proposed in his plenary statement on 7 July that efforts be undertaken to co-ordinate the various national-level CW verification projects that are under way. All of these proposals represent fresh thinking about how to solve the problems that remain before us.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

In the same spirit I would like to draw attention to the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, and the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Dr. Krutzsch. Each in his own effective way has made important contributions to the negotiations. I want to express the deep appreciation of our delegation for their dedicated efforts.

Appendix II of the draft report of the Ad hoc Committee, and the addendum to the report, demonstrate clearly that during the summer an impressive amount of essential work was accomplished by the Chairman and the three co-ordinators. This material will be the basis for substantial additions to the "rolling text" during the inter-sessional period and in the 1988 session.

I have spoken about what has been achieved. Let me now turn to what remains to be done.

First of all, we must continue to focus on the real security concerns of States. We must develop effective provisions for challenge inspection, for monitoring the civil chemical industry, and for ensuring undiminished security for all States during the period for destruction of chemical weapons. We must find an approach that will encourage all States possessing chemical weapons to become parties to the convention, and that will minimize the chances that non-parties will pose a chemical weapons threat to parties.

Second, we must seek to ensure that the provisions of the convention can be effectively implemented. We must clarify the functions and interrelationships of its administrative bodies. We must amplify the detailed provisions that are necessary to implement its complex verification system, and explore the tasks of the Preparatory Commission, starting from CD/769. We must consider both instruments and procedures for inspections.

Third, we must prevent erosion of existing constraints on chemical weapons while we are negotiating. We must support investigation of reports that chemical weapons have been used, and condemn use of chemical weapons when it is established. We must all adopt measures to end the dangerous spread of chemical weapons.

Finally, we must intensify efforts to build confidence among the negotiating States. The United States is gratified that the importance of greater openness about chemical weapons capabilities is being recognized by a number of delegations. The United States welcomes these constructive steps. But there is still a long way to go. Many members of the Conference have not even indicated whether or not their countries possess chemical weapons. The United States delegation calls upon these delegations to make their position clear.

Some of the many complex and difficult tasks I have outlined today can only be resolved between the United States and the Soviet Union. For that reason we have decided to hold another round of bilateral discussions later this year. As I stressed in the Conference on 6 August, closing the gap between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union is an

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

important step toward a chemical weapons convention. However, there are 38 other negotiating partners whose views must be taken into account. Their important role has been clearly demonstrated, for example, in the areas of challenge inspection and non-production. The United States delegation is prepared to work closely and constructively with all other delegations, under the leadership of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, during the inter-sessional discussions and on into the 1988 session, so that a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons may become a reality.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Brazil, His Excellency Ambassador de Azambuja.

Mr. de AZAMBUJA (Brazil): Mr. President, my first words must be to congratulate you for your very able guidance of this Conference in the crucial month of August. The clear, rational and elegant voice of France finds in you exemplary expression. Our countries are good friends. It will be easy for us personally to follow such a natural and agreeable precedent.

I should also like to add a word of thanks to Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, who welcomed me on my first day of attendance.

I also wish to say that it was with special attention that my delegation heard the important statement just made to us by the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden.

I am sorry that my personal contacts with Ambassador Alfararqi of Egypt, Ambassador Turbański of Poland and Ambassador Beesley of Canada have been very short. They leave behind them a solid reputation for professional ability and deep personal commitment to the cause of disarmament.

I cannot of course mention, as I would have liked, every delegate who has spoken kind and generous words of welcome to me. I am sincerely grateful for such warm expressions of friendship and good will. They speak well of the work done by my predecessors and of the contribution which my country has always tried to give to our task.

I cannot, however, fail to respond to the welcome extended to me by my friend from Argentina, Ambassador Mario Cámpora. Our countries and their leaders have been making extraordinary progress in building bridges of co-operation and mutual trust. In a quiet and purposeful way Argentina and Brazil have taken great strides to make us the closest of neighbours and the most intimate of partners. I therefore fully share his confidence that his country and mine can now make an even greater contribution to regional stability and to Latin American integration.

These few weeks in which I have had the privilege of sharing with fellow delegates the far-reaching work of the CD have enhanced my perception of what we might reasonably expect from the ongoing process of disarmament negotiations. First of all let me strike a note of realistic optimism. I feel that significant developments can derive from the current and intense dialogue between the two main nuclear Powers on matters pertaining to the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. de Azambuja, Brazil)

reduction of their military nuclear capabilities. There is widespread hope that as never before their respective positions will be moulded by the conviction that there cannot be justifiable hesitation on the clear choice between a nuclear holocaust and fear-free existence; between life and death for the whole of mankind, such is the lethal force of their atomic arsenal.

It is also evident that the overall implications of the current debate between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear disarmament are of such a magnitude that the rest of the world, especially those nations which have opted not to develop nuclear weapons, should in no way be kept from participating actively and constructively in the ensuing deliberations. Alienating ourselves from a process which concerns each and every nation would inevitably condemn us to live by a set of rules which might not be responsive to our legitimate commitments, purposes and objectives. Brazilian expectations vis-à-vis the disarmament process we are now witnessing were eloquently expressed in President Sarney's words addressed to the CD in April last year:

> "Without relinquishing our right to put forth our own views and to participate in decisions by the great Powers that may affect our interests, we follow with growing attention the proposals and counter-proposals aimed at bridging their conflicting positions, especially between the most heavily armed nations."

The introductory points I have just made should be enough to explain the importance the Brazilian Government attaches to the Conference on Disarmament, the forum where we can best voice our agreement, suggestions and I hope infrequent reservations on the various drafts and proposals that deal with matters so closely linked to the making of our own future. We know ours, individually and collectively, is not an easy task; nevertheless we are also confident that it will be made easier if each of us succeeds in conveying his national position clearly and cogently to this highly representative body.

I trust that the basic Brazilian positions advanced in the course of our deliberations going back to the early years of the ENDC and the CCD have been perceived by the international community as consistent and constructive. As a matter of fact, more than a few of the points I shall make today have been made in one way or another by my predecessors. We have had little justification to change our minds on the central issues confronting us, and the very slow progress of our work has not allowed us to move onto new ground.

During the spring session of the CD as well as in part of our summer work, a significant amount of time was dedicated to the establishment of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda, "Nuclear test ban". In spite of these efforts, different interpretations of the nature of the mandate to be accorded to the ad hoc committee have kept us from implementing the General Assembly's recommendation on the subject. The crux of the question seems to be the reluctance of some nations to consider that this subsidiary body would be better served if entrusted with a meaningful negotiating mandate, with clearly defined objectives in time, as set out in document CD/520/Rev.2. As co-ordinator for agenda item 1, the Brazilian

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. de Azambuja, Brazil)

delegation was able to witness the relentless efforts of the Group of 21 to pave the way for an understanding with other groups on the establishment of an ad hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. Unfortunately this has not yet been possible, but we remain hopeful that in the near future positions may be brought closer so we can fulfil the General Assembly's recommendation on this subject. Our overall objective is to enable the CD to start negotiations on the relevant issues that should lead to the urgent conclusion of a nuclear weapon test ban.

In contrast with the difficulties we are facing in the discussions on item 1 of the agenda, progress is evident on item 4. Under the very able guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, the Committee on Chemical Weapons is truly addressing itself to very pertinent and important questions in this complex field. The conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons is thus now a tangible possibility, which we deeply believe the Conference should not forego.

Nevertheless, as we strive to reach a final agreement we must also pay careful attention to some points more directly related to economic and technological development. As we have stated in CD/CW/WP.176, the banning of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons by means of an internationally binding instrument would represent a major achievement in the process of disarmament and, by the same token, a significant contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. In the light of the important and manifold links between disarmament and security, on the one side, and economic development on the other, a convention on chemical weapons should necessarily include provisions related to the unfettered development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes, with due attention to the needs of the developing areas of the world.

The convention should do so basically in two different ways. Firstly, in a negative way, by ensuring that none of its provisions will be interpreted or implemented so as to hamper the development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes in any country whatsoever. Secondly, in a positive way, by including specific provisions intended to promote development goals.

Bearing that in mind, we have proposed -- as also indicated in the above-mentioned document -- that it is desirable that article XI of the draft convention on chemical weapons include a separate paragraph which would read as follows:

> "Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as establishing any discrimination between States Parties as regards their duties, obligations and responsibilities under the Convention, as well as their right to the development of chemical technology and industry for peaceful purposes".

Accordingly, and allowing for the particular relevance of the matter -- which is to be considered as one that ranks among the basic principles governing the twin purposes of disarmament and development -- the seventh preambular paragraph of the convention should read as follows:

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. de Azambuja, Brazil)

"Considering that the achievements in the field of chemistry should be exclusively used for the benefit of mankind, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis,".

Speaking at the opening of the fortieth General Assembly in September 1985, President Sarney of Brazil stated that "Brazil will make every effort in its power to preserve the South Atlantic as an area of peace, shielded from the arms race, from the presence of nuclear arms and from any form of confrontation originating in other regions". With that objective, Brazil last year presented to the forty-first General Assembly a resolution declaring a "Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic" which was approved by an overwhelming majority, becoming resolution 41/11.

This year in the course of our spring session, the Brazilian delegation presented to the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD a text based on that resolution to be incorporated into the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. We felt then, as we feel now, that the text is in accordance with the spirit and wording of the draft CPD, especially chapter V, section E, subsection 4. This Brazilian initiative contained in CD/CPD/WP.87, which from the very beginning enjoyed the firm and indispensable support of the delegation of Argentina, a co-sponsor of General Assembly resolution 41/11, secured consensual acceptance in the Ad hoc Committee. May I at this point register our appreciation to Ambassador García Robles for his wise conduct of the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD?

To our disappointment, the Brazilian text on the "Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic" was bracketed, along with other texts pertaining to the establishment of other zones of peace, during the latter part of the work in the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD. We are confident that these are temporary difficulties and that our contribution will finally be accepted without any reservations.

Brazil will very shortly participate in the Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development in New York, and we remain active in the preparatory work for SSOD-III. We will work hard to ensure the success of both meetings. We certainly would not like to see important occasions for dialogue and contact not being fully utilized to further the objectives which we so actively pursue in this Conference. We are therefore supportive in principle of all meaningful and realistic attempts to promote the cause of disarmament, and our basic concern is to avoid dispersion of efforts, loss of focus and the wasting of delicate political opportunities.

Consistent with these preoccupations, my delegation is crucially concerned with the improvement of the working methods of our Conference. Thus we welcome the report of the Group of Seven contained in document CD/WP.286, to which we are giving urgent attention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, His Excellency Ambassador Turbański.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, let me begin by welcoming you in the Chair and by extending to you my delegation's congratulations and appreciation for the skilful manner in which you are guiding the Conference during this difficult concluding month of this year's session. I would also like to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, for his contribution to the Conference's work during the month of July. I wish to welcome as well our new colleagues, Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil. I also avail myself of this opportunity to extend words of welcome to His Excellency Mr. Sten Andersson, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, whose important statement we have just heard.

Every year in August we face the same difficult question of assessing the results of our work. For me this August has a special meaning since it marks not only the end of the session of the Conference but also the end of my duties in Geneva.

I have had the honour and pleasure to be associated with this forum for more than four years. It has been a period of great expectations and of great frustrations, as well as of serious and usually sad reflection.

Recent developments seem to indicate that the crisis in the disarmament dialogue which we witnessed especially in the first half of the 1980s can be overcome. There are hopes for a turning-point in that dialogue, for the elaboration of meaningful agreements that would effectively put us on the road towards halting the arms race and leading to disarmament.

Before leaving you, let me express my sincere wish that an important role in this change will be played also by the Conference on Disarmament. It has considerable past achievements, and preserves a substantial negotiating potential. It remains the most representative disarmament body, a forum of great accumulated knowledge and expertise as well as effective and skilled diplomats.

What will help our future efforts is not only an expected and so much hoped-for improvement in the international climate, but also necessary new thinking about disarmament and international security, so strongly demonstrated today in the position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. I think tomorrow it will be shared by all.

There is a growing understanding that disarmament has ceased to be a theoretical postulate, an idealist dream or a field of political or diplomatic games and manoeuvres.

Contemporary arms are not traditional means of waging war. They have become instruments of annihilation of human kind. The current explosion of science and technology is only increasing their destructive power.

Albert Einstein wrote in 1950 the following remark: "The thought of gaining security through national armaments, given the present state of military technique, is an unfortunate illusion.". This truth has become even more evident today.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

In these circumstances, any search for lasting peace and international security must imply not the increase of national armaments but their limitation by co-operative and common actions.

At the same time, the radical solution of the problem of disarmament requires the effective organization of international security. As an eminent Spanish diplomat and political writer, Salvador de Madariaga, put it almost 60 years ago: "The problem of disarmament is not only the problem of disarmament. It is in fact the problem of the organization of the world community". This means that any genuine efforts aimed at the solution of the disarmament problem must be accompanied by parallel action aimed at strengthening the international security mechanism.

These are the main features of the necessary present approach to disarmament. Poland and its allies are strongly attached to it. This attachment finds its expression in their bold proposals for a radical reduction in the most dangerous weapons, as well as in incessant efforts to build a comprehensive system of international security.

Our actions are aimed at both global and regional solutions. Initiatives presented to the United Nations and this Conference are supported by our strong involvement in regional negotiations, including, in particular, the work of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the search for regional European disarmament.

In my previous statement I discussed the main ideas underlying the recent Polish initiative concerning disarmament and security-building in Central Europe. Today I wish to draw your attention to document CD/780, which has just been distributed, and which contains the "Memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on arms reduction and confidence-building in Central Europe", a fuller version of the plan outlined by the Chairman of the Council of State of Poland, W. Jaruzelski, on 8 May this year.

The Memorandum specifies types of nuclear and conventional weapons to be withdrawn or reduced. It develops our ideas on verification of the proposed steps and far-reaching confidence -- and security-building measures. It takes into account the views and concerns of other States. At the same time the proposal preserves its flexible and "open" character. We are looking for further constructive suggestions.

Let me stress that it is a strong conviction of my Government that our active involvement in the search for global and regional solutions to the problem of disarmament and security here in Geneva, in New York, in Stockholm and in Vienna not only serve our national interest but also reflect historical necessity.

Though we all feel that the work of the Conference is not only important but indispensable, we have to admit that the gap between the arms race and the results of disarmament negotiations is increasing. Comparing the results of this year's session with the tasks facing the Conference and the expectations of the world community, our work -- despite some positive developments and despite the efforts of many of us -- can hardly be described as satisfactory.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

There have been no practical results on three nuclear items on our agenda, which I addressed in my earlier statements this year. In particular, the most unfortunate deadlock on the nuclear test ban has been maintained.

The informal plenary meetings on the substance of item 2 -- "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" -- were, in our opinion, a useful though not conclusive exercise. They have proved, however, that there is an extensive range of problems to be dealt with by an appropriate ad hoc committee, which we believe will be established next year.

In spite of the efforts of the distinguished chairmen of the respective ad hoc committees, our hopes for a fresh, more flexible and imaginative approach to the problem of negative security guarantees were not fulfilled. We have clearer views on both aspects of the approach to the radiological weapons problem, though its solution is still before us. Regrettable developments were observed with regard to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, where we were forced to depart from what had already been agreed.

Let me dwell for a while on two items -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and the ban on chemical weapons.

We have behind us a serious discussion in plenary meetings and three years of concrete work in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, this year so ably guided by Ambassador Pugliese of Italy. Many issues were clarified and new ideas expressed. Undoubtedly, we have today a much clearer picture of the problem as well as a deeper understanding of avenues and difficulties connected with its resolution.

The Conference's work in this field must, however, raise concern. A substantial part of our time was devoted to the review of the existing legal régime applicable to outer space. Despite sometimes conflicting assessments of its adequacy for preventing an arms race in outer space, there seemed to be a general convergence of opinions on the need for its preservation and strengthening. This should lead first of all to bona fide implementation and interpretation of accepted obligations in both bilateral and multilateral agreements.

The reality is, however, far from these reasonable expectations. And one can hardly reconcile declarations on the importance of and attachment to existing agreements with practical steps which threaten the legal régime they establish.

This applies in particular to the bilateral Soviet-United States anti-ballistic missile Treaty of 1972. Strict adherence to this agreement is today an indispensable condition for any successful work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its limitation on Earth. The basic philosophy behind this Treaty, namely that arsenals of offensive nuclear missiles could be successfully limited only if anti-missile systems were strictly constrained, retains validity. Nevertheless, threats to the ABM Treaty exist. They include the possibility of its abrogation or reinterpretation violating its spirit and intent.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

This is why Poland fully supports the Soviet proposal that this crucial and termless agreement should be reaffirmed and strengthened, inter alia by the adoption by both sides of a commitment not to withdraw from it within a certain period of time, and by the establishment of a clear understanding on prohibited and permitted activities within the framework of this Treaty. This would be an important confidence-building measure.

Respect for and compliance with the outer space Treaty of 1967 should not only mean compliance with its specific prohibitions. Any sincere declaration of attachment to this Treaty must also mean full respect for other obligations and principles established in the Treaty. They include recognition of the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, as well as the obligation to explore and use outer space for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

It is true that the exact meaning of those concepts is subject to discussion, but probably nobody can deny that the introduction of weapons into outer space, objected to by so many parties to this Treaty, would mean violating these clearly established even if general legal obligations. It is my delegation's strong conviction that the incompatibility between the "weaponization" of outer space and the principles of the outer space Treaty would be confirmed by any independent legal body, including the International Court of Justice.

Finally, the applicability to outer space activities of article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations -- prohibiting the use of force -- has been stressed in our discussion. But if we sincerely want this basic principle of international law to become an efficient norm guiding the activities of States in outer space, we should endeavour to establish real guarantees of its efficacy by prohibiting any space weapons. There is a logical link between the norm banning the use of force and the norms limiting possession of the instrument of force. And it is the very aim of this Conference to fill the existing gap in this respect and supplement this general prohibition of the use of force with norms limiting the power which can lead to its violation, whether on Earth or in outer space.

The fact is that despite the existing body of law, an imminent danger of an arms race in outer space continues to exist, and preparations are being made for the early introduction of weapons into outer space. And it is a paradox of our discussion that the adequacy of the present legal order is most loudly emphasized by those States which are planning to introduce weapons into outer space or are supporting such plans both politically and with their scientific and economic potential.

What really counts is not what States are declaring about the present legal order applicable to outer space, but what they are actually doing within the framework of it. One has to wonder about the utility of further

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

discussion on the present legal order applicable to outer space when this order and the discussion on it do not seem to deter States -- one today and probably others tomorrow -- from the "weaponization" of outer space.

The only conclusion must be that if we really want -- as we declare we do -- to put an effective barrier to this danger, we should concentrate our efforts on what is the main task entrusted to the Conference in this field by the United Nations General Assembly -- namely the elaboration of an agreement or agreements preventing an arms race in all its aspects and ensuring that outer space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We hope for serious and goal-oriented work by the Conference in this field during the next session. Appropriate recommendations should appear in this year's report of the Ad hoc Committee.

An encouraging element of our work on outer space problems has been that a number of valuable suggestions relating to both comprehensive and partial arrangements in this field were presented, which should be the main focus of the future work of the Committee. My delegation is open to any constructive solutions, though our preference clearly goes in the direction of comprehensive agreements which would effectively prevent an arms race in outer space. This is why we have expressed our strong support for the ideas contained in Soviet drafts on prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. During this session we have noted with attention the reappearance of the idea of widening the scope of the existing arrangements, and in particular the 1967 outer space Treaty.

The adoption of this Treaty defining principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space was undoubtedly one of the most encouraging events in disarmament and disarmament-related negotiations. In fact, it can and should be both the inspiration and the starting-point for further efforts. The work undertaken by our predecessors more than 20 years ago, with such prescience of future dangers, should be completed today by us now that the picture of those threats and dangers has become so much clearer.

Our attention during the present session has also been drawn to a number of partial solutions. There seems to be a growing consensus regarding the idea of an arrangement on the immunity of artificial satellites combined with a ban on anti-satellite weapons. Poland welcomes in particular the outline of basic provisions of such an agreement presented recently to this Conference by the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia. Such an agreement would be an important step in creating a comprehensive legal régime for the peaceful uses of outer space. It would also introduce an important element of confidence, and could establish the basis for necessary co-operation in cases of satellite collisions, the risk of which is increasing with continued tests and growing amounts of man-made debris in outer space.

The work of the Conference has not only brought forth ideas for possible international agreements, but has also helped to outline crucial elements of such agreements. This applies in particular to the problem of verification, which so many speakers on so many occasions have described as the "heart of the matter".

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

The Soviet idea of an international inspectorate presented during this session and developed in recent statements by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Ambassador Nazarkin is the most valuable contribution to the practical solution of this problem. Poland welcomes this new, bold and far-reaching proposal. We sincerely hope that it will become a subject of serious discussion at this Conference and a key element of a future agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We also express our appreciation for the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and the presentation made to the Conference by Canada on the results of its PAXSAT research programme. It enhanced our knowledge of possible remote sensing techniques, and should be helpful in our efforts.

Progress which has been made during this session in the area of verification, traditionally such a difficult domain of any disarmament negotiations, is the best proof of the possibility of making a decisive step in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. What is necessary now is the reorientation of our efforts towards a genuine search for acceptable solutions in this field, and the political will of the participants in the Conference to undertake such an effort.

During my years at the Conference I have been especially closely involved in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, witnessing both their highlights and everyday work. Substantial progress has been made over recent years. Let me say in this context how much I regretted learning of the retirement of Ambassador Cromartie, whose contribution to the progress achieved is well known and appreciated, and may I, through you, ask the United Kingdom delegation to transmit to him my very best wishes.

If I try to assess the results of this year's session of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I would say that in general the pace of systematic settlement of problems relating to the future convention was kept up. Though the intensity has varied, I feel that progress was being made throughout the whole session.

I wish to express our gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, for his able guidance of the Committee's work, his own and his delegation's strenuous efforts toward finalization of the draft text of the future convention. His deep commitment and devotion, as well as those of the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Krutzsch, were a great help to all of us and have contributed significantly to broadening and strengthening the areas of understanding, thus bringing us closer to the common goal.

The draft report currently under consideration in the Committee does not, in our opinion, fully reflect the present stage of the negotiations. We are more advanced in our work than is shown in the annexes to the report. I have in mind the results of diverse consultations at different levels, as well as declarations and announcements by delegations desiring to contribute to the development of mutual confidence and better understanding. All these assist in attentive and scrupulous preparations for the final stage of the negotiations on the convention and its subsequent signature.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

Of special importance in this respect was the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. E. Shevardnadze, concerning the principle of mandatory challenge inspections. This approach by the Soviet Union opens up a new perspective to the solution of one of the most difficult and sensitive problems in the convention. At the final stage of negotiations the importance of confidence-building measures has increased considerably. The Soviet invitation to Shikhany is, especially in this context, a step without precedent. Not only the process of destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile facility, but also standard items of chemical munitions, will be demonstrated. The same goal will be served well by the Soviet invitation for delegations to visit a chemical weapon destruction facility at Chapayevsk, as well as the Soviet delegation's visit to a destruction facility in the United States (Tooele).

We believe these developments will have a strong positive impact on the work of the Ad hoc Commmittee in the near future.

Though realizing that a lot of work still remains to be done, I feel that the convention is within our grasp. That is why the existing momentum should not be lost before our task is accomplished. For that very reason the Polish delegation considers that maximum use should be made of the inter-sessional period, and fully endorses the proposal for an additional session or an extended session of the Conference devoted exclusively to chemical weapons before the end of this year. This would be quite a new practice for the Conference. But that is exactly what we need -- a new, fresh approach to the work of the Conference, commensurate with the importance of the present stage of the negotations on chemical weapons. Considerable progress could be achieved before the end of this year, provided all delegations display the necessary will and sense of urgency.

With that optimistic view I shall be leaving the Conference.

Having concluded my statement, I would like to thank all my colleagues and friends in the delegations and in the secretariat for the friendship and co-operation I have enjoyed during my years as Poland's representative to the Conference. I will miss them dearly. Let me express my heartfelt gratitude and sincere good wishes to all of you. May the Conference succeed in its noble task.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I am sure that I will be speaking on behalf of the Conference when I express our regret at the announced departure of our esteemed colleague Ambassador Turbański, who has represented his country with much talent and diplomatic experience. His personal qualities earned him the esteem of his colleagues in the Conference. I should like to emphasize the important role played by Ambassador Turbański, while assigned to the Conference, as the first President of the Conference on Disarmament, a responsibility which he shouldered in an objective and effective manner. He was also Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and in that capacity made a significant

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

contribution to progress in our work towards a total ban on chemical weapons. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish him all success in his career.

I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, His Excellency Ambassador Alfarargi.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt): Mr. President, the presidency of the Conference places on its holder special responsibilities. These increase in August, when the report of the Conference is prepared and the duties of the President extend to cover the inter-sessional period of the Conference. That is why we are particularly pleased to observe that the rotation of the presidency has made you President of the Conference during August. Your diplomatic experience and outstanding ability ensure that you will carry out your lofty responsibilities in the best manner. In all truth, we think that you are the right man in the right place at the right time.

Permit me also to express to your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, our appreciation for the excellent way which characterized his presidency of the Conference this past July.

I also take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, the representative of Sri Lanka, with whom I worked on disarmament when we were preparing for the first special session on disarmament in New York in 1976, when Sri Lanka held the chairmanship of the Non-aligned Movement. I also welcome Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, the representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament. Although we have been working together as colleagues for only a short time, from our conversations and the contributions that he has already made, I believe that he will represent Brazil in an outstanding manner and make a positive contribution to the success of this Conference.

We began our work for today by listening to the important and valuable statement delivered at the plenary meeting by His Excellency Mr. Sten Andersson, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden. I am certain that you will share my view that his statement is symbolic of the positive manner in which the Government, delegation and people of Sweden have always supported and contributed to our efforts to achieve disarmament in this forum.

Today I make my last statement before the Conference as head of the Egyptian delegation, one day before my return to my country to other duties. On this occasion my memory goes back to nearly four years ago, in March 1984, when I made my first statement before this Conference. I then expressed my feelings of concern and perplexity: my concern was due to the failure of the efforts in this important negotiating forum, my perplexity related to the underlying causes of such failure. I do not believe that the situation is much different today. Despite the passage of time, the Conference is still tottering and has not achieved any real progress in its work. I even observe a clear regression in the consideration of many items on its agenda. To illustrate, allow me to review the different items, not with the aim of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

specifying Egypt's position in each case -- a position that is well known and has been clarified in past statements -- but rather to show the validity of my personal impressions of the progress of work in this Conference.

Let us begin with the item on the nuclear test ban. For four years the conference's efforts to re-establish the ad hoc committee have failed. Why? Simply because a group of States declare their readiness to consider the subject in the Conference, while at the same time this same group consider that a nuclear test ban is a long-term objective and reaffirm the necessity to depend on nuclear armaments as a basic component in their arsenals, thus continuing nuclear tests to guarantee the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. A second group of States invoke the position of the first group to justify their insistence on a negotiating mandate for the ad hoc committee as a minimum to show the existence of political obligation, good will and serious intentions to reach a ban on nuclear testing. It may be a coincidence that most if not all the members of this group are States which are not parties to the NPT. Moreover, many questions are raised about the level they have actually reached in developing their nuclear capability. A third group is trying to deal with the subject flexibly through initiatives that are in accordance with the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions. The last such initiative is the draft mandate contained in document CD/772, which honestly reflects United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/46 A. Unfortunately, this third group of countries does not satisfy the other two groups: one pronounces that it is showing unwarranted flexibility, while the other claims it has submitted nothing new. Without determining responsibility or blaming this or that group, doubtless we are all losers. And while we occupy ourselves with seeking agreement on a mandate for the ad hoc committee, vertical nuclear proliferation escalates, the probabilities of horizontal nuclear proliferation increase. Thus we seem to care for the form and forget the substance.

The Conference continued its consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament through informal meetings of the Conference. Although we agreed on a method of structured discussion to deal with the subjects under consideration, we are still far from implementing the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the last of which is resolution 41/86 F, which calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for nuclear arms control and the reduction of nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination. I do not believe that the Conference can make any progress in this field as long as there are States which insist on nuclear armament as a means of deterrence.

I will not dwell on this concept, nor will I enumerate its grave consequences for international peace and security. Suffice it to refer to the fact that the claim that nuclear deterrence has ensured peace in Europe for more than four decades does, indeed, encourage horizontal nuclear proliferation on the grounds that nuclear deterrence can also ensure peace at

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

the regional level in other parts as well. Moreover, the insistence of nuclear States on maintaining their nuclear armament, at a time when they deny it to others, even resisting such a trend with every means at their disposal, gives the impression that there are two categories of States, one endowed with a sense of responsibility, which can wisely use nuclear deterrence and hence is entitled to possess such a deterrent, while the other category is impetuous and not responsible enough and should be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons. This categorization is difficult to accept.

We do not understand what is meant by nuclear deterrence and the level of armament required to provide it. Indeed, the nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers can destroy the world many times over. None the less, one super-Power insists on further developing its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, some other nuclear States insist on having an independent nuclear capability, despite its insignificance compared with the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers, claiming that it is essential for their own security. If this nuclear capability on account of its smallness cannot achieve adequate deterrence, the question that arises is: Why maintain it in the first place? On the other hand, if it does provide adequate deterrence, then why do the two super-Powers have such an incredible quantity of nuclear weapons? And if this is so, why do the two super-Powers not seriously consider unilateral nuclear disarmament measures to generate confidence and give impetus to the negotiations to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, as long as the security of both States can be maintained undiminished at a lower level of nuclear armament? The final document of SSOD-I did refer to such measures. A group of governmental experts affirmed the effectiveness of unilateral nuclear disarmament measures in a study adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

We do not understand the reason for the insistence that the Conference is not competent to negotiate the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and that such negotiations should be confined to the nuclear States, particularly the two super-Powers. Although the bilateral negotiations are important, they will remain limited in their scope by their very nature, because of the participating parties and the subjects they cover. There is no alternative to a multilateral forum that brings together all the nuclear States, where the subjects of halting the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are comprehensively dealt with. If anyone has a proposal about another option, let him present it. Is there any other framework that guarantees the participation of non-nuclear-weapon States while taking into consideration their interests? Or are they sentenced to remain second-class States, to be put aside until a handful of States decide their destiny, so that they will be secure if the nuclear States agree among themselves to halt the nuclear arms race and about nuclear disarmament, but will become threatened with extinction if the others fail to agree? Cannot such States play a conciliatory role in the negotiations, a role for which they are eminently qualified because of their being non-nuclear States?

Frequently we have called for the prevention of nuclear war, and warned about its consequences for human civilization and the survival of mankind itself. How happy we were when the two super-Powers, which own the greatest

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

nuclear arsenals and are capable of launching a nuclear war, became aware of this fact and drafted the eloquent and ringing phrase "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". But what are the practical steps which were taken to translate this pledge into concrete reality? We expected the United Nations Secretary-General's report on the prevention of nuclear war to give impetus to the subject, since it was a report that included a vast quantity of proposals to deal with the subject in all its aspects. But it seems that it has been forgotten, and added to the stockpile of reports, studies and resolutions about disarmament. I could understand that a long time would be required to reach an agreement about practical measures and arrangements to prevent nuclear war, because of the many aspects and complexity of the subject. But what I fail to understand is the failure even to agree to start dealing with the subject. Is this in fact a responsible attitude? If we are not aware of the danger and do nothing to prevent it, then it is a catastrophe. But if we are aware of the danger and do nothing to face it, then the catastrophe is greater.

If we can conclude that there has been clear progress in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, we cannot be similarly confident if asked about the date of completion of such negotiations and the preparation of the draft convention. Some of the plenary statements which we have heard during the recent period give the impression that a convention is very near, while some other statements refer to the fact that we still have a long way to go before reaching our objective. If this variance in estimation proves anything, it shows that these negotiations are tied to considerations in many instances beyond the control of the Conference. It follows that we do not believe in the usefulness of holding a special session of the Conference to activate the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as long as the negotiations are subject to considerations that are political rather than technical. If the aim is to activate the work of the Conference, then a special session could be held or the ordinary session could be extended to deal with all the items on the agenda while concentrating on those given high priority by the international community.

It may be appropriate to comment in this context on the subject of mandatory challenge inspection, as long as there is quasi-unanimity on its being a corner-stone in reaching a convention. Adhesion to treaties is an act of sovereignty decided by every State in accordance with its supreme interests. And withdrawal from treaties in the field of disarmament is an accepted principle when the supreme interests of a State are jeopardized. It follows that any State having chemical weapons, or having the intention to acquire such weapons with the intent of using them, will not adhere to the convention. It is true that this will render it liable to moral pressure, but at least it will be freed from the legal responsibility that results from contravening the convention. That is why we do not understand why those considering the subject of mandatory challenge inspection concentrate on the aspect of verification of compliance while ignoring the aspect of abuse of mandatory challenge inspection and its threat to national security and the production of chemical weapons for peaceful purposes. That is why we support the inclusion of detailed provisions on challenge inspection, ensuring that this method of verification would not be abused and that compensation would be forthcoming for any damage resulting therefrom.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Alfararqi, Egypt)

This leads me to a second point, which is that at a time when we are interested in verification of compliance by the parties with the provisions of the convention, we should not ignore the implications of some States not adhering to the convention. We have to take care not to repeat the experience of the NPT, where strict limitations are imposed on the States parties to the Treaty, while the non-parties remain absolutely free to develop their nuclear capabilities.

A third point. If there is scope for taking confidence-building measures during the negotiating period, and before the convention comes into force, we believe that such measures should include abstaining from producing new generations of chemical weapons and not seeking to continue to produce chemical weapons even after adhering to the treaty.

The United Nations General Assembly resolutions were clear and explicit when they called upon the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. In spite of this, when establishing the Ad hoc Committee agreement was reached on an exploratory stage to prepare the way for such negotiations. After three sessions, we are still at this stage, which seems destined to go on and maybe never end. This is not a result of the fact that the subject is multifaceted and complex — even though we agree with that — but basically due to the differing views about the point of departure. There is quasi-unanimity that the legal régime which at present governs outer space, despite its positive traits, has shortcomings and needs to be strengthened and supplemented, while one State stands alone in its judgement that this very same legal régime is comprehensive and effective and ensures the prevention of an arms race in outer space if complied with. All this amid accusations and counter-accusations about the existence of programmes and counter-programmes for the "weaponization" of outer space.

I really do not know where the logic is in all this. Assuming the validity of the claim that the present legal régime is comprehensive and effective, after such programmes are implemented such attributes will be invalidated. And as long as the result is one and the same, namely that the legal régime governing outer space will be deficient, sooner or later, why then are we requested to stay with our hands tied and wait until the blow falls, while the voice of wisdom claims that prevention is better than cure? And assuming the continuation of the exploratory stage and our failure to reach agreement on an improved mandate and a more specific programme of work for the Ad hoc Committee, we see no reason that prevents the Ad hoc Committee from concentrating the greater part of its work in the coming period on a detailed study of the existing proposals and future initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. Only through such a study can we judge the validity, effectiveness and realism of the proposals. We believe in giving greater powers to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee to ensure this, in accordance with his responsibility to guarantee the good conduct of work in the Ad hoc Committee, and we do not view this as going beyond the mandate or programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee in any way.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

The discussions that took place in the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances reconfirmed the right of States which have relinquished the nuclear option to obtain guarantees against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. This should be the main focal point of discussion in the Ad hoc Committee. All parties, whether nuclear or non-nuclear States, should review their positions to facilitate reaching an agreement on such guarantees. Unilateral declarations, assuming their importance, lack mandatory power, because the nature of unilateral measures means that whoever can pledge them can also repudiate them. That is why such guarantees must be provided for through a binding international legal instrument. Without accepting these facts and working on that basis, I do not believe that the Ad hoc Committee will have any opportunity to achieve progress in its work.

The negotiations that have taken place in the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons have made it clear that we must examine the two questions of banning radiological weapons and prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities together, and reach an agreement on the two items together, irrespective of whether they are considered on the basis of a unitary approach or separately. The negotiations have also shown clearly that the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities is multifaceted. Hence we find it unavoidable to consider it in more than one forum, each forum being competent for the aspect falling within its mandate. This is the approach Egypt follows in dealing with the subject. On that basis, we consider that the Conference on Disarmament is a genuinely competent organ in considering the banning of attacks against nuclear facilities through the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, from the perspective of radiological dangers generated by an attack against such nuclear facilities. I agree with Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, the representative of Sweden, on all points contained in his valuable statement delivered on 13 August evaluating the work of Group B of the Ad hoc Committee entrusted with considering this issue.

As for the work by the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD, it shows a regression in the preparation of the draft programme. It had been decided to conclude the preparation of the draft programme so as to present it to the United Nations General Assembly at the end of the last session of the Conference. To accommodate the desire to delete a limited number of reservations on some paragraphs, we introduced the procedure of presenting the draft programme to the United Nations General Assembly at the end of its session instead of the beginning. Unfortunately, it seems that some of us found in this extended period an opportunity to go back on much that had been agreed upon, albeit tentatively. So the reservations today on the paragraphs of the draft programme are much greater than they were at the start of the session. It was also found to be an opportunity to reopen the discussion on the provisions of the final document of SSOD-I itself, which was adopted by consensus and is still rightly considered as a "constitution" of disarmament.

The issue of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference will not be the decisive factor in the Conference's being able to overcome the present crisis, but at least it will limit the problems we face while undertaking our mission. That it why I believe it is high time to move forward from merely considering proposals on improving the performance of the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

Conference and increasing its effectiveness to the actual implementation of such proposals. If this requires modifying the rules of procedure, let us by all means do that, as it is said that the Conference is the master of its own procedure. We must review the rule of consensus, because we doubt that its originator meant it to be a right of veto, otherwise it would have been specifically stipulated.

Our understanding of consensus is simply that of an expression of the general trend which the whole membership of States participate in formulating. Thus it would be difficult to accept the right of one State to impede it. If it is acceptable to insist on consensus as meaning the right to a veto in the drafting of treaty provisions which are being negotiated, since this does affect the supreme interests of States and their national security, it is inadmissible to abuse this rule in procedural matters considered by the Conference. The procedures for establishing ad hoc committees must also be developed in a way guaranteeing that the task will not be impeded because of differences of views concerning their mandates and programmes of work. We have to consider increasing the powers of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees to conduct their work in a manner enabling them to fulfil their mandates. It might also be appropriate to think of a way to benefit more from the informal meetings frequently held between heads of delegation and members of this Conference and regional groupings on social occasions, so as to conduct a constructive dialogue away from formal frameworks. Lastly, I propose that we should consider the possibility of benefiting to a greater degree from the efforts of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in a way that would help to provide the background which some delegations may need in their work, while at the same time drawing the Institute's activities away from the circle of mere abstract theoretical research and tying them to the actual needs of the negotiating process in this Conference.

The criterion of success for the Conference, as a multilateral body for negotiations on disarmament, is the conventions the Conference can draft in this sphere. The Conference should be guided in its work by the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This forum was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which also determined its membership. Thus it is a specialized organ of the United Nations system, with the mission of preparing draft conventions on disarmament questions through negotiations between its members. If it concludes this task, it presents each draft convention to the General Assembly of the United Nations to approve and recommend the international community to adhere to them and abide by their provisions.

Mr. President, in concluding my statement, permit me to express my appreciation to the Conference, which I had the honour to preside during last June, providing me with further rich experience to add to my credit in my diplomatic career, and allowing me the privilege of knowing dear colleagues closely, whether those present today in this chamber or those who have left during the last four years, and from whom I have gained much and was honoured by their friendship.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

I also wish to thank Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, the Assistant Secretary-General, and the members of the Department for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva for all the help they have given me and my delegation during this period. I wish you all every success in your efforts to achieve the objectives of disarmament for a more secure and peaceful world and a better life for us all. I also wish to express my gratitude to the interpretation and editing services and, in particular, to the members of the Arabic translation service, whose efforts made it possible to convey my ideas to you, through the other languages, in a more than satisfactory manner. I also wish to express my gratitude and appreciation to my colleagues, the members of the delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt, who greatly facilitated my task here by assuming many of the burdens. I wish you all every success in your task.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement, and for his kind words to the Chair. As President of the Conference, I should like to express my regret and that of the members of the Conference at the departure of another esteemed colleague, Ambassador Alfarargi. Ambassador Alfarargi too has been President of the Conference, a post he occupied with the wisdom familiar to us, his great diplomatic experience and his knowledge in the field of disarmament. He was the first Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. His diplomatic talent enabled the Conference to move towards thorough consideration of this important item on our agenda. And on the basis of my personal experience as Western co-ordinator for space, may I say to him as co-ordinator for the non-aligned on this topic, but above all as a friend, that it was a pleasure to work with him. Lastly, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish him all success as he continues in his career.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Ambassador Rodrigo.

Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, at the outset let me offer you the warm felicitations and good wishes of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. August represents the culmination of the efforts of the CD during this summer session, and it is our good fortune that it is you, Sir, who will bring together the different strands of our work. I also had the brief privilege of seeing the efficient manner in which Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe of Ethiopia conducted the work of the Conference last month.

As a newcomer to the CD it would of course be presumptuous of me to attempt an analysis of the achievements and the shortcomings of the session. However, I begin work where my predecessor left off, and would wish to use this occasion to reiterate the continuity of Sri Lanka's commitment to the important work being pursued by the CD as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament.

Despite my very brief experience of the Conference, I have not been insensitive to the special sense of mission, dedication and quiet seriousness with which members of the Conference have approached its manifold tasks. That

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

the Conference includes in its small but representative membership the most powerful States as well as small States like my own emphasizes in a real and very practical way that disarmament is a matter of direct concern to all. In the field of economic relations, nations have been classified into developed and developing, with the developing further classified inter alia into least developed, geographically disadvantaged and most seriously affected countries. In the military and security field, we are all, from the United States and the Soviet Union to Sri Lanka, equally most seriously affected nations. Whatever our military strength, whatever the quality and extent of our participation in the CD, we are all threatened by the same dangers to our survival. We are also all impelled by the same hopes that our worst fears can and must be averted.

Charles Dickens' description in his book A Tale of Two Cities of the times prior to the French Revolution is curiously applicable to virtually all ages -- ours included. It is indeed the best of times as well as the worst of times, the spring of hope as well as the winter of despair.

There is a sober, healthy, hard-headed acceptance that nuclear wars cannot be won and must never be fought. Despite seemingly irreconcilable ideological differences and the continuance of mutually exclusive military alliances, sincere efforts have been made and considerable success has indeed been achieved in reaching out towards common mutually supportive goals -- tendencies, however tentative, which non-aligned countries like Sri Lanka, which have in principle based their security on means other than military alliances, warmly welcome. This city of Geneva has been a launching pad for peace probes that will have repercussions beyond Europe, beyond the States immediately affected. There is justifiable hope that agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles is imminent. A special meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States scheduled for September, despite some complications, encourages a mood of optimism, and opportunities exist to move ahead in other areas, including strategic arms reduction and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In classical non-aligned theory, great Power convergence and great Power rivalry are sometimes considered equally to be feared. But where a healthy concern for pursuing peace initiatives bears fruit, and the international community and the CD are partners in that pursuit of peace, the times certainly cannot be all bad. Last week Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union stated that concurrent efforts at multilateral negotiations in the CD and at the bilateral United States-Soviet level could be complementary. The week before, I was privileged to hear the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, His Excellency Eduard Shevardnadze, address this forum and ask the CD to assist in achieving a Soviet-United States agreement on a nuclear test ban. Ambassador Friedersdorf, the United States representative, has called on the CD to take action which would complement United States bilateral negotiations now going on with the Soviet Union. That the microphones of the CD are being utilized in this dialogue, even if that dialogue may sometimes be strained and the voices sometimes soured, offers a welcome challenge to the CD and our collective efforts in an international environment which has also seen, all too often, the myopia of devaluing multilateralism. The CD must not respond to that challenge by sitting comfortably on the sidelines. For those with special responsibilities whose

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

actions affect the destinies of all other States, the active engagement of representative organs such as the CD would be the surest means of vindicating the claims that such special responsibility will not be misplaced.

We cannot, however, delude ourselves either as members of the CD or as members of the human race that all is well. The nuclear threat has not abated. Increasing sophistication and qualitative modifications have increased the magnitude and terror of that threat, fostering suspicion and instability instead of inspiring confidence and security. The reaches of outer space are threatened by man's ultimate pollution -- "weaponization". Economic problems abound while expenditure on arms moves up. As the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden said in his very important address this morning, the great problems of our time go far beyond East-West rivalry. They are global and often economic. Small countries are intimidated and threatened.

In many respects the deliberations in the CD reflect the state of play in the disarmament field. The significance of its first three agenda items concerning nuclear weapons needs little comment. At the first SSOD, all States agreed by consensus that the most acute and urgent task was to remove the danger of nuclear war. That objective seems far off. In the interim context the question of a nuclear test ban becomes a central imperative to rein in the galloping qualitative nuclear arms race. Last year at the Reykjavik Summit the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that there would be step-by-step progress towards a comprehensive test ban.

Until such time as a ban is in effect, the development of new, more sophisticated and deadlier systems of nuclear weapons will regrettably continue to be pursued with attendant consequences. Each test is only a promise of another to follow by others. The number of States involved is limited, and their participation in a ban would help create a favourable political climate which would stimulate a positive chain reaction in other areas of nuclear disarmament as well.

The test ban has been yoked to questions of verification, as well as to what are described as the necessities of nuclear deterrence. Much has been already advanced to meet requirements in relation to verification, including proposals for on-site inspection and the means of benefiting from the considerable advances in seismology as well as the global data exchange systems.

Sri Lanka is a party to the NPT despite its limitations, and we see an intrinsic link between a test-ban treaty and a more effective non-proliferation régime. The third NPT review conference did in fact call on nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a CTBT in the CD. It is our belief -- held in common with the overwhelming majority of States -- that the conclusion of such a treaty would be the single most important step in strengthening the existing legal régime against further proliferation, both lateral and vertical. Clearly a CTBT is an indispensable step on the difficult road to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, a destination towards which we all decided to travel when

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

we agreed by consensus to paragraph 51 of the Final Document of SSOD-I. Despite all this and the improved climate among the major nuclear-weapon Powers, we have yet to agree on the question of a negotiating mandate, and this has thwarted efforts to set up an ad hoc committee in the CD empowered to work towards the objective of concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

In contrast to the stagnation in the CD on this question, there is happily a clearer flow and movement in respect of item 4 of the agenda of the CD, on chemical weapons. My delegation's gratitude needs to be expressed for the work carried out in the Ad hoc Committee last year under Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, and the major progress achieved under the guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden this year. Thanks to their sustained efforts, agreement on a convention on chemical weapons is a distinct certainty. Outstanding issues most certainly remain, such as those relating to verification, including the balance between the demands of a strict, binding verification régime to prevent violations of the proposed convention and, on the other hand, the concern of States to protect vital installations from unwarranted prying. An extended session of the Conference on Disarmament in November this year should be carefully considered if it could accelerate negotiations. Success on this issue would offer a clear example of the capabilities of the CD as a negotiating organ on an issue whose time has come -- an observation also made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden. Confidence-building measures such as the proposed exchange of visits to chemical facilities have contributed to bring success closer. We are grateful to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for innovative initiatives and modalities to speed up work.

My own delegation has had a special interest in item 5 of our agenda. Resolution 41/53 adopted at the last General Assembly with virtual unanimity signals the concern of Member States to prevent an arms race in outer space and the desire to utilize the Ad hoc Committee of the CD towards this objective. That resolution also urged the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement on preventing an arms race in outer space. Prevention now is better than seeking later, perhaps futilely, to limit, halt or control -- let alone eliminate -- an arms race in outer space.

Extension of the arms race into outer space would have adverse repercussions on current arms control agreements in other fields as well, leading to their weakening. Existing legal and other provisions to deal with the prospect of an arms race in outer space have been found wanting and in need of supplementing, particularly in the light of recent technological developments.

The benefits of the peaceful, rational and equitable exploitation of outer space are perhaps impossible yet to properly assess. However, we already have a more than clear assessment of the dangers perilously imminent in the creeping "weaponization" of outer space. Some 75 per cent of satellites in space are oriented towards military rather than development objectives. Calls for their protection should be examined in relation to the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer space. On-site

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

inspection of space objects by an international inspectorate at the point of launch has been suggested as a contribution to prevent the deployment of weapons in space.

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union made serious and worthy proposals earlier this month with the object of ensuring that items launched into space are not equipped with weapons.

The proposal of your country, France, Mr. President, in 1978 for an international satellite monitoring agency has been studied intensely and remains on the table. The Canadian presentation on verification and PAXSAT and proposals by China, the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, Japan and Argentina call for close examination and study in the Ad hoc Committee. Proposals for a comprehensive ASAT weapons ban and revisions to the 1967 outer space Treaty to remedy its shortcomings have also been put forward.

The Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, Mr. Hameed, speaking (as a member of Parliament) on article 4 of the Treaty way back in 1967, hoped that its shortcomings would not give licence for military activities in outer space, thus negating the lofty objectives of the Treaty. Concerns then expressed have been sadly borne out in the militarization of space. Last year at the CD, Mr. Hameed said of research into space weapons that, before the research of today becomes the reality of tomorrow, we must legislate effectively to keep space free of weapons. The potential of outer space for peace and development should not be blighted by the propensity of space Powers to move to a new arena to pursue an arms race.

The peaceful and equitable use of outer space needs to be promoted in order that co-operation and not confrontation, development rather than destruction impels our endeavours. At the Harare Summit, non-aligned States called for urgent negotiations in the CD to conclude agreements on all aspects of outer space and thus enhance the prospects of co-operation in its peaceful use.

In view of the highly technical nature of many of the issues involved, my delegation firmly supports suggestions for the establishment of a group of scientific/technical experts to clarify and update these issues. The inputs of a qualified group would most certainly enhance the quality of our work.

Item 6 on the question of negative security assurances has not seen much progress. NPT States and those who have renounced the nuclear option need legally binding assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. These assurances should be unambiguous and unequivocal and should not be dependent on or tied to conditions imposed by nuclear States on non-nuclear States -- conditions which then would amount to a form of nuclear blackmail. Lack of progress on this question only makes such guarantees that much more essential, particularly to non-aligned States like my own which have chosen not to seek shelter under the nuclear umbrellas of military alliances.

The third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is not far away. The request to the CD to elaborate a comprehensive programme of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

disarmament was one of the achievements of the first SSOD. It put back disarmament, if one might say so, at a macro level to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality. Despite the very special efforts, skills and dedication of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, little advance seems to have been registered in reaching agreement on the CPD. Had the CPD been in a state of suspended animation one would have had less reason to complain. However, the situation appears to be that even those aspects in the CPD draft that reflect areas on which consensus agreement had been reached nearly a decade ago are now being festooned with brackets of doubt. Clearly, what is achieved or is not achieved in respect of work in the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD will have repercussions on the third SSOD and the prospects for its success or failure. The Final Document of the first SSOD remains a landmark document, and was the result of a major effort that commenced in fact long before the convening of that session in May 1978. If you will pardon this personal interjection, I was personally involved in that preparatory process during the time Sri Lanka was chairman of the Non-aligned Group, as my colleague Ambassador Saad Alfarargi has just recalled. My delegation would be happy to engage in informal consultations as part of the countdown to SSOD-III. Our efforts at the third SSOD should seek to advance from the consensus results of SSOD-I. Consensus is after all the beginning of a process. The commitment to the principle of consensus is best tested in the process of the implementation of that consensus. Implementing consensus is sometimes more difficult than reaching consensus.

I stated at the outset that I have insufficient experience of the CD to make pronouncements on its work. The third special session, taking place a full decade after the CD in its present configuration came into operation, will certainly look at its past performance and its future role. I would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of the People's Republic of China for the tireless efforts he has undertaken with the Group of Seven to focus on certain aspects of the CD's work and present suggestions and guidelines for our greater efficiency and efficacy.

I am sorry to have to add that, as I commence work in the CD, I must also bid farewell to Ambassador Turbański of Poland, Ambassador Beesley of Canada and an old and dear friend, Ambassador Saad Alfarargi of Egypt.

Finally, I would like to sincerely thank you, Mr. President, and those members of the CD who have extended kind words of welcome to me. These have been a source of considerable encouragement, and I look forward to more active participation in the CD than has been possible for me thus far in the four weeks I have been in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, His Excellency Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, may I begin this brief intervention by joining others who have wished well those of our colleagues

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

who are departing from this Conference, and express words of welcome to those of our new colleagues who have joined us here. I must particularly refer to my personal regret that we will be left by Ambassador Beesley of Canada, a man who has made quite a remarkable contribution to the work of this Conference, and by Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, a man too whose presence has left an indelible mark on this Conference. I will miss them both as friends -- and speaking of friends, it is a great pleasure for me to welcome Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo from Sri Lanka, a man whom I have had the privilege of knowing for 20 years.

I want to speak briefly now on the occasion of our move towards the adoption of the progress report of the Group of Scientific Experts, the report that is given in document CD/778, which I assume this Conference will adopt at a later stage today. That report, which was introduced last week by the distinguished Chairman of the GSE, Dr. Dahlman, records that the work of this Group, which has been in existence now for 11 years, continues to be strongly supported by members of this Conference. Nineteen of us took part in the last session of the Group of Scientific Experts, and we were joined by six other States non-members of the Conference on Disarmament. National contributions were made to the work of the GSE by some 27 States. During their work in their last session they gave attention principally to designing a new global seismic data exchange system which would involve the wider use of level II or wave-form data, and they took a further step towards planning the forthcoming large-scale international data exchange experiment. Because the Australian Government remains committed to the earliest possible introduction of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, we consider this work to be of vital significance.

Quite simply, the Group of Scientific Experts will, once again, when they conduct their second global experiment, bring into existence a global seismic monitoring network. It is our firm view that when that system is brought into existence a few months from now, operating through over 70 national centres and four international data exchange centres, in this case with level II as well as level I data, it should remain operational in the future. Simply, when we turn it on again this time, we should not turn it off. By that means we will have moved towards the establishment, permanently, of a major means of verification of a future nuclear test-ban treaty.

My delegation has proposed, in CD/717, that this Conference take the policy or political decision required to ensure that a global seismic network is established, and I am again calling attention to that proposal today and saying quite specifically that in simple, practical terms, a way of achieving that purpose will be to refrain, on the next occasion, from turning the system off when we collectively turn it on to conduct the next global experiment. I would hope, as we move to our final decision this week and next, that a decision of the kind proposed by my delegation and described again now will in fact be taken by this Conference.

May I say too that it was a matter of immense interest and satisfaction to my delegation to hear the contribution to our Conference's work made this morning by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden, and I hope his

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

delegation would consider it acceptable if, in this context of talking about the need for the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty, I could recall straight away what the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden said this morning. He said: "This Conference has a duty to be prepared the day a test-ban treaty can be a reality. Efforts to this end must be launched without delay." My Government shares that view.

One such effort is what the GSE is doing, and what we have proposed should be the permanent establishment of a global seismic network. The other effort that is required is, of course, the establishment of a committee, an ad hoc subsidiary body, under item 1 of our agenda, and it is my delegation's earnest hope that the last remaining procedural obstacles to that development will be removed soon and that that committee will be established as soon as we commence our work next year. But in the meantime, as the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden has said, there is work to be done and we should lose no further time in getting on with that work so that we are ready the day on which a nuclear test-ban treaty is open for signature.

I apologise for omitting reference earlier to my very good friend Ambassador Stanislaw Turbański from Poland. Forgive me for not mentioning you earlier, Ambassador, but I add your name too to those whom I happily wish well, and look forward to seeing you in good health in the future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. Now I give the floor to the representative of Japan, His Excellency Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): As we approach the end of this year's session, I wish today to comment briefly on the work of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as well as on our agenda item I, "Nuclear test ban".

On 13 August, Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden presented to the plenary the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts in document CD/778. I had occasion in the spring part of this session to set forth the views of my delegation on the valuable work being performed by the Ad hoc Group. I will not repeat them, except again to express our appreciation for the very able chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman and to underline a few points which we consider to be of particular importance.

Firstly, my delegation welcomes the further steps taken by the Ad hoc Group with a view to giving practical and technical substance to the concept of a modern international seismic data exchange system based on the expeditious exchange of wave-form (level II) and parameter (level I) data, and to the planning of a large-scale experiment. We wish in particular to offer our most positive encouragement to the five new study groups that have been established, and to their convenors, as well as to Dr. Basham of Canada, who has been appointed as the principal co-ordinator of the large-scale experiment.

We continue to attach great importance to the contribution to be made by the widening network of co-operative national investigations into level II or

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

wave-form data exchange, and our seismic expert, Dr. Suehiro, has been working extensively with his colleagues from a number of countries in this area. One notable sign of progress in this regard is the fact that technical information, experience and recommendations resulting from these exchanges have been collected in Conference Room Paper 167, in the form of a source-book on seismic wave-form exchange which, we hope, will serve as a valuable basis for further expansion of this co-operative endeavour.

Secondly, the progress report (CD/778) contains in its paragraph 11 the reaffirmation of a principle which we consider vitally important, namely, that the international data centres should be open facilities for participating States, providing free and easy access to any data and results of analysis. The task before the Ad hoc Group is to give concrete and technical substance to this principle as quickly and on as wide a basis as possible. It has been somewhat disappointing that some countries apparently still feel a little hesitant or reluctant to translate this principle into practical terms. We hope that they will find themselves in a position to move forward in this regard as expeditiously as possible.

Thirdly, we believe that the objective towards which the Ad hoc Group is working, namely, an international seismic monitoring system, should be attained on a truly global basis in terms of participation by countries and on the soundest possible technical footing. I wish to underscore the importance, reaffirmed in the progress report (CD/778), of a stage-by-stage approach to the large-scale experiment.

In the view of my delegation, these are the points that we in the Conference should bear in mind as we follow the valuable work being undertaken by our scientific experts. Also, we should constantly remind ourselves that their work is designed to form an indispensable basis for our tackling the important question of verification under our priority agenda item, that is, a nuclear test ban. In this context, it may now be time for us to start considering the possibility of the Conference's not just taking note of the work being carried out by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts but also giving political encouragement, guidance and directives to their work.

Verification of a nuclear test ban in all its aspects -- technical, political, legal or financial -- is but one of a host of issues that should be the subject of practical and substantive examination by the Conference, and most suitably in an ad hoc committee. This leads me to the question of the necessity for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Last week, I had occasion to speak on behalf of a group of Western countries on the subject. Today I will speak in my national capacity a representative of Japan.

My Government's positive attitude toward the nuclear-test-ban issue is well known. At the beginning of this year's session, I voiced optimism concerning the early resumption of substantive work by the Conference on a nuclear test ban. That optimism was based on the fact that there existed a general and strong expectation of early commencement of the work, the emerging

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

common perception of the subject-matter of the work and the wide recognition of the necessity of verification as well as willingness to participate in its implementation.

My delegation was encouraged to know that this view was widely shared among the delegations. My delegation actively engaged in an effort to search for common ground among the various positions on the question of the establishment of an ad hoc committee. At this juncture, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to all those delegations around the table which took an active part in our joint efforts to overcome the mandate problem.

In April, the President for the month made a valuable initiative. Let me quote what the then President said at the 410th plenary on 30 April. He said:

> "With this in mind I submitted a draft mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of our agenda, which stipulated that the substantive work we would engage in would be regarded as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Unfortunately, we lacked sufficient time to complete the substantial consideration of the President's proposal, but at the relevant informal consultations a view prevailed that this proposal established a basis for possible future compromise on the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban. It is obvious that this is a task for us all, and my only hope is that persistent efforts in this regard will continue throughout this year's session."

The consultations continued. A number of groups and delegations showed considerable flexibility toward the President's proposal. My delegation is one of them. To my regret, we have not as yet attained the solution.

We have various draft mandates officially tabled before us by groups and delegations. Some were submitted some time ago, some recently. While my delegation respects the positions of each delegation as officially pronounced, we must urge the Conference to face the political realities. The political realities are such that, in the view of my delegation, none of these draft mandates as they now stand enjoy consensus support under the present circumstances. We cannot ignore this fact.

The situation is one in which only a process of informal consultations, where delegations join in searching for a compromise, can produce the desired results. If we in the Conference continue to feel that practical work should be commenced without delay, as indeed Japan does, we should keep such a process of informal consultation alive. My delegation, for one, believes that the assessment of the President for the month of April which I quoted a little while ago is still valid. It is never too late. Let us continue our work for the solution.

Before concluding, I would like to say a few words to departing colleagues. I have already had an opportunity to express my best wishes to Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt. To Ambassador Turbański of Poland, my best

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

wishes for every success in his new assignment in Warsaw. To Ambassador Beesley of Canada, may I wish a quiet and fruitful academic life in beautiful British Columbia.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement.

We have used up the time available for this morning, but we still have speakers on the list for today. I have consulted the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to see whether he might allow us to continue this plenary meeting this afternoon. Despite the time constraints facing the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Ambassador García Robles has kindly granted my request, and I should like to offer him special thanks for his co-operation on behalf of the Conference.

Accordingly, I suggest that we resume the plenary meeting today at 3.15 p.m. precisely. The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet immediately afterwards to continue the consideration of its report to the plenary. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 432nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, may I begin by expressing the pleasure of the Pakistan delegation at seeing you preside over the Conference during the important closing phase of the 1987 session, and to assure you of our full co-operation in the fulfilment of your task. We are confident that under your direction the work of the Conference will be conducted efficiently and skilfully. I should also like to compliment your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, for the competent manner in which he guided our work last month.

A number of colleagues have left or will be leaving the Conference at this session. May I take this opportunity to wish Ambassador Alfarargi, Ambassador Beesley, Ambassador Cromartie, Ambassador Dhanapala, Ambassador Turbański and Ambassador Tonwe every success in their future assignments. We are happy that Ambassador Dhanapala will continue to be associated with our work in the important post of Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. May I also welcome in our midst new colleagues, Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil. Our respective delegations have in the past worked in close co-operation. We look forward to maintaining the same relationship in the future.

We heard this morning the eloquent statement of the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden, and I am sure that the Conference, in its deliberations, will give it the very close attention that it merits.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

As the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament draws to its close, it would seem to be an appropriate occasion to take stock of our work this year. Regrettably, one cannot escape drawing the conclusion that the results achieved by the Conference have been extremely modest, if not negligible, in several important areas. This is particularly true of the nuclear and nuclear-related items of our agenda.

The commencement of the United States-Soviet talks last year on the question of nuclear testing served to focus attention on the central role that this Conference should be playing on the question of a nuclear test ban. At the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly the sponsors of resolution 41/46 A, of which Pakistan was one, made every effort to accommodate the views of the Western group of States, and this resolution received wider support than in previous years. Our consultations on this item of the agenda, at the beginning of the session, thus began on a somewhat hopeful note, and it appeared for a time that after a deadlock of three years, the question of the mandate for an ad hoc committee would be approached in a more flexible and constructive spirit. These hopes, however, have not been borne out, and this question of the mandate has once again proved to be an insurmountable obstacle. We can only regret the rigidity with which some countries continue to approach this issue. In our view, the differences in some of the proposals made this year to break the deadlock are not fundamental in nature, and the formulations suggested are broad enough to enable the Conference to commence practical work on all the relevant issues in a comprehensive manner. We therefore urge all delegations concerned to take a fresh look at this problem so that at the beginning of its 1988 session the Conference is in a position to commence substantive work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

My delegation has been following with interest the bilateral United States-Soviet talks on nuclear testing, and has heard several delegations at this Conference speak in favour of a step-by-step process in which "intermediate" limits would be mutually agreed upon by these two countries as regards the number and yield of nuclear test explosions in parallel with reductions in their nuclear arsenals. In our view, bilateral talks do not offer an acceptable substitute or alternative to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Our aim is a comprehensive test-ban treaty which, being multilateral in nature, ought to be negotiated in the CD, the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament matters. The aim of these negotiations must be a complete prohibition of nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time, and "intermediate" limits would be clearly inadequate unless agreed upon in the context of a short and predetermined time-limit for a comprehensive ban. A nuclear test ban, moreover, is an independent measure of nuclear disarmament of the highest priority and should not be linked to or dependent on a reduction of nuclear weapons.

This year, for the third successive session, the Conference established an ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. My delegation would like to compliment Ambassador Pugliese of Italy for the efficient manner in which he chaired its proceedings. The results achieved in the Committee cannot, however, be regarded as satisfactory, considering the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

urgency of the subject and the priority which most delegations attach to it. Statements made in the Committee on the first two items of its programme of work, namely, examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and relevant existing agreements, were largely repetitious and polemical in nature. A duplication of this exercise next year would not serve any purpose. These two topics have already been given exhaustive examination, and there seems to be broad agreement that, while current international law imposes some restraints, there is a need for further measures. The necessary groundwork has thus been done for a more focused discussion on measures which would promote the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space. We hope, therefore, that agreement will be reached at the beginning of our next session on an improved mandate for the Ad hoc Committee so that the task of elaborating concrete measures to supplement the existing legal régime may be taken up in earnest.

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons registered significant progress during this session under the energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. This is reflected in the additions that have been made to the "rolling text" on such questions as verification of declarations on chemical weapons and of their destruction, modalities for the revision of lists under article VI, and the technical secretariat. However, the momentum achieved in the spring part of the session was not maintained during the summer. The issues which remain outstanding, among them the questions of the order of destruction, commercial super-toxic chemicals, challenge inspection and organizational matters, are complex and their resolution will not be easy. Besides these politically difficult problems, it will also be necessary to agree on the details of certain outstanding technical matters. It is therefore important that negotiations should be intensified and the opportunity for inter-sessional work fully availed of.

Consultations carried out by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the issue of challenge inspection have led to some narrowing of differences, especially as regards the initiation of this process. However, the crucial question -- how to resolve a situation in which the challenging State and the challenged State are unable to agree how the inspection is to be conducted -- remains. My delegation cannot think of any solution to this problem, except that the matter be entrusted to the Executive Council. As has been rightly pointed out, time is of the essence in challenge inspection, and if doubts about compliance remain unresolved, confidence in the convention would be seriously undermined and its viability put at stake.

My delegation has taken a special interest in articles X and XI of the draft convention dealing, respectively, with assistance and with economic and technological development. We are looking forward to listening to the views of other delegations at the consultations on these two issues which are due to be held before the end of the current session, and hope that further consideration will be given to these two articles during the inter-sessional period. Our proposal on article X is before the Conference in document CD/752. We also support the Brazilian proposal on article XI contained in document CD/CW/WP.176.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Concern has been expressed by a few delegations, including mine, over the possibility that some of the States possessing a chemical weapons capability might not adhere to the convention, or that activities which would undermine the objectives of the convention might be carried out on the territories of non-parties. These are problems that will need to be given careful attention by the Conference. Our proposal in CD/752 seeks to address these concerns by assuring States parties facing a chemical weapons threat from any source, whether a party or non-party, of assistance from other States parties. The question of the responsibility of States parties for the activities of their persons, whether natural or legal, on the territory of non-parties is also relevant in this context. There is, moreover, the wider question of what States parties can do collectively about a State party which violates the convention, or about a non-party which retains or acquires a chemical weapons capability.

Despite the forceful chairmanship of Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, this year again, the work of the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances remained unproductive. The repeated appeals of the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their declarations taking fully into account the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States have gone unheeded. My delegation will not, however, slacken in its search for a satisfactory solution to this issue. We intend to persevere in our efforts not only because we feel that the non-nuclear-weapon States which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear option in the wider interest of international peace and security have a right to unconditional assurances from those States which possess these weapons, but also because without such assurances the non-proliferation régime, to which we attach great importance, can only be weakened.

My delegation this year welcomed the decision of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons to establish two contact groups to handle the two aspects of this subject. We did so in the hope that this new approach would enable the Committee to deal with the substance of each of the two questions in a more comprehensive manner, and that it would be accompanied by a more positive attitude on the part of those delegations which in the past had entertained reservations on the unitary method of work. The Committee Chairman, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, and the co-ordinators of the contact groups, Mr. Numata and Mr. Wayarabi, deserve our gratitude for the patience with which they carried out their difficult task. My delegation cannot, however, conceal its disappointment that on neither question could any concrete progress be registered.

As regards track A, i.e. the question of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense, differences among various delegations on scope, definitions, peaceful uses and nuclear disarmament which prevented agreement in previous years have in fact been accentuated.

On track B, i.e. the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, my delegation has taken an active interest. Of the three resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly last year which relate to this item of our agenda, two specifically requested the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an international agreement prohibiting

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

military attacks on nuclear facilities. In its statement last week, the delegation of Sweden stated that the main objective while dealing with this agenda item should be to prohibit radiologically caused mass destruction. My delegation is unable to accept this view. There is nothing in the decision of the Conference establishing the Ad hoc Committee or in its mandate to support the view that its only or even main task is to prohibit radiologically caused mass destruction. In fact, the two resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly which specifically entrust the Conference on Disarmament with responsibility for negotiating an agreement on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities do not make any reference to the question of mass destruction.

The Swedish delegation stated that it was not aware of any international law that provides protection to nuclear facilities, and pointed out that the only specific international law in this respect is contained in the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. We agree with the view that the relevant articles in the Additional Protocols are not satisfactory. However, there is also another international norm. This is contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, which states:

> "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

This norm is also applicable to the use of force by one State against the nuclear facilities of another. To argue otherwise would imply that the attack carried out in 1981 by Israel (which is not a party to the Additional Protocols) against the Iraqi nuclear facility did not constitute a violation of international law.

The basic norm on the non-use of force contained in the United Nations Charter is broad enough to cover all nuclear facilities but permits an exception to be made in exercise of the right of self-defence, a right which most States interpret subjectively. Similarly, the relevant articles of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, which are applicable to "nuclear electrical generating stations", allow for exceptions which could be interpreted subjectively.

The present international régime on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities evidently does not provide sufficient protection. The task that this Conference has before it is to supplement the existing norms by a new international convention which would remove the loopholes to which I have just referred. To limit this protection to certain types of nuclear facilities or those which meet certain quantitative "threshold" specifications or are listed in a register or bear a special marking would amount to legitimizing attacks on the remaining nuclear facilities which are not of the specified type, do not meet the "threshold" specifications, are not included in the register, or do not have the special marking. Such an agreement would not make nuclear facilities any safer. It would have the opposite effect.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

To the question of why nuclear facilities should be afforded a measure of protection that is not available to other installations, my answer is that nuclear facilities have certain unique characteristics. For one thing, the harmful effects of radiation that would be released by an attack on a nuclear facility may not remain limited to the victim State but, as was demonstrated by the Chernobyl accident, could have economic, health and ecological consequences for other States as well. And this irrespective of whether that facility is included in a register or bears a special marking.

The Swedish delegation also argued that the definition of a nuclear facility as "a nuclear reactor or any other nuclear facility for the production, handling, treatment, processing or storage of nuclear fuel or other nuclear material" which is given as one possible alternative in the report of Contact Group B would be meaningless unless the term "nuclear material" is well defined. May I say that we would welcome proposals from other delegations for a definition of this term. A definition of "nuclear material" is in fact contained in another international convention, and we do not see why a mutually acceptable definition for track B cannot be worked out.

The Swedish delegation has stated that its position regarding the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities is clear, realistic and feasible and in fact is the only approach that constitutes a consistent set of elements for a draft treaty. As the report of Contact Group B makes clear, this is not accepted by a large number of other delegations in the CD. It cannot therefore constitute an acceptable basis for a treaty aimed at removing the shortcomings of the existing international régime on this subject.

Ambassador García Robles has shown a great deal of patience and energy in chairing the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, but his task this year has not been easy. Some Western delegations have raised questions about texts on which agreement had been reached earlier. The draft which the Committee has elaborated this year is full of brackets. This year's text in fact constitutes a backward step. In addition to the paragraphs concerning priority items which were already within the brackets, we have now a series of new brackets. We are very far indeed from achieving an acceptable consensus document. In these circumstances, the question must be asked whether it would not be advisable to postpone further consideration of the CPD until circumstances are more favourable.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. Now I give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, first of all I would like to join all those speakers who welcomed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden in our midst. My delegation listened with great attention to his important statement.

The progress report which the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Events prepared on its twenty-fourth session has now been distributed as document CD/778. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic appreciates the efforts the Group made towards a blueprint for a modern international system for the exchange of seismic data. The Group of Socialist States gives its approval to the report. We thank the Chairman, Mr. Dahlman, and the members of the Ad hoc Group for their work on a highly sophisticated scientific and technological matter.

It is my delegation's understanding that the expeditious exchange of seismic data will be a very important measure to complement verification of compliance with a future comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests by national technical means under an effective system of international co-operation.

As can be gathered from the Ad hoc Group's report, solutions are being considered that go far beyond the generally acknowledged scope of seismological research. It appears desirable, therefore, that the Group should not confine itself to just one possible solution. Rather, different options should be worked out, annotated by detailed information about their potential and ways to translate them into action. In fact, this will be needed before any concrete decision on the future data exchange system can be made. I think it would be correct to assume that initial conditions will not be the same everywhere in the world.

We note that the Ad hoc Group has not yet arrived at a full consensus on the best way of devising such a system. Goal-oriented scientific technological studies are required in order to establish and eventually operate a properly functioning exchange of seismic data within the framework of a verification system for a nuclear test ban.

As for the proposed experiment on the exchange of level II seismic data, my delegation shares the view of the Ad hoc Group that the overall concept of the system should be developed under a step-by-step process. It endorses the scientific experts' suggestion concerning the dates of their next session. As in the past, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic will continue to lend active support to the efforts of the Ad hoc Group.

I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Group of Socialist States, to back the Soviet proposal that a special group of scientific experts be set up which would be assigned the task of submitting recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of verification for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests. If this proposal were implemented, all the facets of verification of compliance with relevant accords would be addressed in a purposeful manner. We do hope this initiative will meet with the unanimous approval of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. CIMA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, I am sorry for prolonging this rather lengthy session, but I will be extremely brief.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Cima, Czechoslovakia)

The distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, referred today to Ambassador Vejvoda's statement of 30 July concerning the CPD. He said that Ambassador Vejvoda "criticized delegations for making reservations on elements of the working draft within the Ad hoc Committee and urged them to reconsider their positions". My delegation feels that this is not quite an accurate interpretation of what Ambassador Vejvoda said. The United States, the head of my delegation said, "has apparently reassessed its approach towards the CPD and launched a process of bracketing a large number of provisions which had already been agreed previously". He said further, "it is most disquieting that even some key formulations of the Final Document of SSOD-I are now being disavowed".

Certainly nobody expects the United States delegation to act against the policies of its Government, but undoubtedly the United States delegation can bring to the knowledge of that Government that the change in its approach towards work on the draft CPD -- and there is no doubt that such a change did occur -- amounts to the revision of the Final Document of the SSOD-I and makes it impossible for this Conference to finalize the draft comprehensive programme.

That is exactly what Ambassador Vejvoda had in mind when he made the statement referred to today by the distinguished representative of the United States.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement. I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor?

As I informed you at the beginning of this week, I should like to submit to the Conference for adoption the recommendation which appears in paragraph 17 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/778). The recommendation provides that the Ad hoc Group should meet from 7 to 18 March 1988 in Geneva.

If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the Ad hoc Group's recommendation.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Today the secretariat has distributed to you, at my request, an informal document containing the timetable of the meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As is customary, it is merely indicative, and may be adjusted at a later stage if necessary as our work dictates. Since this will be the last week of the Conference's work, considerable flexibility will be needed to organize the various meetings. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this timetable.

It was so decided.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to remind you that, in conformity with the timetable of meetings for this week, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was to meet immediately after the plenary meeting. However, as consultations are under way on the Committee's report, the meeting scheduled for today will be held tomorrow, Friday, at 10 a.m. in room III.

I would also like to announce that the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet tomorrow, Friday, at 3 p.m. in the Salle du Conseil.

I should also like to emphasize particularly that we have reached the deadline for the adoption by the Conference's subsidiary bodies of their reports to the plenary. It is vital that the committees which are still in the process of completing their work should do so between today and next Monday at the latest. It is also essential to avoid a situation in which all the committees complete their work at the same time, because it will not be possible to prepare all the reports simultaneously.

The first consultation on the substantive paragraphs of the report to the General Assembly, which will be open to all delegations, will be held tomorrow at 10 a.m. in room I to consider agenda items 1 and 7.

The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet immediately after the plenary. I should like to thank Ambassador García Robles once again for enabling us to complete our plenary meeting this afternoon.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 25 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.433
25 August 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 August 1987 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 433rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue today its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

As I announced at the 431st plenary meeting of the Conference, I shall submit today for adoption, once we have exhausted the list of speakers, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/779.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and Algeria. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, will introduce the Committee's report, contained in document CD/784.

Mr. GERMANN (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, in accordance with its mandate, the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons would like to report to the Conference on the progress of its work achieved in the 1987 session. By the same token I would like to introduce the report of the Committee as contained in CD/784 adopted at the 10th meeting of the Committee on Friday, 21 August 1987.

May I recall that since its establishment with a negotiating mandate in 1979, the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances has undergone different stages. While there is clear recognition that non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to a guarantee that they will not be the object of attack by weapons the possession of which they themselves have forsworn, no effective international arrangements could be found beyond the existing solemn assurances on the subject made so far by the nuclear-weapon States themselves.

Negotiations on the subject over the years have revealed the complex nature of the issues involved, but have shown no substantive progress, and have not as yet produced any concrete result on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly an international instrument of a legally binding character. Although during the first years of the Committee's work under its negotiating mandate the item has been analysed in a comprehensive and detailed manner, no further progress has been achieved during subsequent years.

Taking into account the different approaches and remaining positions on how to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, the question this year was whether the prevailing circumstances allowed the Committee to move forward from the current state of affairs and provide something stronger and more effective.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Germann, Federal Republic of Germany)

In the course of consultations and negotiations many delegations considered that, in fact, relevant new developments in the field of arms limitation and international relations, although having a different degree of relevance to the subject-matter, had important consequences for the security of all States, including non-nuclear-weapon States. In this context, the agreement reached between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan was highlighted, which states that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". Furthermore, the importance of the Reykjavik meeting in 1986, which opened up prospects for concrete progress in nuclear disarmament, was underlined.

While it was generally recognized that recent developments in the field of disarmament and international relations were welcome in themselves, it was argued that they had little or no direct relevance to the question of negative security assurances since they had not shown a positive impact on the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerned. The crucial question before the Committee, of whether there was sufficiently strong new impetus to overcome the stagnation from which the work of the Ad hoc Committee had suffered in the last few years, thus could not be answered positively, although various new proposals had been introduced and examined.

Work on the substance of effective arrangements, and discussion on various aspects including elements of interim solutions, revealed again that specific difficulties relating to different perceptions of the security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States still persist and that the complex nature of the issue involved still continues to prevent agreement on a common formula. At the same time, the discussion underlined the wide support for a continued search for a common formula which could be included in an international legally binding instrument. In this context the view was expressed during the final consultations, after the adoption of the report, that all non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States that had reliquished the nuclear option in a legally binding manner were fully covered by the unilateral declarations of the five nuclear-weapon States, but that in any case legally binding negative security assurances were clearly preferable to interim solutions such as a Security Council resolution.

The exchange of views on the latter as well as on previous proposals revealed general agreement that they contained elements requiring further study by the Committee. Accordingly, the recommendation is made to the Conference on Disarmament that ways and means should continue to be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work after the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee at the beginning of the 1988 session, especially in the light of the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

May I take this opportunity to thank all participants in the debate and the final report-writing process for their fairness.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who spoke on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

for introducing its report. I should like to inform the Conference that I shall be submitting the Ad hoc Committee's report for adoption at the plenary meeting to be held on Thursday, 27 August.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, His Excellency Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, in taking the floor, I would like to offer my personal congratulations to you for the manner in which you have conducted our affairs during the month which has traditionally proven to be our most difficult month. Perhaps the pain and suffering of last year has had some beneficial spill-over. I should also like to take this opportunity of expressing my warm regards and friendly au revoir to Ambassador Alfarargi, who has already left us, and Ambassador Turbanski, who will soon be leaving us.

As we are near the end of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to express some thoughts on a number of matters, not all of which are on our agenda. Since this may be the last occasion on which I shall address the Conference, as I shall be leaving Geneva shortly for another assignment, I shall follow the tradition of expressing personal as well as official views, with a particular focus on where we stand as we approach the third special session on disarmament.

On the most important issues on our agenda, and indeed the agenda of all thinking people, namely nuclear disarmament, we are light years away from where we were when I joined this forum four years ago. For those who may not be aware, I presented my credentials on 23 September 1983.

In my personal view, the progress in the INF talks, which now show real promise of a major breakthrough in the coming months, has come about because of conceptual changes in the thinking of both parties. In an article in the McGill Law Journal in 1983, I referred to a major Canadian policy statement by Canada's then Secretary of State for External Affairs made on 1 February 1983 in the Committee on Disarmament, at which I was present in my capacity then as Ambassador for Disarmament, which stressed the following points: that security in today's world cannot be achieved on a purely national basis; that attempts by one side to make gains at the expense of the security of the other ultimately will not work; that action produces reaction, and in the end neither side achieves a long-term gain. Applying these principles to the INF talks at a time when positions were still very far apart, the Canadian policy statement referred to in my article pointed out that such negotiations could only succeed if both parties accepted as their fundamental objective increased mutual security rather than unilateral advantage. It was suggested that it was not clear at that time that both sides had accepted mutual security as the basis of their negotiations.

That was the situation four years ago. I believe that it is no longer the case. Progress towards an INF agreement in the nuclear and space talks now presents the real prospect of important reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. An agreement on the basis of the "global double zero" formula would constitute a first nuclear disarmament agreement -- since the SALT treaties are verifiable arms limitation agreements -- that would completely remove an entire class of weapons from the nuclear

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

arsenals of the United States and the USSR on a world-wide basis. The possibility that these objectives may finally be attainable attests to the validity of the principle of mutual security instead of unilateral advantage in the disarmament process. This key principle is even more crucial for progress in the area of strategic offensive and defensive arms.

It is equally interesting to note that the February 1983 Canadian policy statement in this forum, emphasizing mutual security as the only acceptable basis for arms control and disarmament, also stressed that "an attempt by any Power to develop a policy which assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity." This statement was made at a time before such views were fashionable. Indeed, at the time it was made, contrary views were being expressed in articles and statements from influential sources. This concept has since become an agreed fundamental principle, as was proclaimed in the joint statement by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985 in the famous statement "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

Some amongst us may consider this statement to be mere rhetoric. I do not. Some amongst us seem to see apparent inconsistencies between those words and the action taken by their authors. I do not. Some amongst us may say that action speaks louder than words. I do too. And that, I suggest, is what is occurring. The world is not going to change overnight. But a beginning has been made in a major attempt to ensure that we continue to have a world in which to live, a world, if I may recall the historic post-war statement of Wendell Willkie, which has long since become "one world".

There are other encouraging signs, as other representatives in this Conference have already pointed out. The successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference last year, coupled with current prospects for the successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), have contributed to improving the atmosphere in the Conference on Disarmament markedly and even, some have suggested, to the quickening of our pace at least in some areas. However, with the exception of the negotiations to ban chemical weapons, progress on the main issues on our agenda is not always evident from day to day or even from session to session. Nevertheless, the global picture appears more encouraging when viewed over a period of four years.

There is no issue which has proven more controversial than that of verification. Even if it is not on our agenda as a separate item, it is omnipresent in our work. During my time, this issue of verification, a long-standing Canadian priority which we have regarded as the key to arms control and disarmament agreements, has gradually come to be universally accepted as the essential requirement for the conclusion of such agreements. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. van den Broek, pointed out in his statement to the CD last month, "it is increasingly recognized that asking for on-site inspection" to verify a treaty with important security implications "is reasonable and legitimate". He went on to say that "the growing consensus on the need for strict verification holds the promise of progress with regard to arms control in general". It is

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

stating the obvious to say that the Canadian Government fully shares that view. What may not be so obvious is that such a statement could not have been made four years ago.

As I pointed out in my statement last month, verification performs a series of central functions, the most important being deterrence of non-compliance, confidence-building, removal of uncertainty and treaty assessment. The success this year of the working group on verification at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, under Canadian chairmanship, in reaching provisional agreement on several verification principles, further testifies to the emerging international consensus on these issues. This has to be seen as progress. Thus while verification is sometimes portrayed as an obstacle in the way of a solution, for Canada it has always been a central part of the solution.

It is in this context that I welcome and acknowledge the importance of the statement made in this room by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, when he said that "real verification" ought to involve "foolproof, indisputable, reliable and extremely strict and rigorous methods". The specific verification-related suggestions he made at that time in relation to chemical weapons, outer space and nuclear testing will be studied with care by Canadian authorities with these criteria in mind. I should like to come back later to the question of the standards to be sought in verification measures.

When I came to Geneva in the fall of 1983, the framework of a future chemical weapons convention had just been agreed under the chairmanship of my predecessor. Interestingly, in the light of the hours -- days -- weeks we spend on procedural questions related to mandates and subsidiary bodies, that level of progress had been reached in spite of the existence of an ad hoc Committee without a negotiating mandate. I suggest that there is a lesson for us to be drawn from this, particularly in the context of the report of the Group of Seven on our working methods.

The following year the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons adopted a negotiating mandate and developed its first "rolling text" under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus. In the intervening years considerable progress has been achieved, article by article, in large measure due to the hard work, perseverance and initiative of successive chairmen of the Committee -- Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Cromartie -- and also the co-ordinators of the working groups, as well as participating delegations which have contributed dozens of working papers. The process received a boost in 1984 with the tabling of a draft treaty by the United States. More recently, major initiatives by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the difficult issue of challenge inspection have brought us closer to resolving most remaining differences surrounding this problem. That has to be seen as very tangible progress.

We are again this year indebted to Ambassador Ekéus, whose able and dynamic chairmanship has ensured that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has achieved valuable results on key issues. Some speakers have suggested that the pace of negotiations has slowed down after the impressive gains in 1986 and the spring session this year. This is not so, in the view of my

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

delegation; it is inevitable that, precisely because we are making significant progress in the elaboration of a convention, the pace tends to slow down as new gains become harder and the points under negotiation more difficult to resolve. Moreover, Governments require time to reflect on the results obtained and consider the need to adapt their negotiating approaches accordingly.

The recent announcement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that the Soviet Union now agrees to a fully mandatory challenge inspection régime is a most important statement, even when read in the light of the five qualifying points made later by Ambassador Nazarkin in his elaboration of USSR views on this issue. Clearly, certain important details remain to be negotiated in this area, as indicated in Ambassador Ekéus' report on his consultations. Inter alia, there needs to be agreement on the precise manner in which challenges would be initiated.

It has long been agreed that allegations of the use of chemical weapons must be dealt with as promptly as possible, and that the only adequate method of determining whether or not chemical weapons have been used is on-site inspection. Canada has considered this problem in much detail and this year, together with the delegation of Norway, we have provided a paper (CD/766) proposing an annex to article IX on this important subject. We hope that it will be possible for the Ad hoc Committee to give full attention to the important question of the verification of CW use as soon as this is practicable.

We have also broken new ground in the CW negotiations this year in developing an understanding of the type of international organization required to oversee the implementation of a CW convention. Much work remains to be done before this organization can become a reality. It is critical that we thoroughly understand what we expect such an organization to do before we can complete our work on article VIII of the draft treaty. The Canadian delegation intends to contribute substantively to this as part of our work. I suggest, however, that the mere fact that we are collectively now addressing such issues is an encouraging sign and a clear mark of progress.

I now wish to speak on an issue central to the whole CW negotiation. Canada does not possess any chemical weapons, and does not intend to produce or acquire such weapons. Two working papers tabled in this forum (CCD/434 of July 1974 and CD/173 of April 1981) reported that Canadian chemical weapon stocks had been destroyed. It is not in any spirit of polemics, but with the explicit purpose of accelerating the negotiating process, that I make the plea that all other delegations note this declaration and others like it and consider making comparable declarations -- and do so as soon as possible to build up our momentum and make clear to all the world the seriousness of our intent. It goes without saying, in the light of the foregoing, that we have made very important, concrete progress in our negotiations on the chemical weapon convention during the past four years.

Turning now to the nuclear test ban, in the Canadian policy statement mentioned earlier it was emphasized that the pursuit of a comprehensive test ban was a fundamental -- perhaps the fundamental -- nuclear issue before the Committee on Disarmament. The attainment of this objective remains a major

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

priority of the Canadian Government. The step-by-step approach favoured by Canada four years ago, an approach which now has the support of most delegations around this table, remains the most realistic in our view.

There is, of course, another subject on which verification is crucial. As in other arms control and disarmament areas, adequate verification of a comprehensive test ban would be of vital importance. There has, however, been considerable progress in the past four years in the development of a global seismic verification system, and the Group of Scientific Experts is to be congratulated for its constructive work in this area during this period. A Group which may have been considered somewhat controversial four years ago is now universally acknowledged as one of the corner-stones of our Conference on this issue. The large-scale level II data exchange experiment, which could take place as early as next year, will be especially important in demonstrating the feasibility of verification by seismic means. Canada attaches great importance to the effective utilization of wave-form data, including its adequate dissemination to all international data centres within a global system, for this verification purpose. Here too, much has been achieved during the past four years. The Canadian Government recently commissioned in-depth research at the University of Toronto which has already produced interesting and promising results. I am therefore delighted that one of the scientific experts on my delegation, Dr. Peter Basham, has been chosen to co-ordinate this experiment. We know that he will receive the support and co-operation from others which the importance of the endeavour fully warrants.

There is no reason why we cannot start practical work in an ad hoc committee at the earliest possible opportunity in order to pursue these objectives. I would recall to my colleagues that rule 23 of our rules of procedure indicates that whenever the Conference deems it advisable for the effective performance of its functions, it may establish subsidiary bodies. I refer also to the report of the Group of Seven on this very procedural issue. My delegation firmly believes that establishing a subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban, as the informal proposal of the President for the month of April and his successors made clear, is essential for the effective performance of the functions of the Conference on Disarmament on such a ban, as it would allow us both to take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and to get down to substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues. We would hope that the proposal of the President for the month of April, my friend and colleague Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, will form the basis for consultations during the inter-sessional period and early next session.

Outer space is an issue on which it is more difficult to document substantive progress over the past four years. None the less, we have not stood still, and we have not retrogressed. In 1983 the Canadian delegation urged the CD to begin as soon as possible its essential task of defining the legal and other issues necessary to build upon the outer space legal régime, and made clear Canada's intention to participate actively in this work, urging the establishment of a subsidiary body on this subject. We were, of course, not the only delegation to do so. Subsequently, we tabled a series of working papers intended to advance our work. The Ad hoc Committee was first established in March 1985. Its work since then has been always arduous, sometimes productive, often interesting and frequently frustrating.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

I would like to clarify a point I made in an earlier statement when I referred to the régime of the high seas by way of analogy to the régime of outer space. The Canadian working paper tabled at that time did the same. I wish to stress that I did not refer to the law of the sea as a model, but by way of a law-making analogy. I wish to emphasize this point without developing it further, so as to avoid any misunderstanding concerning the Canadian position.

Given the complexity of many of the questions we have discussed under the existing outer space mandate, the Canadian Government considers that the best way to expedite our work is to put forth our views in the form of working papers. The purpose is to concretize discussions and negotiations, whether or not delegations agree with the papers tabled. Even disagreement clarifies issues, far more than general statements not focused on specific proposals. In my statement to the Conference on 2 April I cited the series of working papers that Canada has put forward, and I do not need to do so again. I would however like to refer to our workshop in Montreal in May of this year, which I had the honour to chair, as another instance of our effort to make concrete contributions in this field. I wish to thank the many delegations which have expressed their appreciation for this workshop. The Canadian PAXSAT presentation to the Ad hoc Committee represented a further effort to concentrate on the practical problems of verification.

With regard to the specific question of verification concerning outer space, I think that it is worth reiterating the point I made to the Conference in my statement of 21 July. Careful negotiation, drafting and implementation of adequate and effective verification systems is essential if verification is not to become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening it or eliminating it. We are pleased to note that the Soviet Union is giving attention to this problem, as evidenced in the proposal outlined in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's speech to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August. We would encourage the Soviet Union to give further thought to its proposal for an international verification system. We have particularly taken note that, as seems clear from this and other elements of Mr. Shevardnadze's statement, the Soviet Union accepts in principle that useful and practical work on aspects of verification can be done independently of a specific negotiating context, and without having previously reached agreement on the details of what is to be controlled. This is a view which has long been advocated by Canada.

By way of clarification, I should also emphasize, however, that, as reflected in our own PAXSAT feasibility study, in our view the implementation of verification systems ought, at least in most circumstances, to be treaty-specific. Canada has not advocated third-party approaches involving verification activities outside the context of an agreement or by countries not party to an agreement. A corollary to this approach has been that Canada has not advocated the putting into place of verification systems or procedures in advance of the conclusion of an agreement. These comments are applicable, of course, not only to outer space but to nuclear test issues as well.

I would make an additional, final point about our work in relation to outer space. The working papers my delegation has submitted have pointed to the potential importance of careful drafting of definitions. The somewhat

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

restrictive definition -- if I may so -- of outer space weapons which appears in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement of 6 August reinforces us in our view that such work could indeed be useful. This is of special importance because, as I have emphasized on other occasions, the central and essential purpose of any arms control agreement and its related verification system must be to enhance stability, and thus we should close the door on any possible areas of ambiguity or uncertainty. I hope I have succeeded in indicating some progress even on outer space over the past four years.

On radiological weapons I believe that we made a useful change in our working procedure in separating the two tracks and dealing with them separately and concurrently. It would clearly be over-optimistic, however, to suggest that significant progress was made on either track. It should be noted that we have done useful work in drawing up the annexes to the report of the Ad hoc Committee, and we should draw upon them as a basis for future work. It is clear, however, particularly with regard to the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense, that some delegations will have to re-examine their positions in the light of their expressed desire for an agreement. To suggest that we have made significant progress on these items over the past four years would be to mislead our Governments and our public opinion.

I cannot refrain from wondering aloud, in my purely personal capacity, whether all of us ought to re-examine our positions since Chernobyl, and, I might add, Bhopal, on the consequences of attacks on peaceful facilities, leaving aside whether these questions may properly be addressed in the CD or should be considered under the Geneva Red Cross protocols. These two disasters have shown us the kind of consequences that we could imagine occurring in the event of an attack on such facilities.

Turning to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I do not think anyone can underestimate the energy, tenacity and determination our distinguished colleague Ambassador García Robles has brought to the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Much valuable work has been done this year, and even if we have not been able to reach consensus on a document we do consider that notable improvements have been made in the text of the draft CPD.

I regret, however, that on some parts of the programme there seems to be a narrower area of consensus now than at least appeared to be the case at SSOD-I. I appreciate that, if new consensus language actually improves previous consensus texts, then we need not treat such original texts as Holy Writ -- providing, of course, we all agree that the new amendments are improvements. I think it is accurate to say, therefore, that in spite of the forest of brackets, through which it is difficult to see the original trees, the fact that we are all seriously focusing on this issue is some evidence of progress.

This Conference is often referred to with pride as the single multilateral negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament. Yet many have referred to its meagre achievements since it was established in its present configuration in 1978 at the first SSOD. As we approach the third special session on disarmament we should quite properly ask ourselves if we

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

have justified the trust the international community, the Governments and the publics we represent all put in us when this forum was created. The ultimate test of this Conference is its ability to make progress on significant arms control and disarmament measures. As I have attempted to illustrate, the CD has achieved some progress, and in the case of CW, even substantial progress during the last four years since SSOD-II. However, no agreement on any issue has been concluded during the past four years -- indeed the past 10 years.

Why has there been no agreement in the last 10 years? Obviously the CD does not work in a vacuum. Is it therefore because it is influenced by the international environment, which may not have been propitious, at least at the beginning of this 10-year period? Is it that its predecessor bodies concluded the easier non-armament agreements first, leaving the more difficult and complex arms control and disarmament issues to the CD? Is it because of our cumbersome procedures? Is it the fault of the major Powers, as some allege, leaving themselves blameless and without responsibility? It would be too easy to try to justify our failures by any or all of these explanations. There is no doubt that we bear a collective responsibility, and as pointed out last week by Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, when we fail we are all the losers.

I suggest, however, that without ignoring the shortcomings or the failures of the CD, we should in the future dwell less on its faults -- and those of each other -- and instead move forward on the basis of what could be accomplished with good will, determination and skilful negotiation. I refer to concrete work, not rhetoric. If we are truly committed and determined, the only path to concrete progress and to resolving differences is to define the areas of common ground and then attempt step by step to expand on them. We need to concentrate on the practical and realizable. We might even ask ourselves if the Conference should concentrate on substantive areas where progress is feasible and consider leaving other areas such as RW, where there is little prospect for early progress, for a cooling-off period.

SSOD-III is less than a year away, and the CD will have to stand judgement on its performance. There seems little doubt that the special session will reaffirm the critical role of this Conference in the multilateral process of arms control and disarmament negotiations as it did in 1982, not perhaps because of its accomplishments but because it has no other choice. The Conference should begin by making the best use possible of the remaining time to achieve progress on major issues and, in particular, attempt to make a final breakthrough on chemical weapons.

Turning briefly to the improved and effective functioning of the CD, as I have stated before in this forum, it is my firm conviction that with better working methods and a more widespread willingness to accept sensible accommodations of interests, it is in our power to improve the productiveness of the Conference. The recent report of the Group of Seven, of which I am a member, made some practical suggestions on two procedural issues which have been at the source of much wasted time over the years: the establishment of subsidiary bodies and our report-writing methods. It is regrettable that it was not possible for the Conference to agree on at least some of these suggestions. It is my impression, however, that the spirit in which the suggestions were made by the Group of Seven has had some influence during the last phase of our session, at least on parts of the CD report. Some other

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

sound practical suggestions have also been made which could in the future help resolve problems relating to the establishment of subsidiary bodies, particularly as the climate improves as a result of major agreements which may be in the offing. The possible solutions proposed, which obviously will require more time for reflection, would move the procedural debate from the mandate question to the work programme, which in itself would be an improvement.

Obviously, many other procedural problems need to be resolved in addition to yearly re-establishment of subsidiary bodies and report-writing. I referred to some of these in a plenary speech on 30 August 1985, and I will not repeat them, but I feel certain that they will eventually appear in the programme of future work of the Group of Seven. We should not give undue weight to procedural matters; it behoves us to ensure that we have done everything in our power to remove procedural obstacles to the effective performance of this Conference. It would be a mistake to rely on the next special session on disarmament to solve these problems for us.

Before concluding, I should like to disclaim any attempt at a definitive overview of the work of the Conference and its predecessor during the past four years. It would be presumptuous to attempt such a task. None the less, I have attempted to indicate where there is evidence of some progress in our work and where there is not.

It may appear to some that there has been more achieved in bilateral negotiations between the super-Powers than in multilateral negotiations in the CD. For my part, I have expressed my views on frequent occasions on the importance of the symbiotic interrelationship between bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations, more particularly in an article in which I addressed that question in the Fortieth Anniversary issue of the United Nations periodical Disarmament. In brief, as indicated in that article I believe that it can be demonstrated that even the existing purely bilateral arms control agreements reflect considerable multilateral input, and, of course, vice versa. So let us not minimize the importance of our efforts, particularly in the case of concrete contributions such as working papers and the efforts to find common ground based on them. Even our rhetoric can be of some use in indicating the international climate.

What is new and, in my view, of great importance is the extent to which the major Powers are using this forum for high-level policy exchanges concerning their bilateral negotiations. This is a most welcome development. It suggests, of course, that it is incumbent upon the rest of us to take this forum at least as seriously.

I want now to conclude by addressing, to my mind, the heart of the problem that faces us in arms control, that is to say, the nature of the transaction we would be dealing with. In doing so I will draw upon a recent statement I made in a conference in Ottawa. It is the essence of an arms control and disarmament agreement that the contracting parties agree to renounce, limit or destroy armaments or military forces in return for treaty commitments by other parties to do the same. To ask States to renounce or scrap weapons in return for treaty obligations as an alternative measure of protecting their security is to demand of them a very serious and difficult

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

decision. In effect, a State accepts a treaty in lieu of weapons as a means of protecting its security. This is an extremely important undertaking, since a primary responsibility of any Government must be to protect the security of the country, however defined or perceived. Given the traditional -- and contemporary -- concern with national security, the importance of verification becomes evident: it is the means by which a party ensures confidence, throughout the life of an arms control agreement, that other parties are complying with their obligations while at the same time demonstrating its own good faith. In a world where there are relatively few internationally effective sanctions, verification must inevitably play a critical role in ensuring that a treaty is and remains effective and does not become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening or eliminating it.

There is a very special role that verification must play. Events of recent years have underscored the crucial importance in certain arms control agreements of compliance with their provisions, and, thus, of verification of compliance. It is axiomatic that in an imperfect world, just as there can be no arms control without confidence in compliance, there can be no confidence in compliance without adequate verification. It follows that verification can be seen as the very foundation upon which the whole edifice of arms control agreements rests.

We have seen how even clear-cut and specific verification mechanisms in some multilateral agreements such as the biological and toxin weapons Convention of 1972, which is not merely an arms control agreement but a genuine disarmament agreement, have proven inadequate to dispel suspicions of violations. We have seen in the Gulf War the consequences of the absence of any verification process in the 1925 Geneva Poison Gas Protocol, which is, admittedly, only a non-first-use treaty, but an important one -- of the kind advocated by many for the control of nuclear weapons. We have also seen how evidence derived from the verification mechanisms of some bilateral agreements (such as the ABM Treaty and the threshold test-ban Treaty) can prove ambiguous, and give rise to disputes and suspicion rather than confidence and good faith in dealing with situations suggesting controversial activities.

These few examples -- in multilateral and bilateral agreements -- demonstrate not only the importance of verification and compliance, but the political sensitivity of the whole process of detecting and handling events suggesting possible non-compliance. Indeed, recent concerns about verification and compliance seem in some cases to have eroded confidence among the parties to arms control agreements rather than reinforced it. None the less, it is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful negotiation and drafting of adequate and effective verification provisions and the establishment of the necessary implementing mechanisms is essential to preventing such a deterioration of confidence. This applies a fortiori to agreements involving nuclear weapons and nuclear tests.

In my Ottawa statement, I pointed out that "Clearly, no verification can be totally foolproof. A verification mechanism must be able to detect, beyond a reasonable doubt, any violation of an agreement that would permit a State to acquire, or clearly indicate an intention to acquire, a military capability threatening to the national security of any other party". I analysed in that statement, at some length, the standard of verification which might be

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

acceptable. Since I have circulated copies of my Ottawa statement to all delegations, I will not take the time of the Conference to read it into the record.

Mr. President, in concluding may I say what a pleasure it has been to work with you and your predecessors, with the Secretary-General, and with all my colleagues in other delegations, and with the secretariat, including both those now present and those who have left us. It has been my pleasant experience to enjoy cordial relations with each of you, irrespective of differences in our political positions and our perceptions of one another's positions. That, of course, is the only way we can work successfully to ensure that with the spirit of camaraderie which prevails in the Conference we can also develop a spirit of conciliation which opens the way to concrete substantive progress. Ultimately, even if we cannot always influence policies made in capitals, we can ensure that we remain sensitive to changes and shifts in position; that we are aware of new developments and particularly new openings; and that we are alert to opportunities to develop and expand common ground. So I must say in my own defence, and in a kind of right of reply to many of my friends, that, yes, I have indeed given many working luncheons at which I have made you all work as well as eat, but I make no apologies, in that at least I have benefited from these informal exchanges, and I hope that others have able to do so as well.

In a concluding comment, may I express on behalf of my wife, Ruth, as well as myself, appreciation for the kindness and hospitality which so many of you have given to us during our four years here.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. On behalf of all the members of the Conference and on my own behalf, I should like to express our regret at the departure of our esteemed colleague Ambassador Beesley. Ambassador Beesley has represented his country in the Conference with the talent and wisdom of which we are all aware. He served as President of the Conference during the month of August last year in a manner which earned the appreciation of all the members of the Conference, and particularly, I may add, that of the President for the current month.

He was also a member of the Group of Seven, to which he brought his extensive experience in multilateral diplomacy. As the Conference knows, he is also a member of the International Law Commission, to which he was elected by the General Assembly by a vote which reflects his status as a jurist. However, when speaking of Ambassador Beesley one cannot mention only his professional qualities; reference must also be made to his personal qualities, which not only earned him the friendship of his colleagues, but also helped us to find solutions to the various problems facing the Conference. I wish Ambassador and Mrs. Beesley, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, a happy future in his academic activities and in his personal life.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, His Excellency Ambassador Hacene.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. HACENE (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I would like to extend to you my sincere and warm congratulations as you take over the task of President of the Conference. The unamimous opinion of your contribution to the work of the Conference is a just reward and a deserved tribute to your devotion to duty and to your great qualities as a diplomat.

My congratulations are also extended to your precedessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, for the competent and effective way in which he carried out his duties. I would also like to take this opportunity to say how much we regret to see some distinguished representatives -- Ambassadors Alfarargi, Beesley, Cromartie, Dhanapala, Tonwe and Turbanski -- leave the Conference. Our wishes for success go with them as they take up their new posts.

Finally, I would like to extend a welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassadors de Azambuja of Brazil, Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Friedersdorf of the United States of America, and assure them of co-operation on the part of the Algerian delegation.

In its statement during the first part of the session, my delegation mentioned the new prospects which the international situation seems to afford in the field of disarmament. The promising dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States on the elimination of one category of their nuclear weapons provided justification for this optimism. It is encouraging to note that the two parties are discussing reductions in their nuclear arsenals and not, as in the past, mere limits on increases.

Faced with this new situation, the Algerian delegation expressed the hope that the current negotiations would help to initiate a genuine dynamic of disarmament and establish equal security for all. Despite some delays, the process of negotiation on medium-range and short-range missiles seems to be making progress. This is a promising sign which confirms the international community in its expectation of a new era in which the two major Powers embark in a resolute way on an effective and global process of disarmament.

From the efforts made to reduce armaments levels in Europe and create the necessary security measures, Algeria, as a Mediterranean country, expects, inter alia, confirmation of the natural links which exist between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean, and effective acknowledgement of the indivisible nature of security and peace between the two regions. This legitimate aspiration, which is shared by the Mediterranean members of the non-aligned movement, was underscored at the Conference held last June in Brioni in Yugoslavia.

In my previous statement I also expressed the Algerian delegation's hope that the willingness shown by the United States and the USSR in their current negotiations would be matched by new impetus in the activities of our Conference. Without wishing to be pessimistic, one is forced to note that this session is not fundamentally different from earlier sessions, because the efforts intended to lead the Conference to renew its vocation as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I are still fruitless.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Symptomatic of this situation is the lack of agreement on the establishment of appropriate subsidiary bodies for items 1, 2 and 3 on our agenda. In this respect, it is unfortunate that the prospects for agreement which emerged at the forty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the granting of an agreed mandate to the ad hoc committee on the basic question of a nuclear test ban did not take concrete shape.

It is equally unfortunate to note that the spirit of flexibility shown by the Group of 21 in order to make such possibilities for agreement a reality did not lead to the results expected. The same arguments designed to place the nuclear test ban in a long-term context were once again put forward.

My delegation has already had occasion to speak on this subject; therefore I will merely recall that the lack of negotiations under item 1 cannot have any valid justification, particularly in the light of the new political and technical developments which have been recorded on this issue. In this context, the input of the Group of Seismic Experts, which has embarked on a new stage of its work, deserves our commendation.

Yet again, the Conference was unable to agree on the establishment of an appropriate structural framework to deal with the question of nuclear disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race, other than through informal meetings. We can recognize the slight improvement during this session on this subject through the consideration of a list of topics. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that the establishment of a subsidiary body would be a more appropriate measure for the consideration of item 2 on the agenda, and would be the proper framework to allow the Conference to make its contribution to an undertaking where the future of the whole international community is at stake.

This requirement also means that specific measures must be negotiated urgently in order to prevent nuclear war and thus dispel the threats hanging over the very survival of mankind. In this light, the international consensus, underpinned by the joint Soviet-United States declaration that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, would in normal circumstances have been a starting-point for constructive work on item 3 of our agenda. Consequently, the lack of agreement on the Group of 21's proposal contained in document CD/515/Rev.3, together with the fact that no structured debate has been organized on this subject, cannot but give rise to frustration.

A chemical weapons ban is still the sole topic on which genuine negotiations are taking place. The Ad hoc Committee dealing with this task has made further progress under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus, to whom my delegation would like to pay special tribute. This progress is reflected in particular in the "rolling text" bearing the symbol CD/CW/WP.167. Nevertheless, some aspects of the future convention remain controversial, and the Ad hoc Committee even marked time during the second part of the session on questions which were thought to be on the point of being settled. Thus it is extremely important that all delegations should show their firm resolve to arrive at solutions on the main issues still pending, and that nothing should further complicate an already complex situation.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Problems related to verification and compliance continue to be the subject of intensive consideration and consultation within the Ad hoc Committee. From experience to date we should draw the lesson that a realistic reply to these undoubtedly important questions lies in the search for a balance between two requirements. On the one hand, the convention must contain provisions which will ensure that all States parties will comply with the commitments they undertake. On the other hand, these provisions should not lead to the creation of situations of needless tension or hamper the development of the civilian chemical industry, particularly in the developing countries. This is why it seems to us especially important to provide for effective procedures and the democratic functioning of the organs of the future convention.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to recall the great importance which it attaches to the development of international co-operation in chemicals under the future convention. We would express the hope that the forthcoming consultations on articles 10 and 11 of the draft convention will make it possible to pave the way for fruitful work on this matter.

In the final analysis, despite the problems which have been encountered, we must highlight the efforts made within the Ad hoc Committee to find common ground on many thorny issues. This good will certainly deserves mention, and should be shown on the other items on our agenda.

I would now like to make a few comments on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and to say how much we appreciate the valuable contribution of Ambassador Pugliese as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. In the view of the Algerian delegation, consideration of the items discussed during the session allows us to draw the conclusion that the Ad hoc Committee will in the future have to undertake more substantive work in keeping with the urgency of item 5 on our agenda. It is true that the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee under this item for the third year running is a worthy achievement, but it must be admitted that the work done to date does not reflect in practice the recognized importance of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Consideration of the applicable legal régime has revealed loopholes and flaws which will have to be rectified if we really want to prevent outer space from becoming a "potential battlefield". To meet such a challenge, political good will on the part of all will be necessary, and it would be pointless in our view to place the role of our Conference in opposition to the framework of negotiations between the two main military and space Powers in order to justify the lack of appropriate negotiations on item 5 of our agenda. Specific proposals have been made under this item, and it is desirable for our Conference to give them all due attention.

To conclude, I would like to express our concern at the debate within the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. It is regrettable that the Committee has not been able to carry out the task conferred upon it under United Nations General Assembly decision 41/421. The work in this body in fact has taken a backward step as compared with previous sessions, as can be seen from the proliferation of brackets in the new text of the CPD. Worse still, parts of the programme which were in fact taken in extenso from the Final Document of SSOD-I have been the subject of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

reservations. Faced with this state of affairs it must be recalled that, while mutual concessions can be justified if we are to arrive at an agreed draft CPD, this should not lead us into a process which would distort the foundations and the very nature of such a programme. We venture to express the hope that the good will and the shared aspirations which were manifest when the Final Document of SSOD-I was adopted will in the future be more evident during our work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to speak?

As I announced at the beginning of the plenary meeting, I propose that we should now take a decision on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/779. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to inform you that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will meet this afternoon at 3 p.m. in Conference Room III.

I should like to make a small correction to the timetable of meetings for this week. The meeting to be held tomorrow, Wednesday, at 4.30 p.m. in this room will be an informal meeting of the Conference, and not consultations, as mentioned in the unofficial document distributed last Thursday. At that meeting, as the timetable indicates, we shall give a second reading to the technical parts of the draft reports to the General Assembly and the substantive paragraphs of the draft report for 1987 to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Finally, I should like to remind you that the informal consultations on the substantive paragraphs, which are open to all delegations, will continue today immediately after the plenary meeting, in Conference Room I. Consultations will also be held this afternoon starting at 3 p.m.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 27 August at 10 a.m.

I give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): I asked for the floor to remind delegations that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is meeting today at 3 p.m. in room III.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his reminder, and I wish not only to confirm it, but to express the wish that the now very strict timetable for the completion of our work for August will be respected.

I give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. LUDEKING (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, before you conclude the meeting, I would like to avail myself of the opportunity -- I do not know whether it is premature -- to thank Ambassador Beesley on behalf of all Western delegations for his dedication and the important contribution he personally made to the work of this Conference. I think we are all particularly grateful for the excellent personal as well as working relations we enjoyed with him, and I think he did a lot to instil the spirit of camaraderie he referred to in his statement, and whose importance for our work here cannot be underestimated. The Conference on Disarmament has always appreciated and benefited from his wise and thoughtful advice, which every so often helped to overcome obstacles and achieve progress here in our work. Thus it is with deep regret that we see you, Mr. Ambassador, leave this forum, and we all wish you all the best for your future new assignment.

Let me conclude on perhaps a more personal note. I am rather new to this Conference but, nevertheless, I have for a long time been familiar with the name of Ambassador Beesley and his contributions to other areas in the multilateral field -- for example, the Law of the Sea Conference -- and thus I am personally very sorry to see you, Mr. Ambassador, leave, which precludes me from benefiting from your experience, and I regret that there will not be any future co-operation, in this forum at least.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any other requests? I see none. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.434
27 August 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 August 1987, at 10.00 a.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

GE.87-63400/0777G

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 434th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue today its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies and its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30, any representative wishing to raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

As I announced at the 433rd plenary meeting of the Conference, today I shall submit to the Conference for adoption, once we have exhausted the list of speakers, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which is contained in document CD/784.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Bulgaria, Italy, Sweden and Mexico. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Bojilov.

Mr. BOJILOV (Bulgaria) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, my delegation as the co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist States would like to make the following statement on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The delegations of the group of socialist countries which are members of the Conference on Disarmament, guided by the peace-loving foreign policy line of their Governments, consider it their duty to achieve a solution to the cardinal task facing the world today, the prevention of war, the elimination of war for ever from the life of mankind, the cessation of the arms race and a move to concrete measures of disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament, the creation of a comprehensive system of international security. This policy line was reflected in particular in the communiqué issued following the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty which was held on 28 and 29 May 1987 in Berlin.

This position also explains our understanding of the essence of the new approach to security in the nuclear and space age. One cannot strive for greater security for oneself at others' expense, nor can one agree to a lesser degree of security. Security does not lie in the search for the elusive phantom of victory in a nuclear war, but in the ability to use political means to seek solutions to the problems of international relations today.

Reliable security for all States and peoples, and peaceful conditions for their development, can be guaranteed only through disarmament, which in turn is unthinkable without enhanced activity throughout the existing negotiating machinery in this area. Unfortunately, today the wheels of the negotiating machinery are turning significantly more slowly than those of the arms race. A dangerous gulf is developing between political thinking and military technology. Reference was made to this in the statements we heard from the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze, and the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Chnoupek, and in statements made in the Conference by the representatives of other socialist countries.

Undoubtedly, a special place in such a process should belong to the sole multilateral body, the Conference on Disarmament. The broad representative nature of the Conference, the participation in it of States from all continents which belong to a variety of socio-economic systems, as well as members of military/political alliances and non-aligned and neutral countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, point to the important role which the Conference should play in negotiations on the cessation of the arms race and disarmament.

The most urgent current problem is undoubtedly the limitation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Recent international events, in particular the emergence of a real possibility that two classes of nuclear armaments will be completely removed from the arsenals of the USSR and the United States have created favourable opportunities for the beginning of a move in this direction, including here in the Conference on Disarmament.

The socialist countries consider that agreement on the "global double zero" formula should be reached at the Soviet-United States negotiations as quickly as possible. The United States should stop putting artificial obstacles in the way of such an agreement, and first and foremost they should abandon their attempts to grant themselves a unilateral exception to the principle of "global double zero" by retaining the warheads which belong to them on the Pershing 1A missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The achievement of agreement between the USSR and the United States on the complete elimination of two classes of nuclear arms is the necessary prologue to the solution of the main issue -- the liquidation of strategic offensive weapons and prevention of the transfer of the arms race to outer space.

As far as the Conference on Disarmament is concerned, because of the position of the United States and certain other delegations in the Group of Western States, the Conference once again remained an onlooker in 1987 vis-a-vis efforts to solve the extremely pressing problem of nuclear disarmament. The delegations of the socialist States do not share the view that negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted only on a bilateral basis. A high level of achievement in negotiations on all aspects of arms limitation and disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, is impossible today without the establishment of an optimum balance between bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Here there must be no conflict. Here the principle of complementarity and mutual benefit must operate.

It is inadmissible that the Conference on Disarmament should become accustomed to a situation where issues related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race are essentially not discussed, although they have been on the agenda for many years. It is obvious that not a single State can stand aside from this task, for the threat of nuclear war is global in its nature, ignoring both national boundaries and ideological differences.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

The delegations of the Group of Socialist States have spoken again during the 1987 session in favour of the rapid commencement of multilateral negotiations within the Conference on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and in favour of the creation to this end of an ad hoc subsidiary body with an appropriate negotiating mandate. Within the context of the Conference it would be possible to devise a comprehensive stage-by-stage programme, with agreed time frames for each individual stage, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Another subject for consideration and agreement in the Conference could be the principles on the basis of which the process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out. An important topic for discussion could be the problems of verifying multilateral measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, and the order of destruction of nuclear weapons. The time is also ripe for solution of the question of cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

On the whole we have a positive attitude to the holding of informal plenary meetings for the consideration of item 2 of our agenda, "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". These meetings, although we realize that they are just an initial step, have not only highlighted the great level of interest and readiness on the part of the overwhelming majority of delegations to take part in concrete negotiations, but have also brought to the fore a host of useful ideas and proposals intended to bring about such negotiations. Our delegations consider that the time has come to take the next step and embark on substantive negotiations at the regular session of the Conference. Therefore, we hold the view that in the spring session of 1988 the Conference should create an ad hoc committee on this item of the agenda.

A major step directed towards halting the nuclear arms race and bringing about nuclear disarmament, and at the same time a fairly easy step to take, would be a nuclear weapon test ban.

The Berlin session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty set forth the task of achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing as a high-priority measure designed to put an end to the development, manufacture and refinement of nuclear arms and to bring about their reduction and elimination, and proposed that extensive negotiations should be started without further delay to work out pertinent accords. The same aim was set out in the document adopted at the session on the military doctrine of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The settlement of this major issue depends to a great extent on the Conference on Disarmament.

Working papers CD/743 and CD/746 submitted by the socialist countries contained specific proposals on how to settle the question of a mandate for an ad hoc committee and how to organize its work.

In order to expedite an immediate start to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, the socialist countries tabled a joint document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". We view this draft as a possible basis for

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

multilateral negotiations to draw up an international agreement on this subject. At the same time, the socialist countries are prepared to consider constructively any other proposals or ideas intended to bring about the rapid conclusion of such a treaty.

Our delegations attach exceptional importance to the inclusion in a future treaty of provision for reliable measures to verify compliance with the nuclear test-ban agreement. That is why far-reaching forms and methods of verification are proposed in the document, both national and international, including measures which have never been proposed before and have never been considered. I would remind you that in the socialist countries' proposal there is provision for the use of national technical means of verification, and the creation of an international seismic monitoring system, whose operation would involve participation by representatives of an international inspectorate, verification of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions on testing ranges -- also with participation by international inspectors -- and mandatory on-site inspections without the right to refuse such inspections.

In our view, all the necessary conditions exist for a start on the elaboration of a system to verify the non-conduct of nuclear explosions. The most suitable and effective body for such work would be an ad hoc group of experts which would have a mandate to prepare scientifically well-founded recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for any possible agreement on the non-conduct of nuclear explosions. In mooting this proposal we in no way belittle the role which the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts should play. As in the past, we favour the continuation of its activities with a view to completion of the development of a system for rapid transmission of level II seismic data which would form the basis of international seismic monitoring of the nuclear weapon test ban.

The delegations of the Group of Socialist States are convinced that it is time to remove the artificial barriers which have been erected by the delegation of the United States and which prevent effective work by the Conference in preparing a draft treaty on a nuclear weapon test ban. We consider it appropriate once again to reconfirm our conviction of the need for the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the Conference's agenda, and we support the draft mandate which was tabled by the Group of Non-aligned and Neutral States.

The delegations of the Group of Socialist States hold the view that at present item 5 on the agenda of the Conference, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", is acquiring ever greater urgency. Our aim is to achieve a strict and universal ban on the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space.

To the credit of the socialist States are such major proposals as the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, the draft treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space or from space against the Earth, and the "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777). Our delegations have repeatedly reaffirmed their readiness to seek agreement on partial measures as well.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

The delegations of the Group of Socialist States, as convinced supporters of effective international monitoring of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements, consider that monitoring plays an especially important role in preventing an arms race in outer space. This is the intention behind the Soviet Union's proposal that consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing a system of international monitoring of the ban on stationing weapons of any kind in outer space, which would provide for the establishment of an international inspectorate.

The Conference has also built up a valuable stock of ideas and proposals tabled by other delegations, which might serve as a good basis for specific negotiations designed to prevent the transfer of the arms race into outer space. All these initiatives and proposals offer convincing evidence of the need to move the work of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 of the agenda onto a practical track. Without exaggeration it may be said that at its 1986 session the Ad hoc Committee had already defined the problems related to preventing the transfer of the arms race to outer space, considered and identified the prohibitions and limitations deriving from existing international agreements, and also highlighted the loopholes in the legal régime governing outer space. We consider, and we are not alone in this conviction, that the future activity of the Ad hoc Committee must be directed towards the substantive and thorough study of existing proposals and initiatives to prevent an arms race in outer space. The work of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space should be directed towards the future, not the past.

The delegations of the Group of Socialist States favour the rapid liquidation of chemical weapons. By their actions they have repeatedly confirmed their readiness to complete as soon as possible the preparation of an international convention on the prohibition of such weapons and the destruction of existing stocks and the industrial base for their production. Here I should like to recall the "Statement by the Warsaw Treaty Member States on the prohibition of chemical weapons" which was published on 27 March 1987. The USSR's new proposals, and in particular its initiative on the need to give legal force to the principle of mandatory challenge inspection without the right to refuse such inspections, provide yet further confirmation of the political will of the socialist States to accelerate negotiations on a chemical weapons ban.

Our delegations hold the view that the rapid completion of work on the convention to ban chemical weapons requires the most intensive possible use of the opportunities we have before us. The holding of an additional session of the Conference this year in order to complete the bulk of work on drawing up such an international instrument might be a step in this direction.

The delegations on whose behalf I am speaking consider that the decisions adopted in favour of rearmament with binary chemical weapons are at odds with the aim of strengthening confidence just as we are coming up to the conclusion of a convention. For years to come they map out not only the maintenance but the strengthening of a chemical threat to all mankind.

We are convinced that negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities can fairly quickly lead to practical results if, of course, a constructive approach is shown by all parties to the

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Bojilov, Bulgaria)

negotiations. We continue to consider that the Conference's inability for many years to complete the preparation of a convention to ban radiological weapons, a task set down in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is significantly detracting from the authority of this international organ.

During the current session as well the socialist States have done everything in their power to ensure the early completion of the drafting of the comprehensive programme for disarmament, in particular as we approach the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. This year the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament did not manage to make any progress in its work. Indeed, a whole forest of new brackets has sprung up. This forest, whose roots are to be found in the position of the United States, is stifling the text of the programme and is threatening its very future. In this connection the socialist countries consider it necessary to express their profound concern.

Improvement of the machinery for the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament is an urgent matter. The socialist countries consider it necessary to create the conditions for significantly accelerating the work of the Conference and making it more business-like and target-oriented. They share the view that in the future the Conference might become a permanent universal body for negotiations on disarmament.

In summing up the results of the 1987 session, it must be pointed out that the achievements of the Conference on Disarmament still fall far short of the hopes which the international community places in this sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Today as never before the significance and role of the Conference are defined in terms of the most urgent problems of the present day, and only if it carries out the mission entrusted to it, only if it proves itself by carrying out practical actions, will the Conference be able to measure up to the scale and importance of the tasks facing it.

(continued in French)

Mr. President, as co-ordinator for the Group of socialist States it is my privilege and pleasure to have travelled along the road together with you during the month of August, a month which is considered to place the heaviest burden on the President of the Conference. Since my delegation has taken the floor today for the first time in plenary this month, I would like to take this opportunity not only to tell you of our satisfaction at working under your presidency, but also to say how much we admire the rational and elegant manner in which you have guided our work, a manner worthy of France's wealth of diplomatic traditions. I am sure that success will crown your efforts.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I give the floor to the representative of Italy, His Excellency Ambassador Pugliese, who, in his capacity as Chairman, will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, contained in document CD/786.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy): Mr. President, before presenting to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, of which I had the honour to be Chairman during the present session, allow me please to express my sincere congratulations on your presidency in this decisive month of August, and our trust in your diplomatic skill in carrying out the work at this delicate moment, and to recall the historical ties between our two countries.

I also wish to thank, for his excellent work, your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, who presided over the Conference in July, and to extend a warm welcome to the newcomers, Ambassadors de Azambuja of Brazil and Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. Our best wishes go at the same time to the colleagues who are departing, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland and Ambassador Beesley of Canada.

I have the pleasure today to submit to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. After its re-establishment, at the end of February, the Ad hoc Committee began its work on 13 March and held its last meeting on Monday, 24 August. In accordance with the agreement reached, the Committee pursued its activities this year on the basis of a programme of work comprising the following three items relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space:

(a) Examination and identification of issues;

(b) Existing agreements;

(c) Existing proposals and future initiatives.

The substantive part of the report reviews the points of view that were expressed about these three items. The purpose of the final part, entitled "Conclusion", is to indicate a consensus in the Committee on essential points, emphasizing once more the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the consequent need to make every effort to ensure the resumption, on an adequate basis, of the substantive consideration of this agenda item at the next session of the Conference.

The work of the Committee, and the intense consultations held by the Chair to find a basis of agreement, have certainly not been easy. The efforts of the Committee reflected once more the importance of the agenda item on outer space. At the same time, our vigorous and often intense discussions revealed the difficulties involved in treating an issue that is directly and deeply connected with bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR, as well as a subjec heavily affected by signigicant and rapid technological developments.

I believe that the Committee's endeavours have helped to advance its task and to lay the foundation for its work at future sessions. I think it is a fact that the Ad hoc Committee has achieved some useful work in this session and has, in particular, given a wider opportunity for a deeper examination of various important issues.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

In concluding, I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation to all the delegations for their valuable contributions to the Committee's work and, in spite of all the differences and dialectical exchanges, for the spirit of flexibility and co-operation which at the end emerged. Without this basic good will, we would not have been able to achieve the results obtained. I have to mention the co-operation and endeavours of the group co-ordinators, but our gratitude and appreciation are also due to Miss Aida Levin, the Committee's Secretary, and to the other members of the secretariat whose devoted co-operation and efficiency were instrumental in facilitating the Committee's work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for introducing its report, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I will present the Ad hoc Committee's report to the Conference for adoption at the plenary meeting to be held tomorrow.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, His Excellency Ambassador Ekéus, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee, which has appeared under symbol CD/782 and has been distributed.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, as you have just pointed out, I asked for the floor to present the report of the Committee to the Conference on Disarmament, as contained in document CD/782. The report was adopted in its entirety by the Committee on 26 August, and has thus been agreed to by all the members of the Ad hoc Committee.

Almost exactly three years ago I had the pleasure as the then Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to introduce in this forum the first so-called "rolling text" for a convention banning chemical weapons. The report I am introducing today clearly shows how far we have come since then. All should be able to recognize that considerable progress has taken place during the three years of work since 1984. While the first "rolling text" was little more than a broad outline for a future convention, the report I am submitting today contains a largely developed draft convention with most of the elements in place. The document we now have before us clearly shows that the convention is no longer a distant goal but a real possibility.

The report consists of several parts, following the pattern established since 1984. The first part is the technical part. The second part, appendix I, constitutes the so-called "rolling text", the result of our negotiations so far. The third part, appendix II, contains papers reflecting the results of work which, though not yet ready for inclusion in the "rolling text", are made available as a basis for future work. This year we also have an addendum to the report.

I would like to draw the attention of the delegates to the fact that the "rolling text" of the draft convention has been somewhat restructured in comparison with earlier years. The articles of the draft convention have been placed at the beginning of the document, followed by the various annexes. I hope this will help all concerned to get a good overview of the material.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

In introducing the report of the Committee, I would like to briefly take stock of where we stand on the major substantive elements of the draft convention.

As regards article I, on Scope, only one aspect was addressed during this session, namely the question of "jurisdiction or control", i.e. the legal scope of the convention. From the discussions it appears that the problems are both of a political and a legal nature, and I find it important that delegations now bring this issue back to their capitals for thorough legal and political analysis.

Article II covers definitions. There has been an understanding in the Committee that this article would best be reviewed after agreements have been registered in other parts of the convention, not the least in the context of article VI. I believe that we now have a broad understanding on most of the relevant substantive provisions of the draft convention, and that the time has come to elaborate the definitions of the convention. Therefore I strongly urge all delegations to thoroughly study this article, so that during the inter-sessional work later this year we can bring it up to date and into line with the developments which have taken place since it was first put together.

Article III on declarations, and its annex, are by and large in place. An outstanding issue has been the question of declarations of past transfers. A step forward was taken this summer when we were able to achieve agreement that past transfers of chemical weapons should be declared. It however remains to decide how many years back in time such declarations should cover.

Article IV and its annex deal with measures to be taken as regards existing chemical weapons. In this area much progress was achieved this year. During the spring we were finally able to solve the long-standing difficulties connected with the issue of destruction versus diversion of existing chemical weapons. The draft convention we now have before us clearly stipulates that all chemical weapons must be destroyed. Furthermore, this year generated a very important development when it comes to early declarations of the exact location of chemical weapons. We now find ourselves in a situation where only one negotiating party still has some reservations on openly declaring and accepting verification at all stockpile locations as soon as 30 days after the entry into force of the convention.

With these important steps taken, it was then possible to elaborate very detailed provisions concerning the verification arrangements that will be required to monitor the stockpiles from when they are declared, 30 days after entry into force, up until and including their transport to the destruction facilities. During the summer part of the session some work has also gone into the further elaboration of verification arrangements during the destruction process itself. The work on these latter provisions has not been entirely concluded, but I have good hopes that this can be done during the inter-sessional period.

A major issue under article IV which remains is the question of the actual order of destruction of chemical weapons. This issue, which boils down to fundamental security concerns, was subject to extensive consultations,

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

in particular during the summer part of the session. Some useful steps were taken, but many more are needed before we can register consensus on this politically, militarily and technically complicated issue. I therefore strongly urge all delegations to carefully study the material available in the report and consider ways and means to accommodate each other's interests when we next address the issue.

Article V and its annexes deal with chemical weapon production facilities. During the spring extensive and detailed provisions were elaborated for the verification of declarations and the closure and elimination of chemical weapon production facilities. Other aspects of the article and its annex are still pending, but I have good reason to believe that before too long the Committee will be in a position to constructively address the remaining issues under this article.

This brings us to article VI and its annexes, which cover issues pertaining to future non-production of chemical weapons. Much time and effort have gone into this area, both during spring and summer. The difficulties involved have been great, politically as well as technically. I therefore find it particularly gratifying that political hurdles have been overcome and that substantive progress has been registered with the inclusion of the new annex VI [4]. The compromises made augur well for the negotiations, in that they show that given enough time and effort it is possible to strike a balance between security concerns and other important national and international interests. Notwithstanding the progress made, article VI and its annexes require more work. During the spring important advances were made and registered as regard the modalities for revising the lists of chemicals, as regards the guidelines for including chemicals in schedule [1] and as regards factors that might influence the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections. This work needs to be further developed and completed.

Furthermore, the régime for chemicals in schedule [1] still contains some outstanding issues which need to be dealt with. May I also remind delegations that the various lists of chemicals have not yet been fully finalized.

Article VI and its annexes and the various remaining issues in the field of non-production from an area where work ought to be continued during the inter-sessional period. I therefore ask delegations to carefully prepare themselves and search for ways and means to constructively bridge the remaining gaps.

In the context of non-production questions I would also like to mention another activity which took place this summer, not within the framework of the Committee itself but parallel to it and so arranged timewise that it coincided with the Committee's work in the area of non-production. I have in mind the meeting with experts from the chemical industry here in Geneva on 6 and 7 July. During these two days a great number of experts were given information about the draft convention we are negotiating, and a series of interesting and valuable discussions took place on various issues of relevance for the implementation of the convention. It is my impression that this

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

meeting generated a broader understanding in the world of the chemical industry for the tasks we are trying to accomplish, and also that some concrete ideas emerged which I hope will prove useful to the negotiations when approaching the remaining technical issues under article VI and its annexes.

Article VII on national implementation measures was not the subject of further negotiations during this year. A few questions remain to be settled, but I do not foresee any great difficulties in this regard.

Article VIII deals with the organized framework for the implementation of the convention. Very useful work was done, inter alia, on the question of guidelines for the international inspectorate. Pending further consideration in some capitals, the text of these guidelines has been included as an addendum to the report. I believe that before too long we will be able to incorporate it in the integrated body of negotiated material.

During the greater part of the session delegations felt that further work on article VIII should await developments in other parts of the convention. I was therefore encouraged when, towards the end of the session, delegations agreed that the time was ripe to take up article VIII and to sort out in detail the powers, functions and interrelationship of the various organs of the international authority to be created. Useful preparatory work in this field was done. There now appears to be a general wish to review this article during the inter-sessional period.

Although this is not an organizational question per se, I also want to draw attention to the fact that work has now commenced on the elaboration of so-called "models for agreements" which States parties are to conclude with the international authority as regards specific facilities. One outline for such an agreement is already included in the report, and a proposal for a second was presented to the Committee for consideration after the completion of the report.

Under article IX work focused on the major outstanding question, namely the politically complicated issue of challenge inspection. All through the year I conducted extensive consultations in order to find approaches to the problems involved that would be acceptable to all delegations. Following a gradual and painstaking process, we find ourselves at the end of the session having made real substantive progress on this crucial issue. I am confident that before long we will be able to transform this progress into treaty language under article IX. For the time being the state of affairs as I see it has been included in appendix II in a report by myself.

The remaining articles X to XVI have not been the subject of negotiations during the session. However, I would like to draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that many delegations now feel that the time has come to address these articles too, and I do hope that the inter-sessional period of work will provide an opportunity to do so, both with regard to article X, Assistance, and article XI, Economic and Technological Development, as well as with regard to the concluding articles.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

I wish to mention one more issue, namely that of the preparatory commission, which will operate during the period between the signing and the entry into force of the convention. I take it as a good sign that our negotiations have now reached a stage where delegations want to address concrete and practical issues connected with preparing the way for effective implementation of the convention from the very first day of its entry into force. The text on the preparatory commission which was worked out during the spring is therefore a very valuable contribution, and I am very pleased to have it included in the report.

The Committee further recommends to the Conference on Disarmament, in paragraph 13 (c) of the report, that work on the convention be resumed as follows:

Firstly, in preparation for the resumed session, private consultations should be undertaken in Geneva by the Chairman during the period 23-27 November 1987 with delegations present;

Secondly, for that purpose, open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee should be held between 30 November and 16 December 1987, including, when necessary, meetings with full services;

Thirdly, the Ad hoc Committee should hold a session of limited duration during the period 12-29 January 1988.

I would like to thank all delegates who have participated so effectively in the work of the Ad hoc Committee. My presentation, I think, is testimony to the good progress we have made and I think, therefore, we have reason to be optimistic with regard to our future work. I would also like to thank the three item co-ordinators, Mr. Philippe Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico and Dr. Walter Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, for their tireless efforts, and the excellent work they have done during both parts of the 1987 session. I also want to point out that we would not have been able to arrive at a report like the one we have just adopted were it not for the excellent performance of the secretariat, Mr. Bensmail, Mr. Cassandra, Miss Darby and the interpreters. I would like to direct my special thanks to them.

The submission of the report on the full session's work on chemical weapons gives me a good opportunity to bid farewell to Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, who has, over the years, participated so actively and so successfully in our joint efforts to achieve progress towards a convention banning chemical weapons, both in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in 1985 and as a Co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist States. I have personally profited from his advice and constructive approach during the years. We wish him all success in his next assignment in Warsaw. Furthermore, I would like to express to Ambassador Beesley of Canada my wish for success in his new task in Vancouver. His four years with this Conference have been marked by his customary intelligent, constructive and, not least, independent approach to difficult problems. Many of us will also miss the working lunches over which Ambassador Beesley presided in a masterly way, thus often bringing about progress where none was expected.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Finally, as the 1987 session of the Conference is coming to its close, I would like to express to you our gratitude for you leadership during the month of August. Your presidency has been characterized by a high professional standard. The effective, rational and devoted way in which you have approached your task has, to no small degree, helped us all to conclude our work this year with success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing its report, which will be presented to the Conference for adoption at our plenary meeting tomorrow, and I thank him for his kind words.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles, who, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee, which has been distributed as document CD/783.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. This is the last week of the session of the Conference on Disarmament corresponding to the current year of 1987. My delegation very sincerely regrets that this is also the last week when the Conference will be able to count on the valuable co-operation of two of its members who will be leaving Geneva very shortly, the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski, who presented his letters of accreditation on 31 May 1983, and the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley, who officially joined this negotiating body on 23 September of the same year.

The first of these two representatives will undoubtedly be remembered, among other things, for his skill in guiding the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on the elimination of chemical weapons when he chaired it in 1985. The representative I mentioned second -- for the simple reason that he joined this negotiating body four months later -- will undoubtedly be remembered for his role in the Ad hoc Committee on the cessation of the arms race in outer space, and especially for the organization of the seminar so successfully held in Montreal in May this year. We wish our two esteemed colleagues the same success in their future duties that they have had in their duties at the Conference on Disarmament in their brief span with us; a period we should like to have seen extended until the felicitous completion of the work of the two ad hoc committees in which they participated.

Mine will be the honour of presenting to the Conference on Disarmament the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on its work during the year 1987. This report, document CD/783, contains two pages summing up the organization of the work of the Committee and the substantive work it accomplished, listing the four working papers received during the period covered by the report and reproducing a conclusion to which I shall be referring subsequently. The report includes a 29-page annex setting out the provisions that the programme might contain.

The conclusion stresses that "areas of disagreement remain with respect to various aspects of the programme", and emphasizes that "the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Disarmament has recommended the inclusion in the agenda of the third special session of an item entitled 'Consideration and adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament'", for which reason the Ad hoc Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference on Disarmament that the Committee should be re-established at the outset of the 1988 session, "with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament."

In order for this recommendation to achieve the desired objective, I deem it my duty to state unequivocally that it will be essential for some of the members of the Committee -- and in several cases this applies to only one or two of them -- to modify the approach they have followed during the year of the Conference's work which is now drawing to a close. That approach resulted, inter alia, in a situation where the 35 pairs of brackets contained in the report which was submitted by the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the Conference, and which the Conference transmitted to the General Assembly at its forty-first session -- document CD/728 of 26 August 1986, which was the basis for our work -- far from being reduced, almost tripled in number, as the draft I am putting before you now contains 97 pairs of brackets.

Examples of the approach I am referring to are legion. I shall cite only two of them, which require no comment. Firstly, in the second paragraph of the introduction to the report of the Ad hoc Committee, one delegation insisted on truncating the reference to paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is true that in abstracto that delegation could allege, by way of excuse in this respect, that in 1978, when that special session was held, there was another administration in that country. But it is impossible to understand such a position, much less to justify it, when we bear in mind that the self same General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982, when the new administration of the country in question had already been in office for two years, adopted by consensus a "Concluding Document" whose paragraph 63 is couched in the following terms:

> "Member States have affirmed their determination to continue to work for the urgent conclusion of negotiations on and the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which shall encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world where international peace and security prevail, and in which a new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated."

Moreover, in paragraph 62 of the same Concluding Document of 1982, adopted as I have already said by consensus, the General Assembly declared:

> "The General Assembly was encouraged by the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed in its Programme of Action."

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Moreover, less than two years ago, on 16 December 1985, the General Assembly adopted, also by consensus, resolution 40/152 D entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", whose first preambular paragraph reads as follows:

> "Recalling that in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly [the first special session devoted to disarmament], the Assembly called for the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

As regards the second example to which, as I said, I should like to refer, this relates to the procedure followed in the Ad hoc Working Group -- the name given, as we all know, until 8 March 1984 to the subsidiary body now known as the "Ad hoc Committee" -- a procedure which, as I have already had occasion to set forth on 23 August 1983 in the statement I made before the body now called the Conference on Disarmament, which was then known as the "Committee on Disarmament" -- was as follows:

> "In all cases where it was not possible to arrive at formulas acceptable to all on the basis of the draft programme returned by the second special session of the Assembly, together with the additional material arising from that session and new proposals submitted during the discussions of the Working Groups, in order to reach agreement it was necessary to resort to the inclusion of the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of 1978 without any change whatsoever."

It is for this reason that the first three paragraphs of section A of chapter V of the Comprehensive Programme reproduced word for word as paragraphs 47, 48 and 49 of the Final Document of 1978, which the same delegation I referred to in the example cited above now wishes to place in brackets, despite the fact that they were adopted by consensus not only in that Final Document but also in the context of the programme in 1983, 1985 and 1986. I will not refer to 1984 because, as you will recall, in that year we did not work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I think that the two examples I have just cited, to which many more could be added without difficulty, suffice to illustrate why I have ventured to assert that, if we wish this Ad hoc Committee to succeed in "resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme", as recommended in its report, it is essential for some of the members of the Committee to modify the approach they followed in 1987.

The Ad hoc Committee, the presentation of whose report for this year I am about to conclude, may take pride in being one of the hardest-working subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament. From the time it began its work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament in the second half of

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

1980 to date, it has held no less than 146 meetings on this issue. The number of meetings held in the course of the current year exceeded by six the number of meetings held in 1986, since last year we had 21 meetings and in the present year 27.

As in previous years, it is for me a very pleasant duty to conclude this statement by expressing our gratitude to all the members of the secretariat, visibile and invisible, for their valuable co-operation, and among them most expecially Miss Aída Levin, the Secretary of the Committee since it began work as a working group seven years ago, who has played this important role with a competence and objectivity which are exemplary in every way.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for introducing its report. The Ad hoc Committee's report will also be presented to the Conference for adoption at the plenary meeting to be held tomorrow, Friday, 28 August.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to speak? I give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, I would wish to comment briefly, in my capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist States for chemical weapons, in connection with the report of the Committee just presented by Ambassador Ekéus, its Chairman. We would like, of course, to express our satisfaction at the adoption of the report by the Committee, and we note with pleasure the important progress made during the year, the progress so ably and so clearly presented by Ambassador Ekéus in his introduction. I feel, by the way, that his summary will be very helpful to the delegations in preparation for further work. However, I would wish to say that we cannot be fully satisfied with the contents of the report, either with regard to the substance of the "rolling text" -- that is appendix I -- or the recommendations, in particular the one concerning the inter-sessional work of the Ad hoc Committee.

In our opinion, more valuable material worked out during the session could and should have been included in the "rolling text", but since we work on the basis of consensus that proved not to be possible. We regret this development, and hope that the inter-sessional period will enable us to enrich the "rolling text" before the start of the 1988 session.

The solution which we have reached with respect to the inter-sessional work is not what we had been expecting, and not what we feel is needed at this stage of the negotiations.

The socialist countries were and still are ready for maximum and effective use of the time between the closure of this year's session and the beginning of the 1988 session. The most far-reaching proposal to that effect -- to "hold an additional session of the Conference this year to complete the bulk of the drafting of the convention banning chemical weapons" -- was put forward by E. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and it has been fully supported by the socialist countries.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We believe that at this advanced stage of negotiations on Chemical Weapons we should do our best to maintain the momentum by means of full and intensive use of the time available. I can assure you that the delegations of our group will be present in Geneva on 23 November 1987 and ready to start further work on the convention under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus.

In concluding I would like once again to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, for his strenuous efforts and able chairmanship during the whole session, and for his efforts at the stage of discussion and adoption of the report which brought us finally to the adoption of the report.

Our thanks go likewise to the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Krutzsch, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Nieuwenhuys, for the their patient, hard work and the skilful manner in which they have performed their duties. Let me also thank the secretariat and the interpreters for their valuable assistance and contribution to the work of the Committee. And with your kind permission and through you, Mr. President, let me thank whole-heartedly the distinguished Ambassador García Robles, the distinguished Ambassador Rolf Ekéus who spoke today, and you, Mr. President, and other colleagues for the very kind, generous words and good wishes addressed to me on the occasion of my leaving the Conference. On my part I wish them and all of you all success in your future endeavours.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador from Poland for his statement. I am tempted to add, on behalf of the Conference, dziekuje bardzo. I give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Miss LETTS (Australia): Mr. President, I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Western group of countries and Norway regarding the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD), which was tabled today as document CD/783.

During its 1987 session the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, continued its work on the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in accordance with its mandate to present the programme to the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. With that in mind, all delegations worked particularly hard to resolve existing differences and to complete the programme with the aim of submitting a clean text to the forty-first session of the General Assembly.

At the beginning of this year's work it appeared that the problems which remained to be resolved were not too numerous, although these parts did cover some high-priority items which arguably represented some of the most difficult issues on our disarmament agenda. During the course of our deliberations it also became clear that there were other parts of the text which, while containing no brackets, needed to be reassessed in the light of evolving circumstances and which, as a consequence, required some readjustment in order to bring the programme more in line with current day realities.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Miss Letts, Australia)

Such adjustments should be seen in the light of seeking to produce a document which can truly be said to provide the international community with a practical guide to numerous steps which can realistically be put forward for a programme of action towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

It is also worth noting here that in recognition of the evolutionary nature of the disarmament process, there were several new proposals submitted by different groups. The Western group of countries and Norway sought to substantively contribute to the Committee's work by submitting a number of working papers and by participating actively in the Committee and in the various contact groups to seek to harmonize positions on the programme as well as contributing to an improvement of the text.

We would here like to make a couple of points about the approach taken to the programme, and in particular the method used to resolve outstanding parts of the text. We are aware that the practice has been developing over the past years to use language from the Final Document of the first special session to resolve parts of the text which could not be otherwise agreed to. In many cases this method has served us well, and we would like this to be perfectly clear: the group of Western delegations and Norway consider the Final Document of SSOD-I to be a bench-mark for international efforts in arms control and disarmament, and confirm the continuing relevance of its overall objectives.

However, we should not necessarily accord the practice of using Final Document language an unassailable status when our primary objective should be to create a programme of action which should ideally supplement and, as appropriate, look beyond the Final Document of SSOD-I.

In the first instance, we should therefore not be afraid of drafting texts which creatively seek to harmonize positions on this very important task. Similarly, defending the language of the Final Document merely because it comes from that source and to the exclusion of other solutions seems to us to diminish the chances of arriving at a document of which we can be proud both from the point of view of quality and substance. Indeed, work on a number of items this year has demonstrated that a fresh approach has often brought us closer to an agreement.

Under the dedicated and tireless stewardship of Ambassador García Robles and the delegation of Mexico, work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament continued this year at a more intense pace. We believe that the results have been productive. In particular, we have come to the point where delegations' positions are far clearer than in previous years. While it may appear that more difficulties have been put in the way of concluding an agreed Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, it would seem to us that the clarity now obtained in fact facilitates an already very difficult and complex task.

If one looks at what the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is tasked to achieve, it is no small surprise that we have such a variety of views, some of which seem diametrically opposed. After all, what we are dealing with is an issue of critical importance for all members of the international

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Miss Letts, Australia)

community: their security and the search to find ways in which that security can be enhanced at the lowest possible level of armaments. The difficulties of giving expression to such a wide-ranging and complex task, in what must necessarily be a consensus document, must never be underestimated. The level of agreement that has already been achieved, as documented in the text now before us, should therefore be welcomed.

Our sincere thanks must also go to the co-ordinators who were given the responsibility to conduct work on various outstanding parts of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. This has brought some very promising results. The section on conventional disarmament in Europe, co-ordinated by Dr. Heinz Peters of the Federal Republic of Germany and Dr. Krutzsch and his delegation of the German Democratic Republic, is now completely free of brackets.

Significant progress was achieved in coming closer to a consensus text on the prevention of an arms race in outer space under the "Related measures" section, co-chaired by Mr. Renié of France and Mr. Lkhagvajav of Mongolia. Similarly, the segment on verification co-ordinated by "Friends of the Chair" Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia and Mr. Lundbo of Norway has brought us very close to achieving an agreed text on a very fundamental element in the process of arms control and disarmament.

Our thanks go to Mr. Sood of India for his efforts in finding a consensus text in the chapter covering negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms, "Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament" and "Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war". We are grateful to Mr. Rydberg of Sweden for successfully co-ordinating the finalization of a new text on "World public opinion in favour of disarmament", as well as working towards the resolution of a text on a nuclear test ban. Under Ambassador García Robles' chairmanship this year we have also succeeded in coming much closer to an agreed text on stages of implementation for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Finally, our very special thanks go to Ms. Aida Levin and the secretariat for their excellent work during the year, often under extremely difficult circumstances.

In conclusion, the group of Western countries and Norway believe that the current annex to the report of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament Committee, which will appear as an addendum to CD/732, while containing a number of parts which are yet to be agreed to, does represent a clearer picture of the remaining areas of difficulty and therefore provides a better basis for achieving an agreed, effective and balanced Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

We therefore look forward to the re-establishment of the Committee at the outset of the 1988 session, as recommended in our report, with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and reconfirm our commitment to work towards this end.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, I think this probably really is the last time I'll be addressing the Conference on Disarmament, so I wish to join my close friend and colleague, Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski, in expressing gratitude to you, Mr. President, and to our colleagues for the kind words said by you and our colleagues today and on other occasions on my impending departure from the Conference on Disarmament. I am instructed also by my wife Ruth to say a word of appreciation for the farewell hospitality accorded to us. May I join Ambassador Turbanski also in wishing each of you real success in our vital work, which will undoubtedly go on after our departure.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley, on behalf of the Conference. Are there any other requests to address the Conference?

As I announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I will now present to the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which is contained in document CD/784. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the Ad hoc Committee's report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): As provided for in the timetable for this week, the Conference will adopt its reports to the forty-first and forty-second sessions of the United Nations General Assembly at tomorrow's plenary meeting at 5 p.m. I am informed by the secretariat that the English text of the reports will be available in delegations' pigeon-holes from about 2 p.m. These will be the latest versions of the reports. The various language versions will also be avilable between 3 p.m. and 4.30 p.m. in the delegations' pigeon-holes, to enable the members to check the texts which will be submitted to the plenary.

The next meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held tomorrow, Friday 28 August, at 5 p.m.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.435

28 August 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 28 August 1987, at 5 p.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

GE.87-63312/0806G

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 435th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Today, in accordance with its programme of work the Conference will consider and adopt reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, the report on the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the forty-first session of the General Assembly and the annual report to the forty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

As I announced at yesterday's plenary meeting, I will now put before the Conference for adoption the reports of the ad hoc committees in the order in which they were introduced by their chairmen. I now propose that we proceed to adopt these reports. The first, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, is to be found in document CD/786. Are there any delegations which would like to take the floor before we adopt the report of the Ad hoc Committee? If there are no objections I will take it that the Conference has adopted this report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any delegations which wish to take the floor after the adoption of the report?

I give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. LUDEKING (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, as this year's session draws to a close, I would like to thank you for steering us so skilfully and energetically through this demanding and sometimes difficult phase of report-writing. You have contributed significantly to bring the proceedings of our Conference to a successful conclusion.

The Western Group is aware that not all expectations may have been fulfilled by the results we have achieved this year. However, we cannot but observe that significant progress has been made in a number of areas of our work.

Only yesterday, in introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus recalled how far the negotiations had gone since he was last Chairman three years ago. He pointed out that today we have a largely developed draft text with most of the elements in place. The conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons -- a matter of the highest priority for Western countries -- is no longer a distant goal but a real possibility.

It is also most auspicious that, as we end the session, the prospects for achieving an agreement in the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations which would lead to the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons seem excellent. In our view, this reinforces the validity of our approach to ending the nuclear arms race.

We consider that the way to make progress in disarmament is by a measured approach aimed at achieving substantial, balanced and effectively verifiable agreements which secure stability and peace world-wide with fewer and fewer weapons.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Ludeking, Fed. Rep. of Germany)

The Western Group considers that the Conference is ending the session in a better state than it started. However, there is no room for complacency. We can do even better next year. It is in our joint interest that the account we are to give of the work of the Conference to the third special session on disarmament due next summer is a creditable one.

As I have the floor and before concluding, please allow me to also bid farewell to those heads of delegation who are leaving the Conference at the end of this session. I would like to express the appreciation of my delegation for the contributions Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, Ambassador Beesley of Canada and Ambassador Turbanski of Poland have made to our common cause. We would also like to thank them for their friendship and co-operation, and wish them all the best for the future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now propose that we take up for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/782. Are there any delegations that would like to take the floor before we adopt the report of the Committee? I call on the representative of France.

Mr. de la BAUME (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, before we give our full agreement to the text of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which marks a new, very positive step in the elaboration of the convention to ban such weapons which we all hope for, I must on behalf of the French delegation react to a particular point raised during the presentation of the report by the President of the Committee on 27 August.

I note that in his comments on article IV, the Chairman of the Committee said that we were now in a situation where only one country "still has some reservations on openly declaring and accepting verification at all stockpile locations as soon as 30 days after the entry into force of the convention". This very explicit statement refers to the French position, which is thus singled out and summarized in an inadequate manner.

I must first of all note that at no other point in his presentation did the Chairman single out any other delegation, whereas on many items various countries also have quite specific positions. Therefore as far as our delegation is concerned there is an unfortunate difference in treatment. I do not feel that this sort of approach is likely to facilitate smooth negotiations.

I would now like to recall the facts. The French delegation declared that it was prepared to accept the declaration of the stockpile locations on the thirtieth day after the entry into force of the Convention. While taking such a step forward regarding the principle for all stocks, it proposed in working paper CD/757, which was submitted on 11 June last, that special consideration should be given to ways and means of declaring security stocks: whilst accepting the possibility of a public and complete declaration of such stocks, we pointed out that it might be preferable not to make such a declaration public for reasons of security, but to resort to the so-called sealed envelope procedure. In any event, and even if this procedure were to be adopted, the location of the stock would be communicated to the international authority and would be open to challenge inspection.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. de la Baume, France)

Whilst moving forward on the question of declarations of location, we wanted to underscore the importance of security questions. Indeed, I observe that the Chairman's presentation itself notes on the same page 3, in the last paragraph, that the much discussed issue of the order of destruction of stocks is related to fundamental security concerns. I would take the liberty of recalling that it is indeed our special position on location which has to be tied in directly with the debate under way on this subject, on the subject of which the Chairman of the Committee has himself invited all delegations to give careful attention to the relevant sections of the report and to look for mutual acceptable solutions.

Briefly put, our position on location, which has changed appreciably this year, is a specific aspect of the general debate on security. Both for reasons of form and for reasons of substance, it therefore seems to us that the remark on draft article IV which singles out my country is unfortunate and could have been avoided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Do any other delegations wish to take the floor before we adopt this report? If there is no objection, I will consider that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Would any delegations like to take the floor after the adoption of the report? Since this is not the case, we now have to adopt document CD/783 containing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Do any delegations wish to take the floor now?

If there are no objections, I will take it that the Conference adopts this report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Would any delegations like to take the floor after the adoption of the report?

We have thus concluded the consideration of the reports of the ad hoc committees to the Conference.

We will now pass to the consideration and adoption of the reports to the forty-first and forty-second sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The two draft reports are contained in documents CD/WP.287/Rev.1 and CD/WP.288/Rev.1. They were distributed to delegations' pigeon-holes today, and also this afternoon in this room. The official document containing the report to the forty-first session of the General Assembly will incorporate the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which we have just adopted. The secretariat will proceed in the same way with the annual report of the Conference to the forty-second session of the General Assembly, in which the reports of the other ad hoc committees will be incorporated. Naturally the secretariat will fill in the blank spaces which were left in the texts of the two draft reports. Minor corrections which delegations may wish to make in the texts including questions of concordance amongst the various language

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

versions, should be brought directly to the attention of the secretariat, which will take the necessary steps.

I now put before the Conference for adoption the draft report to the forty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations contained in document CD/WP.287/Rev.1.

Are there any delegations which wish to speak before we adopt the report? If there are no objections I will consider that Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Does any delegation wish to take the floor after the adoption of the report? We shall now proceed to adopt the draft annual report to the forty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as contained in document CD/WP.288/Rev.1. Are there any delegations which wish to take the floor before the adoption of the report? If there are no objections I will take it that the Conference adopts its annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any delegations which would like to take the floor after the adoption of the report? I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

Mr. BELAID (Algeria) (translated from French): As we prepare to bring to an end the work of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 is pleased to congratulate you on the competence and integrity with which you have carried out your tasks as President of the Conference. Thanks to your diplomatic skill and the co-operation of delegations, the Conference has managed to produce and adopt its report for the year 1987 as scheduled.

I do not wish to review all the work we have done. However, I would like to underscore the progress made towards the elaboration of a convention to ban chemical weapons. Yet it must be noted that similar progress has not been recorded elsewhere, in particular on matters to which the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Group of 21 attach special priority, in other words nuclear issues. We remain hopeful that future work on the various items will be more successful thanks to contributions from all delegations.

This being said, I would like to take this opportunity to say how sorry we are to see some distinguished representatives leaving the Conference. I am referring to Ambassadors Alfarargi of Egypt, Beesley of Canada, Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, Tonwe of Nigeria and Turbanski of Poland. Everybody is familiar with the professional and personal qualities of these eminent representatives, as well as their contribution to our work. We therefore regret that the Conference will no longer have the benefit of their presence amongst us, and we wish them every success in their new assignments.

Before concluding, Mr. President, please allow me through you to extend the thanks of the Group of 21 to Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Deputy Secretary-General Ambassador Berasategui and all the members of the secretariat. Finally, I should like to thank the interpreters and translators for their effective contributions

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(Mr. Belaid, France)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Algeria, and I thank him for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I call on the representative of China.

Mrs. WANG (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, as the current session of the CD is drawing to a close, I wish, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, to extend to you our appreciation and congratulations on the outstanding work you have done and the great skills you have displayed during the last and most difficult month of the current session. Like other delegations, we are satisfied that this session of the CD has been able to accomplish the task of report-drafting more smoothly than in previous years. This is attributable both to your diplomatic skills and to the relatively relaxed overall international climate in which the session has been proceeding.

Although the session has achieved some success in its substantive work, on chemical weapons in the main, the progress it was able to make was still a far cry from the high hopes we cherished at the initial stage of the session. In particular, little headway was made in the areas of nuclear weapons and outer space. The task before us is still a formidable one, and we need to make further efforts.

I wish to avail myself of the opportunity to address my thanks to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, staff members of the secretariat and the translators and interpreters for the tremendous and useful work they have done.

Finally, I would like to express my regret at the departure of Ambassador Beesley of Canada and Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, and to wish them new successes.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the the representative of China for her statement, and for her kind words addressed to the Chair. Are there any other delegations wishing to speak? As that does not seem to be the case, may I, in keeping with tradition, outline a few thoughts to conclude my month in the Chair?

We have come to the end of a very active session, rich in promising developments but also frustrating in certain respects. With certain individual shadings, I think we all share this rather positive stock-taking in adopting the report of the Conference.

I should, however, not like to embark on a comprehensive review of lessons to be drawn from the six months of the 1987 session. Three distinguished colleagues have done so eloquently and pertinently in their different ways in the course of this month of August when taking leave of the Conference. In these three contributions taken together, there is very substantial food for thought that can usefully provide inspiration for our thoughts on the future work of the Conference and once again I should like to thank Ambassador Alfarargi, Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Beesley for having thus worked for the future.

For my part, before tackling a few specific points of method regarding the month of August, I should just like to make a few general political

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

The first point is that there have been many, indeed very many, representatives of Governments coming to address the Conference. Looking at the list from the beginning of the year I can see the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, China, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, the Minister of State of the United Kingdom, India, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Iran, the USSR and Sweden. Lastly and above all the Conference had for the first time the honour of a visit from a Head of State, namely the President of the Argentine Republic, His Excellency Mr. Alfonsín. I think that these visits, more numerous than last year, reflect increased interest on the part of the international community in the work of the Conference.

Conversely, and this is my second comment, the Conference has undoubtedly derived benefit from the recent developments in the international situation, particularly in Soviet-United States relations. Experience shows that though this is not a sufficient condition to make multilateral disarmament progress, it is a necessary condition. The follow-up to the Reykjavik Summit, the stepping up of INF negotiations, the prospects for a new Summit have contributed to the smooth running of our work here in Geneva. This is an indisputable fact, but we should not see a mechanical relationship therein either.

A third comment, which is an extension of the two comments above: within the context of the Conference itself this year a number of movements have taken place which are of general political significance. I am not going to review them in greater detail, but, in a word, we have been able to confirm in Geneva this year an agreement among all States that verification is an essential component of any disarmament accord, and consequently that this question must be kept apart from inevitable political differences and become the subject of a very rigorous practical consideration.

As far as our work in the month of August is concerned, I do not think that at the time of adopting the report it is necessary to go over each agenda item. I should simply like to confine myself to three methodological considerations.

Firstly, the method for the preparation of the report has been satisfactory generally speaking. With a few exceptions, which have confirmed the rule, the deadlines have been met, the texts have been adopted smoothly. I should on this occasion like to thank the committee chairmen, the group co-ordinators, the general co-ordinators, the item co-ordinators and above all the delegations themselves, which, through an effort of collective discipline, have each made their contribution. This development is particularly interesting to note as, at the same time, we have begun -- without going very far, it is true -- consideration of the report of the Group of Seven on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. Have we then moved directly from theory to practice without taking a formal decision? It is not for me to draw that conclusion, but I think that in our collective work on the report of the Group of Seven, which must absolutely be continued, the positive experience of this month of August may be a useful point of reference. May I simply in this connection recall the wish that I expressed at the beginning of this month: let us try not to take a procedural approach to matters of procedure. And, with the experience of this month as a basis, I should like to add: above all, it is actions that count.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

Secondly, thinking of the wise recommendation of one of our colleagues, who asked us not to content ourselves with simple procedural results, I think we should indeed assess the report from a political standpoint. On many agenda items -- it has to be said -- this document does not enable us to record decisive movements vis-à-vis last year, and that is regrettable. But I think none the less that on these subjects, whether they have been dealt with in subsidiary bodies or not, the report this year provides a clear and precise exposition of the problems relating to each of these points, which should be useful for the debates in the General Assembly in the autumn, for the resumption of the work of the Conference next February, and, let us hope, in arriving then at genuine political compromises.

Thirdly, the month of August was not exclusively devoted to the adoption of the report. I recall that last month it was explicitly contemplated that for certain subsidiary bodies the continuation of substantive work should be possible. I note that this applied particularly to the Committee on Chemical Weapons, which, formally or informally, has continued substantive work during this month of August and has even been able on this occasion to record useful progress for the future.

If I now try to add a more general thought at the end of this month of August, the end of our session, it would be rather in the form of a question. What is the reason for the subtle but undoubted emergence of the Conference on Disarmament in an international situation where, on a broader scale, negotiations are livening up, where efforts are being made to move from a concept of arms control to the search for effective disarmament, even if this disarmament is thought of in terms of categories? It is of course too soon to speak of a historic turning-point. Much remains to be done, in particular in our forum. But we may note an overall movement of which our work is a part. And it may be interesting, I think, to consider the very flexible negotiating network which is beginning to emerge. Each of the links in this network has its own characteristics, and will retain them: the Geneva nuclear and space talks, Stockholm, Vienna, New York at this particular time with the disarmament/development conference, and ultimately the Conference on Disarmament itself. This does not correspond either to the ideal hierarchical arrangement that we might have desired, or to a rather simplistic sharing between the bilateral and multilateral aspects. But it is up to us to ensure that this simultaneous development of negotiations takes shape and is organized. This, in many ways, will be the very crux of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My end-of-session remarks would not be complete if I did not now pay tribute to the all too discreet, but indeed extraordinary contribution made by the secretariat to our work -- by the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and their entire staff, including the translators and the interpreters, whose irreplaceable contribution can be appreciated particularly keenly in the month of August. The President of the Conference, along with the chairmen of the committees, is especially well placed to see all that they do for us quietly -- and may I extend the metaphor to say: we are the spoken work, they are the written word, we are the moment, they are permanence. On behalf of us all, for the month of August and for the entire session, I express to them our deepest gratitude.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

(The President)

I have no other points to raise during this final meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Before adjourning this plenary meeting I should like to remind you that the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday 2 February 1988, at 10 a.m. As agreed by the Conference in adopting the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/782, paragraph 13 (c), the Ad hoc Committee will hold a session of limited duration from 12 to 29 January 1988. I should also like to recall that open-ended consulations of the Ad hoc Committee will be held between 30 November and 16 December 1987, and that private consultations will be undertaken by the Chairman in Geneva, in preparation for the resumption of the Committee's work, during the period 23-27 November 1987 with delegations present. The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.435/Corr.1
12 October 1987

ENGLISH only

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

**Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 28 August 1987, at 5 p.m.**

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

Corrigendum

Page 6, top right hand corner delete **(Mr. Belaid, France)**

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9